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Contents:
Why Doesn’t the Navy Sing?
No Bastions for the Bear
Sea Power: Opportunities
A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet
A Quiet Revolution
War, Morality, and the Military Professional
Aircraft Maintenance and the Paper Chase
Don’t Cry Sea Wolf Yet
The Chinese Marine Corps
And the Winners Are. . .the FFG-7s
The FFG-7s in War and Peace
Holloway’s Hooligans
That Dangerous Polyester Look
Shipboard Training
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Why Doesn’t the Navy Sing?”
(See E. M. Leonard, p. 32, May 1984
Proceedings)
Commander S. A. Mohsberg III, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy—Major Leonard laments sailors’ inability to sing their service song. The prob'em is that the Navy doesn’t have a service song.
The original music and lyrics to “Anchor’s Aweigh” were written early in this century for use at the U. S. Naval Academy. To this day, the Brigade of Midshipmen proudly sings at the annual Army-Navy football game, “Roll up the score, Navy, Anchor’s Aweigh, Sail Navy down the field and sink the Army, sink the Army Grey.” These are fine words for the occasion but have little meaning for boatswain’s mates or Sea- bees in the construction force.
As an elementary school student, I was taught to sing, “Anchor’s Aweigh my boys, Anchor’s Aweigh, Farewell to college joys, We sail at break of day, day, day!” Not very many people leave a college campus to enlist in the Navy.
My recommendation is that the Navy keep the music—it’s well known, loved, and unbeatable—but conduct a Navywide contest to write lyrics to which all Navy men and women from seaman to admiral could relate.
Armed with lyrics as well as music to which they could relate, the sailors with whom I’ve served could out-sing the members of the other services anytime.
forces to protect those SSBNs again51 U. S. naval forces hell-bent on destroying those same SSBNs is a doubtful scenario- If the Soviets were contemplating such a strategy, however improbable, the U. reaction should only be delighted accep1' ance. It is a perfect strategy for their de feat. A Soviet Navy not venturing out o the northern fogs and the ice of the Bar ents Sea or the Sea of Okhotsk is n° threat to the ability of the U. S. Navy t0 control the world’s seas. The Soviet5 would be doing for us exactly what we would wish to do to them, and at no tron ble to ourselves.
It is not clear what kind of war the a^ thor contemplates. Yet, plainly, it lS mighty one, involving exchanges of clear weapons upon both landmasses-'" least upon the Soviets’, for there is re|® s ence to intercontinental ballistic misst (ICBMs) having taken out certain Sov^., targets. It is, at the least, a nuclear war attrition. The author recognizes correc that the Soviet Union does seem to rega even nuclear weapons as first and to most just weapons, and that even a clear war is something to be fought a
won. But that does not mean that
United States has bought that viewp01 Every U. S. president and Western g has made it clear that our belief is tha
nuclear war would be an unmitigate1
;d dis
aster for all of mankind, and that we
are
of*e
not preparing to fight one. It is part <
U. S. deterrent strategy not to accep1 ^ Soviets’ apparent premise that a nuC^ war is both fightable and winnable- ,
“No Bastions for the Bear”
(See D. B. Rivkin, pp. 36-43, April 1984; F. J.
Glaeser, W. J. Ruhe, pp. 14-17, June 1984
Proceedings)
Captain Robert H. Smith, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The 1984 General Prize
Essay Contest winner was a surprise and a disappointment; the essay is severely flawed in both premise and conclusion.
The idea that the Soviet Union plans to keep its nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in its backyard and at the same time employ the bulk—or even the totality—of its naval
ba<*e, nudj
strength, is to persuade the Soviets^ ^
essence of U. S. deterrent policy, -- ^ by both reason and massive tiuc‘ ,
their thinking is wrong, and that they only lose in a nuclear war. ^
Yet the author presupposes a nU^ at war that has been in progress for wee least—and that it is a matter of sutP ^ ing importance to send surface D ^ groups barging into the Barents Sea °r j. Sea of Okhotsk against awesome opP a tion in order to ferret out and dest j certain number of SSBNs. Yet, aS
battle groups approach Soviet wate1^
which the Soviets would be aware
OK
the Soviets would most likely fire their load of nuclear missiles before they felt themselves perilously threatened.
Again hypothesizing a major, protracted nuclear war in progress, is the author assuming that those SSBNs sitting >n the “bastion” in the Barents Sea are going to keep firing their loads and return repeatedly to reload at their various bases? Fanciful as that may seem, if we believe it, our priority then would most likely be to strike at their bases and de- stfoy their indispensable shore-based loading facilities.
The author at one point also suggests Ihe possibility that it is not a nuclear war. “Ut that does not deter him from hypothesizing the sending of the battle groups to ihe Barents Sea to go after those SSBNs. *et> if we buy the premise that the Soviets are putting much more of their nuclear Power into their SSBNs, then will they n°t feel even more threatened at the prosit of the U. S. Navy coming up there to destroy a fair part of their strategic deter- reut power? If they believe that threat is Credible, then they will let fly, and all at °nce the war that was merely conven- honal will escalate into an all-out thermo- riUclear exchange. What is any different, c°nceptually, if the United States were going after the Soviets’ SSBNs or their arid-based ICBMs? In both cases, it is c°unterforce, and we would have to be Prepared for a terrible reaction.
All this is beside the point because if “ere is a nuclear war, events raging elsewhere around the world, particularly in 7 United States, Western Europe, and ue Soviet Union, would render irrelevant any battles to root out SSBNs in the near 'Vaters of the Soviet Union.
But let’s move on to other items. The author takes it for granted that sufficient Prces can do the job of defeating all the , e‘ending Soviet naval forces and land- jased air, and thence destroy the SSBNs. don’t believe it for a minute, and I don’t J?heve any other knowledgeable naval server believes it either.
One aspect the author didn’t mention at j. was mines. Would not the Soviets— °remost in all the world in that field—
Usp •
„ c mines in great numbers, and skill- ^ By, to protect their forces in the astions? It seems they would. The ap- roaches to the Sea of Okhotsk are partic- ^ly well suited to mining. Will we then q Sending minesweepers from the West °ast to sweep their great fields? Then Jp11 minesweepers? Will our allies’ a nesweepers be sent into the Barents? t^nd who and what are going to protect ^ose small and indefensible craft while %y go about their tedious and protracted eePing effort?
Also, why should the theoretical Soviet SSBNs remain in the Barents Sea? Why will they not retreat further, into the White Sea, or even the Kara? Will the battle group pursue them into the rivers and the canal network of the Soviet Union itself?
The author makes the mistake of many who study Soviet writings in finding more meaning than is necessarily there. For it is going to be Soviet capabilities and the realities of technology and geography that will determine Soviet strategy, and not the dubious public writings of Soviet naval officers.
Moreover, the author attaches undue weight to undeserving writings. For instance, he notes that some Soviet writers have concluded that the reason the German U-boat campaign failed in World War II was that Germany did not protect its U-boats. If the Germans had kept their U-boats in the Baltic, the Kiel Canal, or in the U-boat pens on the French Coast, they would have been safe, but useless.
If most Soviet writers do seriously maintain that the German U-boat campaign did not succeed because Germany failed to protect its submarines then the United States is in luck. Such a misreading of history could only be evidence of a deficiency of Soviet strategic understanding so acute as for the U. S. Navy to rejoice. However, one suspects that the Soviets know better. The author should have counterbalanced the Soviets’ incorrect view with balancing evidence of his own understanding of why the German U-boat campaign failed. It failed because of the sheer magnitude of the Allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort and the many thousands of ships and planes that were thrown into the ASW campaign.
Tactically, the defeat of the U-boat was preordained simply by the denial of the U-boats’ surface mobility, which took
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away their ability to search for, and to close, their targets at the speed and endurance that could only be conferred by having some freedom on the sea’s surface. The denial of that mobility took place just as soon as there were sufficient Allied aircraft and escorts available. As soon as a certain number of the latter could be spared from immediate close-in convoy protection, they were positioned to roam astern and on the distant flanks of the convoys in order to intercept the surface-closing submarines. The British understood this early in the war but lacked the escorts to put these tactics into effect. These tactics were first proven in the epic convoy battles that raged in the late winter and early spring of 1943. The convoys suffered heavy losses, but the losses of U-boats were prohibitive. It was then the British knew that they were going to win the Battle of the Atlantic and
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that Admiral Karl Doenitz, the German Commander in Chief, knew that he was going to lose.
The author should have asked how the Germans could have protected their U- boats. Only by attacking and destroying the Allied aircraft and the surface escorts that were killing their submarines. And they could only have done that by being able to deploy forces on the high seas and in mid-ocean with strength and capabilities competitive with the U. S. and British forces. But they had no hope of possessing such forces. If the Germans had had such forces they wouldn’t have needed their U-boats. Abundant German surface and air forces roaming at will in the Atlantic could have stopped the convoys going to Britain.
It is regrettable to spend so much time digging into what might seem to be minutiae, but it is important to do so. It is only by this tedious dismantling of the author’s arguments that their underlying shallowness can be exposed. To be fair to the author, he has much in common with many of those who concoct narrow scenarios and arguments of advocacy.
The author speaks of the “force array”—every Soviet system and platform-providing for the bastion defense of the SSBNs “. . . a multilayered and synergistic defense. ...” Unfortunately, all too often the presence of multiple forces and their attendant noise and confusion lead to a self-defeating negative synergism, where the sum of the parts of the forces adds up to less than the whole.
Another statement of the author’s, “. . . significant Soviet breakthroughs in ASW could be made at any time,” is a cliche. Talk of “breakthroughs” in ASW ignores the 40 years of vigorous research in non-acoustic modes of submarine detection that have gotten nowhere. The author may have made the familiar error of mistaking Soviet writings on the areas of their research for concrete evidence of attainment of significant capability. He is not alone in this error. But the gap between study and operational capability is as huge for the Soviets as it is for the United States.
The author states that, “. . . although U. S. Los Angeles-class attack submarines may conceivably operate by themselves in Soviet home waters today, their future ability to penetrate the sanctuaries unassisted is uncertain.” All things are uncertain. But it will be far better for the Los Angeles class, or other advanced submarines, to attempt to penetrate Soviet waters, quietly and covertly, than 11 would be in conjunction with thunderous battle groups. Submarines fill this role best.
In summation, the author tried to cover much more ground than he was capab* of doing. Perhaps no one could. In any event, he should not have tried. As * was, he bit off far more than he was able to chew.
“Sea Power: Opportunities”
(,See J. L. Byron, pp. 69-12, February 19tP Proceedings)
Captain K. G. Schacht, U. S. Navy ^ tired)—The Byron article addresses ^ wide range of topics: readiness r° numbers, size and design, readme > strategy, and technology. Each is mt esting and challenging. However, the ^ tide outlines the problems but not solutions or procedures to obtain the Hopefully, they will stir up mtereg among those with sufficient influet* ’ brains, and generosity to devote an out effort to come up with solutions- Commander Byron states, “Teen ogy has dealt a cruel blow. . poon, Tomahawk, Mk-46 torpe' ASROC, SUBROC, Standard, phal^,ts Sea Sparrow, Phoenix—nobody s“ y enough of these weapons to know » ^ are any good with them.” This is an cellent statement that needs introspeC and intensive study. ^
Many experienced people believe _ complexity and related expense overtaken capability. It all comes a^ to overly complex specifications P f ised by the designer and manufac^r and accepted by the trusting cust°0ftefl The former’s expectations are more t achieved. The results are a weap°n ^ meets test requirements only when ^ fully prepared by experts (not the Or a enlisted technician on board the sh1",’jI) torpedo that is too expensive to be » ^ deep water where recovery is unce ^ an expensive missile that has to o g
nn t Ql* CT ^ ^ A
unreal-
rati°n
even
Finally, he recommends the integi of land-based air and naval forces, going so far as to suggest that the naV . of the Med work with B-52s. I like ideas. But some comments are in or u First, regarding intra-allied training bilateral, trilateral, multinational oper tions and exercises—there have be many Sixth Fleet commanders, supPoft j by both the U. S. and NATO comm^ structure, who have strongly endof such efforts, and the records canno1
been
activi
taken. I would imagine that recent
the
• haV^
U. S. forces’ special attention, ^ caused some reduction in combined op ations, since the U. S. forces gene^cb serve as the focal point around w ^ such maneuvers are conducted. 8utat objective is sound, and there has bee least one Sixth Fleet commander in me,
history who tried hard to reduce the 1 -s
Fleet’s profile, concentrating °n , f)
MATO rnlp onrl titln nf
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“A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet”
(See A. Maiorano, pp. 52-58, February 1984
Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)—First, let’s address Lieutenant Maiorano’s concern that the Soviet naval threat is in the North Atlantic and not in the Mediterranean. Good point, but isn’t the U. S. Second Fleet or the NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic assigned the mission of countering that threat? In reality, that U.S./NATO force exists only on paper much of the time, but, when the chips are down, it becomes a formidable unit, composed of some impressive numbers and quality, whether it be U. S. only, or NATO. Undoubtedly, it is not enough to guarantee success, but it certainly cannot be written off as a unit that ignores the North Atlantic problem. But I do partly agree with Lieutenant Maiorano. A good case can be made that the Second Fleet’s or Striking Fleet Atlantic’s area of operations is of more significance than the U. S. Sixth Fleet’s. However, the most probable requirements for naval forces at the moment— and for the last several years—are in the Mediterranean, more specifically, the Eastern Med. 1 have made some recommendations in my lifetime about moving out of the Med, but I can’t entertain that idea given the current political alignments of nations.
Second, let’s take on Lieutenant Maiorano’s concept that the new additions to our nuclear forces “virtually eliminate the carriers’ nuclear strike mission” and that “to present the Soviets with a nuclear force, albeit a secondary one, is no longer the burden of the Sixth Fleet.” There is probably little argument that the carriers’ role in nuclear matters has decreased in significance since the carriers’ incorporation in the first Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) in 1960, although the actual capability in that role has increased tremendously. However, if there is one thing the Soviets have wanted on the bargaining table for many years, it is those aircraft carriers and that nuclear mission. I still get invited to informal sessions with the Soviets just because I know something about carriers and their nuclear role. That carrier nuclear capability is a fear they have not abandoned. Consider the dollars they have spent in the past 25 years to combat that threat. That may still be one of the strongest deterrent capabilities of our nuclear forces. I can’t vote for giving up that capability in the Sixth Fleet, or any other fleet for that matter.
Next, I would like to discuss Lieutenant Maiorano’s point about other worldwide commitments putting demands on scarce naval resources, making it advisable to cut down on the size of our Med1' terranean force. There is little question that the requirements and commitments have us stretched thin, and that shifting the burden to others would be most useful. And he is correct in stating that the withdrawal of some U.S. units from the Med would “spark European cries 0 decoupling.” Those of us who have trie that tactic before have never gotten be yond the first echelon of U. S. or NAT authority. But the point is valid. We nee more of the kind of forces being used in the Med for the missions of today and the most probable missions of tomorrow.
In addressing a solution to the problem he has posed, Lieutenant Maiorano hangs his hat on operational integration: an
operationally integrated maritime stra egy for NATO’s southern flank ’ ‘ e then suggests more intra-allied training"' multinational operations and exercises- He wants to incorporate fast-attack mi sile boats into his operational integrating’ he seems to deplore the phaseout of H- ’ forward-deployed missile boats. He 0 sires more offensive mining plans, op#a tions, and exercises, involving NA forces, not just those of the United States- too dismal in the actions that have ties in the Eastern Med, requiring
NATO role and title of Comm: Striking and Support Forces StrikeForceSouth), and exorting his ^ to always think of “combined opc q tions”—operationally integrated N ij forces, including anybody who vv ^ join up, even on an informal basis- even offered the Soviet Meditefl-3^.^ commander a role in one NATO exe being conducted in the Greek/311. ,i Thrace. The invitation was respee
declined because of previous plans.
I am sure that many former Sixth Fleet commanders can relate specific incidents where intra-allied training was outstanding; where the Italians controlled the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces superbly; where the Turks and the Italian San Marco Battalion looked like one unit; where the French showed their knowledge of NATO procedures at sea better than any of the formal members of the NATO community; where the Spanish Marines displayed a knowledge of the
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U. S. equipment they own, sending our own troops back to basics; where the Turkish naval infantry showed a degree of discipline that made anyone proud to be in the same arena with them; and where the British continued to demonstrate why they are the teachers of us all in naval matters at sea. Those “combined operations” have been a tradition of the past, depending partly I’m sure on the personalities of the commanders involved and the real-world demands for combatant forces.
Relative to the phasing out of U. S. forward-deployed missile boats, I am happy that decision has been made. But that does not mean that the idea of missile boats in the Med is not a good one. On the contrary, the record will probably show many plans for the allied use of such boats. Let the United States bring the carriers, attack submarines, and more sophisticated systems. Let the allies do the things they can do best in that arena— and small missile boats are in the repertoire of several. The training and integrated operations that Lieutenant Maiorano suggests are a must, of course,
in making a realistic capability out of the potential.
As for mining operations, I am not sure how plans have changed in recent years- but I believe Lieutenant Maiorano woul be somewhat encouraged by more know*' edge of the actual mining plans that exist- Training for minelaying operations lS always a problem—a neglected area *n peacetime (just like logistics). But the point is well taken and has been discusse in many a Sixth Fleet/Strike Force Sout staff meeting. ,
On the subject of integrating lan based air and naval forces, I say am** • Prior lack of enthusiasm for bringing j*1 two together started with a real limitat*0 in the capabilities of each and the natu of the threat. World War II was a sea ha tie for the Navy and a land battle for* Army Air Forces, and opportunities not often present themselves for *n^
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grated operations, although there many exceptions, of course. But capa1 ities now permit such integration, * practice is required. There seem t0 excellent attitudes on the parts of both U. S. Navy’s and Air Force’s seI7'r6 chiefs to further such activities, and tn has always been outstanding recept,v(o on the part of NATO commanders bring the two together, particularly use of U. S. naval air in the “°ver |nt0 beach” role—including penetrations i Central Europe. a.
In pushing for his strategy of °P tional integration, Lieutenant Mai°r seems to think that some forum lS^[S quired for implementation and sugg ^ as one possibility a liaison between U. S. interservice “Interdiction E*e. tive Board” and the NATO “De e js Planning Committee.” Maybe d*3 f required for introducing commonalO^ weapons and such. However, it has my experience that in integrating jt and NATO (or other) forces, whet be on the Northern Flank, Central br |
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or the Southern Flank, the key indi
involved is the U. S. commander1 ^
naval forces to be integrated. He caoft the initiator, and, if given some supF ^ by his superiors in the U. S. c ,jvjty command, he will find great recep .fl, among the other nations and forC volved. There is no need for a 1 a forum. We are talking about °Pera>jl- integration—professional soldiers. ^ ors, airmen, and marines, doing a(1y things—which should not require jf catalytic thrust from the civil authon anything, the politicians and d*P have sometimes been obstacles to integration of forces.
There used to be a philosophy Sixth Fleet staff that I imagine still
the
1984;
W 'of <he
It went something like this. If you are going to have to fight and do so only with U. S. forces, get everybody on the U. S. team that you can. Go “joint”—and then try to get yourself appointed as the officer-in-charge. However, the best approach is to get the NATO forces with you—and anybody else who can make a reasonable contribution. Go “combined”—and then try to get yourself appointed as the officer-in-charge.
“Joint” and “combined” are the operative words in Lieutenant Maiorano’s recommendations. If they are implemented, there is a good possibility that some of the work load for the Sixth Fleet can be reduced, and some of its forces can be used in other locations.
One interesting exercise that has been attempted for several years by some commanders is the concept of “flexible deployments. ’ ’ The idea is to get away from the fixed numbers of units that must be in the Med at all times. Some of us wanted to vary the strength levels, shifting units to the Indian Ocean or the North Atlantic in varying numbers, reducing the numbers of units in the Med drastically at times, and then coming in later with massive forces. We wanted to create some guesswork for the Soviets, or whomever. At the same time, we believed that we could add to the real capabilities in the
NATO structure in all areas.
Four carriers off Bodo, Norway, occasionally would do a lot to improve confidence in the Northern Flank and, at the same time, give the Soviets pause to reflect. A similar force in the Eastern Med, at another time, would create the same impressions. But such actions would require a reduction of forces to relatively low limits in some areas for some periods. That is the problem. Most operational commanders would probably support the idea. The political repercussions, however, keep such sensible operational concepts from being implemented.
One new factor in considering concepts for employment of the Sixth Fleet has to do with the recent agreement for more cooperation between Israel and the United States. How far are we prepared to go with that in regard to the Sixth Fleet? Some interesting ideas have already been discussed informally. One has to do with the formation of some kind of alliance in the area, similar to NATO. Maybe it would have to start small, with Turkey, Israel, and the United States involved, possibly expanding to include Egypt, and, later, other Arab nations. The requirement for coalitions of that nature, however, is that the countries involved agree on the common threat, and that seems to be an obstacle at the moment. Some countries think the Soviets are the only threat, and others concentrate solely on the Arab/Israeli problem. But a coalition of nations in that area could do much to affect the actions of the Six® Fleet.
The idea of increasing the Israeli nava capability has also been discussed. For example, give them the necessary air at® surface units to take over responsibility for ASW in the Eastern Med. The Israelis could use shore-based air power in®' grated with ships to do an effective job. J the United States ready to go that far ® spreading out the load in the Mediterra nean? That is a question that no mili®^ man will be allowed to answer alone-" '"‘and for good reason.
My applause to Lieutenant Maiorai® for his thoughts on the issue. Such broa concepts for the employment of our ® sources should be valuable contributions to the development of strategies—eve” (some might say especially) when ®ey come from lieutenants.
‘A Quiet Revolution”
(See R. E. Chatham, pp. 41-46, January R. L. Gallagher, pp. 100-104, April 19^
Proceedings)
The U. S. Naval Institute is proud to announce its first annual Arleigh Burke Essay Contest, which replaces the former annual General Prize Essay Contest. Three essays will be selected for prizes. Anyone is eligible to enter and win. First prize earns $2,000, a Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute. First Honorable Mention wins $1,000 and a Silver Medal. Second Honorable Mention wins $750 and a Bronze Medal.
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Dr. Raymond S. Widmayer, Mine fare Technical Advisor, Office
I
Chief of Naval Operations—Commander Chatham’s article is a courageous statement of a fundamental trend toward a degradation of the effectiveness of the submarine in the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission.
In addition to discussing the problems of using our submarines to counter enemy submarine activity in the face of ever- decreasing acoustic-radiated signals, Commander Chatham unknowingly makes a strong case for the use of another ASW weapon—the modem ASW sea niine.
Although mines are not immune to the effects of reductions in submarine-radiated acoustic levels, their fundamental utode of operation is not altered as the author asserts is the case with submarine ASW operations. Mines continue to passively detect and track potential targets ®Ven in a reduced signature situation. However, the range at which a target is detected is reduced. Therefore, a larger uumber of mines is required, but there is n° impact upon the mine’s operational Process.
Modern deep-water ASW mines, such as Captor, were designed to provide °Pen-ocean ASW barriers and to economically complement other ASW asSets, such as P-3s, surface ships, and submarines. Other tactical uses of ASW mines are evolving as our understanding m potential warfare scenarios increases. Mines offer the potential of countering unerny submarine targets without jeoparding lives or expensive platforms, exCePt while being laid. For example, a c°mplete barrier of Captor mines across major open-ocean areas would cost less dan one modem nuclear-powered attack Subrnarine and would require no manning other than P-3 ASW coverage, which Mmid be active in such areas anyway, 'milar scenarios can easily be envi- Sl°ned in other key ASW regions where mines provide effective ASW coverage Mthout jeopardizing crews and platform assets.
ASW should be a team effort. It is un- lkely that the ASW mission for subma- dnes will be, or should be, dropped.
owever, Commander Chatham makes S'),T|e extremely provocative points that S °uld not fall on deaf ears.
The modem ASW sea mine offers a ast ASW potential. When used as a j^nd-alone weapon system or as a com- P°nent of a complementary ASW weap- ns arsenal, mines will enhance ASW fectiveness, will serve as force multi- Plers, and will reduce the ASW burden Signed to manned platforms.
(Continued on page 100)
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 41)
“War, Morality, and the Military Professional”
(See P. R. Schratz, pp. 46-51, September 1983; A. Jones, p. 150, November 1983; L. S.
Mackay, p. 89, January 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Paul R. Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I like to see ensigns write in to the Proceedings, but ....
Ensign Mackay does me the double injustice of a misquote to support an erroneous conclusion. I stated that “ . . . every effort must be made today to alter the current doctrine, gradually increasing the moralization of the use of force .... The question is less the morality of a given policy . . . than the direction in which the structure of policy is moving.” This is quite different from the statement he attributed to me; . . the important moral consideration ... is not the morality of each policy. ...”
In no way should my statement be interpreted as desiring “to free ourselves from moral restraint”—quite the contrary. Nor do 1 claim that “every aspect of our doctrine is not required to conform to the highest moral obligations,” and any conclusions drawn from these assumptions are erroneous.
“Aircraft Maintenance and the Paper Chase”
(See J. C. Roach, A. H. Genovese, pp. 116119, December 1983; H. Walker, L. Gerken, p. 16, February 1984; J. M. Evans, pp. 76-77, March 1984; H. Finley, pp. 92-96, April 1984 Proceedings)
Captain William C. Oehrle, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), President, WECO Associates, Management Consultants— Congratulations to the authors. Having enlisted as an airman recruit in 1950, I also recall with nostalgia the relative ease with which we kept some old (even then) TBM “Turkeys” ready to be used for mission assignments.
There is no question that the 3M system is a mess and should be called M-3 (Misinformation, Missing Data, Misapplied). I found that out the hard way when I was responsible for support of the Reserve P-3 Fleet when I served as commanding officer of the Naval Air Systems Command Weapon Support Unit. The authors are right in stating, “The failure is not so much technological as it is the misapplication of technology.” I don’t believe any person involved in the difficult process of providing adequate integrated logistics support (ILS) programs to the fleet thinks we should do away with automated data processing or the maintenance index system. The question is how best to design, implement, operate, and use these tools.
I also agree with the authors that another study of the problem will fail for the same reasons, plus more. The correct way to introduce technology and, specifically, electronic aids to improve the ILS process is from the ground up. What technology or device can be put in the hands of the mechanic or technician that will not only help him do the job better but also off-load the onerous paper work? There are many programs and projects going on in both government and industrial laboratories applying such technologies as mini- and microcomputers, small recording devices, standardized data communications systems to “net” a series of devices, talking multimeters, robotics, hand-held education, or training devices to aid in the performance of the operator.
The problem is that most, if not all of these efforts are proceeding independently with no thought to the impact that one solution might have on the total ILS process.
A coordinated technology assessment office should be established in the Material and Systems Commands dedicated to redesigning the entire system from the ground up. A single point of contact at Naval Material Command (NavMat) should be established to define goals and coordinate, approve, or disapprove projects and/or programs affecting the ILS process. This would allow the Systems Commands and their supporting government and industrial laboratories an opportunity to “have their day in court” on the worthiness of ideas, concepts, procedures, technology, devices, equipment, and systems as to the impact they might have on the total ILS process. Field test activities of the Systems Commands should be charged with and funded to test and verify the worthiness of each program and project. A specific individual or code should be assigned in the research, development, training, and education activities of each System Command to not only represent the command interface with NavMat but to be responsible for activities, projects, or programs within the command that might impact the ILS process.
Weapon System Program managers already have the direction and guidelines affecting reliability and maintainability- There is little that can be done other than Avionics Electronic Reliability Maintenance and Improvement Program/Opera- tion and Safety Improvement Program action to improve fielded weapon systems. What needs to be done is exactly what the authors conclude: “Take delib" erate, resolute action to alter our course.”
“Don’t Cry Sea Wolf Yet”
(See J. C. Salvinien, pp. 20-23, March 1984
Proceedings)
William E. Dwyer, Jr.—Since when has the Proceedings been a shill for weapon5 makers, particularly foreign ones? Jeafl' Claude Salvinien’s comment sounds like what it is—the response of a salesman10 a threat to selling.
Singing the Exocet’s praises while iS' noring its deficiencies is hardly laudable- Compared with weapons such as the Hat' poon or Otomat, the whole range ol Exocet models is found wanting from the points of view of payload and range. Sal' vinien speaks of multimissile wa^5 overwhelming the Sea Wolf. Yet the combination of the MM-38’s ludicron5 box launcher, which takes up a dispt0' portionate amount of space, and its ,n' ability to be reloaded at sea ensures th3* large-scale attacks will remain figrnent" of an MM-38 user’s imagination.
The comment about HMS Brillid” standing by while the Atlantic Convey°r was hit cannot be allowed to stand u" challenged. Let me remind the author tha the Brilliant was several miles awa!’ with HMS Hermes and Invincible, a1 time of the attack—well outside of m Sea Wolf’s range.
As long as myopic high commas continue to supply warships with inabe quate numbers of surface-to-surface m'5 siles, Sea Wolf and systems like it will able to handle only piecemeal attach
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“The FFG-7s in War and Peace
(See D. T. Stokowski, pp. 112-115, April 1984, P. X. Rinn, pp. 12-17, May 1984 Proceedings)
Chief Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Operator Charles Johnson, U. S. Navy'f Concerning Lieutenant Stokowski’s art' cle, the dilemma of whether to station 3
al
to
the
“The Chinese Marine Corps”
(See B. Hahn. pp. 121-127, March 1984 Proceedings)
Commander James A. Marcely, U. S. Navy—Commander Hahn’s article is full of good information on an important factor in Asian naval affairs about which virtually nothing has been written in Western military periodicals or books.
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However, I noticed an inconsistency rooted in Chinese propaganda.
Quoting from an authoritative Chinese source, Commander Hahn lists the missions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Marines as follows:
► “Lead landing operations, attack islands, and capture and hold advance naval bases”
► “Carry out land warfare related to naval warfare missions”
► “Research and develop landing operations and techniques, examining tactics and weapons to attack islands and coasts in future naval warfare”
1 noticed that defense of China’s coasts against amphibious attack is not a mission for the Chinese Marine Corps. The Chinese Marines are an offensive weapon for seizing territory, and Commander Hahn convincingly shows that they are trained and equipped primarily for that mission.
Yet, throughout the article, Commander Hahn parrots the Beijing line that the expansion of the Chinese Marine force has been in response to external threats to China. For example. Commander Hahn writes:
“At about this time [1953], retraining facilities were established in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces to upgrade and reorganize the force should it become necessary to resist other United Nations’ actions in the region and to further assist the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
To what United Nations’ actions is Commander Hahn referring—an invasion of Mainland China? Defense of the territory of China against invasion is a mission for the regular units of the People’s Liberation Army, not the Chinese Marines.
Commander Hahn also writes about the “1958 crisis between Taiwan and China.” As I recall, this crisis consisted of heavy shelling by the Chinese of the Taiwanese-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and some indications that the Chinese were preparing an amphibious assault on the islands. The crisis did not “stimulate” the strengthening of Chinese amphibious capability. The truth is that the Chinese increased their amphibious warfare capability before the crisis, and the pre-invasion bombardment created the crisis. Only resistance by the Taiwanese, forceful posturing by the U. S. Navy, and strong diplomatic words from Washington prevented the Chinese from going ahead with an amphibious assault. Also, in reference to the Soviet amphibious threat to China, one does not build up one’s own amphibious forces in response to an amphibious threat.
The Chinese Marines’ true mission is veiled, but not completely obscured, m Commander Hahn’s otherwise excellent article. Commander Hahn notes the “greatest concentration of strength in the two military districts of Fuzhou and Nanjing.” Given the threats to China, one would expect the bulk of its marines to be in one of its northern districts to defend against the Soviets, or near the Vietnamese border. Fuzhou is directly opposite Taiwan, and Nanjing is in the central base area of China’s East Sea fleet. That fleet’s area of control looks out toward Taiwain—not toward the Soviet Union or Vietnam.
Commander Hahn totals up the Chinese amphibious assault lift capability as 8,500 combat troops with appropriate equipment and supplies, and an administrative follow-on lift of seven mechanized divisions. These are all one trip per ship totals. This is far in excess of require' ments to seize Chinese-claimed islands in the Spratleys or any offshore island except for Taiwan.
The raison d’etre of the Chinese Narines is the invasion of Taiwan. Its other missions and uses are subsidiary to that purpose. While Beijing prefers not t° bruit that about in the Western World' Commander Hahn should have said d-
“And the Winners Are ... the FFG-7s”
(See pp. 110-150, April 1984; P. X. Rinn. PP- 12-17, May 1984 Proceedings)
FFG-7 equipped with SQR-19 tactic towed array sonar (TACTAS) two three convergence zones (CZs) from ^ escorted formation to achieve opti’11 acoustical advantage, or to retain the frl?_ ate in formation to provide electr°n. support measures (ESM) and antia umbrella protection, may not be releva in at least one scenario—escorting^ west-to-east convoy during war on European Central Front. An Oliver of ard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate. s tioned two to three CZs to the north1-'3 of position and intended moverne would provide early detection and Pr° tion down both the submarine and 1° r
range aviation (LRA) threat axis—the subniarine from the direction of the G-I- UK Gap, and LRA from the Soviet Union. This presumes that the Soviets, 8>ven wartime Central Front priorities, do n°t decide to relegate anticarrier warfare ln the Mediterranean to LRA and out- chop some or all of their guided missile submarines to provide a second threat axis relative to our reenforcing convoys. The same stationing considerations might aPply to an FFG-7 escorting a battle ?roup conducting a strike on any threat ax's, if the battle group would limit itself J° a slow enough speed of approach to the aunch point to enable the FFG-7 to keep any kind of station.
. As for the related articles in the same Jjsue, the bottom line seems to be that the t'FG-7 is a flne low-mix ship. An advance of numbers may or may not override radividual platform limitations in any ?lven set of circumstances. We have to aPpreciate and understand limitations as VVeH as capabilities, and learn to employ "'hat we have to our best advantage. We ITlUst continue to examine these issues in Positive ways, and not lapse into the all- to°-human tendency to merely lament our misfortune.
Holloway’s Hooligans”
(.See W. Thomas, pp. 154-156, April 1984 r°ceedings)
Jeutenant Commander Robert Wallace Jake, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)— |~aPtain Thomas writes with affection of ne Holloway aviation midshipmen, who 11)61 the need of their time and, in due c°Urse, took their places in active commissioned service, although with bastard aates of rank.
The days of the Holloway midshipmen °Verlapped those of another, even more Pherneral naval institution of which little emory remains, because its last mem- ®rs flitted off the active duty list more an 35 years ago—the Option Baker avi- tlQn cadets.
£ Toward the end of World War II, the nUreau of Personnel (BuPers) expected a huge quantities of replacement but it was not so apparent to . -- us in the V-5 program. We were
l Ven every inducement to get out and go
a°rne.
"eed for
Hi,
°se of
Shortly after V-J Day, cadets were of- ^ red these choices:
Able—to complete original active duty
6°mi
^ ■■mitment , “aker—to get your wings and go
.n°me
Uharlie-
Wh.
-to go home immediately.
'en the Holloway program was in-
traduced, the opportunity to switch to it was offered to qualified cadets. For most of us, the opportunity for two or three extra years at midshipman’s pay did not seem much of an inducement, even though the prospect was held out for receiving a Navy instead of a Naval Reserve commission at the end.
With our Option Charlie friends out of the way, the number of student aviators was reduced but was still not commensurate with the instructor and ground crew ranks at Corpus Christi and Pensacola. Because of the point system in effect in late 1945 and 1946, almost all the instructors at both places were eligible for early discharge, as were most of the experienced petty officers on the flight lines.
There were plenty of delays in the training syllabus. My log book shows seven weeks between my last primary flight and my first flight in intermediate, and another five weeks between intermediate and advanced.
Flight instructors, although highly skilled and dedicated, were mostly ensigns and lieutenants, junior grade. Ground school was comprehensive. We compared notes with what we knew of the Air Corps syllabus and were convinced that we were getting the better of the two. In fact, at least part of the time we were getting the only training, because the Air Corps shut down its primary and basic flying schools at the end of 1945 and for most of 1946.
Besides the V-5 cadets, there were two other kinds of flight students taking the same instruction syllabus: student officers and enlisted aviation pilot candidates. Cadets mostly flew with other cadets, but occasionally we would pick up a straggler from another category. In that era, the real bargain for the taxpayer was the aviation cadet; at $75 per month, the cadet made little more than half the midshipman’s pay.
Among cadets, there was no distinction or segregation between the two option groups during training. The only difference was a piece of paper in the record, which could be changed until the orders were cut for graduation.
We started seeing Holloway midshipmen on liberty in Pensacola toward the end of 1946. I remember meeting one in the bar of the San Carlos Hotel after Christmas. If they were not allowed to drink hard liquor, they were not saying so. In fact, with their hats off, it was hard to tell midshipmen in uniform from cadets. (Cadets in that era were not issued visor caps. Of course, every girl in Pensacola knew exactly which was which.)
Three weeks and six landings on the
USS Saipan (CVL-48) later, I was standing in the sun at a commissioning ceremony. We did not receive a commission in one hand and orders to inactive duty in the other. Instead came a set of temporary additional duty orders to the Naval Air Training Base Pensacola. For the next few days, I made a daily run from Chevalier Field to Naval Air Station Brunswick with a freshly overhauled SNJ scheduled for mothballing in the huge lighter-than- air hangar. A couple of times, there was time for a spin at a lush watering hole on Sea Island. In due course, that life of ease ended with another set of orders, this time reading, “Released from all active duty.”
I don’t know how many cadets chose the Baker option. The total must be less than the 2,000 aviation midshipmen of 1946-50. I also do not know how many of my fellow Bakers became active in the Naval Reserve after returning to civilian life. Two of my wing-mates joined the
The Option Baker cadet was a rarer naval bird than a “Holloway Hooligan” with a shorter career—27 days (exclusive of annual duty for training) for Robert Blake, second from left.
active program at Memphis. Others were called back to active duty in the Korean War. I was able to keep flying for more than 11 years in New York reserve squadrons. By then, any limitations implied by an original A3L designator had blended into the universal aviator’s 1315.
Later, on annual training duty periods, I was able to make contributions to an A4
N
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Type Board, a sea-air search for a downed Saudi aircraft, a supply mission for a lost nuclear weapon search in the Mediterranean, and to compile for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, the official record of the attack on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5).
Many former Option Baker cadets went on to distinguished civilian aviation careers. One of my classmates became a fine designer of fighter aircraft; another, chief test pilot for a major helicopter company; and I went back to work for Pan Am, my prewar employer, to complete a 40-year career in engineering and management.
From this tale, one can see that the return on the taxpayers’ investment in the clipped wings of the 1945-47 Option Baker cadets is not to be measured only in terms of active duty service performed. Yet, it is startling to realize the number of days of commissioned active service (exclusive of annual duty for training)—27 days in my case.
“That Dangerous Polyester Look”
(,See D. M. Kennedy, W. R. C. Stewart, pp.
97-98, January 1984; J. W. Cupp, p. 23, March
1984 Proceedings)
Dr. H. Adams, Jr., Ph.D., Technical Director, Man-Made Fiber Producers Association, Inc.—It is apparent that the authors confuse the issue of “dress uniforms” and situations which would require the use of truly protective clothing, i.e., clothing of special design for protection in those situations of increased potential for exposure to intense heat such as flash fire. The authors state that it is only after exposure to thermal conditions in excess of 500°F that thermoplastic fibers, such as polyester, experience melting. Anyone exposed to such thermal conditions without protective clothing could be expected to experience severe bums, if not death, regardless of the materials of conventional clothing. Furthermore, comments on the Navy Safety Center’s “Weekly Summary No. 17-83” are misleading. That document clearly distinguishes between the proper use of conventional clothing (uniforms) and those situations which require the use of protective clothing for Navy personnel.
In 1979, representatives of our association met several times with Navy officials of the Naval Military Personnel Command to review and discuss the issue of the proper use of polyester in naval uniforms and safety for shipboard personnel. During those meetings, we submitted copies of a paper prepared by our association, “Literature Survey of Bum
Injury Potential of Conventional Wearing Apparel.” The information contained in this paper concerns only conventional wearing apparel and does not discuss pr°" tective clothing. However, based on documented investigations summarized ® the paper, results confirm that “fabrics ot thermoplastic fibers like 100% nylon and 100% polyester are considerably more difficult to ignite and evolve substantially less heat at a lower rate of burning than comparable construction of 100% cot' ton.” The paper also reviews investigations that support the statement tna “medical evidence has shown that polymer drips falling on skin do not increase severity of a bum injury or complied subsequent treatment of the bum.” These results, of course, relate to those situa tions which would not require the use protective clothing.
The Man-Made Fiber Producers Ass° ciation represents 90% of the dornest>c production of man-made fibers and yam* which, in turn, accounts for some 75% ® all fibers and yams processed by 6. ■ textile mills. Representatives of our ass® ciation would welcome the opportunity meet and discuss any questions with pa* ties interested in this subject.
Shipboard Training: The Team s the Thing
CSee D. S. Appleton, pp. 107-113, October 1983; J. R. Sander, p. 26, January 1984; r. Dyer, p. 96, April 1984; D. S. Appleton, P- June 1984 Proceedings)
Fire Control Technician First Class Sd"1 uel D. Cope, U. S. Navy, USS Hud (AS-31)—I thoroughly enjoy every *s* of the Proceedings. I was deeply d turbed, however, by Lieutenant Sande letter. As a petty officer with ten >'eaJ^ active duty service, I question his sponse to the team training probte Where were his mid-management P pie? As a division officer, he should ha been directing his chief to get the lea 1 petty officers (LPOs) motivated to du^ and lead, regardless of the comman attitude. . „
There is an outstanding school be taught at the Charleston Naval Sta*1 Fleet Mine Warfare Training CeO i Charleston, South Carolina. This s<- is “Leadership and Management, bfl , . tion and Training,” and it is for the m ^ management types, the LPOs, ancl. facing chief petty officers, who are hel j countable daily. As a recent graduu > can only say I should have attendee* g school much earlier in my career; d real learning experience. 0„t-
Kudos to your staff. Keep up the standing work.
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