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The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates will have a bright future if they are used in surface action squadrons (SASs). With appropriate tactics for their use, a reshuffling of fleet deployments in light of the new SASs, and a reworking of support structures, the U. S. Navy will become stronger and more versatile.
Surface action squadrons, each made up of eight Oliver Hazard Perry -class frigates and a tender, could operate as forward-deployed “trip wires” in low- threat environments around the globe.
Six surface action squadrons should be formed, each to consist initially of eight FFG-7s and a tender. Such a squadron would have at its disposal eight rails for Harpoon and Standard missiles, eight 76-mm. Oto-Melara guns, and from eight to 16 LAMPS-III Seahawk helicopters. Backfits and later production will add to these assets the Phalanx close-in weapon system, recovery equipment for helicopter operations, and the tactical towed array sonar. Thus, weapon and sensor system redundancy would be enjoyed by the SAS. The squadron tender would be able to perform maintenance items that an FFG-7 crew could not do on its own. The tender should carry replacement LM- 2500 turbines and LAMPS helicopters. Another capability of the tender would be support of the frigates’ class maintenance plan. For dry-docking services, one or two of the deployment areas could also be assigned a floating dry dock.
The mission of these surface action squadrons is to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in low-threat areas. “Low threat” means situations where Soviet forces are not involved, but the absence of the Soviet Navy does not mean that the SASs will be operating in “no-threat” environments.
There are many navies with an ability to inflict a great deal of damage with a few heavily armed corvettes and patrol boats, or with several high-performance aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions. A navy so equipped would be able to close a choke point in an afternoon. The SASs must counter such threats.
At present, SLOC defense is a task that our Navy is prepared to provide at the outbreak of hostilities, and is not an ongoing activity—but it should be. Even with real-time knowledge of the situation, current response times would allow a choke point (such as the entrance to the Persian Gulf) to be closed. Forward deployment of the SAS would serve to deter such a situation. Current U. S. policy is to make an aggressor think in terms of the strategic repercussions of an attack on our shipping. The presence of SAS units in the contested area would also require the weighing of tactical responses.
SAS deployment, then, would be based primarily on the protection of SLOCs. For this purpose, the six SASs would be distributed to the Persian Gulf/ Red Sea area, the Straits of Malacca/ Southwestern Pacific area, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and both U. S. coasts. With such large patrolling areas, the ships’ LAMPS helicopters will be important to widen the patrol area and provide a real-time surface picture.
But, wouldn’t operating so close to shore appear provocative? This is where the FFG-7’s lack of shore projection ability can be viewed as an asset. A small country experiencing internal strife is less likely to feel threatened by such an escort squadron than by a carrier battle group stationed nearby for exactly the same purpose. Such a deployment practice
should also be reassuring to the U. S. public, which is usually hesitant to support the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy.
While overseeing SLOCs would be the normal routine, the SAS would also serve the United States as a watchful eye around the globe, ready to take up station off shores where political turmoil may erupt. In situations where a conflict of interest occurs between the United States and a low-threat nation, the SAS would continue to escort merchantmen in the area, but much more closely so that they remained inside the frigates’ missile defense envelope. Subsurface and surface surveillance would be conducted to prevent an attack; again, the tactical problem of the aggressor is made more complex.
In a conventional war with a power possessing a small- to medium-sized navy, the surface action squadron should be able to acquit itself well. In such an event, its forward deployment could make it the object of a first strike. However, operating the FFG-7s together allows the SAS to present strong missile defenses. Allowing for leakage, even casualties of 25% would still leave a squadron of six frigates to counterattack. Nor would such a force be left alone—at this point, the aggressor probably would have shot his bolt and would be resorting to “iron bombs” and naval gunnery, while the SAS would have Harpoon missiles capable of being targeted over the horizon by LAMPS helos. Meanwhile, the Navy probably would have a battle group or two making flank speed for the area. While all this does not necessarily guarantee a happy ending to our scenario, it is not as grim as the prospect of a carrier that has countered the leak-through missiles with her flight deck.
Here is the “versatility” we mentioned earlier. Such a response provides the Navy with more flexibility in committing its assets in a conflict. With a surface action squadron already on hand, increased tension would attract stronger surface forces capable of shore bombardment and greater surface action—followed by a carrier battle group. Beyond this, involvement of the U. S. Marine Corps would signify a more serious intent that would eclipse the initial SAS response. As this escalation takes place, the SAS would be integrated into the arriving forces to provide added screening and air defense. Thus, the SAS would become a low-threat tripwire that could provide an immediate capability for the United States to defend its maritime interests.
The surface action squadron concept offers the opportunity to change the way we employ our carrier battle groups and surface action groups. Current practices call for carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and Western Pacific—as a minimum. Other battle groups are in various states of overhaul, work up, and stand down. While this policy maintains forward deployment, it also spreads our “main punch” forces out and keeps them steaming in circles. Rather than perpetuating such a cycle, the Navy should develop an employment concept with an emphasis on concentrating and moving the carrier battle groups and surface action groups unexpectedly.
It is at this juncture that war against the Soviet Union and its allies must be considered. In a conflict with the United States, Soviet naval forces will have two main tasks to perform: severing our SLOCs and eliminating the U. S. Navy as a fighting force. Our forward-deployed carrier groups invite a coordinated, lethal attack. Having destroyed these formations, the Soviets could turn their attentions elsewhere, while we hurried to get our remaining carriers into fighting form. Meanwhile, the remaining escorts from the now-submerged carriers would be involved in their own fight for survival as ad hoc formations against Soviet surface forces (accustomed to working together) and Soviet submarines. These U. S. surface forces may also be eliminated before they can shake off years of defensive thinking.
In theaters other than the North Atlan- tic/European, the use of forward-deployed SASs would help to eliminate such a threat. (The North Atlantic/Euro- pean theater is omitted here because land- based air and allied forces tend to shield U. S. forces.) Again, the tripwire effect is operative. Squadron actions by the SAS, using Harpoon missiles and LAMPS helicopters for over-the-horizon targeting, would blunt the Soviet surface forces as they attempted to engage our carriers standing off in open ocean.
The Flatley (FFG-21), above, makes a port call in Spain. If SASs were stationed in the Med permanently, U. S. carrier operations could become much more flexible.
While the Soviets were still in littoral areas, they would be harassed by surface action squadrons. For the Soviets to turn their full attention on the SASs would be to allow U. S. battle groups to command the tactical picture, while ignoring the SASs would leave the Soviet formations open to coordinated frigate attacks.
As the SASs fought the forward battle, the carriers would be able to group at arm’s length to act in concert. Rather than having a single carrier group be caught off guard, the SAS concept allows coordinated efforts by multiple battle groups and surface action groups. Soviet naval air forces would have a much harder task, since they would have to fly farther and search more ocean; Soviet surface forces would be faced with the coordinated efforts of U. S. naval forces and be forced into either piecemeal operations at disproportionate odds, or operate as a massed fleet with no air cover.
Again leaving the North Atlantic/Euro- pean theater out of this discussion, the Soviet guerre de course would be up against the considerable defensive talents of the SAS. Pursuing an aggressive antisubmarine warfare policy and screening merchantmen from Soviet air and surface forces would be the tasks of the SAS. The major objective in these defensive actions would be to get the merchantmen out of the choke point and littoral areas with as few losses as possible. What is needed are the defensive tactics to protect war- related commerce.
Most discussions of antisubmarine defenses for merchantmen have focused on whether such an undertaking should be based on area defense or point defense— whether ships should form convoys or proceed singly. If area defense such as the escorting of convoys is no better than the point defense approach, the question becomes, is point defense feasible? The sheer number of merchant vessels to be escorted, compared with the number of available escorts, indicates that some sort of area defense must still be the solution to the problem.
Current U. S. antisubmarine warfare practices use a couple of helicopters and/ or ships to find a submarine, or at least deter a close approach by the submarine. The SAS provides the Navy with the ability to conduct antisubmarine warfare on a scale not previously attempted. Despite the quieting measures taken in modem submarines, they are still, at higher speeds, noisier than the surrounding ocean. For this reason, the submarine tactic of waiting for the target at some position ahead of the track is still the best method of attack. With this in mind, escorting ships can devote most of their attention to the area ahead of the merchant ships. This will force the attacking submarines into either an extremely dangerous situation, or an attack approach at cavitation speeds from the flank or the rear of the body being attacked.
These are the tactics that surface action squadrons will take at the outbreak of hostilities. Since they are already on station in the sea-lanes, the frigates would collect merchantmen and escort them to their destinations. As escorts from the SASs become available, the most important ships would be sent on their way.
Independent SASs also provide for practice at this method of escorting vessels, a condition not currently available through orthodox merchant escort theory. While on station, the SASs can ask merchantmen to voluntarily cooperate, or simply hold a practice session around a merchant vessel or two.
The NATO scenario is the most complex, but possibly the one upon which the SAS can have the greatest impact. With SASs deployed in the forward areas, and the bulk of the U. S. fleet concentrated but not committed, the all-important resupply of NATO will be guarded not by marginally capable escorts designed for a low-threat environment, but by carrier battle groups and their heavier escorts. The carrier battle groups will be free to operate in concert against Soviet ships and shore targets without having to fend off the initial thrust.
With the FFG-7s removed from carrier escort duties, about one-third of the surface-to-air missile rails currently available for battle group defenses will be lost. Over several years, this problem can easily be remedied by fitting Spruance-class destroyers with the Mk-26 launchers and guidance equipment for which they were originally designed. Such a backfit would produce a net gain of 70 rails for battle group defense, and strengthen tremendously the Spruance-class ships’ capabilities. As the years progress, and Ticon- deroga-dass cruisers and Arleigh Burke- class guided missile destroyers enter the fleet, the detached FFG-7s will hardly be missed.
Command and control remain a significant problem with the Oliver Hazard Perry class. While LAMPS operations will allow a self-generated picture of the immediate area, the lack of Link-H equipment deprives the SAS of an overall tactical picture. This is not of major importance in the low-threat environment, but as the sophistication of the threat increases, it is a commodity that would be “nice to have.” As such, it should be installed as the opportunity presents itself, and the units thus fitted should be spread throughout the SASs.
Two indirect benefits accrue from the SAS concept. First, the U. S. Navy will develop tactical proficiency in situations excluding an aircraft carrier, a skill that has not existed for quite some time. The mechanics of multiplatform surface action and antisubmarine warfare conducted by more than one or two units will also be applicable to other classes of escorts engaged in these activities. As these tactics are pushed higher and higher through the fleet mix, they should become even more effective as they are used by units with greater individual capabilities. The second advantage is the diffusion of personnel trained in these tactics. Rather than being buried deep within a tactical publication that seldom sees the light of day, these tactics will be present in the minds of officers and enlisted men who have actively used them.
Ensign Richardson was commissioned last December through the NROTC program at Purdue University, Indiana. He is currently attending nuclear propulsion school at Orlando, Florida.
FFG-7s in the Outer Air Battle
By Midshipman First Class Scott M. Newman, U. S. Navy
Many high-ranking naval officers, including former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired), and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters, U. S. Navy, have been voicing concern over Soviet cruise missile developments—and rightly so. “Soviet antiship cruise missiles, especially those launched from long range bombers and submarines, pose an increasingly serious threat to our naval forces and sea lines of communication.”1 Specifically, the “Backfire” bomber, which fires the AS-6 “Kingfish,” which has a range of about 130 miles, and the “Oscar”-class guided missile submarine, with a payload of 24 antiship cruise missiles, are weapon systems that deserve our careful attention. The Soviets are strong proponents of these weapons and are continually improving the range, speed, and targeting capabilities of their missiles. We must develop and improve our methods and weapons to combat this threat, or face defeat. The Oliver Hazard Perry frigates can contribute in this effort.
Study of Soviet naval warfare doctrine indicates that any Soviet attack will be a massive saturation of missiles from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Our current strategy to combat this missile threat is a defense-in-depth concept. The area surrounding a battle group is divided into three zones: the outer defense zone, the area defense zone, and the point defense zone. Through the process of attrition in each zone, it is hoped that few, if any, missiles will reach the high-value units of the force.2
The key to success of this defense-indepth lies in the outer air battle. It is here where early detection of incoming targets by E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and engagement by fighters begins the attrition process. The success or failure at this stage determines how well the battle group will