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Although the better part of a decade will pass before the Soviets put their carrier battle group show on the road, critics are already hailing the Su-24 Fencer” (with the funny fur hat, preceding page) as one of the potential triple-threat—fighter I interceptor! attack—stars of the Soviet carrier air wing.
The United States has based its claim to tactical maritime superiority on the power of the carrier air wing. Heretofore, Soviet sea-based aviation has been confined to helicopters and a limited-capability, fixed-wing vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) fighter-attack aircraft. This status quo is about to be upset.
Table 1 Mission Progression of Major Soviet Surface Combatants Warfare Tactical
In Commission Mission Requirements
Resulting
Platform
Platform
Characteristics
Early 60s Anticarrier Provide credible strike ca
pability against U. S. carriers without tactical superiority.
“Kynda,”
“Kresta-I"
Mid/Late 60s
Antisubmarine
Counter U. S. sub threat Moskva,
(particularly SSBNs) with “Kresta-II,
long-range weapons and “Kara”
sensors, particularly aircraft.
Early 70s
Antisubmarine
First long-range SSM (SS- N-3) armed ships. Limited AAW/ASW capability for self-protection. Relatively small with high offensive weapon-to-size ratio. Weapons’ emphasis on long-range ASW missiles (SS-N-14) and integral helicopter support. AAW capability upgraded. Ships becoming larger.
Refine ASW capability and install on small, cheaply produced ship for support of other platforms.
“Krivak-I,'
“Krivak-IE
Late 70s
Antisubmarine
Antisurface
Provide tactical maritime superiority in mission areas with ability to conduct extended operations. Provide viable seaborne TacAir capability.
Kiev
Small, with limited number ofSS-N-I4s (four). Integral ASW helo support and Soviet state-of-the-art ASW sensors (including VDS). Reliant on other units for AAW/ASUW protection as well as logistic support. VTOL-equipped “cruiser” carrying “Forger" attack aircraft and ASW helos. SS- N-12 provides updated long- range SSM capability. “Forger” and SA-N-3 offer Soviet state-of-the-art AAW protection for Kiev and escorts.
s.
Having witnessed the power and flexibility of U. S. carrier battle groups, the Soviets seem intent upon developing a similar capability. In a break from their most traditional tactical plans, the Soviets have chosen to include large-deck carriers equipped with high- performance conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft in their future order of battle. In a recent interview. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins described the current Soviet
naval priority as aviation.1 This emphasis, however, is not restricted to the Soviets' 60,000-ton CTOL carrier which is being built; the Soviets are planning to deploy fully integrated and mutually supporting carrier battle groups.
For the past 20 years, Soviet ship construction has been steadily directed toward the deployment of mutually supportive battle group-sized units. This goal, which will be realized by the late 1980s, has been based on three tactical prerequisites:
► The ability to counter the U. S. and Allied surface offensive capability, primarily the striking powei ot the Western carrier forces
► The development of a credible antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, first as a counter to the Western submarine-based ballistic missile threat, but also
as protection for their own naval forces ► The refinement of sea-based logistic support, capable of sustaining Soviet naval operations on a worldwide basis
Under the guidance of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, the expansion of Soviet sea power into a viable “blue water” fleet has been done incrementally with each ship design filling a specific tactical need. Table 1 reviews the Soviets’ surface combatant programs since the early 1960s. In planning the development of their fleet, the Soviets concentrated on those mission areas and tactics they perceived as countering the strengths of the U. S. fleet.
^ Commission | Warfare Mission | Tactical Requirements | Resulting Platform | Platform Characteristics |
Early 80s | Antisurface Antiair Antisubmarine | Operate at extended range from land-based air support and provide protection over wide area in AAW environment. Upgrade SSM strike capability. | Kirov | Large size and redundancy of weapons led the West to classify her as “battle cruiser.” SS-N-19 provides advanced SSM capability, while the anticipated SA-N- 6 will provide AAW area defense. First Soviet surface warship with nuclear propulsion. |
Eady/Mid 80s | Antisurface Antiair | Provide upgraded medium- range SSM on high-endurance platforms. | Sovremennyy | Large destroyer (approx. 8.000 tons) armed with SS- N-9 missiles and projected medium-range AAW system (SA-N-7). |
EaHy/Mid 80s | Antisubmarine | Upgrade high-endurance ASW support using state- of-the-art sensors. | Udaloy | Large destroyer (approx. 8,000 tons) armed with SS- N-14 missiles, two new ASW helos (“Helix”), new 100-mm. guns, and projected close-in SAM system for limited AAW/ ASUW capability. |
^>d 80s | Antisurface Antiair | Provide surface-launched cruise missile threat with credible AAW capability. | “BiackCom-1” | First Soviet cruiser built since early 60s with emphasis on ASUW without ASW capability. Ship offers significant offensive firepower for less investment than Kirov. |
Ute 80s | Antisurface Antisubmarine Antiair Power projection | Use high-performance carrier-borne aircraft in offensive and defensive employment. | (Undesignated) | Estimated 60,000-ton “big deck” carrier with projected 40-60 aircraft air wing. Believed to be nuclear powered. |
The Soviets have paralleled the development of their surface combatants with the construction of
mobile logistic ships capable of supporting fleet operations. Obviously patterned on U. S. efforts in this area, the Soviets have built replenishment oilers and sharpened their skills at using these ships for underway replenishment of task groups. It is reasonable to assume that, by the time the Soviets have constructed the combatant elements of their battle groups, they will be capable of sustaining a battle group in operating areas as far from Soviet home ports as our forces routinely do today.
The Nature of the Soviet Carrier Group: We should resist the temptation to consider the Soviet carrier battle group (CVBG) an imitation of the U. S. Navy’s, although the American influence on recent Soviet ship programs is evident. Nevertheless, the Soviets have followed their own path in fleet development, and the resulting CVBG will be marked by the experiences and perceptions the Soviets have gained from at-sea operations. In addition, the Soviets undoubtedly view their battle groups’ missions differently than we see our carrier groups’.
Although the flexibility of a carrier-centered battle group allows for a myriad of assignments, the Soviets likely will task their CVBGs with four missions: to demonstrate naval presence for political reasons; to counter U. S. CVBGs; to project power ashore; and to protect Soviet naval and/or merchant forces.
In demonstrating presence, the Soviets probably will use their carrier forces to impress nonaligned nations and to reinforce the Soviets’ self-generated image as the superpower patron of the developing world. In a reversal of U. S. policy aimed at stabilizing international conflict with carrier presence, the Soviets can be expected to deploy their forces in support of the assorted “revolutionary” movements. The military and political ramifications of a Soviet carrier providing tactical air support in such conflicts are wide-ranging. Perhaps most significant would be the tendency for the United States to counter such deployments with U. S. battle groups. If this occurs, the danger of superpower showdowns will increase when Soviet CVBGs deploy.
The need to counter U. S. CVBGs has been a perennial Soviet naval problem. It is logical to assume that the Soviet carrier air wing will be strike- oriented, continuing the Soviet reliance on concentrated firepower in a centrally coordinated attack. Significantly, the Soviets will have new generations of surface-launched antiship missiles to support their airborne assault of U. S. carrier groups.
Although it would be out of the Soviets’ character to use air power as a single weapon, as the U. S. Navy did in strikes in North Vietnam, undoubtedly, the Soviet nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) will be tasked with the projection of power ashore. It is by no means coincidental that the Soviets are expanding their naval power to include both air superiority, carrier-based aircraft and amphibious forces at the same time. The recent surge in amphibious lift capability deployed by the Soviets suggests they intend to be able to place land forces on foreign shores. A primary mission for the Soviet CVBG will be the support of these amphibious forces.
Protecting friendly naval and merchant forces is a task Soviet and U. S. CVBGs share. Unlike the U. S. mission, the Soviets will include protection of their strategic submarine forces. New Soviet ballistic missile submarines, such as the “Deltas” and “Typhoons,” mark a move toward larger, slower platforms with longer range missiles. Deployed in waters contiguous to the Soviet Union, the modern Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force can be placed under the umbrella of Soviet carrier forces. Such Soviet CVBGs would threaten the U. S. Navy’s most credible counter to Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the long-range patrol aircraft which would be particularly vulnerable to the carrier’s fighters and the surface-to-air missiles on her escorts.2
Although the better part of a decade will pass before a Soviet CVBG deploys, it is not too early to examine its probable composition, tactics, and effectiveness. The missions and the ships we have seen suggest what we might expect in the Soviet CVBG.
Air Wing: An often-mentioned CTOL aircraft candidate for the Soviet carrier air wing (CVW) is the Su-24 “Fencer.”3 This two-seat fighter-bomber in a “navalized” version would offer the Soviets a proven, high-performance air superiority vehicle for employment as either a fighter/interceptor or attack aircraft. Another candidate for inclusion in a carrier- based fighter/bomber role is the Su-17 “Fitter.” Although less capable than the “Fencer,” the “Fitter’s” lack of complexity, in comparison to the “Fencer,” makes it attractive for first-generation flight deck use. The “Fitter” also is already flying in the navy’s land-based forces. In keeping with Soviet philosophy and tactical requirements, it is logical that the backbone of the new Soviet CVW will be attack oriented. Further supporting this notion is the relatively small size of the projected Soviet carrier (roughly two-thirds that of U. S. carriers), which means a correspondingly smaller air wing. Because attack aircraft are smaller than modern interceptors, more aircraft can be deployed if the former are favored by the Soviets, who also can be expected to include ASW helicopters with their carrier air wing. The Soviet carrier may carry 50 to 60 aircraft, compared with approximately 85 to 90 on U. S. carriers.
Escort Forces: The new surface combatants described in Table 1 are worthy escorts for a large- deck carrier. The Udaloy and, to a lesser extent, the older “Karas,” “Kresta-IIs,” and “Krivaks” can provide viable ASW protection for a carrier group with the mix of shipboard and helicopter sensors developed over the past 15 years. Although Soviet ASW tactics have emphasized active sonar employment and close-in screens, the modern Soviet ASW escorts are capable of providing standoff support for a carrier, much in the same manner as our Knox frigates and Spruance destroyers have become accustomed to “sprint and drift” tactics along our carriers’ tracks.
Although observations of Soviet naval antiair missilery have supported the belief that Soviet surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) are somewhat less capable than the U. S. Navy’s, the Soviets appear determined to close this gap within the next few years. The Kirov's SA-N-6 and the Sovremennyy’ s SA-N- 7 will provide the Soviet task force with capable area air defense systems. Tactically, the long-range capability of the SA-N-6 and the obvious ability of the Kirov to operate independently make this cruiser well suited for detached picket duty, much like oui guided missile cruisers (CGs) and nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers (CGNs) are assigned. The Sovremennyy, on the other hand, will support Soviet CVNs as a close-in “shotgun” capable of providing a final shot at any air threat leaking through the outer defenses.
The Sovremennyy, mounting large modern naval guns, also will provide the Soviet carrier group with a significant antisurface defense. In addition, the Sovremennyy's medium-range surface-to-surface missile is a sound defensive investment for the Soviet battle group commander. The Kirov and “BlackCom-1,” however, may represent another dimension to the Soviet carrier-centered battle group. Having employed surface action groups (SAGs) as the mainstay of their offensive surface forces for more than 20 years, it seems natural that the Soviets will deploy SAGs in support of their carrier forces. The offensive potential of such a combined CVBG/ SAG is significant. The SS-N-12s and SS-N-19s to be mounted on the Kirovs and “BlackCom-ls,” respectively, are estimated to have 200- to 300-nautical mile ranges. The integration of the carrier air wing and this capability gives the Soviet task group of the future extraordinary firepower and flexibility. Table 2 outlines the roles a Soviet CVBG and SAG would play in each of the Soviet CVBG missions.
______ Surface Action Group Role
Provide visible patrol in heavily traveled waters
Conduct port visits at key locations Provide AAW picket support Use long-range cruise missiles in coordinated attack
Conduct raids on U. S. ASW/AAW pickets operating independently Conduct ASW in support of CV Provide AAW picket support Protect CV force from surface attack (either operating inshore or seaward of CV)
Conduct diversionary tactics to confuse defenses ashore Act as escort and gunfire support for landing forces
Conduct ASW in support of CV Provide AAW picket support Act as escort for shipping Conduct interdiction patrols Conduct strikes on threatening sur- face/submarine forces Provide AAW picket support
*PIRAZ_ Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone SSSC—Surface/Subsurface Surveillance and Coordination
Protection of naval/ Establish area surveillance (PIRAZ,
merchant forces SSSC)
Conduct preemptive strikes on threatening enemy forces Provide air protection for force
Countering U. S. CVBG Conduct air strikes against CV and
escorts
Provide intelligence and targeting information
Provide air protection for CV, escorts, and SAG
Power projection ashore Conduct air strikes ashore
Establish area surveillance (PIRAZ, SSSC)
Gather intelligence
Provide air protection for force
Demonstrating presence Establish area surveillance (PIRAZ,
SSSC)*
Table 2 Combined Soviet CVBGISAG Mission Support Roles —
Mission Carrier Group Role
Submarine Forces: Just as Soviet surface forces can be expected to play an offensive role in Soviet CVBG tactics, it is certain that the Soviets will use
their large tactical submarine force to support CVBG missions. The value of nuclear attack submarines as ASW escorts for carriers has been proven by the U. S. Navy, and some Soviet SSN classes, such as “Victor" and “Alfa,” possess the speed and weaponry required to provide a similar service for carrier groups. In addition, the Soviets have continued to develop their cruise missile submarine capability at a pace commensurate with the progress of their surface forces. Considering the Soviet reverence for centralized command and control, it seems certain that the offensive mission of the Soviet CVBG will be supported by the antiship missiles of the Soviet submarine force.
Shore-Based Air Power: The development of sea- based aviation will not immediately alter the Soviet reliance on shore-based aviation as naval strike and defensive weapons. In fact, Soviet naval aviation continues to procure new aircraft replacements such as the “Backfire” bomber. The addition of long- range, air-launched cruise missiles to the tactical air threat posed by a carrier air wing obviously complicates the tactical problem for forces under a coordinated attack from both.
For now, it appears that the Soviets will rely on shore-based aircraft to provide tactical support for battle group operations. To date, there have been no reports that Soviets have begun developing carrier-borne assets to fulfill long-range ASW protection and airborne early warning (AEW) roles, leaving gaps considered critical in U. S. CVBGs. The reliance on shore-based 11-38 “May” and Tu-126 “Moss” aircraft for direct support leaves the Soviet battle group in remote waters without a flexible and responsive counter to rapidly developing ASW and antiair warfare (AAW) threats.
Command and Control: By U. S. standards, Soviet command-and-control procedures seem overreliant on tactical guidance from higher authority. In the past, this has been the result of a land war- oriented mentality that has stressed the need for strict control of operational forces at a high level. This concept has not become outdated completely, however, and the effectiveness of the integrated Soviet ocean surveillance system (SOSS) testifies to the proficiency of the Soviet shore-based naval command structure. Viewing Soviet practice and projected capabilities, it can be assumed that the Soviet CVBG commander will have less latitude in making his operational decisions than his American counterpart. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the entire Soviet command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structure has been developed along these lines, and the emergence of a carrier force will not appreciably change this structure or its functioning.
The notion of centralized operational control may well prove to be a two-edged sword for the Soviet
CVBG. The ability to coordinate the battle group’s offensive efforts with the support of the other forces enhances the threat posed by the battle group. Conversely, the reliance on such a system of control limits the ability of Soviet naval commanders to make and exercise timely decisions. Ultimately, the Soviet CVBG commander may be ineffective at evaluating and responding to an unforeseen or deteriorating tactical situation.
Sizing Up the Soviet CVBG: It is natural to measure the potential of their CVBG against the capabilities of our carrier battle groups, although such comparisons must be done warily. Figure 1 summarizes the composition of Soviet and U. S. CVBGs and the approximate ranges of their offensive and defensive weapons, circa 1990. This figure does not include land-based aviation which may support the CVBG (e.g., Il-38s, P-3s, etc.) and only considers the primary tactical contributions of each platform. Also not included is the antiship version of the Tomahawk cruise missile, which is planned for inclusion on almost all the U. S. surface escorts pictured. Should these plans be realized, the 300-nautical mile reach of the Tomahawk could provide the U. S. carrier battle group a crucial hedge in any at-sea engagement.4
Will their group be as good as ours? No. But it will be good enough by Soviet standards. The Soviet CVN’s limited air wing lies at the core of the weaknesses in the Soviet CVBG. Perhaps most glaring is the comparative lack of defensive capability shielding the Soviet group. Balancing this, however, is the preponderance of offensive firepower the Soviet CVBG can muster from both its air wing and supporting forces.
By examining the threat presented by the Soviet CVBGs of the 1990s in a “worst case,” full-scale conflict scenario, certain elements of our naval strength emerge as either successful or lacking in the struggle to maintain maritime superiority. Analysis of these “losers” and “winners” gives us insights into some solutions for improving our future naval forces, particularly our battle groups. First, we will look at our losers.
► Our ASW Forces: U. S. ASW forces are equipped poorly to function in the kind of environment the Soviet CVBG is capable of establishing. The prospect of a Soviet CVBG protecting a sanctuary for their SSBNs is a problem with serious strategic implications; our reliance on large, slow-moving aircraft (i.e., P-3s, S-3s, SH-3s, and LAMPS) for tactical ASW will also put our CVBG at a disadvantage. The ASW problem facing the U. S. battle group commander who opposes a Soviet CVBG is a series of poor choices: weakening the CVBG’s air defense by escorting ASW forces with fighters; operating long-range airborne ASW forces without protection
in the face of Soviet tactical air and AAW defenses; holding the ASW aircraft on the deck and thus inviting attack from Soviet submarines. The use of other platforms for ASW is similarly threatened by the Soviet CVBG. Many of our surface ASW escorts would be unable to survive a concentrated aircraft or cruise missile attack. Even our nuclear attack submarines must be wary of the Soviet CVBG’s own ASW punch when attempting to prosecute Soviet subs sheltered by the CVBG.
► Our Amphibious Forces: Current U. S. amphibious experience has not equipped our forces to contend with the particular problems a Soviet carrier air wing can present. Although the need for air superiority in the amphibious objective area (AOA) is recognized, our amphibious planners have come to regard absolute control of air space over and around the beach as a given. This assumption has led to two accepted scenarios for amphibious assault— either a large-scale Allied landing in Northern Europe under the umbrella of ground-based air support, or a limited action (raid, rescue, etc.) where the needed air power could be furnished by a U. S. carrier. It is in this latter contingency that the Soviet CVBG provides the most serious threat. The Soviet tendency to get involved in Third World crises in which we would be most likely to engage in a limited assault makes such an assault risky if the Soviets deploy a CVBG. Providing tactical air cover for any landing in the face of an opposing Soviet battle group would require increased naval forces; most likely, one U. S. CVBG would have to be dedicated to a defensive, anti-Soviet CVBG role while a separate carrier would be needed to support the assault forces.
Beyond the strictly military cost of such an action, the political commitment of meeting a Soviet threat in the AOA may be the most serious threat to our amphibious forces. It is one thing to engage the forces of a small hostile nation in support of a limited objective; it would be an entirely different matter to consider such an invasion if it presented the specter of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. As a political/military instrument, our amphibious forces are alive and well, with a flexibility unmatched by any other segment of the U. S. armed forces. In building a CVBG, however, the Soviets have increased the price of using this instrument to a cost that our national leaders may be unwilling to pay in all but the most desperate situations.
► Our Seaborne Logistic Forces: Our current and projected operations around the world depend on a fragile chain of civil and naval supply vessels. Op-
erating without escorts, our support forces for battle groups travel around the world on the supposition of international goodwill and the hint ot a Pax Americana our naval forces provide. Even in a regional conflict, however, this protection would be thin. 1 he Soviets are aware of the fragile nature of our logistic support, and in the event of an armed face-off, they can be counted on to strike at this weakness. We have built small ASW escorts (FFs and FFGs) with the notion that the biggest blue water threat to be faced by our supply lines will be posed by Soviet submarines. The Soviet CVBG makes the dangei faced by our sea-based support three-dimensional and requires a more sophisticated counter.
Balancing our notion of the Soviet carriei threat are systems and weapons that Soviet naval leaders have to worry about.
► Our F/A-18: Much maligned, but sound in the demonstrated performance, the tactical flexibility of our own strike-fighter will prove the final worth ot this aircraft. As a fighter, it can respond to the Soviet carrier-based threat by providing air cover tor out attack, ASW, and AEW planes or protection against a Soviet coordinated attack. In its strike role, it can take the war to the Soviet battle group. Most important, the F/A-18 can switch to either tasking with a word from the battle group commander. This of- fensive/defensive latitude, used with real-time tactical considerations, makes the F/A-18 a natural at countering the peculiar problems presented by a Soviet CVBG.
► Our Long-range Antiship Missiles: The aforementioned combined threat of Soviet tactical air and antiship missiles is a capability our forces can use as well. Tomahawk gives us the promise ot a similar capability and, given the poorer defensive systems of the Soviet CVBG, our own success at such tactics would overshadow Soviet efforts. Taking the concept a step further, we can project our resurrected battleships, armed with Tomahawks and Harpoons, into a support role for a carrier, as has been suggested for the Kirov. Whatever our eventual employment for tactical Tomahawk turns out to be by the time the Soviets deploy their CVBGs, the potential for such a long-range weapon is evident. The addition of 300-nautical mile Tomahawk range arcs would alter Figure 1.
► Our E-2C Hawkeye: Forget that it is ugly and as well armed as a Cessna 150, the “Hummer has proven itself the most valuable aircraft in the wing when it comes to providing a defensive perimeter for the carrier to operate behind. In the face of an opposing air wing, the E-2C will give us the vital first look at the Soviet CVBG and detect the launch of the Soviet CVW as well. Integral AEW will be the single largest advantage the U. S. CVBG will have over its Soviet counterpart. Add to this the E- 2C’s ability to detect surface forces and direct air strikes against them, and this sophisticated aircraft takes on a significant offensive role against the Soviet CVBG as well.
► Our Shipboard AAW Systems: The Aegis system and the complementary SM-2 Standard missile will be the basis for the combat systems of our major carrier escorts of the 1990s. Carried by Ticonderoga (CG-47) cruisers and the DDG-51s, this weapons technology will be most effective against the projected subsonic tactical air threat the Soviet CVW will be built around. Just as important to the C3I of our battle group will be the next generation of automated tactical data systems at the heart of the Aegis system. As more of our carrier escorts become members of the Navy tactical data system (NTDS) club, the Soviet ability to conduct both coordinated attacks and individual strikes against our CVBG forces becomes less threatening.
► Our Submarine Forces: U. S. submarine commanders will see the Soviet CVBG as a new source of targets. Professional hubris aside, our nuclear attack subs will prove essential in countering a Soviet carrier group. The best testimony as to the effectiveness of our tactical submarine forces is the emphasis the Soviets have placed on ASW. Despite this, the Soviet CVBG will lack integral long-range ASW cover; this shortcoming becomes more significant in light of the plans to arm our submarines with Harpoons and Tomahawks.
While it is fashionable to extol the tactical virtues of modern Soviet sea power and to decry the shortcomings (often more perceived than proven) of our fleet, the Soviet CVBG deserves a more measured perspective than this. Its coming is an obvious challenge to our naval capability, and the threat it represents deserves rational analysis.
But as long as we maintain the commitment to build and effectively use those systems capable of countering the tactical threat the Soviets’ CVBG has unveiled, the U. S. Navy will meet the challenge.
'Quoted in interview with San Diego Union, 28 March 1981.
!For a thorough look at the implications presented by Soviet SLBM ASW. see H. Caldwell. "The Empty Silo-Strategic ASW." Naval War College Review. Septembcr-October 1981. pp. 4-14.
3J. Moore, Jane's Defence Review. Vol. 1. No. 3. 1980. p.233.
JFor a complete discussion of our plans for Tomahawk, see P. Johnson. "Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactica! Mix." Proceedings. April 1982, pp. 26-33.
5Of course, the good news is that Soviet logistic forces are as vulnerable as our own; a protracted war at sea could place both sides in the position of attempting to starve each other out.
Commander McKearney graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973. A surface warfare officer, he has served in the operations and engineering departments in the USS Edson (DD-946), as operations officer in the USS John S. McCain (DDG-36) and USS Berkeley (DDG-15), and as first lieutenant/operations officer in the USS Alamo (LSD-33). Commander McKearney is presently a master's degree candidate in the operations research/ systems analysis curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.