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matine in the final phase of construc- tlon and perliaps some dozen more 601” series landing craft, few other combatants will probably enter serv- lce- Although there were reports that a new 2,980-ton class LS is under conduction, it seems that such design w,ll be offered for export only. Presently, the Yugoslavs are trying to increase their naval export trade. Yugoslavia delivered one 1,850-ton frigate t0 Iraq in March 1980 and one for Indonesia is to be delivered in 1981. Also “601”-class landipg craft and Wt/H-class river minesweepers have 6een offered for export, with three of tBe latter going to Iraq in 1979.
Albania: The Albanian Navy is a small coastal force, composed almost entirely of ’obsolete ships. The navy’s ma‘n task in peacetime is surveillance 0 'ts own coastal waters. In wartime,
Middle Eastern Navies_____
Charles F. Sills the naval forces would be employed to defend the coast. The Albanian Navy does not possess the capability to challenge superior enemy force. Many of its ships are not operational. Since all ships are either of Soviet or Chinese origin and Albania has poor relations with both, the problems of maintenance and repair and supply with spare parts must be formidable.
With the exception of 35 “Hu Chwans,” which arrived in the early 1970s, and 6 “Shanghais," which arrived in 1974-75, all vessels are more than 20 years old and many, particularly the “Whiskey’’-class submarines, may be non-operational.
As for the future, there is little- prospect that the Albanian Navy will acquire new ships or modernize the existing ones unless the present policy of the government changes radically, that is to say by beginning a rapprochement with either the Soviet
Bloc countries or the People’s Republic of China.
.Often Western observers overemphasize the significance ot the number ot ships and personnel when analyzing the Warsaw Pact navies. Too little attention is paid to such factors as number and quality ot ships in operational service, quality ot training, system of command and control, morale, discipline, etc. It should be emphasized that in some important respects the quality and reliability ot Western-made arms and equipment are far superior to Soviet ones. More significantly, NATO training standards are generally stricter than those in the Warsaw Pact navies. Nevertheless, despite the many deficiencies that exist, the Warsaw Pact navies must be taken seriously. By their very existence and size, they play an important role in enhancing Soviet naval capabilities both in the Baltic and Black seas.
This past year, in the Middle East/ °uthwest Asia theater, political- ^'litary attention was largely focused the “Gulf War,” the Iran-Iraq con- r°ntation. Although primarily a Stound and air struggle, naval en- 8agements have played a significant Part in this conflict especially in regard to reciprocal destruction of key ®c°nomic assets such as shoreline oil- andling facilities.
Accurate reports of actual perform- atlce on the part of the Iranian and ra8> navies in these battles and raids arc hard to come by; both countries tfcnd to inflate the good news and Understate the bad. But it is certain tBat a significant amount of unit attri- |>on has occurred on both sides. The ranian Navy, less affected by Kho- rrie'ni’s revolutionary purges than its Slster services, proved itself able to Perform innovative war missions fairly arnaging
to the enemy; while the Jaqi Navy has been held more to home . asts and did not venture appreciably 0pen-sea engagements. But if the Ranian Navy has been effective against ra4, the present spare parts shortages
and, even more importantly, the wholesale cancellation of procurement of new units have frozen it in development and capability, and it can no longer pretend to have any extra-Gulf reach.
Saudi Arabia, still deep in the slow-moving Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), has realized'that vast amounts of funds spent for base facilities and future weapons cannot defend it against the present threat to its coastal oil installations from Iranian air and naval forces. The manning- and skill-level situation in the navy, as in all Saudi services, remains critical. Of the smaller Gulf countries, Oman seems the likeliest to develop, eventually, a proportionately significant naval arm; its mission is tied into Hormuz Strait right-of-way defense.
Egypt is in the midst of its ambitious force modernization program, working to transform its inventory from Soviet bloc-supplied equipment to Western sources. Fortunately, with the Camp David Peace Accord a reality at least for Egypt and Israel, there are no present threats of any magnitude. Sadat has his own ideas about the perimeters of Egypt’s security however, and the police role he would like the Egyptian armed forces to play in the region. Egyptian base expansion will likely proceed with U. S. assistance, linked to the quid of staging base support for the American Rapid Deployment Force. Elsewhere in North Africa, Libya's Qaddafi continues to cause mischief; Tunisia does not need a credible armed force so long as the French continue to keep the former protectorate under their defense umbrella; and Morocco’s preoccupation continues to be with the desert land war against the Polisario guerrillas.
Israel’s navy remains adequate for its defense needs, which is fortuntate, because triple-digit inflation is adversely affecting military procurement across the board. Syria’s new Treaty ot Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union will likely result in the U.S.S.R. benefitting more in terms of enhanced access to Syria’s ports than Syria will from increased Soviet assistance to the Syrian Navy.
In the eastern sector of Southwest Asia, India is continuing its large- scale naval expansion, boosted by a massive 1980 arms purchase agreement with the U.S.S.R. Concurrently, New Delhi pursues its rhetorical policy of seeking great power naval withdrawal from the Indian Ocean.
Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula
Iraq: Although Iraq has long been anxious to be recognized as a Persian Gulf naval power, the Iraqi Navy has traditionally been responsible for maintaining only coastal and inland waterway patrols, with no major combatants in the inventory. Since Iraq has only a 40-mile coastline and because none of its naval facilities enjoy unfettered access to the Gulf, it has not experienced the rapid growth and modernization enjoyed by the other services in recent years. Iraqi naval personnel represent only 3% of Iraq’s total armed forces strength.
Despite Iraq's 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and despite the fact the U.S.S.R. remains first on Saddam Hussein’s list of military hardware suppliers, Hussein is gradually distancing himself from the Soviets. This is especially true in the area of naval procurement. Iraq’s first major acquisition has been the 1,850-ton training frigate I bn Khaldum, commissioned at Uljanic Shipyard, Yugoslavia, on 13 March 1980. This ship is CODOG- powered by a combination of one Rolls-Royce Olympus gas turbine and two MTU diesels and is armed with a Bofors 57-mm. gun and nine smaller guns. Her intended purpose is to supply seagoing training for about 100 cadets. Having arrived in Iraq before the war with Iran began, she now appears to be bottled up at Basra.
The major acquisition program, however, has been the order for six “Wadi”-class 673-ton corvettes, four 2,525-ton Lupo-class frigates, and two Stromboli-class 8,700-ton oilers from Italy. The corvettes are to be similar to those recently delivered to Libya but with six (instead of four) Otomat missiles and a possible lightweight Aspide surface-to-air missile system in the armament package. The Lupos each require two General Electric LM- 2500 gas turbines for their CODOG propulsion plants, and the sale of these has been embargoed in an on- again, off-again sequence of contradictory statements from the United States. (One report indicates that two engines were shipped prior to the embargo.) Delivery of any or all of these ships is obviously well in the future and will depend on Iraq’s future economic status.
Recent deliveries include three
Neltin-chss river minesweeper/gun-
boats from Yugoslavia in 1979, and a fourth 1,150-ton “Polnocny-C” landing ship in 1979. A navy-manned presidential yacht of 2,000 gross registered tons was ordered in Denmark in 1980, and a Dutch yard is building a diving tender for the Iraqi Navy- Losses among the existing Soviet-supplied combatant forces are unconfirmed, but prior to hostilities 3 “S.0.1” subchasers, 8 “Osa-II” and 6 “Osa-I" missile boats, 10 “P-6” tor' pedo boats, 4 “Zhuk” and 2 “Poluchat-1” patrol boats, 2 “T-43^ minesweepers, and 3 “Yevgenya minesweepers, and a number of support craft were in service.
Iran: It remains to be seen whether the Gulf war has convinced the Ira' nian leadership of the critical need t° maintain and expand the Iranian Navy. After ail, the war was started by Iraq’s abrogation of the Shaft al- Arab waterway treaty, and a strong navy will be vital if Iran seeks to defend its Gulf coast military and oil in' stallations in any future conflict.
1. Algeria | 7. Iraq | 13. Morocco | 19. South Yemen |
2. Bahrain | 8. Israel | 14. North Yemen | 20. Sri Lanka |
3. Bangladesh | 9. Jordan | 15. Oman | 21. Syria |
4. Egypt | 10. Kuwait | 16. Pakistan | 22. United Arab Emirates |
5. India | 11. Lebanon | 17. Qatar | 23. Tunisia |
6. Iran | 12. Libya | 18. Saudi Arabia |
|
What is certain is that the Shah s vision of Iran as having a “world role as guardian and protector of 60% 0
'■he world’s oil supplies”—and the Iranian Navy as having an expanded role in executing this Persian Gulf/ •Arabian Sea policeman policy—is dead. It is difficult to remember that 'he Shah once contemplated the purchase of a British-designed mini- 'arrier/through-deck cruiser for V/STOL aircraft. The final 3 of 12 ”La Com- attante-II” class, Harpoon-armed rniss‘le boats have been embargoed in France, more than two years after their Slsters were delivered and, perhaps for- Cunately, only 12 Harpoon missiles ever arrived in Iran. The 33,000-ton rtplcnishment oiler Kharg was com- Plcted by Swan Hunter in England on '5 April 1980, and her present status ls uncertain. Two of four further '■'^gaw-class landing ships were can- ^Hed in March 1979, but Lavan and ‘“nb have been completed by Yarrow at Glasgow. The return of the 52 • S. hostages may permit all these sh‘ps to be delivered, but how they "hi be paid for is uncertain.
Now, the Iranian Navy’s capa- 1 ’ties and operating range arc severely restricted. Except for the sporadic special raid operations against ra9' facilities, Iranian naval activity as not approached prerevolutionary levels. Larger combatants remain ^°se to home ports. All the U. S.-, fitish-, and French-built vessels are fclieved to be lacking in spare parts a,1(J maintenance. Even in terms of ran s ability to blockade or mine the 0rmuz Strait, its three former U. S. c°astal minesweepers are in dubious c°ndition, and even if they could be Fut to sea, their magnetic signature °uld likely be too high for them to
safely sweep mines.
Finally, the new naval base at Chah Bahar, which was to be the centerpiece of the navy’s outreach into the western Indian Ocean, remains unfinished, and it is difficult to see how, in light of Iran’s present economic situation, work could resume even if the government wanted to develop a significant naval arm.
Saudi Arabia: Since the Saudis have come to fear the Ayatollah Khomeini s anti-monarchist Islamic revolution as the principal external political threat, they sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Thus, although Iraq is not now perceived as a threat to Saudi Arabia as it used to be, Iran has now become a direct military threat precisely because of Riyadh’s support for Baghdad. And since the Iranian leadership has publicly threatened to take military measures against Saudi oil facilities in reprisal for their alliance with Iraq, the Gulf war has driven home to the Saudi royal family the vulnerability of the country’s chief economic assets on the Gulf shoreline. This concern over possible Iranian air or naval strikes was indicated in the Saudi request for U. S. E-3A AWACS support.
This concern has also reinforced the decision to expand the Saudi Navy. The current Saudi Navy and that fleet ten years from now will be radically different. Not only are the first 13 gas-turbine powered patrol units ordered in the United States in August 1977 supposed to enter service in early 1981, but a massive new acquisition program from France has been announced. The French contract, signed in May 1980, calls for construction, training, and logistic backup for four 2,000-ton frigates, two 11,000-ton underway replenishment ships, 20 AS-366 Dauphin helicopters (each capable of carrying four AS-15 antiship missiles), four search and rescue helicopters, and two Atlantic-II maritime patrol aircraft. Three of the frigates will be built by CNIM La Seyne and the other by DCAN, Brest. All will reportedly carry eight Otomat antiship missiles, a Crotale SAM system, a 100-mm. lightweight gun, two ASW torpedo launchers, and a Dauphin helicopter. Rumors have also surfaced of later orders to be placed for two 4,000-ton frigates and a repair ship.
The U. S. program for Saudi Arabia has already resulted in the delivery of four ”MSC-322”-class minesweepers in September 1979, four utility landing craft in 1976, eight “LCM-6” landing craft (four each in 1977 and 1980), and two large harbor tugs in 1975. The four “PCG-1” and nine “PGG- l”-class combatants constitute a more formidable capability, however. The 815-ton full load PCGs will have eight Harpoon missiles, a 76-mrn. Mk-75 gun, provision for the Vulcan/Phalanx close-in defense system, and two sets of triple Mk-32 tubes. Their nine smaller compatriots will have four Harpoons, the 76-mm. gun, and provision for Vulcan/ Phalanx, but no ASW’ capability. Both classes are powered by a single LM-2500 gas turbine rated at 16,500 horsepower and two 2,000-h.p. MTU diesels in a CODOG arrangement driving two controllable-pitch propellers. The 384-ton PGGs will be able to achieve 38 knots, while the PCGs will be capable of 30.
r°ceedings / March 1981
41
Oman: Having successfully quieted the Dhofar rebellion (with Iranian and British help), the Sultan of Oman’s
ered in June 1979. Recently deliverer*
(1978), and two “Zhuk”-class parr1
oi
Exocet SSMs hate been installed on two of the Omani Navy's patrol boats (A1 Mansur, right).
armed forces can be considered fairly well battle-tested. Qabus himself is a Sandhurst graduate and thinks in geo-military terms. His inclination is to ally himself with the United States and with regional moderates in order to safeguard the stability of the Gulf, at the mouth of which Oman is so strategically placed. In June 1980, the United States and Oman exchanged diplomatic notes providing for security cooperation, including U. S. access to refueling storage facilities at the port of Muscat and the island of Masirah.
For its part, Oman is to develop its naval patrol and minesweeping forces so as to contribute to the defense of the Strait of Hormuz. Since last May, a new Omani naval base has been in operation at Jazirat al-Ghanam (Goat Island), an old Royal Navy wartime signal station which lies off the Omani portion of the strategic Musandum Peninsula adjacent to the Hormuz Strait shipping channels. The base consists of a naval garrison, patrol boat dock, airport, and radar station, and is designed to function as the chief surveillance/defense anchor on the southern shore of the Strait. Facilities on the Musandum mainland are also being upgraded. Because of lack of resources, the radar set in operation on Goat Island was cannibalized from one of the small navy boats, and is the only set carrying out complete surveillance of the Strait. A slave radar installation is to be built on one of the Quoin islands, and will be connected to the Goat Island station.
A single large missile boat was ordered in 1980 from Vosper Thorny- croft, Portchester, (possibly a nearsister to the Egyptian Ramadans) to be armed with four Exocet missiles and a 76-mm. Oto Melara gun. The unit will replace the Al Busbra, lost in 1978 while returning from a modernization in England as deck cargo. The Al Bushra’s six surviving 37.5-meter sisters have a mixed armament, with the final three carrying an Oto Melara gun, and Al Mansur and Al Nejah now each carrying two Exocets and a twin 40-mm. gun. By far the largest Omani warship is the 2,000-ton landing logistic support ship Al Munassir. delivered in 1979 and also equipped with an Oto Melara gun. Besides these, there are a large number of small logistic support landing craft built in Britain, a 1,380-ton cargo ship, and some support craft.
Nevertheless, the Omani Navy is stretched to the limit in its endeavor to actually patrol the Strait, as well as Oman’s 1,250-kilometer coastline. And the new equipment purchases will delay the Omanization process in the navy, as British expatriate contract officers and upkeep personnel will be required to maintain and even run these craft at least in the initial stage.
Kuwait: Another new West German customer, Kuwait, has on order eight missile boats from Liirssen, the first to be delivered in mid-1982. Six of these are reported to be of the “TNC-45” type purchased by the United Arab Emirates, and two may be of a larger 57-meter, 400-ton design like the three “FPB-57” class delivered to Nigeria in 1980-81. All are to carry four Exocets, the ever-popular Oto Melara 76-mm. gun, and a twin Breda 4()-mm. antiaircraft gun, and the electronics systems will come from the Netherlands. Existing Kuwaiti assets are of British origin.
Bahrain: Bahrain has turned to Liirssen in West Germany for the first sizeable combatants for its coast defense fleet and has on order two “TNC-45” class, Exocet-armed patrol boats and two “FPB-38”-class gunboats. The “TNC-45s" are to be delivered in 1983-84, while the two “FPB-38s” were to arrive early in 1981. These 188-ton, 38.5-meter boats are to have a platform capable of accepting a Lynx helicopter and will carry one 40-mm. and one 20-mm. cannon. The ten patrol boats now in service were built in Great Britain in 1974-75 and range in size from 10 to 26 tons full load.
Qatar: In September 1980, an order was placed with CMN, Cherbourg, f°f three “La Combattante-III”-cIass missile boats to duplicate the units of that class being built for Nigeria. Armed principally with four Exocet missiles, the first of the 425-ton craft is scheduled to be delivered in mid- 1983- Currently in operation are six 120-ton patrol boats built by Vosper-Thorny- croft in 1975-76 and 29 smaller patrol craft, only two of which displace more than 13 tons.
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.): The Baniyas and Marban, the first of f°ur “TNC-45” missile boats ordered from Liirssen in West Germany, were de!iv' ered in August 1980. These are the first warships to mount the ne'v MM-40 version of the ubiquitous Ex* ocet missile; each boat has four cyl*n' drical launch tubes, which at fifSt glance resemble Harpoon canisters- Also in the armament suite of the 255-ton, 44.9-meter ships are an Oto Melara 76-mm. gun and a-twin Breda 40-mm. weapon.
South Yemen (People's Democratic public of Yemen): South Yemen is more favored by the U.S.S.R. than its northern Yemen neighbor, not the least because of its superb port at Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea- The South Yemeni Navy consists entirely of Soviet-supplied units, the largest of which is a Polish-budr “Ropucha”-class LST which was dehv' patrol combatants include a 900-t°n former "T-58” minesweeper confiS' ured as a corvette and delivered *n 1978, six “Osa-II”-class missile boats delivered in pairs (1974, 1979, and 1980), two “Mol”-class torpedo boats
l|
craft (1975). Two “P-6” class torpedo boats and two “S.0.1” subchasers delivered in the early 1970s may survivt also. In addition to the 4,400-r°n
Ropucha,” there are also four Polnocny-B”-class 950-ton medium landing ships and three smaller landing craft.
North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic): North Yemen has been supported by both the United States and the U-S.S.R. as sources for its small force °f patrol craft. The U. S. component consists of three 90-ton “Broadsword” class built by Halter Marine (New Orleans) in 1978 (but armed with Soviet Machine-guns and 23-mm. cannon after delivery). The U.S.S.R. donated two “Zhuk”-class 60-ton patrol craft ln the same year. Soviet contributions ^>ade prior to 1970 include three “P4 -class torpedo boats (now in poor condition), two landing craft, and a torpedo retriever which doubles as a Patrol boat. New Soviet small combatants are expected.
Jordan: Confined to the Gulf of ^8aba, Jordan’s six patrol craft were u'lt by Bertram of Miami, Florida, and include two 31-foot “Enforcer”- class built in 1958 and four 38-foot bnforcer”-class built in 1974.
steady source of military hardware. Equipped with Soviet arms for more than 20 years, Egypt found itself deprived even of spares for its grounded MiGs. More recently, Egypt’s participation in the Camp David Treaty led to the dissolution as a protest by its Arab partners of the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), composed of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Qatar. To assist in de- Sovietizing Egypt’s armed forces, President Anwar Sadat has turned mainly to the United States, Britain, and France. And the United States and U. K. have sponsored and funded a born-again AOI, the Egyptain Military Industrialization Organization (EMIO), under which the Soviet- developed dockyards at Alexandria will be modernized and expanded. Cairo wants the yard to be capable of servicing the Egyptian Navy, and the U. S. Sixth Fleet as well, rather than embarking on ambitious warship programs which would inefficiently drain the precious defense budget.
Sadat has sought to transform the Egyptian Navy from a heavy vessel one to a fast, sharp strike force. To this end, Vosper Thornycroft has launched four of the six Ramadan-class 260-ton diesel-powered missile gunboats ordered in September 1977, and the first should reach Egyptian waters by June 1981. Vosper is also involved in a most unusual "rebuilding” venture for Egypt, whereby six wooden, Soviet-designed “P-6’7”Komar” hulls built at Alexandria were delivered to England in 1978 for completion with Italian diesels, French missiles, and British electronics. These 80-ton “6 October’-class boats and the Ramadans carry Otomat antiship missiles (two in the smaller, four in the larger boats), while all have a new design electronics package from Marconi. The first of the “6 Octobers” ran trials in 1980.
Orders have been placed with Matra by Egypt for a truck-mounted coastal defense version of this Franco-Italian missile. Of the 12 “Whiskey”- and “Romeo”-cIass submarines, the “Whiskeys” are probably beyond restoration, but a number of European firms have been bidding to rejuvenate the half-dozen “Romeos” delivered by the U.S.S.R. in 1966-69.
Egypt has also ordered 6 Crestitalia “Aztec” 21-meter fiberglass patrol boats, and a further 36 may be acquired; these are all to be armed with the same twin Oerlikon A32 30-mm. guns as are used on the “6 October” class. Fourteen British "SRN-6” hovercraft were ordered in 1980 for patrol and mine warfare duties.
Most modernization work on the Egyptian Navy is being provided by France, Britain, and Italy. Nevertheless, U. S. yards will likely win their share of Egyptian naval contracts, given the considerable level of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits the United States has pledged to Egypt, $4 billion over the next five years.
The Camp David Accord resulted in the United States becoming virtually responsible for Sadat’s political survival and, hence, for the loyalty of the Egyptian armed forces, as equated with the viability of Egypt’s military hardware. Immediately after Egypt signed the treaty with Israel, Washington awarded Cairo a $1.5 billion military air package, and by now it is evident that the United States has made a nearly unlimited commitment to accomplish a heavy military buildup of Egypt, the only openly strong Arab ally in the Middle East for the time being.
The U. S. State Department plans to allow Egypt to use $ 18.2 million of its FMS credits to co-produce a dozen 65-foot Sea Spectre patrol boats. Most of the production will take place in the United States during the first two years of the program, and then shift to Egypt during the final two years of the project. U. S. and other military assistance will increasingly take the form of co-production or licensed production of key weapon systems in Egypt, as Egypt desires to be able to manufacture the bulk of its own military equipment. Which systems the United States will permit Egypt to buy or produce under license will depend in part on American arms transfers to Israel; since Camp David, Egypt and Israel are now inextricably linked in the U. S. arms export approval process.
It is important to view the massive American military assistance commitment to Egypt in the context of a developing political-military alliance, to include U. S. contingency and training use of Egyptian bases and facilities. A keystone of these arrangements is the projected Egyptian naval base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea, which Sadat would like the United States to finance at a cost of $250-300 million. In exchange, the United States would likely be able to use Ras Banas for Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) prepositioning and staging. Whatever agreements are finally concluded between Washington and Cairo concerning the RDF, it is certain that there will continue to be an increase in the frequency and scope of joint U. S.-Egyptian exercises, to include naval and marine operations, in the next several years.
Libya: Egypt’s major perceived military threat is presently Libya. Thus far, Sadat has restrained himself from dealing preemptively with Qad- dafi’s provocations, partly from the political reluctance to be seen as attacking a brother Arab state, and partly from the reluctance of Egyptian armed forces commanders to fight Soviet frontline equipment and possibly Soviet-bloc crews with Egypt’s obsolete equipment. Meanwhile, Libya continues to stockpile modern Soviet as well as European arms.
All four of the Otomat-armed, 630-ton Wadi Mragh-c\ass corvettes have now at last been delivered by CNR, Riva Trigoso, Italy. To this force are being added ten French-built
“La Combattante-II”-class, 311'ton missile gunboats from CMN, Cherbourg, also equipped with f°uf Otomat missiles. The last of ^ Soviet-supplied “Osa-11” missile boats was delivered in July 1980. The first of the French-built craft was scheduled to be delivered in December 1980 and the last should arrive in 1982. At that time, Libya will have no fewer than 27 ships and craft each armed with four antiship missiles, a formidable force for defense or mischief.
Three new “Foxtrot” submarines were delivered from Russia in 19^6- 78, but three more which the LibyanS expected to receive have failed to materialize. Efforts to purchase submarines from Spanish, French, West German, and Italian suppliers have failed to date, with Yugoslavia no" being the most likely to succumb to Libyan blandishments.
SPERRY Dl
Libya’s one frigate, the l,650-ton- 1973-vintage, British-built Dat As' sauari. was damaged by a bomb belo" the waterline in October 1980 while
at an Italian shipyard being refitted, repaired (from damage caused by her Crew on the delivery voyage in 1973), and rearmed. Albatros (the Italian ver- Sl°n of Sea Sparrow) is replacing the short-range Seacat SAM system, while our Otomat antiship missiles are e‘ng added and two sets of triple torpedo tubes (240 “Type-A244” homing torpedoes were ordered from taly in 1979) are replacing the Limbo mortar.
The Turkish contribution consists °h 14 German-designed “SAR-33” fast Patrol boats to be built at Taskizak shipyard and delivered at the rate of °ne every four months, beginning in '981, and 14 “C- 107”-class 600-ton ar>ding craft ordered from the same )"ard in December 1979. Poland deliv- ^red four “Polnocny-C”-class medium a°ding ships in 1977-79, but one A/ Qyis) was lost through fire at Sta >n September 1978; two larger arnphibious warfare ships, the 2,800- ^°n I bn Ouf and Ibn Harissa, arrived from France in 1977-78.
. fortunately, for peace and tranquil- lcy in the Mediterranean, Libyan naval Units are reported to be poorly main- ta'ned and poorly handled, but this c°ndition and general inexperience Cannot be expected to last forever. Tunisia: Tunisia’s small navy has ad no recent major additions, and the e«s pride, the 2,100-ton President °urguiha (ex-U. S. Thomas J. Gary "ER-326]) is showing her 38 years, he newest craft in service are two ^5-ton fast patrol boats completed in ctober 1977 by Vosper Thornycroft, ^hile in May of that year two Shanghai-II” gunboats arrived as ®‘hts from the P.R.C. Two 23-meter lt>erglass-hulled patrol boats were Under construction for Tunisia in '980 by Aresa, Arenys del Mar, hpain.
Algeria: The Algerian Navy
achieved considerable status in 1980 'V'th the acquisition of the largest hiissile-equipped patrol combatant of any African Navy and the arrival of the nation’s first major combatant. The “Nanuchka-H”-class Ras Hamidou arrived from the Baltic in July, and the 1,900-ton “Koni”-class frigate Mourad Rais arrived in Algiers on 20 December. Press reports indicate that a second “Nanuchka-II” is on order. Both the “Nanuchka-II” and the “Koni” are equipped with an SA-N-4 missile system for air defense. The Ras Hamidou, whose appearance duplicates that of the three Indian units of the class, also carries four “Styx” antiship missiles. Algeria already had eight “Osa-IIs” and three “Osa-Is” equipped with four “Styx” SSMs each, while some of the six “Komars” delivered in 1966 may still be serviceable.
Plans were announced in 1979 for an indigenous small combatant construction program to commence at facilities to be developed at Mers-el- Kebir. Construction of four missilearmed, 40-meter craft has been delayed however.
Morocco: Ships now in service in the Moroccan Navy are all of French origin, but France has been supplemented as a supplier by Spain. Bazan Shipyard, El Ferrol, now has under construction a 1,520-ton Descuhierta- class frigate ordered on 14 June 1977, the same day on which four Lazaga- class 399-ton missile patrol boats were ordered from Bazan, Cadiz. Progress has been slow, and the first of the Lazagas had yet to be delivered by the end of 1980. The Lazagas were each to be armed with four French Exocet antiship missiles, an Oto Melara 76-mm. gun, and a 40-mm. AA gun.
Eastern Mediterranean
Israel: The Israeli Navy continues to add new, indigenously constructed missile craft to its fleet, but older units are being sold abroad. One Re- shev (Sa’ar-lV), Romacb, completed in 1974, was delivered to Chile in December 1979, while a second was expected to transfer a year later. These have been replaced by Aliyah (commissioned in August 1980) and Guela (commissioned in December 1980), the first pair of a new Reshev variant equipped with a hangar for a Bell “Kiowa" helicopter which will be a reconnaissance and missile-targeting aircraft. These new craft displace nearly 500 tons full load and are 3-6 meters longer than the ten Sa'ar-lVs commissioned between April 1973 and May 1979- They are armed with eight Harpoon and four Gabriel-II antiship missiles, as well as one 40-mm. AA, two 20-mm. AA, and several machine guns. The six Sa’ar-II class, 250-ton missile boats, the earliest of the general type, are being equipped with EDO-780 series towed sonars and carry homing torpedoes to enable them to perform ASW patrol.
The first Grumman-designed “Super Flagstaff”-class hydrofoil was nearing the launching stage at Lantana Boatyard, Lantana, Florida, in late 1980. If successful, a further ten hydrofoils may be built at Israeli Shipyard, Haifa. Many of the smaller patrol types hurriedly acquired during and immediately after the 1973 war have been worn out, and in total numbers, the Israeli Navy is slowly sinking. But the addition of the new Aliyah variant of the Reshev series will permit over-the-horizon missile targeting for the 16 or more missile boats now armed with Harpoon.
Syria: After having had its losses in the 1973 War with Israel made good, the Syrian Navy has experienced little growth. Since the arrival of its two principal surface combatants, two export model “Petya"-class light frigates in 1975, the major additions have been two “Osa-II” missile boats delivered in 1978, and a further four such units in 1979. These joined an existing squadron of six “Osa-Is” and probably replaced the remaining wooden-hulled “Komars.”
Lebanon: Surprisingly, few of the small patrol boats which made up the
pre-1973-War Lebanese Navy have been lost, but all were quite elderly by the late 1970s. Accordingly, a number of small craft have been imported. These include two British Fairey “Tracker”-class fiberglasshulled craft, delivered in January and February 1980, and six 41-ton, 21- meter Crestitalia “Aztec”-class patrol boats, delivered by Ameglia of La Spezia in 1980.
Southwest Asia
India: Following the disruption in Iranian naval procurement, the Indian Navy is by far the most powerful in Southwest Asia in terms of equipment. And new construction and acquisition programs continue at a rapid rate. The carrier Vikrant has been refitted to handle the eight Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft to be delivered beginning in 1983. To further support its carrier capability, India reportedly purchased the British repair ship Triumph, a former carrier, which it plans to cannibalize to support the
Vikrant until a replacement, to be built in India, is ready. India also plans to expand its submarine force beyond its eight Soviet-supplied “Foxtrots.” A contract to build seven submarines of the "SSK- 1500”-class has been signed with Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, with the final five to be assembled in India. These submarines are probably similar to the widely employed “Type-209” class.
The Rajput, the first of three new- construction, heavily modified “Kashin”-class guided missile destroyers was delivered late in 1980. These ships differ from their Soviet Navy sisters in having four “Styx” missiles mounted forward and in having a helicopter hangar in place of the after twin 76-mm. gun, while twin 30-mm. AA guns are used in place of the 30-mm. Gatling gun employed on Soviet “Modified Kashins.”
The Godevari, the first of a series of at least three indigenously designed 3,500-ton missile frigates, was launched by Mazagon Dockyard, Bombay, on 15 May 1980. Employing the same steam turbine propulsion plant as used in India’s six modified Leander-class frigates, the new ships will have Soviet-supplied “Styx” and SA-N-4 missile systems and guns and will carry two British-built Sea King ASW helicopters. Taragiri, the fifth Leander, was commissioned on 16 May 1980 at Mazagon and her sister Uin- dhyagiri will complete the series in 1981. Both these latter units differ greatly from earlier Indian Leanders in having a large telescoping hangar aft for a Sea King helicopter, a Bofors twin 375-mm. ASW rocket launcher on the forecastle, and two sets of Mk-32 ASW torpedo tubes added. Delivery of “Nanuchka-II” missile corvettes from the U.S.S.R. ceased at three with Hosdurg in 1978, but two additional “Natya”-class fleet minesweepers, Allepy and Ratnagiri, arrived in 1980 to complete a series of six.
Despite Indian rhetoric about superpower imperialism—early in 1980, India proposed a Persian Gulf-Asian summit.conference to keep superpower rivalry out of the Gulf—the Indian Government continues its close arms procurement relationship with the Soviet Union. The May 1980 agreement with Moscow for $1.62 billion of military equipment is the largest of its kind ever made by India. Although the Indian Army will be the main beneficiary of the deal, the navy may receive additional equipment. Coming only six months after the Afghanistan invasion, this arms pact represents a major Soviet political achievement and calls into question the non-alignment stance of this linchpin Indian Ocean military power.
Pakistan: Profiting from the embargo on arms sales to South Africa Pakistan purchased two French-built Agosta-class submarines already °n order in November 1978. Of these, Hashmat (ex-Astraut) arrived at Karachi in October 1979, and HurtM1 (ex-Adventurous) in February 1980- Four U. S. Navy Gearing FRAM-l-clas5 destroyers have been acquired: TttfH (ex-1X'iltsie [DD-716]) and Taimur Epperson [DD-719]) in April 1977, and Tippu Sultan (ex-Damato [DD-87l])> and Tughril (ex-Henderson [DD-785]) °n 30 September 1980. Two additional Chinese “Hainan”-class 400-ton subchasers, Punjab and Sarhad, arrived in 1980 to join two sisters transferred m
1976. Eighteen “MC-55”-class fiberglass-hulled patrol boats were dehv' ered from Italy in 1979-80, and, with French assistance, a 250-ton degaussing craft was being built at Karach1
in 1979.
Bangladesh: Both former British frigates acquired in the mid-1970s are operational and may be refitted with Seacat short-range SAM systems from Great Britain. A program to acquire six 30-meter patrol boats has been announced.
Sri Lanka: Two Chinese “Shang" hai-II”-class patrol boats were transferred to Sri Lanka in November 1980 and join five sisters transferred *n 1972 and 1975. Construction of a class of 40-ton patrol craft continues at the Colombo Dockyard to replace the rapidly diminishing numbers 0 “101”-class, 13-ton craft built in Singapore in the late 1960s. With the demise of the old frigate Gajabahu 111 1978, the largest combatant now ‘n Sri Lankan service is the 2 10-ton torpedo tube-less “Mol”-class patrol boat Samudra Devi, donated by the U.S.S.R. in December 1975.