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Shipboard Fuel Economy--------
By Commander Richard W. Tripp, Jr., U. S. Navy
Improved shipboard fuel economy can be obtained without expensive programs or reductions in operations if ships and their engineering plants are operated with a better understanding of the factors which affect fuel consumption.
When a ship is standing by to answer bells—i.e., at zero speed—fuel is being consumed to provide hotel services and to operate the auxiliary machinery that supports the propulsion plant. As the ship thrusts her way through the water, fuel consumption increases to provide the power to the main engines and the increased load on the auxiliary machinery. The power required for propulsion is proportional to the cube of the ship’s speed. At low speeds, the fuel consumed reflects the energy consumed for hotel services and supporting auxiliaries and is strongly
influenced by the number of components in operation—e.g., one or two boilers. At high speeds, fuel consumption is dominated by the power required to drive the ship through the water. The most economical speed occurs between these two limits, at a speed where the fuel consumed for propulsion is about half of that for hotel services and auxiliaries. In order to determine a ship's most economical speed, the miles steamed per gallon of fuel must be plotted versus speed. Such a plot also shows the range of speeds for economical operations.
It is important to understand the distinction between fuel consumption as a function of speed and average fuel consumption as a function of average speed. The former means the instantaneous rate or the consumption rate for operation over a sustained period at that speed. Since fuel consumption is dependent on the cube of speed, the average consumption for operations at varying speed depends on the average value of the cube of the speed, which corresponds to a speed greater than the average speed. For example, if a ship steams at 15 knots for one hour and 25 knots for the second hour, her average speed is 20 knots, but her average fuel consumption corresponds to a speed of 21.2 knots.
When a ship’s schedule can be adjusted so that she can make a transit at her most economical speed, fuel consumption will be optimum. If the ship is constrained by her schedule to a higher speed of advance (SOA), it can be shown mathematically that the minimum fuel consumption occurs when the ship conducts the transit at the SOA required. Any operations conducted which require speeds above the SOA increase fuel consumption,
whether it be flight operations, cal training drills, or just g1
tacti-
etting
ahead of track. Operations such as eva
sive steering or zig-zagging
also
in-
the
crease fuel consumption because ship’s speed must be higher than SOA required.
Schedulers and planners of deet
erations can be
factors
important - ,
fuel economy. A well-planned sc ule, taking time and distance bet ^ events into account, can minimize ^ costly transits from one operating to another. With a reduced °Peratl1^ tempo, every underway hour musc used to maximum advantage. ^ ample, time spent entering and ^
areas should be reduced with reSP
effec'
tive if they are taken as a singl
-allc
ing port and transiting to °Pera^ct
to total time under way. Thus, days of underway time are most e^^
rather than periods.
broken
single ■ into sma*
If a ship has no need to cover { tain distance in a given time, the economical speed is the mim01^ speed practical. Depending ship and navigation consider* that could be steerageway or just ^ ing. With suitable anchorages, ing open sea, the commanding 0 has the option of anchoring- at-anchor fuel consumption *s
to
saving fuel, watches can be re^U ' j. and the crew gains additional e*P
than that for steaming. In addin°n
ence at anchoring.
Fuel costs should be consic ^ selecting platforms for missions ^ deciding how to carry out some Different ships, otherwise e9 jy suitable for a mission, consume ^
less
;idered
different amounts of fuel at the s
speed. A helicopter uses
much
fuel than a ship. Using a rru1
ok
of
j98‘
ls their raison d’etre, and al-
mm;
and
recovering aircraft with the
Carrier» — 7
_ s speed should be minimized in
j °f other units which use signifi-
Aty 'ess fuel at high speeds.
sh|p,sany speed, several factors affect a
her fres,stance to motion and thereby
bas Ut consumption. Hull fouling
era| Sl8nificant effect. Tests on sev- 1 frig
‘gates indicate the power re- t0 maintain 17.5 knots in-
dotted
Cte;
fro^ t0 ^ebver or P‘c'k UP cargo away a ship’s normal berth requires
^UC^lf^eSS tban us*n8 the ship
T 1
n addition to being the largest in- 1 ual fuei consumers in the Navy, « carriers greatly affect the fuel sumption of escorts and supporting Xl 1 iaries. Conducting flight opera-
ari^U®^ considerati°ns of aircraft safety training are paramount, many acss can be taken to reduce fuel con- saf ^tIOn w'thout affecting aircraft y or reducing flying time, j Unch‘ng aircraft in order of weight and°VeS ^ant efficiency. Launching
faum required wind over the deck cess-^ann‘n8 operations to avoid exe speed between launches is ims- ®nt' Even a 1-knot reduction in jncan result in significant fuel sav- mS’ ^ typical carrier consumes 14% |jn(^ at 21 knots than at 20
^bich ^SCOrts can fie 8*ven stations theC n0t require them to match de> Carner's course and speed. Ren- adi °US P°‘nts and times should be cc>nd' ■ ^ refiu‘re^ by changing wind ken ltl0riS’ with rendezvousing units speed"e^ 'nf°rrned- If the use of high renj bV °ne or more units to effect a ra._ e2v°Us becomes unavoidable, the
,av°r of
cantly
Pacjp about 2% per month in the Perio'C atlC^ '*><^° *n tbe ^c*antic. ,c waterborne hull cleaning to
reduce the buildup of marine growth is a current program. Maritime companies are using self-polishing copolymer paint with good success. Excess displacement is an obvious fuel consumer, but few naval ships have control over this except when ballasting. Trim also affects fuel consumption. David Taylor Model Basin tests of a typical combatant-type hull indicate that the power required for a given speed increased up to 4% with a trim by the stern of .22° and decreased slightly with a trim by the bow. Similar results were obtained during tests of a new LSD design. The effect will vary with hull form and draft. Since it was not investigated in the design of ships currently operating, trial and error must be used to determine a ship’s most economical trim. When steaming in shallow water, a ship will squat at high speeds. The same effect increases the power required to drive the ship before the squat becomes noticeable. For a frigate at 15 knots, the resistance becomes appreciable at 20 fathoms.
Excessive use of the rudder increases the ship’s resistance also. A properly adjusted autopilot permits slightly more course variation but uses less rudder than one which is over driven to maintain a steady course. Data from maritime companies indicate that an autopilot is a factor in fuel economy. Recent tests of an “intelligent” steering control system demonstrated fuel savings of approximately 1% over a well-adjusted autopilot. The implications of these results are that a poor helmsman will increase fuel consumption. It appears that autopilots on naval ships may be cost- effective because of fuel savings as well as reducing watchstanding requirements.
The foregoing has considered fuel economy measures outside of the propulsion plant and is independent of the type of propulsion plant. Although the following discussion applies directly to conventional steam plants, concepts can be used to improve propulsion plant efficiency in other plants. Within the propulsion plant, fuel economy measures are divided into four areas: operating modes, inefficient practices, maintenance, and water consumption.
Current guidance set forth in the Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) and the Propulsion Operating Guide (POG) will not help establish the most economical plant configuration. They were not designed with fuel economy in mind, and they do not recognize all modes of operation. In order to achieve improved fuel economy, many accepted engineering practices must be reexamined. In many cases, the most economical configuration requires the acceptance of some reduced plant reliability since it involves securing redundant components. In peacetime, with a pressing fuel problem, the decision needs to be made in favor of fuel economy. In any case, it rests upon the shoulders of operational commanders as well as commanding officers to establish the policies which govern plant configurations. The CNO or fleet commanders must provide guidance to subordinate commands as to what risks are acceptable in the name of fuel economy.
Although prediction of actual fuel savings is difficult, since plant efficiency is the result of the combined
iliary
haust is unloaded to generator condenser. When a - . ^ unable to steam auxiliary because
the amount of auxiliary exhaust ^ loaded, it indicates a plant whic operating very inefficiently. Stea modified main permits the ship t0
that
unitS
ex-
from
that
reducer. A ship
150/15
p.s.i.
tiom
in
Studies conducted on several ship5 dicate common problem areaSaj]ey bathing showers, laundry and operations, steam catapult water ^ tanks, and the dumping of con nated low pressure steam drains- installation of totalizing flow 10 ^ in specific circuits results m ^.[eS
flow'1
waj
.ret
effect of all components in operation, certain principles can point the way to improved fuel economy. As a rule, machinery is most efficient when operated at or near rated load. That means fuel economy is improved with configurations that use minimum equipment. Equipment is most efficient when it is in good material condition and operated at design conditions.
The biggest loss of energy in the steam cycle is in the condensers. This loss is minimized when they are operated at design vacuum with minimal condensate depression. Although many auxiliary turbines (e.g., main feed pumps) are called non-condensing, they act as condensing units when they contribute to the total auxiliary exhaust to the point that the exhaust must be unloaded to the condenser. Any unloading is costly in terms of fuel, since each pound of steam sent to the condenser means about 950 BTUs of energy are lost to the sea. Generally, actions which reduce the amount of auxiliary exhaust unloaded will improve fuel economy.
Single boiler, cross-connected operation—a common method of improving fuel economy—is a good example of a minimum equipment configuration. The boiler operates at a higher load with higher superheat temperatures. The main feed pump does not need recirculation flow, which represents wasted energy. Higher superheat temperatures mean less steam flow to turbines and therefore, less work needed by the main feed pump. The reduction in the number of auxiliaries operating, coupled with improved efficiency of those operating, decreases the amount of auxiliary exhaust unloaded. At 15 knots, a destroyer should improve fuel consumption by 15% in this mode.
For operations below standard speed, greater savings can be achieved by trailing one shaft. A steam turbine-driven ship can realize these savings only if vacuum can be broken in the main condenser. Since this means greater resistance to the freewheeling turbines, temperature limits may limit the maximum speed at which this is effective.
At speeds below the point where a second feed pump is needed, a standby pump is frequently kept idling, ready for rapid use. This is a good example of how reliability costs fuel. At low loads, any pump is inefficient. For example, a typical frigate’s main feed pump requires 3,600 pounds of steam per hour in this mode. When the direct and indirect costs of producing this additional steam flow are considered, this idling pump increases fuel consumption by 40 gallons per hour.
A main circulating pump is needed when the sea water flows through the main condenser because the ship’s motion is inadequate. The speed below which a circulating pump is required depends on water temperature and condenser condition. Although this speed could be as low as 5 knots, most operating procedures call for circulating pump operation at speeds below 12 knots. In this speed range, the steam required to drive the circulating pump is a significant percentage of total steam flow. A ship operating in the transition region can improve fuel economy by using the circulating pump only when needed. This can best be determined by the ship with a series of miniature economy trials in the speed range of specific interest.
Since the boiler is the point where the chemical energy of the fuel is converted into the thermal energy of the steam, it is crucial to good fuel economy. The efficiency of this process is reduced by the presence of scale or soot, air casing leaks, refractory problems, and an excessive amount of air. Excess air is that above the amount required for 100% combustion. Optimum combustion is achieved with 10% to 20% excess air. This is indicated visually by a brown haze and a yellowish orange or golden flame. As excess air increases above the optimum, fuel economy goes down significantly because of decreased boiler efficiency, lowered superheat temperature, and increased forced draft blower load. Recent ship checks by David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center, Annapolis, have determined that most ships are operating with 50% to 100% excess air to ensure they maintain a clear stack. During wartime, a clear stack may be necessary, but in peacetime, it costs
fuel and increases pollution throug inefficient combustion. The economy haze did not go away with disti at fuels.
“Steaming modified main means the main condenser has been Pla under vacuum and lined up to recei excess auxiliary exhaust. This requir considerable additional equipment^ ^ operation and results in higher consumption than “steaming aU where the excess auxiliary
turbine
ship |S
un-
nore the more basic problem.
Most ships are configured so heating steam for the distilling can be supplied from auxiliary haust, where it uses energy that w° otherwise be unloaded, or
uses the latter mode of operation P ^ vides the energy through inCf fuel consumption. This is about 1 8 Ion of fuel per 24 gallons of water tilled for direct energy costs. _j,e As energy conservation efforts progress, less and less “free en ^ from auxiliary exhaust will be a able for the production of w' Water conservation is therefore c allied with energy conserva
conservation for two reasons: it attention to the fact that water being measured, and it permits ^
management by identifying the ^
tion of frequent but irregular consumptions of water. i
Although it is apparent r poorly maintained plant will ^
efficient and consume more me one in good condition, it is le5S _,y what maintenance affects fuel ec the most. One area is the valve {
tenance program. Leaks, " „y
water or steam, represent
I
osses. The greater the volume and the *8her the temperature, the greater r e energy lost. Seat leakage, which is not readily visible, can be great and ^?use a significant loss of energy.
°mrnon examples are leaky augmen- t0rs or steam chest drain valves. In the area pump and turbine maintenance, the bigger the unit or the more U operates, the more significant mal- Performance becomes. Worn wearing rings and defective labyrinths are two Samples of energy-wasting maintenance items. Proper maintenance of the boiler and its controls are essential for good fuel economy. Anything which detracts from good combustion or operating at design pressure and temperature should be corrected immediately.
Significant fuel savings can be achieved by conscious, knowledgeable effort and planning. But, first, fuel economy must become everyone’s responsibility. All too often, the engineers see all of their fuel savings efforts wasted in excessive speed; a CO is forced to use high speed because of poor planning by an operational commander’s staff; and the operational commander places the blame on operational commitments.
Commander Tripp, an instructor at the Ship Material Readiness Course in Idaho Falls, Idaho, has served as engineer in the Tattnall (DDG-19), reactor control assistant in the Nimitz (CVN-68), and executive officer in the Bainbridge (CGN-25).
Navy-Marine Corps Pilot/NFO Attrition
B \ •
y ajor W. D. Jones, U. S. Marine Corps
es were sent to 4,300 active duty pj|o recently separated Marine 7<^tS an4 flight officers. Responses of the ' an<^ ^7% respectively indicate tyasltlterest in the survey. While it Ce gfatifying that such a large per- shn returne<f the questionnaires, it gra^S t*lat only 22% of company- tetj 6 resP°nflcnts intend to stay until 7§^ernent- This leaves a staggering ° who are either not certain of
'T’l
ne number of pilots and naval c officers (NFOs) on active duty in e Navy-Marine Corps has signifi- antly declined over the past several ^ rs- So acute is the exodus in the ar*ne Corps that it prompted the Nng Deputy Chief of Staff for Avi- *n February 1979, to issue the tjn°w‘ng statement: “We cannot cone to lose our dedicated and experi- cCe<a av*ators at the present rate and Currently maintain the tradi- q. a y high state of readiness of our rps. This adverse trend in aviator Coentlon’ st'h an area of foremost ofn^ prompted the Deputy Chief p, ^ta‘ for Aviation, Headquarters, se u ^ar'ne Corps, to undertake re- ^ >n this area by sponsoring, in tio^ ffie Marine Corps Opera-
>n n,S) Analysis Group (MCOAG) to aid sj Remaining those factors which of 1 1Cantly affect the career decisions ^P’lots/NFQs. The MCOAG distrib- „ . . 9Uestionnaires containing 95 in- Care'es at>out which most influenced er decisions, i.e., personnel man- r)0^nent' family, job content, eco- najrICS’ and benefits. The questioned their career intentions or who are definitely planning to leave the Marine Corps! What service can afford that loss of experience? What will this loss rate do to combat readiness? How can the Navy-Marine Corps counter this adverse trend in its aviators and NFOs? What will it take to keep “new blood” flowing, thereby giving the assurance that experience will be maintained and passed on?
The Marine Corps took one positive step by using the MCOAG study as a point of reference. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the formation of an ad hoc committee on 19 October 1979 known as the Aviation Officers Retention Committee (AORC) under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower to study the adverse trend of the pilot/ NFO exodus. The AORC was to develop specific recommendations, review current programs, and make initiatives for responsive management/policy issues. The AORC is comprised of representatives from all cognizant staff agencies and is studying the following five conclusions based on the responses to the MCOAG’s survey:
► Personnel management practices do not satisfy the basic needs of pilots or NFOs for a secure and rewarding career in which attention is paid to their individual problems and desires.
^ Any personnel policy or procedure that restricts the flying opportunities available to a pilot/NFO denies fulfillment of his need for self-expression, precludes job satisfaction, and contributes to attrition.
► Assignment policies should be revised to increase the career time (espe-
dally in early years) that pilots/NFOs spend in flying billets.
► Economic incentives (e.g., bonus or increased aviation officer’s career incentive) would reduce the attrition rate.
► Airline hiring contributes to (but not necessarily causes) attrition by providing an opportunity for dissatisfied pilots/NFOs to seek flying careers outside the Marine Corps.
The recommendations concerning the pilot training rate (PTR), increasing the minimum service requirement (MSR), proficiency flying (PF), and dual career paths need to be amplified.
The current PTR is not sufficient to provide the required number of pilots/NFOs to maintain combat readiness in the face of high and increasing dropouts. If the attrition rate is high because of “drop-on-request” (DOR) or “washout” because of academic or flight instruction failure, then the procedures for the selection of candidates in the input cycle must be changed to select only those individuals who have a high probability of completing the flight programs. The flight aptitude and spatial visualization tests simply do not contain a probability function which would indicate the individual’s ability to successfully complete the programs. This leaves the services with the alternative of increasing the number of recruits to realize the desired number retained, not a very cost-effective manner of selection.
The MSR should be increased in the Marine Corps to keep it in line with the Navy and Air Force. This MSR should be five years. The cost to train a naval aviator (in excess of $325,000) negates a shorter "pay-back” time and cuts into career material. The Navy and Air Force recently increased their MSR without experiencing an adverse effect on supply of pilots/NFOs.
PF should be reinstated without the requirements of annual minimum total flight time, night time, and instrument time. While studies have shown that PF does little to maintain flying skills, the cost involved to allow pilots in DIFDEN (duty involving flying denied) billets would be offset by the increased effects on retention. The MCOAG survey showed that of the
company-grade respondents 74% would be inclined to resign if assigned to a non-flying billet. Conversely, assignment to a flying billet would encourage 70% to remain. The same study showed that about one-third of the field-grade respondents considered that termination of the PF program had an adverse effect on job satisfaction and career retention. If a pilot/ NFO is assigned DIFDEN orders, and he/she is allowed to fly without the turmoil which is associated with meeting semi-annual and annual minimums, then those who can fly will fly. In most cases, the individual will meet or come close to the yearly requirement now stipulated by OpNav 3710.7. Reinstating the PF program would give the perception that the service cares about the needs and the desires of the individual. It would tend to show that the service does take care of its own.
An offshoot of the PF program is the dual career path. The Marine Corps prides itself on close-air support (CAS)—yet, the perception is that the Marine Corps does everything to stifle the development of proficient CAS teams by not allowing its pilots to fly or train using tactics developed by the Army and the Air Force. A dual path would allow those aviators who want only to fly, and not command, to do just that. It would make their primary billet Squadron Pilot/NFO and not Admin O, S/2, S/4, etc.
The last point, not covered in the MCOAG study, but inferred, is that the stiff competition between industry and the military for the limited supply of qualified male, college graduates causes the military to overlook a wealth of talented and dedicated career personnel, both male and female. To counteract this, we should reinstate the Naval Aviation/Marine Corps Aviation Cadet (NavCad/MarCad) programs. These programs can be reinstated and opened to active duty service personnel in the grades of E/s/e/6, male and female, who have not reached their 24th birthdays; have at least two years of college; passed the flight aptitude and spatial visualization tests; passed the flight physical; have a minimum of four years active duty; agree to a five-year MSR and a
commission in the Navy or Marine Corps upon successfully completinf flight training, or, must agree to tW° years of active duty pay-back if t^ie' DOR. Using a 24-year-old E/5 as a hypothetical case shows the following four years’ active duty; meets all c qualifications as stated above; ar* agrees to the pay-back. This indi'1 ual is ordered to flight training whR takes 18 months to successfully corn plete. This will give the individua five-and-one-half years’ active duty the end of flight training. Five yeajs of MSR give the individual ten-an one-half years’ active duty. DangkJ carrot in the form of 18 months 0^ “Bootstrap”* with a three-yt‘af Pa|, back now’ gives this individual ^ years active duty time. There are many individuals w’ho will sut) ^ their letter of resignation with years of active duty service, who been selected for augmentation
the regular Navy or Marine w’ho have made regular promo
into
Corp5 -
itionSi
one
and who are allowed to fly'. Hence has another solution to both the retetl[ tion problem and the recruitme problem with this individual. ^.f Companies which have shown
employees that a growth potem
con'
rvive-
ists within the company have
tinued to grow, prosper, and sur ^
The service can show its pers°nn
if the
that a growth potential exists individual will take the initiative apply himself or herself to develop ^ his or her fullest. Pay will not incre.^, to keep abreast of inflation; l,vl ^ conditions will not improve 1,111 faster; and benefits may continue
an1
d
decline. Therefore, the services m show they do care and do take care their own. Let us put the evi from the MCOAG study to use duce the Navy-Marine Corps P NFO attrition.
•Bootstrap is the name given to a college(0 pletion program for officers. For time , complete a degree program, the Par serves a pay-back tour.
. coif'
nder
After completing flight training un j e MarCad Program, Major Jones flew Pr0P i ^ fixed-wing aircraft, multi-engine tra”S pjo and helicopters. He is currently serving 3 gram Team Manager for the Air Traffic and Landing System.
9®1
Williamsburgh to the Prinsendam's Rescue.
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Thomas F. McCaffery, U. S. Naval Reserve
The greatest sea rescue of modern ^mes began on what had promised to
be
a routine mid-watch on 4 October
'980. The bridge watch, composed of
slrnsman, lookout, and the author (as 0 ficer of the deck), had just settled in "ben the radio auto alarm broke the 9uiet of the bridge at 0020.* The radi° operator called the bridge ortly after, with the position of a Passenger ship, M/V Prinsendam, appar- ntlV on fire. The Prinsendam's posi
tion
Arthi
was quickly plotted, and Master
tour H. Fertig was apprised of the
Ration. At 0035, the Wil-
,amsburgh's course was changed to as-
*lst the stricken vessel. The Wil-
Ian‘sburgh's estimated time of arrival
°k Scene at full speed was 0630,
s 0rtly after first light.
Th • •
tie preparations for this rescue op-
r®tion began on a low key. Voice and
‘otelegraph communications were
jjtablished with the Prinsendam, S/S
Jeat Land, and U. S. Coast Guard
^°tnrnunications Station Kodiak. The
Land, an American flag roll-on/
to Vessel, was released to proceed
identification of the Williamsburgh for the U. S. Coast Guard on-scene commander, circling above the Prinsendam in a C-130. Communications were established from the bridge with him on marine band VHF-FM (Channel 16) at this time. Around 0600, radar contact with the Prinsendam was established. The deck lights were extinguished shortly afterward, and the Prinsendam was sighted, silhouetted against the dawn, dead ahead. Shortly after our arrival on scene, a Coast Guard helicopter hovered over one of our two helipads to collect several of the limited number of fire extinguishers for use on the Prinsendam. This was, for the most part, the deck crew’s introduction to helicopter operations. At this same time, Captain Fertig began reducing speed for improved maneuverability. His plan was to proceed slowly up to the lifeboats and swing the ship to a southerly heading, providing a lee on the starboard side. The wind was easterly at 25 knots and a
5-foot sea was running.
The distance to the lifeboats was, at this time, too great for visual contact. They had drifted some distance away from the Prinsendam. as apparently no sea anchors were deployed on any of the lifeboats or rafts because of the lack of competent crew members in the boats. To assist in finding the boats, it was requested that a flare be fired from one of the boats. Finally, after some delay, a red flare was fired indicating their position south of the Prinsendam by some two to five miles.
The approach to the lifeboats proceeded at a deliberate pace, since a 225,000-deadweight ton tanker is not an easy vessel to handle. By 0700, a lee had been formed and a powered lifeboat was alongside. This was the only boat under power of the six lifeboats launched by the Prinsendam, except for a tender which was suffering engine troubles. It was not until 0722 that the first survivor stepped onto the deck of the Williamsburgh.
Anchorage, Alaska, because of
unsuitability for.a major rescue
ration. In conference with the master t-u .
and °e aut^or Prepared lists of rescue as ^re~f‘ghting equipment, as well v- B°tential berthing areas for sur- afV°rs' The Williamsburgh proceeded speed to the disaster area, with 'ef Engineer William Camacho and
h
er
The U. S. 1,000-foot oil tanker Williamsburgh was the first large ship to reach the stricken Dutch cruise liner.
U. S. COAST GUARD (D. COOK
• °St °f his officers and men on duty che engine room to obtain
>n
ax'rnum speed.
Jia^j H400, Captain Fertig ordered all th S °n duty- The crew remained in OffStatUS ^or rhe next 44 hours. Chief br jCCr Harry Rogers proceeded to the while the deck, engine, and and S dePartments were awakened informed of the situation. As the ai^ Degan bringing the limited tne] on rioi
°Unt of rescue gear on deck, the fcury vapor deck lights were turned
This
Os
not only aided the prepara-
°n deck, but provided positive
kite -II ■
^ ’ au tunes are Alaska Daylight Tim
e Ascription +9.
*>00
early
ely
The process of bringing each survivor aboard by Jacob's ladder was slow, and it quickly became obvious that because of this slow process, the lack of powered lifeboats, and Williamsburgh's lack of maneuverability, another rescue approach had to be found.
The flexibility and speed of the helicopters, combined with the stability of the Williamsburgh and her strengthened helipads, proved to be the most efficient method of rescue. From 0750 to 1530, U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Air Force, and Canadian Armed Forces helicopters arrived with survivors, medical personnel, and supplies. The Williamsburgh's deck crew quickly became adept at directing helicopter pilots onto this unfamiliar landing area and assisting survivors from the helos. Overhead, the C-130 had been joined by a Canadian Argus patrol plane. Both kept watch over the entire operation, guiding helicopters to boats and providing communications relays.
Survivors began to trickle aboard, most of them elderly and dressed in everything from tuxedoes and mink coats to pajamas and bathrobes. The steward’s department, headed by Chief Steward Robert W. C. Rutherford, escorted the survivors to the crew’s mess for hot coffee, soup, and dry blankets. They then moved to berthing areas in lounges, crew rooms, and passageways. Unfazed by the tenfold increase in demand on his department’s services. Chief Steward
Rutherford, seemingly without blinking an eye, fed and housed more than 400 people for a day and a half.
Seeing the need for a boat to rescue those in the four liferafts, Second Officer Kerry Horton, Second Assistant Engineer Paul Walker, A. B. Timothy Hagan, and Oiler David Kopp climbed into the first lifeboat which had come alongside and quickly had it operating. Under the command of Second Officer Horton, this boat proceeded to rescue survivors from the rafts which the helicopters could not reach because their rotor wash threatened the crafts’ stability. The boat's crew members continued in this effort until they were recalled by Captain Fertig at 1500 as they ran low on fuel in increasingly worse sea conditions. Even then, they were attempting to tow another boat to the Williamsburgh until the towline parted and could not be repassed.
U. S. COAST GUARD
Medical assistance during the ^ hours of the rescue was in extretn^ short supply, there being only £he thor in charge of the Willi‘>ms^ur^, small hospital and an elderly ^ tralian physician among the surVl.iliet already on board. Even at this potentially serious cases svere co ^ on board, including a caseafl d hypothermia treated by the authot^^ another suffering from smoke in .( tion. At approximately 1000, an Force C-130 arrived overhead wltn Force doctor Captain Donald *VJ -ng and five parajumpers. After con with the on-scene commander, lC decided not to drop these pe°P*e the water as planned, but to Pr°C^e to shore and return in Air Force re^ff,e helicopters. Upon their return, hours later, they joined three dian Armed Forces medics ^r°Upf. out by Coast Guard helicopter- Hudson and three of the parajon1
survivors in boarding the helicopter.
1300, the medical situation was ■mproving, with military and civilian radical personnel arriving from all 0ver Alaska. More potential emergences continued to arrive, however, as (he day wore on and the weather decorated.
n scene commander. The additional Cfchant vessels, while not as well ^’ted as the Williamsburgh for this QpCUe, were welcome assets in terms i.fm°rs eyes keeping track of te oats, lees available for helicopters o work in, and for an Air Force e^copter low on fuel, a place to land. 1^ y 1630, the majority of survivors a been either placed on board the
ftrnained on board while the others remained with their aircraft to assist
Despite the weather, the tempo of e ’copter operations increased until, * one point, helicopters were waiting or a clear deck. Thickening fog and a tismg sea hindered the search for eooats and the rescue of their occupants. Along with more helicopters a”d supplies, the afternoon brought ?°re ships, led by M/V Portland and o lowed by s/S Sobio Intrepid and S/S Canyon. The USCGC Boutwell "EC-719) arrived on the scene in the arlV afternoon to assume the duties of
Williamsburgh or flown ashore in helicopters returning for fuel. At this time, Captain Fertig requested to be released to proceed for the Straits of Juan de Fuca, 48 hours away, in order to continue in the general direction of our intended destination. Remaining on the scene were the Boutwell, Sobio Intrepid with an Air Force helicopter on her deck, Keystone Canyon, and Portland. In the air, a Coast Guard C-130 and two helicopters continued searching for the last two boats, each with a handful of survivors and one with two Air Force parajumpers on board. These were finally rescued by the Boutwell in the early hours of 5 October by homing in on the parajumpers’ radio in thick fog and rain.
At 1730, in the interests of returning the survivors to shore as soon as possible, the captain was ordered to reverse course and return to Valdez, Alaska, where it would be possible to deliver the survivors at dockside. Survivors began attempting to sleep wherever and however they could. The crew members of the Williamsburgh slept, when they could, on the decks, giving their rooms and beds to the survivors. Through the evening and into the morning, Dr. Hudson and the other medical personnel monitored the progress of the survivors, many of them in need of exotic medications which had not been available to them for almost two days by the time the Williamsburgh arrived in Valdez.
The survivors departed in a pouring rain and boarded buses and ambulances waiting on the pier in Valdez. Slowly, the elderly survivors left the ship escorted by stronger ones, some clad in crew members’ clothing, others still wearing what they had on when they left the Prinsendam.
At 2230, on 5 October, the last of more than 370 persons rescued by the Williamsburgh from the Prinsendam was ashore. The balance of the 500 passengers and crew had been either flown ashore by helicopter or were on board the Boutwell. During this operation, not a single fatality occurred. This accomplishment is perhaps best phrased in the words of Dr. Donald Hudson, “Considering the age and physical condition of the passengers, most of them would have died if not for the Williamsburgh and her crew.”
Lieutenant McCaffery, as the Third Officer of the Williamsburgh, was a watch officer or officer of the deck during the entire rescue operation described here.
B •
°eing’s Jet Foil Undergoes Royal Naval Evaluation
^ mes D. Ferguson
full ttlou8b extensively and success- °Perated by several Warsaw Pact fie 'eu an<^ a^so by that of the People’s tra^U be of China, hydrofoils have at- fernarkably little interest in tj0riest- A long U. S. naval evalua- <jeg Pr°gram is only now resulting in itt(jnit*Ve system selection, and limply ^taban operations have taken tfae.’ but otherwise the very real at- haytl0^S bail-borne vessels seem to nav^ betn ignored by Free World foil S' This is despite various hydro- StVerPa[0)ects having been studied by 20^ European navies during the thinkiCentUry' A change in tactical ar0u *ng may, however, be just W,hic|_ir^e corner, as the Royal Navy, ^dr f Carne<f out relatively low-key 0 °‘l trials during the 1940s, has recently spent some $12 million on the purchase and modification of a Boeing Marine Systems Jetfoil. Its operational evaluation is now well under way, with its potential suitability for a wide variety of tasks being assessed.
HUS Speedy (hull number 14 in the successful Boeing Jetfoil series), was ordered in mid-1978, and launched at Seattle, Washington, in July 1979- The ship was delivered to the U. K. some four months later. Royal Navy modifications were made at Vosper- Thornycroft’s Porchester yard, and included such items as the provision of crew accommodations, boats, radio and navigation equipment, etc. Following the successful completion of extensive builder’s trials, she was accepted by the Royal Navy on 3 June 1980, and formally commissioned 11 days later. On-board post-commissioning and shiphandling training took place over the next few weeks, being combined with a further period of technical trials. Speed and maneuverability parameters were recorded under a wide variety of weather and sea conditions; noise levels were monitored at numerous stations; and a beginning was made in studying some of the vessel’s unique characteristics.
With the Royal Navy’s Fishery Protection Squadron being tasked to oversee fishing activity around U. K. coasts, plus the surveillance of much of Britain’s extensive offshore oil installations, it was logical that the Speedy be assigned to this unit for her operational evaluation.
ship
weight and sea state (the compntatl1^ is very similar to that required pr*of.
large aif'
craft), and is between one and & minutes. Acceleration is smooth, an in many cases can be achieved witn personnel on board being aware or ^ transition. For this reason, and to a vise of significant deceleration r°r
This was scheduled to take six months, and she accordingly arrived at Rosyth Dockyard, on the Firth of Forth, last November to begin her program. The service is stressing that the Speedy is no more than a trials vehicle, having been minimally modified from the basic Jetfoil design. Her suitability for all aspects of the offshore patrol task will be critically assessed, with special attention being paid to her behavior in the exacting weather conditions commonly encountered in typical operating areas. On completion of this program, the ship will undergo further evaluation in a number of alternative roles—mine countermeasures, strike, etc.—and the outcome will be the compilation of a complete hydrofoil operational package. Future British hydrofoils could be built under license in U. K. yards, but the Ministry of Defence is pointing out that the Speedy represents only one aspect of Royal Navy interest in unconventional ship systems. A hovercraft unit has been operational for some years, and its activities have taken it to a wide variety of climatic regimes, and other surface-effect-ship projects are under consideration. An additional benefit from the Speedy's operation evaluation is the likelihood that material would be made available to other NATO navies, and there can be little doubt that Boeing will use British operational experience in refining its future development programs.
Unlike most comparable systems, the Jetfoil design uses submerged foils, these giving a far smoother ride, and allowing her to operate at higher speeds in much worse weather conditions than conventionally designed craft. Computer-controlled flaps on foil trailing edges use sensor inputs to retain a constant immersion level and also maintain the vessel’s one-degree, bow-up pitch angle. This effectively prevents the vibrating motion associated with surface-effect foil types, and its passenger appeal is a major part of Jetfoil's considerable commercial success. All hydrofoils are subject to varying degrees of weather limitation and a significant part of the ship’s evaluation will study this vital operational parameter. Current Fishery Protection Squadron thinking sees a wave height of between 12 and 15 feet as a notional limit, with swell length having to be taken into consideration. The operational evaluation will also study the military application of the commercial Jetfoil procedure of putting the sea on one or other bow, and then beating up in short legs to make good a given base course. This allows for foil-borne operation in sea and sw'ell states which w'ould otherwise be over limits.
Civil Jetfoils have no means of propulsion apart from their twin gas turbines, but HMS Speedy has been fitted with two Allison G.M. diesels to provide an alternative hull-borne capability, as well as a means of extending her range. The two 3,780 s.h.p. Allison 501-KF gas turbines each drive a 24,000 gallon-per-minute water pump, with inlets being located in the foils, and which have movable “buckets” to provide an astern capability. A bow thruster provides control in the athwartships plane during berthing and slow-speed turning. The docking switch, or splay facility, which sets the deflectors at varying angles from 12° to 24°, in conjunction with the engines providing a turning moment, produces the athwartships
Length 30.78m. (Foils up)
27.43m. (Foils down) Beam 9.14m. ..
Draft 5.18m. (Hull-borne, foils
down) ..
1.83m. (Hull-borne, fo*ls up)
2.40m. (Foil-borne) Weight 117 ton (Full load)
Speeds 47 kt. (Max.)
42/45 kt. (Cruise)
10 kt. (Diesels)
Range 550nm. approx.
Complement 18 (5 Officers, 4 CPOs’
9 Junior Ratings)
control and resultant sideways rn°ve ment during berthing.
Time from hull- to foil-borne °Per
ation is a variable dependent on the takeoff or landing of any Iarge
which can be experienced during sori1^ types of reversion to hull-borne °Pe(^ tion, all transitions are advised in a vance on the ship’s internal broad system. Special crew-safety proced have also had to be devised for crai reversions. While hull-borne operatl0^ generates a moderate wash, foil-b0 ^ operation does not, and port
thorities have permitted Jetfoil s to Proceed at full speed on waters as con- lned as London’s River Thames. This Permits high-speed operation in close Proximity to other vessels.
On her near-400-nauticaI mile pas- Sagc from Portsmouth to Newcastle-
0n-Tyne, the Speedy established a host records by taking approximately ten °urs port to port. As this included a rict hull-borne spell for personnel transfer, her average speed was more £ an 40 knots. Evidence of her value ^°r fishery patrol operations came from er first Rosyth-based patrol, during w *ch she made 44 fishing vessel Slghtings, 30 of which took place in a|r hour, and her semi-rigid inflatable k 8hles were used to carry out two ^ardings. This performance was 0ut twice the going rate for conditional fishery protection offshore atr°l vessels in the same period, and Was achieved with nenced crew.
a relatively inexpe-
With
weight being critical for op-
tium foil-borne performance, the f >' is unarmed, and Royal Navy S0Ufces advise that
low
S.
Ri
no weapons
fit is
contemplated. Fishery Protection ^iadron experience is that mere
'jyal Navy presence is enough to recompliance with instructions,
sult m
and
ays no l
c°u^ld hydrofoil developments
Pack;
pla niSht-stick-happy” policing Ro> 1°° Part ‘n their thinking. Future
well include a limited weapons age, but probably not more than 'ght automatic gun or missile
mounting. A small number of crew personal weapons would also be carried, but Royal Navy boarding parties are uniquely and traditionally unarmed, save in the most exceptional circumstances.
The Speedy has an endurance of about 14 hours, which translates into a range of 500 to 600 nautical miles. This does away with the need for extensive crew accommodations, and in fact, her facilities for both officers and ratings are Spartan. Most nights, she would be berthed alongside, with her crew living ashore, and if need be this could be done on a detached duty basis from civil ports. The need for full-standard accommodations is one which will have to be carefully assessed for any future Royal Navy hydrofoils, especially if they are larger and more sophisticated, with bigger complements.
Her high speed makes the provision of adequate navigation equipment of paramount importance, and some of her bridge gear seems more suitable for airliner use than on board a small warship. She is controlled from the wheelhouse by an aircraft-type control column, and in aircraft fashion, takes up steep bank angles in turns. Unlike conventional vessels turning tightly at high speed, the Speedy only loses 1 or 2 knots, with a 180° radius of less than 400 meters. Again, unlike her conventional counterparts, she is physically steered by an officer, who has direct access to engine and foil con
trols for one-station handling of all maneuvers. Her operations room is located immediately below the wheelhouse, and houses the very successful Computer-Assisted Navigation Equipment system as fitted to all other offshore patrol vessels. Her radar is a Decca 1226 set, with a specially built display, and her prime navigational system is the Decca Mk-l4. A proposal that some form of satellite navigation system be fitted as a replacement to the Decca is under consideration, with the eventual outcome probably being the selection of one of several recently developed systems.
Progress through the initial stages of the operational evaluation has generated a considerable amount of enthusiasm and determination among her ship’s company and fishery protection staff to make the project work and establish the offshore hydrofoil concept as a viable defense system. According to First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, “HMS Speedy represents a major step for the Royal Navy in the field of small, fast-moving vessels. ... It is obviously too soon to draw any firm conclusions, but the Service would not have procured the ship for trials and evaluation unless it was felt she had good potential.”
Mr. Ferguson, the Northeast Scottish Correspondent for Flight International and Aviation News, is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
0
B
Ur Expatriate Navy
y Samuel L. Morison
hsti^hat follov
shi arranged alphabetically by
N; ^
I.- . "“l ‘oiiows is the first part of a lstinc v
ft
av C*ass'^'cation, of every U. S. r ^ and Coast Guard ship
Jat0 another country between 1 th "Q"’
uary 1970 and the present. Only
hu11C S^*PS and craft that carried Navy are nurnbers, at one time or another, activ'nC.luded- Most of them are still 'n their respective navies.
6 bei^6 are s'x rrtocics”—see column tfan . 'v by which ships have been c‘Pie trre^' "fihey are: (1) Sale: The rent country buys the ship and re-
ceives title to her or a foreign country contracts with a shipyard, foreign or U. S. to build a ship(s). It pays the fees, but the United States provides technical assistance and a lot of the ship's equipment; (2) Loan: The United States retains the ship’s title, and the recipient pays all the operating, maintenance, and other costs. A loan is on a government-to-govern- ment basis; (3) Grant Aid: The recipient country receives the ship in lieu of a stipulated amount of money, but the United States retains title and pays for
all activation, modernization, etc. costs; (4) Lease: Similar to a loan, but it is on a Navy-to-Navy basis (with U. S. Government approval), and the United States retains title; (5) OffShore Procurement (OSP): A vessel is built in a foreign yard, but the United States pays half the construction costs. All vessels built under this mode are assigned USN hull numbers for accounting purposes; and (6) Spec: Those ships transferred to recipient countries by means other than five methods previously specified.
In some cases, ships have double entries. This is usually because ships were originally leased to a country and several years later sold to the country (or in the cases of the patrol craft tenders [AGPs], served under more than one foreign flag). Ships indicated as sold, with only single-line entries, were either loaned or leased, in the 1950s or 1960s or sold to the recipient country straightaway. In some double entries, the foreign name on the second entry may differ from the first entry. The foreign name/pendant number indicated is the one the ship wore on the date of the indicated transaction. If it differs from the previous entry, it is because at the time of the second entry the foreign country had previously changed the ship’s name. On 30 April 1975, the government of South Vietnam surrendered to North Vietnam. For those South Vietnamese naval ships that were captured that is the date used in the transfer column.
Note: USNS before a U. S. name indicates that the ship served with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) before transfer. USCG before a U. S- name indicates that the ship served m the U. S. Coast Guard before transfer- A — in the U. S. name or foreign name column indicates that the ship has no U. S. or foreign name. If only a number appears in the Foreign Name/Pendant Number column, rbe ship only had a pendant number a5 signed.
U.S. Transfer Recipient Foreign Name I
Hull No. U.S. Name Date Country Pendant No. Mode
DESTROYERS TENDERS (AD)
AD-31 | Tideuater | 20 Feb. 71 | Indonesia | Dumai( 562) | Lease |
|
| 14 Mar. 79 | Indonesia | Dumaii 562) | Sale |
SMALL AUXILIARY FLOATING DRYDOCK (AFDL) |
|
| |||
AFDL-10 | — | Dec. 78 | Philippines | — | Lease |
AFDL-11 | — | 20Jun. 72 | Cambodia | DF-2 | Loan |
AFDL-20 | — | 5 Mar. 80 | Philippines | YD-204 | Sale |
AFDL-22 | — • | 30 Sep. 71 | S. Vietnam | HQ-9604 | Lease |
AFDL-26 | — | 11 Feb. 77 | Paraguay | DF-1 | Sale |
AFDL-28 | — | 23 Jan. 73 | Mexico | — | Lease |
|
| 12 Jul. 78 | Mexico | — | Sale |
AFDL-39 | — | 11 Feb. 80 | Brazil | Ctdade De Natal | Sale |
AFDL-44 | — | 1 Aug. 80 | Philippines | YD-205 | Sale |
OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP (AGOR) |
|
| |||
AGOR-1 | USNSJosiah | I7Dec. 71 | Greece | Hephaistos(A-4 13) | Lease |
| Willard Gibbs | May 77. | Greece | Hephaistos(A-413) | Sale |
AGOR-5 | Charles H. Dai is | 10 Aug. 70 | New Zealand | Tui(A-S) | Lease |
AGOR-6 | Sands | I Jul. 74 | Brazil | Almirante Camara(H-4 1) | Lease |
AGOR-8 | Eltanin | 19 Feb. 74 | Argentina | Is las 0rcades( Q-9) | Lease |
(Returned 1 Aug. 79)
PATROL | CRAFT TENDERS (AGP) |
|
|
| |
AG P-7 86 | Garrett County | 24 Apr. 7 1 | S. Vietnam | CanTbo(HQ-80\) | Lease |
|
| 5 Apr. 76 | Philippines | Apayao( AE-516) | Sale |
AGP-821 | Harnett County | 12 Oct. 70 | S. Vietnam | My Tho(HQ-800) | Lease |
|
| 5 Apr. 76 | Philippines | DumagatiAL-^l) | Sale |
AGP-838 | Hunterdon County | 1 Jul. 71 | Malaysia | Sn Langkau /(A-1500) | Sale |
|
| 1 Aug. 74 | Malaysia | Sri Langkau /(A-1500) | Sale |
SURVEYING SHIPS (AGS) |
|
|
|
| |
AGS-25 | USNS Kellar | 21 Jan. 72 | Portugal | Commandante Almeida Carvalho( A-S27) | Loan |
AGS-35 | USNSS*/. | 29 Mar. 72 | Taiwan | ChuHuaiAGS-'iM) | Lease |
| George D. Keathley | 19 May 76 | Taiwan | ChuHuaK AGS-564) | Sale |
LIGHT CARGO SHIPS (AKL)
AKL-1 | Sharps | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | KunSan( AKL-908) | Sale | |||||
AKL-12 | Mark | 1 Jul. 7 I | Taiwan | Yung Kangi AKL-5 14) | Lease | |||||
|
| 19 May 76 | Taiwan | YungKangi AKL-514) | Sale | |||||
AKL-28 | Brule | 1 Nov. 7 1 | S. Korea | Ulsani AKL-910) | Lease | |||||
|
| 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | UWAKL-910) | Sale | |||||
AKL- 3 5 | —(USNS) | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | MaSan( AKL-909 | Sale | |||||
NET LAYING SHIPS (AN) |
|
|
|
| ||||||
AN-27 | Mulberry | 30 Aug. 78 | Ecuador | Orion (0-111) | Sale | |||||
AN-79 | Etlah | 29 Sep. 76 | Dom. Republic | Cambiasi P-207) | Sale | |||||
AN-82 | Marietta | 30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela | Puerto SanMH-11) | Sale | |||||
AN-86 | Passaconau ay | 29 Sep. 76 | Dom. Republic | Separacion(P-208) | Sale | |||||
AN-87 | Passaic | 29 Sep. 76 | Dom. Republic | Calderas(?-209) | Sale | |||||
AN-90 | Tunxis | 30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela | Note 1 | Sale | |||||
AN-91 | Waxsau | 30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela | Note 1 | Sale | |||||
AN-93 | — | 17 Sep. 70 | Turkey | AG-6( P-306) | Grant | |||||
|
|
|
| (ex-Dutch) | Aid | |||||
U.S. |
| Transfer | Recipient | Foreign Name/ |
| |||||
Hull So. | U.S. Name | Date | Country | Pendant No. ________ - |
| |||||
OILER (AO) |
|
|
|
| ||||||
AO-132 | USNS Mission Santa Clara | 31 May 74 | Pakistan | DaccaK A-41) |
| |||||
GASOLINE TANKERS (AOG) |
| Hsing Lung(AOG-e> HsingLung(AOG-*> |
| |||||||
AOG-7 | Elkhom | 1 Jul. 72 19 May 76 | Taiwan Taiwan |
| ||||||
AOG-8 | Genesee | 5Jul. 72 | Chile | BeagleiAOG-54) |
| |||||
AOG-11 | Tombtgbee | 7 Jul. 72 | Greece | j\riadni( A-414) |
| |||||
|
| 11 Jul. 78 | Greece | Ariadni(A-4 |
| |||||
AOG-50 | Cheuaucan | 1 Jul. 75 | Columbia | Tumaco(bT-6t)) . Lung Chuan(AOG- |
| |||||
AOG-53 | Namakagon (ex- | 29Jun. 71 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
| Neu Zealand) | 19 May 76 | Taiwan | Lung Chuan(AOG-‘> Chang P«(AOG-507> |
| |||||
AOG-57 | Pe caton tea | 19 May 76 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
AOG-76 | Tonti | Jun. 74 | Colombia | Mamonal (BT- 62) |
| |||||
BARRACKS CRAFT (NON-SELF PROPELLED) (APL) |
|
| ||||||||
APL-26 | — | Mar. 71 | S. Vietnam | -(HQ-9050) |
| |||||
APL-27 | — | Mar. 71 | S. Vietnam | -(HQ-9051) |
| |||||
APL-47 | — | 1 Dec. 72 | Turkey | DenizaltK Y-120-$) |
| |||||
APL-53 | — | 6 Dec. 74 | Turkey | —(Y-1205) |
| |||||
REPAIR AR-I3 | SHIPS (AR) Amphion | 2 Oct. 71 | Iran | Chahbahari A-4 ^ |
| |||||
| 1 Mar. 77 | Iran | Chahbahari. A-4 0 |
| ||||||
AR-14 | Cadmus | Sl)an. 74 | Taiwan | Y»7V«(AR-521> |
| |||||
BATTLE | DAMAGE REPAIR SHIPS (ARB) |
|
| |||||||
ARB-12 | Helios | 28 Dec. 77 | Brazil | Belmontei.G-2^) |
| |||||
AUXILIARY FLOATING DRY DOCKS (ARD) | FoU’uSo. ,<AR£> Fo ir»Ne.5<ARD- |
| ||||||||
ARD-9 | — | Jun. 71 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
|
| 1.2 Jan. 77 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
ARD-11 | — | 17 Jun. 74 | Mexico | — |
| |||||
ARD-12 | — | Nov. 71 | Turkey | Hatuz#7 |
| |||||
ARD-13 | — | 30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela | DF-11 |
| |||||
ARD-14 | — | 11 Feb. 80 | Brazil | Afonso Pena(Gl2V |
| |||||
ARD-15 | — | Apr. 71 | Mexico | FoU'»No.<’<AR^'/! Foil". No. ward-61 |
| |||||
ARD-22 | Windsor | 1 Jun. 71 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
|
| 19 May 76 | Taiwan |
| ||||||
ARD-25 | — | 20 Aug. 73 | Chile | Ingeniero Mery (ARD* 131) |
| |||||
ARD-29 | Area | 1 Nov. 71 | Iran | —(FD-4) |
| |||||
|
| 1 Mar. 77 | Iran- | —(FD-4) |
| |||||
INTERNAL COMBUSTION | ENGINE REPAIR SHIP (ARG) „ |
| ||||||||
ARG-4 | Tututla | 21 Feb. 72 | Taiwan | Tien 7XARG-51 |
| |||||
LANDING CRAFT REPAIR | SHIP (ARL) |
|
| |||||||
ARL-15 | Minotaur | 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea | DxiSrfARH11 |
| |||||
ARL-23 | Satyr | 30 Sep. 71 | S. Vietnam | VinhLmg <HQ-»02) |
| |||||
|
| 24 Jan. 77 | Philippines | Y*b./<AE-5I7> |
| |||||
Transfer
Date
Recipient
Country
^ Askan
^ Knshna
%39 a**,
%7AGe SHips <ARS)
HS-2, GraPPu
ARS-24 D‘lnw
ARS.25 GyP
*aleguard
-Cf REpAIR SHIP A'6 Negara
ARVE-3 REPAIR SHIP (Engine) (ARVE)
Avn‘‘nu! Aug. 73 Chile
30 Aug. 71 | Indonesia |
22 Feb. 79 | Indonesia |
30 Oct. 71 | Philippines |
5 Mar. 80 | Philippines |
30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela |
1 Dec. 77 | Taiwan |
15 Aug. 79 | S. Korea |
31 Mar. 78 | S. Korea |
28 Sep. 79 | Turkey |
(Aircraft) (ARVA)
1 Oct. 73 Mexico
SpBlnAR|
E RESCUE SHIP (ASR)
%10
^•20
Green let %/arf
12 Jun. 70 15 Feb. 73 30Jun. 73
ATa-184R! 0CEAN TUGBOAT (ATA) Kalmia
Turkey
Turkey
Brazil
Aea.
'I86 C-hokia
(ex'U.S.A.F.)
187 &«&4
)rA' I 9q t ATa.,92 *•««
Pdlarnook
1 Jul. 71 3 1 Mar. 78 14 Apr. 72
19 May 76 10 Feb. 72 14 Feb. 76 9 Aug. 71 1 Jul. 71
Colombia
Colombia
Taiwan
Taiwan Argentina Argentina Haiti S. Korea
*1-4.
aTa,
193
196
207
PAahopac
““"/motex-u.s Wild Life
5>erv.)
Apr. 76 30 Oct. 80 1 Jul. 71 19 May 76 l Feb. 76
S. Korea Dom. Republic Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan
Foreign Name! |
| u.s. |
| Transfer | Recipient | Foreign Name! |
| |
Pendant No. | Mode | Hell No. | U.S. Name | Date | Country | Pendant No. | Mode | |
Djaja WidjajaOl 1) | Loan | ATA-208 | Sagamore | 1 Feb. 72 | Dom. Republic | Caomabol RM-18) | Lease | |
Jay a Wijaya(921) | Sale | ATA-209 | Umpqua | 1 Jul. 71 | Colombia | Bahia HtmMBU-lA) | Lease | |
Narra(AR-88) | Lease |
|
| Apr. 79 | Colombia | Bahta Honda!RM-74) | Sale | |
Narral AR-88) | Sale |
|
|
|
| (sunk 13 Feb. 75) |
| |
Guyana(T-\8) | Sale | ATA-210 | Catauba | 10 Feb. 72 | Argentina | Alferez Sobral (A-9) | Lease | |
|
|
|
| 14 Feb. 76 | Argentina | Alferez Sobral(A-9) | Sale | |
TaHu( ARS-324) | Sale | FLEET OCEAN TUGBOAT | (ATF) |
|
|
| ||
Gumi( ARS-26) | Sale | ATF-67 | Apache | 30Jun. 74 | Taiwan | T(?-lf/ue(ATF-55 1) | Sale | |
Chang lFo«(ARS-51) | Sale | ATF-70 | Choctaw | 3 1 Mar. 78 | Colombia | Pedro De HeredialRM-72) | Sale | |
Isinl A-5 89) | Sale | ATF-72 | Kiowa | l60ct. 72 | Dom. Republic | Macorixl RM-21) | Sale | |
|
| ATF-75 | Sioux | 30 Oct. 72 | Turkey | GazallA-567) | Lease | |
|
|
|
| 15 Aug. 73 | Turkey | GazaHA-S61) | Sale | |
General Vincente Guerrero(\A-0“)) (Used as AGP) | Sale | ATF-81 ATF-82 ATF-83 | Bannock Carib Chickasaw | May 79 15 Mar. 79 19 May 76 | Italy Colombia Taiwan | Sebastian De Belal Calzar( RM-73) 7V7*tf£(ATF-548) | Sale Sale Sale | |
Aguila(\SF-9\) (sunk at sea 8/80 after severe grounding damage) | Loan | ATF-90 |
| 17 May 74 | Peru | tf/«(ATF-123) | Sale | |
ATF-96 | Abnaki | 30Sep. 78 | Mexico | Yaquil A-18) | Sale | |||
| ATF-98 | Ankara | 1 Jul. 71 | Chile | Sargento A Idea (ATF-6$) | Sale | ||
Lease | ATF-101 ATF-102 | Cocopa Hidasta | 30 Sep. 78 15 Mar. 79 | Mexico Colombia | Seri! A-19) R odrigo De Bastidas (RM-74) | Sale Sale | ||
| ||||||||
AM A-585) | ATF-103 | Hit chit i | 30 Sep. 78 | Mexico | Coral A-20) | Sale | ||
AM A-585) | Sale | ATF-104 | Jicarilla Mol ala | 15 Mar. 79 | Colombia |
| Sale | |
Gastao Moutinaho(K-10) | Sale | ATF-106 | 1 Aug. 78 | Mexico | R-71 chg. toOtomi [A-17]) | Sale | ||
| ||||||||
|
| ATF-114 | Tawakoni | ljun. 78 | Taiwan | Ta-Hue(ATF-324) | Sale | |
Bahia U tria(RM-7 5) | Lease | ATF-116 | Tolowa | Jul. 71 | Venezuela | Felipe Larrazabal | Sale | |
Bahia UtrialRM-75) | Sale |
|
|
|
| (R-1 lXdisposed of 1972 |
| |
Ta-An( ATA-550) | Lease | ATF-155 | Cusabo | 30 Aug. 78 | Ecuador | after grounding) CayambelR-101) | Sale | |
Trf-A»( ATA-550) | Sale | ATF-156 | Luiseno | 1 Jul. 75 | Argentina | Francisco De Gurruchaga | Sale | |
Comodoro Somellera(A-10) | Lease |
|
|
|
| (A-3) |
| |
Comodoro SomelleralA-10) | Sale | ATF-157 | Nipmuc | 1 Sep. 78 | Venezuela | Antonio Picardi (R-22) | Sale | |
Henri Christophe (M H - 2 0) | Sale | ATF-161 | Salinan | 1 Sep. 78 | Venezuela | Miguel Rodriquez(R-23) | Sale | |
Tan Yang (to Korea | Lease | ATF-I62 | Shakori | 29 Aug. 80 | Taiwan |
| Sale | |
Coast & Geodetic |
| ATF-163 | Utina | 3 Sep. 71 | Venezuela | Felipe Larrazabal(R-21) | Lease | |
Survey as AGS) Tan Yang | Sale |
|
| 30 Dec. 77 | Venezuela | Felipe Larrazabal (R-21) | Sale | |
Enriguillol RM-22) | Lease | SMALL SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVP) |
|
|
| |||
Tu-Po>g(ATA-549) | Lease | AVP-49 | Orca |
| Ethiopia | Ethiopial A-01) | Sale | |
Ta-Pet7g(ATA-549) | Sale |
|
|
| ||||
| Sale |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Inst, of Oceanology |
| AUXILIARY AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT | (AVT) (EX-LIGHT CARRIER-CVL) |
| ||||
| AVT-3 | Cabot | 5 Dec. 72 | Spain | Dedalol PH-01) | Sale |
Pakis
Tari ~K,5ta’ii V. S. Gearing (FRAM l)-class destroyer Taimur (D-166) is the former USS Epperson (DD-719). Together u ith the ^ (D-165), ex-USS Wiltsie [DD-716], they received extensive overhauls, after transfer and prior to sailing for Pakistan.
U.S. Hull No. | U.S. Name | T ransfer Date | Recipient Country | Foreign Name/ Pendant No. | Mode |
DESTROYERS (DD) |
|
|
|
| |
DD-42 1 | Benson | 1 Nov. 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-427 | Hilary P. Jones | 1 Nov. 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-431 | Plunkett | 1 Nov. 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-448 | La Valette | 26Jul.74 | Peru | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-454 | Ellyson | 6 Aug. 70 | Taiwan | Note 1 | Sale |
| (ex-Japanese) |
|
|
|
|
DD-458 | Macomb | 6 Aug. 70 | Taiwan | Hsuen Yang( DD- 1016) | Sale |
| (ex-Japanese) |
|
| (Stationary Training Ship) |
|
DD-472 | Guest | 1 Aug. 73 | Brazil | Para(D-27) | Sale |
DD-473 | Bennett | 1 Aug. 73 | Brazil | Paraibai.D-2%) | Sale |
DD-500 | Ringgold | 7 Mar. 77 | W. Germany | Z-2(D-17 1) | Sale |
|
| Sept. 8 I | Greece | — | Sale |
DD-509 | Converse | 1 Oct. 72 | Spain | Almirante ValdeziD-l7)) | Sale |
DD-513 | Terry | 26Jul. 74 | Peru | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-5I5 | Anthony | 27 Jun. 72 | W. Germany | (Missile Target) | Sale |
|
| Early 79 | Greece | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-516 | Wadsuorth | 7 Mar. 77 | W. Germany | Z-J(D- 172) | Sale |
|
| Sep. 80 | Greece |
| Sale |
DD-520 | Isheru ood | 15Jan. 74 | Peru | 6*m(DD-72) | Sale |
DD-521 | Kimberly | 25 Jan. 74 | Taiwan | An Yang(DD-18) . | Sale |
DD-528 | Mullany | 6 Oct. 71 | Taiwan | Chiang Yang(DD-9) | Sale |
DD-532 | Heermann | l4Jan. 77 | Argentina | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-540 | T u tning | 16 Aug. 7 1 | Taiwan | Kuet Yrfwg(DD-8) | Sale |
DD-54 I | Yamall | 23 Jan. 74 | Taiwan | Kuen Yang( DD-19) | Sale |
DD-545 | Bradf'trd | 23 Apr. 77 | Greece | Thye/lal.D-28) | Sale |
DD-546 | Brou n | 23Apr. 77 | Greece | Natannon(D-6}) | Sale |
DD-547 | Cowell | 17 Aug. 71 | Argentina | A Imirante Stomi( D-24) | Sale |
DD-550 | Capps | 1 Oct. 72 | Spain | Lepanto(D-2\) | Sale |
DD-551 | David W'. Taylor | l Oct. 72 | Spain | Almirante Ferrandiz(D-22) | Sale |
DD-556 | Hailey | 1 Aug. 73 | Brazil | Pernambuco(D- 30) | Sale |
DD-561 | Prnhett | 12Jan. 70 | Italy | (7fw/tTr(D-553) | Sale |
DD-569 | Aulick | 23 Apr. 77 | Greece | SfimtmH D-85) | Sale |
DD-571 | Claxton | 7 Mar. 77 | VC'. Germany | Z-4(D-178) | Sale |
|
| 26 Feb. 81 | Greece |
| Sale |
DD-572 | Dyson | 7 Mar. 77 | \X'. Germany | 2-5(D-179) | Sale |
|
| Sept. 8 l | Greece | — | Sale |
DD-573 | Harrison | 19 Aug. 71 | Mexico | Cuauhtemoci F-1) | Sale |
DD-574 | John Rodgers | 19 Aug. 71 | Mexico | Cuitlahuaci F-2) | Sale |
DD-581 | Charrette | 23 Apr. 77 | Greece | Velos( D-16) | Sale |
DD-582 | Conner | 23 Apr. 77 | Greece | Aspis(D-0G) | Sale |
DD-583 | Hall | 23 Apr. 77 | Greece | Lonchi( D-36) | Sale |
DD-596 | Shields | ljul. 72 | Brazil | Maranaho (D- 3 3) | Sale |
DD-630 | Braine | 17 Aug. 71 | Argentina | Almirante Domeco | Sale |
|
|
|
| Garcia(D-25) |
|
DD-631 | Erben | 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea | Chung Mu( DD-91) | Sale |
DD-642 | Hale | Feb. 77 | Colombia | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-644 | Stembel | 14 Jan. 77 | Argentina | Rosales(D-22) | Sale |
DD-656 | Van Valkenburgh | 15 Feb. 73 | Turkey | lzmir( D-34 1) | Sale |
DD-63 7 | Charles J. Badger | 17 May 74 | Chile | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-668 | Clarence K. Bronson | 13 Feb. 73 | Turkey | Istanbul(D-bAO) | Sale |
DD-670 | Dortch | 14 Jan. 77 | Argentina | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-67 3 | Hickox | 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea | Pusan(D D-93) | Sale |
DD-675 | Lewis Hancock | 1 1 Apr. 73 | Brazil | PiauH D-3I) | Sale |
DD-678 | McGouan | 1 Oct. 72 | Spain | Jorge Juan(D-2*)) | Sale |
DD-686 | Halsey Powell | 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea | SeouHDD-92) | Sale |
DD-694 | Ingraham | 16Jul. 7 1 | Greece | Af/W«(D-211) | Sale |
DD-696 | English | 1 1 Aug. 70 | Taiwan | Hut Yang( DD-6) | Sale |
DD-697 | Charles S. Sperry | 8 Jan. 74 | Chile | Ministro Zenteno(DD-16) | Sale |
DD-699 | Waldron | 30 Oct. 75 | Colombia | SantanderCD- 03) | Sale |
DD-700 | Haynsu vrth | 12 May 70 | Taiwan | Yuen Yrfi»g(DD-3) | Sale |
DD-702 | Hank | 1 Jul. 72 | Argentina | Segut(D-2S) | Sale |
DD-703 | Wallace L. Lend | 4 Dec. 73 | S. Korea | DaeGu(DD-91) | Sale |
DD-O t | Bone | I Jul. 72 | Argentina | Bouihard(D-26) | Sale |
DD-703 | Compton | 27 Sep. 72 | Brazil | Mato G rosso( D- 34) | Sale |
DD-706 | Gainard | 19 Mar. 71 | Iran | Note 1 | Sale |
DD-709 | Hugh Pun is | ljul. 72 | Turkey | ZiftrlD-356) | Lease |
|
| 15 Feb. 73 | Turkey | Zaftr( D-356) | Sale |
Sold to Spain in January 1980, the former USS Francis Marion (LPA-249) is now the Castilla (TA-12).
U.S. Hull No. | U.S. Name | Transfer Date | Recipient Country | Foreign Name/ Pendant No. _________ . |
DD-7 11 | Eugene A. Greene | 31 Aug. 72 17 May 78 | Spain Spain | Churrucai D-61) Churruca( D-61) |
DD-7 13 | Kenneth D. Bailey | 13Jan. 75 | Iran | Note 1 |
DD-7 14 | W'llliamR. Rush | ljul. 78 | S. Korea | Kang lt"«»(DD-922) |
DD-7 16 | Wiltste | 29 Apr. 77 | Pakistan | TariqiD- 165) |
DD-7 19 | Epperson | 29 Apr. 77 | Pakistan | Taimur( D- 166) |
DD-7 27 | DeHaien | 5 Dec. 73 | S. Korea | lncheon( DD-98) |
DD-728 | Mansfield | 4Jun. 74 | Argentina | Note 1 |
DD-7 29 | Lyman K. Swenson | 6 May 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 |
DD-7 30 | Collett | 4 Jun. 74 | Argentina | Piedrabuenal, D-29) |
DD-7 31 | Maddox | 6Jul. 72 | Taiwan | Po Yang(DD-10) |
DD-742 | Frank Knox | 30Jan. 7 1 | Greece | Themistocles (D- 210) |
DD-746 | Taussig | 6 May 74 | Taiwan | Lo Yang(DD-14) |
DD-733 | John A. Bole | 6 May 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 |
DD-7 56 | Beatty | 14 Jul. 72 | Venezuela | Carabobo( D-4 1) |
DD-7 58 | Smug | 30 Sep. 73 | Brazil | Rn, Grand* Do Hot" (D-37) |
DD-7 59 | Lofberg | 6 May 74 | Taiwan | Note 1 |
DD-760 | John IF. Thomason | 6 May 74 | Taiwan | Nan Y'<*ng(DD-l7) |
DD-761 | Buck | 16Jul.73 | Brazil | Alagoas(D- 35) |
DD-764 | Lloyd Thomas | 16 Oct. 72 | Taiwan | Dang YangLDD-1 D |
DD-765 | Keppler | I Jul. 72 | Turkey | Tinazt*pt(D-h‘>‘i'> |
DD-770 | Loury | 290ct. 73 | Brazil | Espirito Santo(V- 38) |
DD-775 | W illard Keith | ljul. 72 | Colombia | Caldas(D-A 1) |
DD-776 | James C. Owens | 16Jul. 73 | Brazil | Sergipe(D-56) |
DD-777 | Zellars | 19 Mar. 71 | Iran | Babr{ D-07) } Ministro Portales(DEF |
DD-779 | Douglas H. Fox | 8 Jan. 74 | Chile | |
DD-780 | St'trmes | 16 Feb. 72 | Iran | Palangi D-09) |
DD-781 | Robert K. Huntington | 3 1 Oct. 73 | Venezuela | Falcon( D-5 1) |
DD-782 | Rouan | lOJun. 77 | Taiwan | Chao Y'rfW£(DD-9l2) (Grounded 22 Aug -t>n route Taiwan, lost) |
DD-783 | Gurke | 17 Mar. 77 | Greece | Tombasiz(D-215) |
DD-785 | Henderson | 30 Sep. 80 | Pakistan | Turghili, D- 167) |
DD-786 | RichardB. Anderson | lOJun. 77 | Taiwan | Kai Yang(DD-915) |
DD-787 | James E. Kyes | 26 Apr. 73 | Taiwan | Chien Yang(DD-^ |
DD-789 | Ever sole | 1 ljul. 73 | Turkey | Gayret(D-352) |
DD-790 | Shelton | 26 Apr. 7 3 | Taiwan | Lao Yang(DD-lO) |
DD-794 | Iru in | 11 Apr. 73 | Brazil | Santa Catanna(D-W |
DD-796 | Benham | 15Jan.74 | Peru | VillariDD-71) • |
DD-797 | Cushing | 1 Aug. 73 | Brazil | Para( D-29) Al.ala Galtano(D-™' |
DD-799 | Jams | 1 Oct. 72 | Spain | |
DD-805 | Chet alter | 5 Jul. 72 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea S. Korea | Chung Buk(DD-95) Chung BuH DD-95) |
DD-817 | Corry | 27 Feb. 8 1 | Greece | — |
DD-8I8 | New | 23 Feb. 77 | S. Korea | Taejoni, DD-99) «!) Pres,dente Alfaro^ |
DD-819 | Holder | 1 Sep. 78 | Ecuador | |
DD-82 1 | Johnston | 27 Feb. 81 | Taiwan | Kal,*AIPasa(D-^9) |
DD-822 | Robert H. McCard | 5 Jun. 80 | Turkey | |
DD-825 | Carptnltr | 27 Feb. 81 | Turkey | Amttepe(DD-?>47) |
DD-829 | Myles C. Fox | 2 Aug. 80 | Greece | Note 1 |
DD-8 30 | Everett F. Larson | 30Oct. 72 31 Jan. 77 | S. Korea S. Korea | Jeon Buk( DD-96) Jeon Buki, DD-96) |
DD-832 | Hanson | 26 Apr. 73 | Taiwan | Liao Yang(DD-2 D |
DD-833 | Herbert J. Thomas | 6 May 74 . | Taiwan | Han )'ang(DD-l5) |
Transfer
Date
Recipient
Country
Foreign Name! Pendant No.
OD-8,5
dO-837
DO-839 DO-84 i
““-842
DO-843
DO-849
“0-859
“D-86Q
0D.I
86 i
Charles P. Cecil
SanfitU
Ernest G. Small
Powers
Noa
Piske
Arrington (M'ne damaged 72) RichardE. Kraus Pupertus
Etonard F. Mason Charles H Rua„ Norris ^cCa/frey Harwood
2 Aug. 80 1 Oct. 77 19 Feb. 71
1 Oct. 77 31 Oct. 73 17 May 78 5 Jun. 80 26 Apr. 73
23 Feb. 80 10Jul.73 11 Jul. 78 10 Mar. 78
2 1 Sep. 73 7Jul. 74 15 Feb. 73 17 Dec. 71
Greece
Taiwan
Taiwan
Taiwan
Spain
Spain
Turkey
Taiwan
S. Korea
Greece
Greece
Taiwan
Turkey
Turkey
Turkey
Turkey
OB.
■869
OB.;
Arn°ldJ. Isbell
•871
k ' 1 n OtU-7-, u«nato
ob.
0-872
•875
Tran Hung Dao(HQ-01) Rajah Lakandula(PF-4) Presidente Bourguiba(E~07)
Mode | U.S. Hull No. | U.S. Name | Transfer Date | Recipient Country | Foreign Name/ Pendant No. | Mode |
Sale | DER-334 | Forster | 25 Sep. 71 | S. Vietnam | Tran Karsh Du{HQ-04) | Lease |
Sale | FFR-334 | Forster | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | Dai Ky(HQ-03) | Spec |
Sale |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sale | UNCLASSIFIED MISCELLANEOUS (IX) |
|
|
| ||
Loan | IX-305 | Prowess | 3 Jun. 70 | S. Vietnam | HaHoH HQ-13) | Lease |
|
| (ex-MSF-280) | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | (HQ-07) | Spec |
Lease | IX-311 | Benewah | 2 1 May 74 | Philippines | (Employed as Civilian | Sale |
|
| (ex APB-35) |
|
| Hospital Ship) |
|
Sale | AMPHIBIOUS CARGO SHIPS (LKA/AKA) |
|
| |||
Sale | LKA-91 | Whitley | 23 Feb. 74 | Italy | Etnai A-5 3 28) | Sale |
Sale |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sale | AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORTS (LPA/APA) |
|
| |||
Sale | APA-218 | Noble | 19 Dec. 74 | Spain | Casti/la(TA-2\) | Grant |
Sale | LPA-248 | Paul Revere | 17 Jan. 80 | Spain | CastillaCTA-11) | Sale |
Sale | LPA-249 | Francis Marion | 11 Jul. 80 | Spain | Aragon( TA-12) | Sale |
| AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORTS (SMALL) (LPR/APD) |
|
| |||
Loan | APD-66 | Enright | 3 Aug. 78 | Ecuador | Moran Valverde(DD-03) | Sale |
Sale | LPR-89 | Ruchamkin | 31 Mar. 78 | Colombia | Cordoba! DT-15) |
|
Sale |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lease | DOCK LANDING SHIP (LSD) |
|
|
| ||
Sale | LSD-5 | Gunston Hall | 25 May 70 | Argentina | Candido De Lasala(Q-4$) | Sale |
| LSD-8 | White Marsh | 19 May 76 | Taiwan | Chung Chen{LSD-191) | Sale |
| LSD-21 | Fort Mandan | 23 Jan. 71 | Greece | Nafkratoussa(L-153) | Lease |
|
|
| 5 Feb. 80 | Greece | Nafkratoussa(L-153) | Sale |
Loan | LSD-22 | Fort Marion | 15 Apr. 77 | Taiwan | Chen Hail LSD-618) | Sale |
Sale | LSD-25 | San Marcos | 1 Jul. 71 | Spain | Galitia{ TA-31) | Lease |
Sale Sale |
|
| 1 Aug. 74 | Spain | Galicia{ TA-3 1) | Sale |
| LANDING SHIP INFANTRY, LARGE (LSIL) |
|
| |||
Loan | LSIL-698 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | **- | Spec |
Sale |
| namese |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSIL-699 | — (ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
Sale |
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSIL-702 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | — | Spec |
Loan |
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSIL-871 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
|
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
| LSIL-872 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
|
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
| LSIL-875 | —(ex-Cambodian) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
| LSIL- | —(ex-Cambodian) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
| MEDIUM | LANDING SHIPS (LSM) |
|
|
| |
Sale | LSM-17 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | Ul ftsi«g(LSM-613) | Sale |
| LSM-19 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | KiRsni LSM-610) | Sale |
Sale | LSM-30 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | KoM**(LSM-606) | Sale |
| LSM-54 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | Fvng Tv(LSML-608) | Sale |
Sale | LSM-57 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | U"o/M/(LSM-609) | Sale |
Sale | LSM-84 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | Nung R^(LSM-611) | Sale |
| LSM-85 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | — | Spec |
|
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSM-96* | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | PianOJSM-607) | Sale |
Sale | LSM-l 10 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
|
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSM-175 | Oceanside | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Batanes( LP-65) | Sale |
Sale |
| (ex-S. Vietnamese) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSM-268 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | 7>T«(LSM-602) | Sale |
Sale | LSM-276 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | (Scuttled, May 75; | Spec |
Sale |
| namese) |
|
| raised Feb. 77) |
|
Sale | LSM-313 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 30 Apr. 75 | Vietnam | — | Spec |
|
| namese) |
|
|
|
|
| LSM-3I6 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | SibAMLSM-612) | Sale |
| LSM-355 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Western Samaii. LP-66) | Sale |
OSP |
| namese, French) |
|
|
|
|
OSP | LSM-462 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | Ka ToXLSM-605) | Sale |
OSP | LSM-546 | — | 15 Nov. 74 | S. Korea | 7V»tC<MLSM-601) | Sale |
OSP |
|
|
|
|
|
|
OSP | SUPPORT LANDING SHIP, LARGE (LSSL) |
|
| |||
| LSSL-9 | —(ex-S. Viet- | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | La U nion(LF-SO) | Sale |
|
| namese, Japanese, |
|
|
|
|
Lease |
| French) |
|
|
|
|
Sale | LSSL-68 | —(ex-Japanese) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
Sale | LSSL-87 | —(ex-Japanese) | 24 Sep. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
Apostolis(D-2 16)
Te Yang(DD-925)
Fu Yang(DD-7) SbenYangi DD-932) Blaz De Lezo(D-65) Blaz De Lezo(D-6^) Piyale Pasa( D-3 50) Note 1
Kuangjui DD-90) Kountouriotisf D-213) Kountouriotis(D-2 13) Lai Yang(DD-981) Af.F. CakmaHD-351) Kocatepe( D-354)
Note l
Kocatepe( D-354)
(Sunk 22 Jul. 74 Turkish Air Force) Sacbtourisi D-214) Sachtouris(D-214) Tippu Sultan{D-168) Adatepei D-3 5 3) Adatepe(D-353)
Marti lio Diaz (D- 2 5)
Py(D-27) Langara(D-CA) Langara( D-64)
Note 1
4 Dec. 73 lljul.78
30 Sep. 80 27 Mar. 7 I 15 Feb. 73 3 Dec. 73 Mar. 81 15 Jan. 73
31 Oct. 73
Dyes, 17 May 78
bJ, 27 Feb. 81
. ^(Damaged Jul. 77
collision on
E "Trill Royal
r\ 1 J U
.“D-876 T'yw. Tucker
■877
OB.
Kogtrs
“0-879P^r.
“0-8,
DD-h,
Lea
Greece
Greece
Pakistan
Turkey
Turkey
Brazil
S. Korea
Argentina
Spain
Spain
Greece
Iran
Dd.ro, 22 N,
?!
2S
D“G-30
fov. 75)
• urse
^tK .Perry
Brinkley Bass Utckell ^ Hare
31 Aug. 72 17 May 78 27 Feb. 81 3 Dec. 73 1 Jul. 72 31 Oct. 73 17 May 78 7 Dec. 79
^tredith
Miss|le destroyers (bixi)
DE.tA„TEs (FF/DE)
%
°E-169
“e-2v> B°"‘h
Amirf,
E-250
fell
!S
fe
De °34 De‘'°35
(e*-Ja,
A the
^'Japanese)
Japanese) Ath*rton
"“""(replaced
R%^
Holt
finger Muir Litton ^mley Oar,1^
^yj'mes
M"R.p„
Wc
Mcl*>rri,
De , 35 Cl 7 *1
•°36 s. On Berry
Spain
Spain
S. Korea
Brazil
Greece
Spain
Spain
Turkey
Gravina( D-62) Gravina(D-62)
Mariz E. Barros(D-26) Kanaris(D-2 12) Mendez Nunez(D-63) Mendez Nunez(D-63)
2 May 70 W. Germany
RommeK D-187)
13 Sep. 76
13 Sep. 76
3 1 Aug. 78 lOct. 73
25Jan. 74 15 Nov. 74 6jun. 75 15 Nov. 74
15 Nov. 74 28 Jul. 72 8Jul. 72
16 Dec. 74 20 Feb. 73 31 Jan. 74 16 Dec. 74
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Mexico
Taiwan
S. Korea
Thailand
S. Korea
S. Korea
Uruguay
Colombia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Datu Sikatunai PF-5)
Rajah Humaboni PF-6)
Datu Kalantiau{PS-l6) Commodoro Manuel Azuetai IA-06)
Tat Yuan(DE-21) Chung Nam( DE-73) PinKlao{ 3)
Note 1 Note 1
18 Dey*//o(DE-3) Boyaca( DE-16)
M ongisidH,343) Samadikun( 341) Martadinata(342) Ngurah Rai(344)
*46
“eh.
“Ed | ^SSILE DESTROYER ESCORT (DEG) | ||
i-9 |
| 24 Sep. 73 | Spain |
:->o J'li |
| 23 May 74 | Spain |
| I6Jan. 75 | Spain | |
11 |
| 2 Dec. 75 | Spain |
\ U*l |
| 10 Nov. 76 | Spain |
P,Cket escort ^arrih | SHIP (DER/FFR) | ||
1'326 | r | 13 Feb. 71 | S. Vietnam |
^‘J.Gary | 5 Apr. 76 | Philippines | |
| 22 Oct. 73 | Tunisia |
BalearesFF-11) Andalutia(F-12) CatalunaiT-li) Asturias(F-l4) Extremadura(F-7 5)
Mr. Morison, U. S. editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, writes the Proceedings' annual Changes in Status of Ships feature and makes frequent contributions to the Proceedings.
u.s. Hull No. | U.S. Name | Transfer Date | Recipient Country | Foreign Name/ Pendant No. | Mode |
LSSL-96 | —(ex-S. Vietnamese) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | S*/«( LF-49) | Sale |
LSSL-101 | —(ex-S. Vietnamese) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Note 1 | Sale |
LSSL-129 | —(ex-S. Vietnamese) | 17 Nov. 75 | Philippines | Camarines S*r(LF-48) | Sale |
Note 1: For cannibalization and scrapping.
EDITOR'S Note: The second part of this listinE will he published in a forthcoming issue of Proceedings.
The Coast Guard’s New Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft
By Captain Howard B. Thorsen, U. S. Coast Guard
In a few months, a long-awaited message will flash from Little Rock, Arkansas, to Washington, D. C.: the first of the Coast Guard’s new' medium-range surveillance (MRS) aircraft will have been delivered. From many diverse offices around the country, a huge, collective sigh will be heard . . . and more than a few wives should be treated to a surprise invitation to dine out. Undoubtedly, the
most exasperating aircraft program the Coast Guard has ever launched, the MRS* will have had a gestation period of approximately ten years.
Under the terms of a contract signed in January 1977, Falcon Jet Corporation (FJC) of Teterboro, New' Jersey, and Little Rock, Arkansas, will deliver 41 aircraft, spare parts, documentation, contractor support, and training for approximately 90
pilots and 240 maintenance personnel-
The HU-25A w'ill be a hybrid of the current technology available fcora three w’ell-known aerospace manufac turers. The airframe is the Falcon 20O, the evolution of a rugged, comrnet dally successful design with a strong military heritage, built in France by Avions Marcel Dassault/Breguet AV1 ation. The twin engines will be the Garrett ATF 3-6-2C, a modern technology turbofan engine with a modular design. The integrated avionics system w'ill be the result of efforts by the third major sub-contractor, Coll‘nS Government Avionics Division.
The HU-25A will be replacing c e venerable HU-l6s (Grumman Alba tross), which began Coast Guard sefV ice in the 1950s, and some Conva*r HC-131S, which were pressed into serv ice as a stopgap measure four Vea^ ago. Transition to the new aircr
will mark the end of reciprocating
engine-powered aircraft in the CoaSt Guard’s inventory. .
The HU-25A will have impress1'’^ qualities and characteristics wt1‘ should serve the Coast Gu*r j medium-range, fixed-wing needs * into the 21st century. It will °Pet^n from airfields with a length of 5. feet at a normal takeoff weight of aP proximately 31,500 pounds. The will consist of pilot, copilot, two servers (search positions), and a sen systems operator. __
The HU-25A will use its high'P^ formance capabilities (.88 math 40,000-plus feet) to quickly and e ciently transit from takeoff to stati°n’
•The official Coast Guard designation lS ^ 25A. No name for the aircraft has been nounced yet.
112
Proceeding's / AprB
1001
and will spend the majority of its time at *0w level over water, searching visUally and electronically at the scene of reported distress or patrolling in ^arch °f pollution sources, at a speed ?. ^0 knots or less. Because of the 'gnly destructive aspects of the salt to environment> great care was taken inhibit corrosion by requiring fay ace sealing, wet rivet installation Procedures, and the elimination of magnesium components and fittings Mside the pressure hull. The aircraft \ rneet all current FAA and EPA Se and environmental emission nl'qf3r^S' nirera^r life of 30,000
1 C hours and an equal number of rln8s ‘s possible because of the gged design, proven through years operation of the various models of ® alcon 20 throughout the world. Cfaj. rhough not technically a new airs4 C ^esign, a brief description of the rhe KnCC events which must precede ^ ’rtk °f the HU-25A will show the ^agnitude of the task. First, some 21
1 ‘cations to the most recent Fal- c°n 20
fuselage—the F model—have in p lncorPorated by the manufacturer are- r,ance' Some of the modifications Crtaarger rudder throw' (travel), in- ajj. . Ac electrical capacity, and the ante/100 w‘nS root lights and cl rtlatic slat operation. Extensive tin n^tS Were required for the installa- pla 1 ATF eng|nes' which re- en . rhe General Electric CF-700 3.6mes that power the F20F. The ATF ftarne^'neS ^lave keen mated to an air- 1^78 * In ^rance’ s‘nce November engin /^*t*10ugh the final production tip, . COnfiguration awaits FAA cer- has tl >n "n t*1e United States, Garrett Hlc;;ntlnually updated those engines, ^ave accumulated hundreds of niaj0^. ^0urs on the F20G, and the hon ^
b,
een
r*CV °f work required for certifica-
°f the
F20G has been completed.
unce th . .
ljnjte engine is certified in the So0n)1 States (which is
expected
and the installed engines have catj0C°nhgured appropriately, certifi- ^^nwfp C^e F20G W‘H follow' shortly. pr0c airframe production has
either i ’ an<^ shipsets have been kittlt Re*‘Vere<l to the FJC facility at in p 0ck- or are temporarily stored c°nfjrance- The first production- Ured engines were mated to the
b,
een
Old Goats Still Spry----------------------------------------
By Michael L. Boursier
Thumbs up, signals the ground crew at Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod, Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, that the aircraft is ready to taxi, as two large engines billow out large columns of white smoke. The HU-16, or “Goat” as it is affectionately known to Coast Guard pilots and crewmen, may not be as sleek as many modern planes, but it has served well. The air crewmen know what they’re doing; the pilots know what they’re doing, so you can relax and sit back in your chair.
Pushing the throttle forward and easing off on the brakes, the pilot slowly raises the nose and flies off roughly 3,000 feet down the asphalt stretch.
The Coast Guard had 88 of these early 1950s vintage seaplanes, but only six are still in use. The planes have flown well over 500,000 total flight hours since their Coast Guard service began in May 195 1. But, after logging close to 11,000 flight hours, each retires to the boneyard.
The first H-I6s entered military service in July 1949. At various times, they also have seen service with the U.S. Air Force and Navy, as w'ell as flying services of many foreign governments.
Since the plane began to be employed as a search and rescue aircraft, it has set nine world-class amphibian records, including a non-stop distance flight in October 1962 from Naval Air Station, Kodiak, Alaska, to the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Florida.
Another noteworthy achievement was its participation during the early Sixties and Eighties in rescue operations of Cuban refugees.
Designed by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company of Bethpage, New York, shortly after World War II, the amphibious aircraft features a boat- type hull enabling it to make water landings. Pilot Lieutenant Ted Ohr said, "These planes have the capability to land in the water, but because of a strong maintenance problem, including corrosion factors on an old frame, we make water landing strictly an emergency procedure.”
It takes a special skill to keep these vintage flyers going, especially considering Cape Cod is the only air station still using this rare bird.
What keeps this 63-foot, 32,000-pound plane in the air? The aviation machinist’s mates w'ho w'ork on the Albatross side of the station receive no special training; it is all on-the-job instruction. Sent directly from Coast Guard Aviation Mechanic School in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, they train to repair the 1,425 h.p. engine. Fifty-five enlisted “Goat” personnel and 16 HU-16 pilots are assigned to Otis.
Like a breed with a terminal disease, as of December, the last Goats had only 6,111 total hours of service left.
With a thundering whirr that resembles a seven-plane formation of T-28s, a rising Goat flaps its wings as it takes off. Soon it will fly away forever.
F20G fuselage in June 1980 at the FJC facility in Little Rock.
There will be more than two dozen modifications made to the F20G in the United States, which, when approved, will result in FAA certification of the HU-25A. The most obvious alterations will be the installation of two large (18 in. X 34 in.) windows, port and starboard, to allow effective visual search by the observer crewmen, and a 19 in. X 32 in. drop hatch which will allow aerial delivery of pumps, rafts, and other equipment at a distress scene. (These structural modifications are being done by Grumman Aerospace, assuring that corporation a continuing, albeit tenuous, link with Coast Guard MRS aircraft operations.)
After extensive testing in their dynamic simulator, Collins completed the avionics installation, and efforts leading toward FAA approval of the systems have been under way for more than a year. The avionics systems are state of the art, designed for maximum flexibility in use of communications/navigation equipment. The CMS-80 (Collins’ Cockpit
Management System) will allow preset or manual tuning of the dual HF, VHF-AM, and IFF, and single UHF and VHF-FM. Navigation capabilities will be impressive: dual VHF omnidirectional radio/instrument landing system/marker beacon, dual distance measuring equipment and radio altimeters, UHFA'HF/LF direction finders, and tactical air navigation. .
The. radionavigation (RNAV) subsystem will also accept inputs from the Loran-C and inertial equipment. The RNAV computer will provide navigation information to the autopilot. Preset search patterns and auto-throttle capability will eliminate the previous inefficiencies in reducing altitude and airspeed before setting up to begin a search pattern at datum. The APS-127 radar will provide a multi-mode (search, weather, and navigation) capability which is also input to the CMS.
An Engine Health Monitor System will continuously record more than 40 engine parameters, immediately alerting the pilots of dangerously abnormal indications and recording all readings for later use by maintenance personnel in tracking engine performance.
Each aircraft will be capable of carrying an additional sensor system which consists of side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared/ultraviolet 0™
UV) linescanner, TV, and an aerial reconnaissance camera. The SLAR will be fuselage mounted; the IR/UV and ^ will be pod mounted to wing hardpoints; and the KS-87 camera wi be mounted internally.
There have been some frustrating delays—the delivery of the first air craft will be about two years Jate primarily because of delays in getting the engines certified—but the tin ^ product will usher in a new' era Coast Guard operations, and r HU-25A will be worth the wait.
Captain Thorsen, former Chief, Aeronautic Engineering Division, Coast Guard Headqua ters, is now Commandant of Cadets at the CoaS Guard Academy. His professional note exam10 ing the Coast Guard’s new short-range recovery aircraft—“The Dolphin That Flies”—app^ in the Special Coast Guard Issue (October ) of the Proceedings.
Writing for the Proceedings______________
By Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Choice of Subject: A timely and important subject is a real plus. The Proceedings should and will continue to publish articles of historical interest and on subjects of a strategic nature. However, I detect an increasing interest among both the readership and the board in articles on improving the naval professionalism—i.e., the tools and procedures of the trade. In my view, the Naval Institute receives too few such articles (and probably too many armchair strategist articles). Aviators and submariners have been particularly reticent in giving the readership their ideas in' print. The Naval Institute cannot and probably should not try to duplicate the Navy’s many in-house trade journals on operations, tactics, maintenance, and training; but I believe the Proceedings could use more articles on these subjects. While 1 would encourage authors who have something original to
say about leadership or retention t0 keep submitting manuscripts, I a believe many of us have aim reached the saturation point in reading about these concerns, undeniably 1111 portant though they may be.
Clarity of Thought: A good edlt0^ can help a limping manuscript (afl the Proceedings staff does an excel* ^ job), but the Editorial Board needs ^ know specifically what is on f _
mind and has an understandable
pectation that you will state it c*ea in coherent English. After w’rit'11^. your article, ask someone whose use^j the written word you respect to re^
it. Then, ask your reader to define
c • r if hi*
message or your manuscript.
reply is not close to your intent, J ^ have more work to do. Authors te^ to test the water with friends who subject matter experts, but they 0 _
t
overlook the constraints (and opp0^[1]* nities) inherent in the written wot -
Salt Water: While a maritime sub- •ect is not an absolute necessity if the article is good enough, the Editorial 0atd looks for some relevance to the Seagoing professions. Do not labor for salt water’’ connection if it has to 6 COntrived. Care in the choice of |ect and in article focus and perspective can avoid a rejection, th ^r°Cee<^*n8s Departments: Many au- 0rs have something to say that j^'ght fit nicely into one of the ack-of-the-book” departments, such s Nobody asked me, but . .
he Old Navy,” “Leadership orum, “Professional Notes,” etc.
e Editorial Board and staff members ^ alert to save or modify an article job ^ m C^ese departments. Their and your chances of acceptance are Ped by measuring what you have to ay against the publishing categories t}, at> e' ^his piece is a case in point: her^ 1S n0t enough of general interest it f C° Warrant article treatment, but „'ts the "Prof Note” criteria.
‘ority: Do not be deterred by Nnior rank or lack of authorship
Sent,
your
, krntrnbers are particularly careful
wit aCCUIlipiIMICU ilULIIUia
a , e future. Encouragement of such °rship is a key part of the Insti-
composed of high-quality pro- °nals who are on the authors’ side vlt^ 0 Want to see as many people’s ProSjas possible published in the CeedingS.
. ^.ent'als. The Editorial Board and staff
j.1 •
, eir reviews of works by junior au- do ' only are junior authors
th StSt t0 C^e deckplates, sticks and th(.0tt'tS’ an<^ foxholes, but they are of fW °h the accomplished authors
aut
Ut^s toission.
Odf‘t0r‘a^ ^oard and Staff Comments: turCaSi°nally a manuscript will be re- for t0 t^le author with suggestions ^Provement and resubmission. In rjai r,Cases’ rhis represents keen Edito- the °ar^ 'nterest in the subject and cu SU^8estions are oriented to °tni ^tS *n art‘c^e length, correction of ific SSI°ns °f relevant material, or ver- ha^R011 °^ata or sources. The Edito-
>ard and staff members are not tying . ,
rti°Uth ° Put wort*s ln anyone s Ptov ’ are try*ng t0 help im- teresta° art*cle by making it more in- c0rip n8 and by fitting it within the staff neS Pmatdings format. The
fessi ,S ...........
and
Constructive Criticism: In my experience, the Editorial Board has been particularly receptive to the purchase of manuscripts wherein the author outlines a problem and offers solutions—and, the more innovative the better. Authors who stop short of proposing solutions, who question the motives of colleagues, or who succumb to the temptation of simply complaining receive a cooler reception. But, even here, if the subject is good enough and the message is clear enough, the editors will work closely with the author to get it in publishable form. I am personally aware of one case in which the staff returned a manuscript three times for revision, worked closely with the author, and got it into print to the satisfaction of the Editorial Board, staff, author, and I believe, the readership as well.
Publishing Mechanics: When an article is purchased, it goes “into the bank,” where it is held until the editors fit it into the Proceedings’ publishing schedule. Except for the special issues, the editors attempt to attain a subject matter balance in each issue. An article may wait a long time before publication. Occasionally, after an article has been in the bank for an extended period, it will be returned to the author (who keeps the purchase price) for disposal, including possible submission to other journals for publication. The bank fluctuates in size, but averages around 50 articles at any given time. Many of the prize essay entries of high quality are purchased for publication, even though they did not win a prize.
Serving on the Editorial Board was one of the highlights of my naval career. I know of no other position that provides a serving officer both the broad perspective of his profession and a grass-roots feel as to what is on the minds of its most able and articulate members and authors. If you are among the most able, you owe it to yourself and the profession to become one of the most articulate. Pick up that pen and lend a hand!
The F-18 Hornet: Did the Navy Get Stung?
By Arthur Hanley
to
in-
pared with the General Dynamics'
,/lT%
F-16 proposal, the F-18 was ciw*/ ^
coul^
Norman Polmar’s “Naval Aviation, Part I,” in the September 1980 Proceedings shows once again why he is so well respected worldwide. Since the article is a report on the state of naval aviation, specific questions about and detailed discussions of the F-18 were outside the scope of his feature. But they must be addressed: How did we get into the situation we have with the F-18? How could two of the world’s most reliable and competent aviation manufacturers (McDonnell Douglas and Northrop) produce an aircraft that seems to be in so much trouble? Why did this happen? And, where can we go from here?
To understand how this situation came about, it is necessary to look at the early days of the F-ii program. When Grumman won the contract for the F-14, it was obvious that the aircraft was going to be big. Vietnam was in everyone’s mind, along with the picture of F-4s being outmaneu- vered by MiG-17s and MiG-2 Is. Although airframe technology had advanced to the point where it w'as feasible to build a large aircraft that was very maneuverable, many people in DoD and the fleet did not believe it was possible. This was the genesis for the concept of the light, maneuverable fighter. One might expect that when the F-14 actually flew and it became apparent that the F-14 would be at least as maneuverable as any projected light fighter that the pressure for a light fighter would disappear. Nevertheless, certain developments kept the light fighter alive.
As originally planned, the F-14 was to be produced in three versions. The first, the F-14, would have the TF30 engine and was intended to get the F-14 in service as fast as possible. Possibly as few as 13 and no more than 69 F-14AS were to be built. The F-I4B would have the 30,000-pound thrust F401 engine, an auxiliary power unit and various aerodynamic and maintainability enhancements. All F-14AS would be converted to F-14BS. The F-14C would have a new’ fire control and radar to meet the anticipated threat of the late 1970s-early 1980s. Because of structural and airframe- changes in the F-14C. it was unlikely that F-1 iBs would be converted to the C model.
The contract for the F-14 did not allow' for the rapid inflation of the early 1970s. Further, the government often made late payments. It did not help matters that the number of F-1 is to be ordered seemed to change almost monthly, w'hich made it impossible to keep the same subcontractors or realize the benefits of mass production. The contract for the F40I engine was also written in such a manner that ensured its cancellation, and with it, the F- 14B.1 Although there were proposals to adopt the other F-I4B features on the F-14A, these were shot down, partially because of cost and partially because the bureaucracy said that F-I4AS w’ere being ordered so F-I4B components should not be used.
Continued inflation, contract problems, lack of a constant production rate, and funding flow problems contributed to a lack of confidence in the program both in the fleet and in industry. Many subcontractors did not want to spend the money necessary to tool up to produce components for a program in which no one could predict the number of aircraft that would actually be ordered, or even if the program would continue. Although the F-14A was an enormous improvement over the F-4, its performance was only a fraction of what would have been possible in the F-I4B. All of this tended to help sell the concept of the light, less capable fighter.
It became apparent fairly early that the “low-cost” Naval Air Combat Fighter (NACF) was going to cost a lot of money, especially considering its limited capabilities. It was further realized that, given that an aircraft carrier has only 24 fighters regardless of their capabilities (or lack of capabilities), the NACF would not be capable of meeting the expected threat. However, a strong DoD lobby for the light fighter kept the NACF program going. Further F-14 testing was showing that the NACF was not going to be a better dogfighter than the F-1-4 b r'lc F-14 ever got engines of the proper thrust. The NACF program continued, but evolved into two versions: first, the light fighter for the Navy; second, a v/STOL fighter/attack for the Marine Corps. Contractor selection was ex peered in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, the Air Force was developing prototypes of two ex perimental Light Weight Fighters (LWF)—F-16 and F-17. The same hght fighter lobby in DoD that sold the NACF concept got the U. S. Air Force to purchase one of the LWF designs (in stead of superior F-15s) to complete the equipping of Air Force fighter wings- McDonnell Douglas and the Air F°rce pointed out that for what it was g0,n? to cost to develop and procure b LWFs, the United States could buy 3 greater number of F-15S. Nevertheless, a LWF flyoff was conducted, and the F-16 was ordered as the Air Forces 1 Combat Fighter (ACF). ^
Certain forces in DoD now not that the Air Force had an Air Combat Fighter, and the Navy was develop*0? a Naval Air Combat Fighter. With t> ties that sounded almost alike, lC " suggested to Congress that the Na'f be required to purchase a version the Air Force’s ACF for itself. Tl>e Force backed this idea, hoping realize reduced unit costs from an crease in the production line. Cong^s so ordered. It was known that neit of the LWFs could meet requiremen of the NACF, so DoD directed 1
Navy to lower its requirements
i r 4 i Wfs
what it was thought modified >- ^ might be able to meet. Based on proposals for the navalized F-l6 the navalized F-17, now called c F-18, the Northrop/McDonnell Dou?^ las F-18 w’as selected. Although c0°\
. . . clearly
superior aircraft, it should be no^ that the F-18 as proposed and accep did not meet the Navy’s requireme for approach speed even then.
There was no way that anyone - ,
claim that the associated researen
evelopment costs and purchase of °0 F-jhs were going to cost less than uy>ng 400 more F-I4s. This “prob- em was solved by buying 400 A-18s replace A-7s, which did not need to C rt'Placed. It was shown at the time at it would cost more to develop and Procure the F/A-18 than to continue vv,rh F-i4s and A-7s. Any possible sav- ngs might only be the result of logis- off1 Sav‘n&s> ;ln<J they would not set the increased costs until some- rne in the 21st century. This was t0rjfirmed by GAO.
j. n corT>parison with the F-14, the ..18 Proposal offered superior accelera
tion
tlrrnii
is
and acr .
t[1aCUal combat experience show thee ability to fly supersonically on groclc IS of no value in air-to- cati>?^ °Perations. In any case, when
uPersonic, but numerous studies
^ln8 air-to-ground weaponry, the rt supersonic.
Was made of the fact that
A'18 is n Much
the - r'lere would be a reduction r- There is a flaw in this think-
cypes of aircraft operating from a
rate of climb, and sustained lnfi capability. These advantages t^U te^ ^rom t*le F-18*s superior po^r-t°-weight ratio. The F-18 pro- ^.|.a a^so offered superior maintaina- ^ ty in relation to the F-I4A, partly s ^ause the less capable F-18 had fewer cetTls t0 maintain, and partly bell 1 6 SUPer'or maintainability was y a priority for the F-14B. The F-I4A r(,as suPerior to the F-18 in all other [j Pects> and the F-14B would have SuPerior in all respects.
A is COrnPar‘son writh c^e A-7, rhe jp . Proposal offered superior agility, lts stores were jettisoned. The A-18 *ritoOSa* C0U*^ a larger payload land p16 3'r w^en ^Perar‘ng from a ca ■ 4561 ^ut w^en operating from a ar,tr’ A-is would not lift as large rjJ33^^03^ as an A-7 over the same Sari^fc' A-18 would not deliver the tlla0fdnance any more accurately rrior ^ A"7’ A-IX, course, is far e expensive than an A-7. The A-18
S|0ce ji., . ■
the e F^A-I8 w'ould be performing si()n<atta<'^ and part of the fighter mis-
he
Carri(
'Hg, -p,
thf , 1e F|,A-18 wmuld indeed replace to c ’ Dut IC would still be necessary p0rt ’ F-Ms to perform the major T^cref1 the Navy’s fighter mission. 0re> although only one type of aircraft would perform the attack and partial fighter mission, a carrier would now' have to carry two types of fighters, so the number of types remains the same. In fact, during the transition period, the number of types on deck would actually increase.
Still, the development of the F/A-18 proceeded normally. The GE J101 engine became the F404 with 1,000 pounds more thrust. The estimated price of the F/A-18 kept increasing, and no one seemed concerned. Concept drawings of the F/A-18 sometimes showed an infrared (IR) tracker under the nose, and then a few months later the IR sensor would disappear. As the F/A-18 drew more money from naval aviation, there were halfhearted Navy attempts to terminate the program, but DoD would not seriously consider such a possibility. It was made clear that if the Navy did not take the F/A-18, it would get no fighters at all, which tended to keep Navy protests muted. Even so, the rise in the price of the F/A-18 w'as reaching a critical point, and it could no longer be ignored. The DoD solution was rather unusual: i.e., order more F/A- 18s!
It w'as clear from the beginning that the Navy did not have enough money to pay for the F/A-18 and its other programs, and that one of those other programs would have to be killed. Seeing a way to kill tw'o birds with one stone, DoD announced that it was canceling the AV-8B for the Marine Corps (the Corps’ highest priority project) and increasing the order for F/A-18s by 70% to make up for this loss.2 The Marine Corps appears to be less than thrilled w’ith the F-18 as a fighter; because it is single-seat, is not all that capable when compared with the alternatives,3 and it is expensive.
It is surprising that the 70% increase in the size of the F/A-18 order resulted only in a 2% decrease in unit price, in constant dollars. The most logical explanation for this is that the price being quoted in testimony before Congress and to the public was low. The actual price w'as so much higher that the large increase in the size of the order only served to bring the price back dowm to a point 2% less than the claimed price. It is known that the prices of the F/A-18 and F-14 are
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Is it too late to stop the F-18 program (F-18 in operational paint scheme, upper photo) and build more F-14s (F-I4B prototype pictured)?
virtually identical, and this is particularly disturbing when it is realized that the F/A-18 enjoys a substantially higher and more economical production rate. It seems likely that if F-l4s were produced at the same rate as the F/A-18, or better yet at the present combined F-14 / F/A-18 production rate, the F-14 would cost substantially less than an F/A-18. Now, a newer plane costing more than an older plane is nothing new, but in this case the older plane is much more capable than the newer one, and each new airplane procured instead of the older plane means a relative loss in the Navy’s fighting abilities. If the F/A-18 were canceled and F- 14s and A-7s were procured in equivalent numbers to replace canceled F/A-18s, the Navy would save enough money to pay for the AV-8B program and still have $8 billion left over!4 Yet despite this, the F/A-18 continues.
ings / April 1981
117
The first thing that comes to mind in a situation like this often is, “Here’s another contractor ‘sticking it’ to the Navy.” This is not the case. McDonnell Douglas has years of experience with fighters and may well be
ised
The fourth alternative is the Pr°F(
pabW
n t -out , wmv.li u<o iuii <iii- * y
and the higher thrust Pegasus 1 I-33- This ^ turn out to be the best deal for the * Corps, if enough fighters can be found to them over until it is available.
■eded
4This 58 billion could pay tor the need engining of the F-14. Considering
the
oi
performs with afterburner would now
thn*sr’
the best fighter builder in the world. Northrop has an enviable record as an on-time, on-cost contractor. The basic design of the F-18 appears excellent. Northrop has spent years refining it from the P530 through the YF-17 to the F-18. The F-18L version would be an exceptional aircraft in the role for which it was intended. The problem is that the aircraft simply was not designed to perform the Navy fighter/attack mission. Northrop and McDonnell Douglas are not at fault for producing an aircraft that the Navy does not need. They are producing what was asked for. It is possible that the F/A-18’s high price relative to the F-14 is the result of heroic attempts by the contractors to make the F/A-18 into an airplane that might be able to perform missions for the Navy.
The best move the Navy could make at the present time would be to terminate the F/A-18 program. The present political climate seems to indicate the Navy might be successful in getting DoD support. With the concerns of the state of our defenses, it also appears that Congress would fund the necessary replacement aircraft, especially when it is noted that such action would be cheaper than continuing with the present course. The F-14 production rate would have to be increased from the present two to two- and-a-half per month to eight per month, but this is feasible and would cost less than the proposed F-i-4 and F-18 production for fiscal year 1982. The savings that would result could fund the adoption of the desperately needed FIOIDFE engine for the F-14. It would also be possible to investigate the installation of two nonafterburning F404s in the A-7. If it is economically feasible to accomplish the latter as part of a conversion in lieu of procurement program, there arises the intriguing possibility of "zero-timing” the now surplus TF-i I engines and installing them in A-6s. This would give a major increase in A-6's performance while simultaneously increasing range because of the TFil’s much lower fuel consumption relative to the J52 presently in the A-6. (This is outside the scope of this article; it is only included to show some of the options available.)
Cancellation as soon as possible will also prevent too much effort being expended on an F/A-18 production line and will minimize expense of contract termination. McDonnell Douglas will naturally protest, and it is unfortunate that it will have put so much effort into this project, but that cannot be helped. Full-scale production of the AV-8B will mitigate the effects of the F/A-18 cancellation, as will a possible AV-8B order from the Royal Air Force. It can also be hoped that the Air Force will also acquire F-15C/DS instead of more F-16s. A similar solution presents itself as regards to the Canadian F-18 order. F-15S could be substituted for F- 18s, and, if this is added to an existing Air Force order, could result in substantial savings to the Canadians as well as providing increased capability and greater commonality with the U. S. Air Force. Unfortunately, this does nothing for Northrop, and will probably mean the death of the excellent F-18L. Northrop still has the F-5G program, which would benefit from the A-7’s F404s.
The most important thing to be learned from this is that programs and organizations are not ends in themselves, but only means to an end. The end is to provide the Navy with the aircraft it needs to perform its mission, and to do it at the most economical cost possible, not to produce any particular aircraft just to be producing that aircraft.
'The Pratt He Whitney F401 engine shared a common core and other parrs with the FI00 engine for the F-15. Since the Air Force was expected to buy far more F- 15s than the Navy would buy F-l4s, the Air Force was designated lead service. There was some talk of canceling the F-15 in tavor of Air Force F-l4s, which the Air Force wanted to prevent. As a result, when the F100 encountered development problems it appears the Air Force glossed them over. For one critical 150-hour qualification test, it seems the Air Force would stop the test whenever a part was about to fail, replace that part before it failed, then continue the test. The Air Force then accepted the engine. The contract specified that when the Air Force accepted the FI00 engine, the Navy had to either accept the F401 in the same state or terminate its involvement. The Navy wisely chose the latter course, otherwise it would have had to fund bringing the F401 up to requirements by itself. For the record, the F401 was to have developed 21,000 pounds of thrust at military power and 30*0 in maximum afterburner. The TF30 only devel ops 20,900 at maximum afterburner.
2One of the problems DoD ran into in doing this was that the AV-8B cost less than d1® F/A-18. DoD’s response was predictable. ,n some way to raise the cost of the AV-8B. was accomplished by slowing the planned Pr0 duction rate of the AV-8B and by arbitrarily delaying the entire AV-8B program to cauS further price rises.
3The most obvious alternative would be r F-14. In addition to being less expensive, |C far more capable. Even the F-14A has demon strated a consistent ability to operate ^ 2,000-foot or less strips, and this STOL <-‘aPa ity would be valuable for the Marine CorP During the period when the Marines thoug they were going to get 100 F-l4s, the operat*0 and maintenance of the aircraft in the ^ar'^ Corps environment were extensively exam'0^ and found to be feasible. The commonality " existing Navy equipment is another advantag^ Another possibility is the F-15B or D- ^ ^ not carrier-capable, it is more effective than ^ F-18, costs less, and in the versions mention has two seats. The F-16 is not a viable five. It is much less capable than the F ^ harder to land, less maneuverable, and ^ single-seat fighter. It is also very expenSI McDonnell Douglas has offered to sell at^%an _ F-15Cs and Ds at a rate of five F-15s f°r c' six-and-a-half basic F-l6As and Bs. The F-l ^ a daylight, VFR-only fighter. There are P^af1^ the works to attempt to upgrade the F-l 6* ^
this is certain to raise the cost substantially- ^ the F-16 will still be the least effective El- fighter.
that
FIOIDFE purs out up to 29,000 P«urul^_ thrust yet weighs less than the TF30, ^
provement in performance should be su ^ tial. Endurance should also be increased s‘ ^ many of the operations that the F- l4A PrcSL
w be abkt0 be accomplished using only military ^ with the consequent savings in fuel fin"- also claims that because the FIOIDFE
i - ptn.il0
signed tor extreme durability (at some j
• • • 11 be rc
in weight), engine operating costs could
duced by up to two-thirds.
Her
Hanley has been an air traffic contr and-one-half years. He holds a confime^ ^ r*s license with an instrument rating jdent of aviation in general and nav n in particular.
I had the good fortune to serve on the Board of Control and Editorial Board of the Naval Institute from April 1979 until December 1980. As a periodic contributor to the Proceedings since 1959, I was particularly curious as to how the Editorial Board selected articles for purchase and publication. My batting average over the years had ranged from 50% for manuscripts submitted and purchased to 30% for those submitted and printed in the Proceedings. The staff was always gracious—win or lose—and encouraged me to keep trying. It was and is good advice; because persistence and a w’illingness to learn from mistakes are just as important to authorship as having something to say and saying it well.
Based on my experience with the Naval Institute, I offer the following points of advice and encouragement to prospective Proceedings' authors.
Admiral Winnefeld, who served as Chairman of the Naval Institute's Editorial Board from June until December 1980 when he retired from active duty, is now with the Rand Corporation.