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S. Strategic Options in the P«sian Gulf”
^ O. Johnson, pp. 53-59, February ,;8I Proceedings)
M ar^eS Bond, Naval Architect and ar,ne Consultant—I am amazed that tia)riter W'tb Ma)°r Johnson's creden- *.s bas so badly missed the several ltnt truths about the Persian Gulf : which involved and concerned
in eStS bave known for years. First,
Edition to the Saudi reluctance to |
targe groups of non-Moslems situate
years sanctii
m the country, less than six ago the Ford White Flouse was ^ >oning studies by DoD, Navy, the and otbers f°r rke capturing of pae Saodi oil-producing areas and les i-e., the Eastern Province.
Uj Uwait was so alarmed by the at- StreSP^ere at the time that it began
c°nst^t^,en*ng ’tS armed forces and riJcting a real navy, which it con- aes t0 strengthen today. For an ex-
par tbe causat‘ves °f chat
nuia, 1 submit the title page from Al , ?”■ 'n tf|e March 1975 Harper's
3n article
entitled “Seizing Arab Oil” a D -^eS ISnotus-" a pseudonym for plo V chink-tanker frequently em- 0tle^e ,bV DoD. That article was only Su many at the time, evidently tyjsh°rted by the administration’s grat f C° test those waters.” 1 am dUsj ec* that it was the Navy’s con-
‘dea f"r
at the time that it was a bad Wa$ _ r logistic reasons. (No mention
logistic
of rTla<le about the political effects
would have controlled it then, which is why it never was pursued further. That became plain that year when the Shah “assisted” Sultan Qaboos of Oman in maintaining his territorial integrity against insurgent forces in Dhofar, while consolidating his claims to Gulf islands near the Strait of Hormuz. Those Iranian forces were not withdrawn until 1977, and the Shah’s military mission stayed in Oman well beyond that date. Iranian aid to Oman was a continuing policy until the downfall of the Shah.
The experience of the several Gulf states in the training and organizing of Arab youth into naval forces is dismal. If they don’t like the life, they simply go home to their fathers’ tents. The only young men who get involved are those who are without family influence or money, and probably are illiterate besides. In Saudi Arabia, they will have no hope of being officers or gaining many promotions if they come from certain areas such as Hofuf in the A1 Hasa Oasis, since the Saudis are still penalizing the area for resisting Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in the old days. Officers come from the A1 Qasim area of Nejd, the city of Buraida, which did support Abdul Aziz. Put that into your computer! Arabs are not freshfaced high school graduates who grew up with ’57 Chevies and Blue-Ribbon beer. They are medieval mentalities thrust into the nuclear age. This was one of the sources of rebellion in Iran (1 1 million Arabs) and is, together with the Insh’Allah (May God Will It) attitude, one of the chief obstacles to any effort involving modern equipment and concepts in the Middle East.
Sure, use and UCLA have turned out some bright young people. And these bright people waste no time to get their piece of the Saudi GNP either. They also do not care for the military, which they do not regard as any sort
Contents:
U. S. Strategic Options in the Persian Gulf
Maneuver in Naval Warfare The Education of a Warrior Shipboard Information Handling Tools The Subject of "They”
The Difference on the Beach Leadership
What’s Happening with JEFF?
The Classification Society Obligation Their New Cruiser The Old (Fresh Water) Navy The AVF—Making It Work
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
stich
an attempt.) In any case, the Could pfe not so naive as to let what chid. e a Pacb °f f°xes into their like T COOP’ even ‘f the foxes look (qa„: e 82nd Airborne or the 7th
Si
,atidi:
oj.’ ^ luiuuiiu.
Ti?1 ^rnPbibious Brigade.
The p,
ersian Gulf Military Alliance a novel idea, having been pro- ln 1975, but the Shah and Iran
of a meaningful career. Saudi patriotism and national unity probably exist only in the minds of non-Saudis. Most of the Arabs in Kuwait and Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) are related to what were once A1 Hasa, Qatif, and other Arabs now called “Saudis," but who were driven out by the Wahabi zealots years ago. Along the Shatt-al-Arab, families extend across the Euphrates frontier from Kuwait to Ahwaz, and from A1 Fao to Baghdad.
There are some other folks around the Gulf too—Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Dubai, Bahrain—and all must have a voice in Gulf plans. To assume that Saudi Arabia will in some way assist militarily has no basis in recent history. Saudi Arabia did assist North Yemen against South Yemen, but only passively. Saudi Arabia has so many potential cans-of-worms within its borders now that it doesn’t want to rock its own boat. There are nearly half a million foreigners—Palestinians, Yemenis, Baluchis, Filipinos, Koreans, plus about 50,000 Americans—in Saudi Arabia today. The royal family must also face the possibility of an uprising, a la Shah.
Oman is a fascinating and even enjoyable place, but its geography is wretched. I sincerely hope that Oman’s Defense Minister invites a number of field-grade officers of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to visit Oman soon, say about the end of June, when the swimming is good at the Khalij Hotel, and the Shamal is in full flower. They should visit Salalah and the port of Matrah, and take a hike to A1 Khasab, up the Musandam Peninsula. They’ll find it very enlightening. The U. S. Marine Corps hasn't seen territory like this since the march to Mexico City, and the marines weren’t using rubber-tired vehicles then!
I wonder where that $ 100 million in U. S. defense credits, etc., given in exchange for U. S. base rights in Oman, is going to be spent. Unless there are some real strings attached to it, my bet is that it will be spent in Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany for Oto Melara guns, Exocet missiles, Jaguar fighters, Harriers, Lowestoft patrol boats, Ley-
land recon cars, and a new set of color-matched Mercedes sedans. The British have snookered us, and they are the old heads there now. When the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) was formed and the Scots were playing “Leaving Old Aden” on their pipes, the Brits were busy turning their caps around and staying. Don’t forget that the refinery at Abadan was not only built by British Petroleum (BP), it was kept running by BP’s Oil Services Company (OSC). So were the Shell deals in Kuwait and Iraq. It is no accident that the biggest embassy in Oman is British.
Major Johnson bases his rationales on three theses for achieving a collective regional security: (1) Saudi Arabia must be the basis of such an arrangement; (2) Oman will closely cooperate with the Saudis; (3) Iraq will control the Northern Gulf soon. I do not agree with any of these arguments. Forget the idea that the Gulf nations are really going to do very much in their own interests in the face of a determined attempt by a superpower to take them over vis-a-vis oil resources. Efforts at creating some sort of “Saudi Navy” of significance in such a situation should be left to the supporters of the U. S. Military Training Mission at Dammam, where the CNO of the Saudi Navy is an 0-5.
The RDJTF should cash in its stuff at Diego Garcia and get away from that coral atoll, which is nothing but a missile target—and I mean for ship- borne missiles, not medium-range ballistic missiles from Afghanistan. Mas- ira Island is a nice idea, but the head of the Masira Khalij, with a few improvements, is better.
Iran’s navy was much better trained and equipped than Iraq’s at the commencement of hostilities. Even with the embargoing of the French- built “Combattante-IIs," Iranians still have more serious warships than the Iraqis anyway.
1 certainly agree with Major Johnson’s final paragraph—I ought to, it’s part of a report I made to the Kuwaiti Government in 1975. All of this is really not a new' problem, it’s been there since they brought in Damman No. 7 in 1937; it’s just a new generation.
“Maneuver in Naval Warfare
(See L. Wells, pp. 34-41, December 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Carl 0. Schuster, U- Navy—Commander Wells’s article IS both timely and thorough in describ ing the need for understanding th's important element in warfare at sea^ Maneuvering and deception will e necessary ingredients in U. S. strategy during future conflicts. The diversity of missions has combined with creasing forces to preclude our over whelming opponents by number5 alone. As in World War II, victory will be achieved by misleading c enemy as to our location and inten tions. Commander Wells’s treatise Pr0” vides some sound rules for maneuver and operational deception en route
to
ick-
an objective and just prior to attai Understanding the information gathering and dissemination Pr0 (theirs and ours) is essential to f°rrn^ lating any tactical plan. It is equa important to be familiar with the fects wind and sea will have on y efforts.
Developments in airborne ra have reduced the effectiveness or so^ of the commander’s suggestions. ^ tioning two units close together " not make them appear as a single la ^ ship. The resolution of modern borne radars is such that it w» ,
readily apparent to an experi operator that he is looking
ience'
at
d
t\vo
sea5
will
small ships. Moderate to heavy and an inattentive operator change this, but the use of a . enhancer would be a more erte
ploy. The stationing idea does
have
n conjunct'0
merit, however, if used i with a blip enhancer to simulate ^ underw'ay replenishment with
1 1 t Jgj cu
“emergency break-away” in ora hide the location of logistical unltS' ,| Maneuvering down w'ind with 5 clouds of chaff will prove fruit chaff disperses too quickly and 'rr^,lfl larly to simulate targets for more ^
an
few moments. For this reason is normally employed in dense to saturate search radars or
clot"
as
ds
momentary decoy or alternate ^ for tracking radars or missile see Since surface ships provide well-shaped radar echo while
a sWj
claa1
20
Proceedings
/ Apr11
19®1
a|titude
chaff has also proven ineffec-
Under
tnore
missile attack. This will provide protection and use less chaff than
CePtion
does nofi the two can be easily separated in a group of returns. High-
at Protect‘ng surface ships so that r a ‘ cloud intended to protect a sure group must be launched to a rela- ely low altitude and results in a y short period of coverage. The assive quantities of chaff needed to j^a'ntain this shield are not likely to available. A more effective tactic
an U ^ to use tbe c^*a^ as cover or alternate target for individual ships
ration coverage of an entire group. l. 'directing an attacker away from diff 'Va^Ue un‘ts *s an interesting and lcult task. It requires an under- dlng of friendly and hostile opera- Qj- s and sensors. Random stationing but*11115 "S a usebd t0°* m tb's effort, Pla USe bbP enhancers, false anjne guards, deceptive falcon radials, tjaj °^set marshal patterns are essen- c°mponents of the plan. All de- ‘°n units and their formation St °ok and behave like the units s‘mulate or the effort will fail.
Ph °tber dement to consider is the tharn0lTlenon of bodies of warm water Uias tfavtd through the cold ocean aC()S' These bodies can be used to tior)St'Ca^y hide” ships and forma- |yj s brom submerged submarines can^ °uts‘de- Use of these phenomena tnarseri°usly impair the hostile sub- tyjt/ne e^ort' ASW traps can be set m these bodies while land-based maritime patrol aircraft and S-3A assets seek the enemy without. A thorough understanding of this phenomenon can open a plethora of options to the tactical planner and should not be overlooked.
The development of infrared, laser, and electro-optical sensors and guidance systems have marked the return of smoke screens to naval warfare. All these systems can be adversely affected by well-laid smoke screens properly employed in relation to the wind. Knowledge of the wind and its influence on these screens and on chaff is critical in the multi-sensored environment of the modern war.
Weather is the final factor which cannot be forgotten. Fog, haze, and rain seriously degrade infrared and electro-optical sensors. Ducting and trapping layers in the atmosphere can either enhance or impair electronic support measures/radar detection. Airborne early warning and ship stationing should be determined with these factors in mind. The formation may transit in and out of rain squalls or fog encountered at sea. The wind, the air, and the sea all impact on naval operations. These elements should be used to advantage whenever possible.
Recent articles in Proceedings concerning a naval officer’s education are very pertinent. Tactical planning and decision-making are complex endeavors requiring a diverse educational background. Upcoming missile systems with multiple guidance systems will further complicate the problem as each attack will require the coordinated employment of off-ship electro-magnetic and infrared decoys as well as chaff. Some of these will operate in the water while others will drift in the wind. Now, more than ever, the naval tactician must fully understand his environment before he can consider himself proficient in his chosen field.
“The Education of a Warrior”
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 40-45, January 1981;
R. A. Dun, p. 21 February 1981; J. R.
McDonnell, p. 15 March 1981 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As a past president of the Naval War College, I thoroughly enjoyed Commander Buell’s article. History shows that the Navy has never believed in the Naval War College since it was founded. Admiral H. G. Rickover, one of our admirals least acquainted with war, is one of the War College’s severest critics. The height of Admiral Rickover’s foolishness about preparing a Navy for war is the Senior Officers Ship Material Readiness course. Let no one doubt that it was his drive that brought it into being! Oh, if someone could only convince him that “weapons make a warship!” His submarines are fast becoming “low-altitude foxholes.” No one can get them, but they can do little with the few weapons they carry. Here we have a vehicle that can go around the world without refueling but has so few weapons it is of little sustained use in a campaign. I am of course referring to our Los Angeles (SSN-688)- class attack submarines and not the Polaris/Poseidon deterrent systems.
U0c
Now, I have been an ardent defend-
areas of naval warfare and na-
So 1 responsiDintyr it is
0ne jsUSC'^ an<J fragmented that no ity f0rlr!charge or has the accountabil-
Navi1 !htm or their performance. Our y has
not fought at sea since
as m-
reqUes'Jria* ^aw- I took the job at the S'/Wiary Paul Nitze, who i aC fne suPP°rt and a free hand. Ppalled when I arrived there. It
er °f Admiral Rickover for many
Veare a J
’ ri- As an engineer, he has few Superiors. As a man ro fight a war or Prepare a navy to fight a war, he s much too narrow a vision. No one as been killed by a propulsion plant, n°r have many ships been sunk by ne- A surface ship or a submarine is n°rhing blit a vehicle to bring ^Pons into a position where they 3n ke employed effectively. He is
c where he belongs, running a j P ex technical program and doing ^ well. However, few in the Navy fi MarC^^ have challenged his forays in ts where he lacks the competence make valid judgments. One finds f Y ln the Navy reluctant to ever R i.U^ t0 an<^ d,saSree w‘t^1 Admiral ^ over. EveHts have overtaken him. ^ , educational requirements of a ljtt| Crn Professional naval officer have " £ relationship to his idea of what a sees 6 Sy>0°k” should be. When one ■ntot^at t^le Navy bas had to impress bu . riuclear program several veerfe<^ graduating midshipmen, who jsnot volunteers, the handwriting no°n cbe wall! When we have to put
volunteers into either submarines r naval . .
tr°ubl aviatl0n» we are in serious
right>rnmanC^er ®ue^'s article goes Mit' t0 cbe point. Where are the t0(j .. ers> Halseys, and Spruances of maj ' ^re they “nuke spooks” or bav.ntenance people? I would rather tionai
char estrategy. Who in the Navy has a^yo^6 weapons? Can you name
0Hd w n _ - . . .
ar rl. The time is coming
t>lUe_ C e challenge of the Soviet be r*.^ater Havy when our Navy will , etiU|red to fight.
ColieneV'r attencied the Naval War I ha^ efore * ^>ecame its president. C°lleSatisfactorily completed War Sttate6 COrresP°ndence courses in ternancl tactics as well was run down and inadequately financed. The educational process was geared to the silly process of the colored papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy had spent $874,000 in military construction funds on the War College since it was started. Sims Hall, where I had swung my hammock as a seaman in 1925, had been renovated. My Shipmate article, “I Had A Dream” (October 1974), catalogs the trials and tribulations of all the prior presidents. They all had similar problems with the Navy Department and support for the students. This was particularly so with the assignment of students. When I arrived there, the last member of the faculty selected for flag rank was Don Felt. The span of years from 1945 until 1968 saw few War College graduates selected for flag rank.
Now, we have a nice new beautiful War College, with its facilities aptly named for its distinguished graduates, Spruance, Connolly, and Hewitt. This is in spite of the Navy, not because the Navy fought for it. It is primarily because we were able to sell our needs for the Naval War College to two people in Congress. Both continue to be my friends. They were Senator Henry Jackson and Congressman Bob Sikes from Florida. My support in the Navy came from Undersecretary Bob Baldwin and Chuck Baird, as well as Mr. Nitze. The uniformed Navy would have put the money at the Naval Academy. Congressman Sikes, as Chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, would have none of it. In truth, people condemned Sikes for building up western Florida with military facilities at Pensacola and Eglin Field, but in all fairness, maybe we should have named a hall after him.
My successor, Dick Colbert, who thanks to Secretary Paul Ignatius I was able to help select, carried out the rest of the program in his usual outstanding manner. He deserves tremendous credit for the War College we have today. The Navy lost a bright star when he died.
While I didn’t make a career out of the Navy, I spent 43 years in it. 1 have been retired 12 years and have traveled far and wide since then. Commander Buell is correct in his evaluation of Navy education today. It is at the bottom compared with the Air Force and Army. Its comprehension of the principles of higher education is wholly inadequate. The Navy hasn't fought at sea since 1945. It is time for the Navy to forget Rickover and his tantrums and the use of Congress as a sounding board and to begin to educate its officers to be true professionals in national strategy and naval warfare. The components of national strategy encompass economics, politics, technology, and military forces, in peace as well as war, to accomplish our national objectives. While ship material readiness is important as a subcomponent of the Navy’s problems, the question as to who will fight our Navy is of much more importance. There are many more aspects to the educational problem that couldn’t be covered in an article as short as Commander Buell’s. Bravo to him! He did expose the tip of the iceberg. X
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(Continued on page 79)
%
°®edln
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 23)
^•pboard Information Handling Tools”
^ C. Toedt, pp. 104-106, January 1081 breedings)
^“tenant Richard H. Quijada, U. S.
avy a veteran 0f more than 22
nars delving into the mysteries of a Paperwork in one capacity or •j. I believe that Lieutenant
ae c s suggestions would do the fleet UstJ'err*endous disservice. Who among as not felt the thrill of locating an Scure directive after days or weeks of £Could the discoverers of the a Sea Scrolls have possibly felt ni0re elation?
fo,
Think
of
it! If the shipboard in-
fiecj131'011 system were to be simpli- ln the manner suggested by the ^ided Lieutenant Toedt, the ftu C 'nst'nct in all of us would be the 3te^ ^ we would no longer have SysCoV °^scartb|ng out the OpNav
junior officers of the fleet. Pity the poor lad who would be able to quickly find an answer when he needed it, get on with the job, and get more work done during normal working hours than he does now by working half the night. He would be summarily deprived of an excellent reason for seeking more satisfying employment elsewhere.
Lieutenant Toedt’s suggestions, if ever implemented, would spell the end of Navy information management as we know it, nothing less.
Fortunately for paper shufflers, empire builders, and rice bowl proprietors everywhere, this task is probably beyond the ability of mortal man to accomplish.
Stru,
Urn» TyCom, and GruCom
etions
in order to accomplish a
Ilve-m ‘
tthe lnute tas^- These instructions, atlt| t\c”rnbined with fleet, task force,
dtrstas^ group commanders’ OpOr- and directives and
a myriad of tQt^l^Hetences which are seldom
Cross-r..,
vi^j Cte or 'n agreement, have pro-
■ltats of j- .
can f Aversion and recreation. They
otrn tLe f,ascs for
“The Subject of ‘They’ ”
(See B. A. Daly, p. 82, February 1981
Proceedings)
Senior Chief Yeoman Richard L. Aarhus. U. S. Navy—Perhaps the late Walt Kelly may have best described "they" through his Pogo comic strip: “. . . we have met the enemy, and not only may he be ours, he may be us.”
and bombs. In the distance, the rumbling of heavy combat could be heard, as the rear guard desperately attempted to prevent the enemy from tightening its stranglehold on the little beachhead. And through the smoke, all eyes on the beach looked to the sea, for deliverance lay there.
In the water, scores of ships, some large, some small, were taking on as many men as possible. And as the day passed, it became clear that the vast majority of the men on the beach would escape. What had happened?
The planners of the great exodus could hardly believe their good fortune. A scant few days earlier, they had expected to save a mere handful. Now, success was within their grasp. The powerful enemy tank columns, surrounding the tiny beachhead, were at a dead halt, just a few miles from the high-water mark. Had their leader decided to issue a halt order? What could have possibly caused this?
As the last dazed, tired survivors on the beach piled into the little boats waiting for them, they thought of their tiny rear guard who would not
naval managers with literally
aCC0|
. -------- entire careers.
g‘ne, if yOU will, the sense of
ty,at's ^t by fbe for
by a sho:
Hate
°nes among us who, in research-
by <lUestion and having been told . ore command that such-and-
c0Ver1S not a requirement, later dis- is acr,Un„°ur own rbat the requirement
“y the"
3„ ” " mat uu. iv.cjUMi.niv.iu
by thUally valid and has been issued kn0wle/ery staff that disclaimed direct *t' Simplifying the
towar jVe system would go a long way sittih| r°bbing us of this, one of life’s e Pleasures, out th
Hiy ae teal threat is not to those of e group; it is to the fresh-caught
The Difference on the Beach
First Lieutenant John Gordon, U. S. Marine Corps — On the beach thousands of exhausted men huddled among the sand dunes. Occasional rounds of artillery fire crashed down in their midst, adding to the casualties they had sustained in the past few days of retreat. Overhead, fighters of each side dueled for control of the skies. Not realizing that their own air forces were making a heroic effort, the trapped men on the beach cursed their own fliers when an enemy bomber or fighter penetrated to the beach and churned up the sand with cannon fire
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escape. But as they turned their eyes to the sea they saw the main reason for their salvation. Despite all their equipment, uniforms, and supplies lying on the beach behind them, they bad survived. A minor miracle had been achieved.
Dunkirk? Not exactly.
A mere three miles from shore lay the battleship New Jersey (BB-62). Her booming 16-inch salvos still roared overhead into the assembly areas of the massed enemy tanks even now trying to organize a final attack on the beachhead. The columns of smoke rising from behind the low hills surrounding the beach were testimony to the destruction wrought by the great ship over the past few days. Scores of enemy tanks and hundreds of “soft- skinned” vehicles lay wrecked along the roads leading to the perimeter of the beachhead. The rocket-assisted 16-inch rounds had begun the pounding of the enemy many miles from the beach, using the ship’s own helicopter observers and radar. The escape was made good.
A few air-to-surface antishipping missiles launched by enemy aircraft had penetrated the fleet defenses. Several had been knocked down by the battleship’s own Phalanx fire and surface-to-air missiles. One or two had actually struck the ship, but their high-explosive warheads, designed to wreck an aluminum superstructure of a frigate or destroyer, had made little impression on the massive armor of this, the last battleship.
As the rescue fleet sailed away, with the air battle still raging overhead, they could feel proud. The New Jersey could feel proud. Wars are not won by evacuations, but the mission had been accomplished behind the massive shield of 16-inch firepower. The remnants of the Rapid Deployment Force had been saved to fight another day.
We need a Battleship.
miral Rickover’s note, curiously titled “Leadership.’’ If this is a satirical piece, designed to stir up commentary, it is very good. But if it actually represents the opinion of our most senior admiral, then it is an insult to all the junior officers who carry the leadership load in the operating forces because it implies:
a. They don't know their jobs.
b. They don’t work hard.
c. Leadership isn’t important anyway.
You may recall that Admiral- Rickover begins by telling us that “Leadership is an esoteric concept which cannot be defined.” And just as we’re about to believe him, he proceeds to define it! His definition is a pretty good short description of Theory X—i.e., drive yourself; drive your men till they drop; don’t trust anyone. A brief look at officer retention figures in the Nuclear Navy (36% in spite of large bonuses) will show the effectiveness of that leadership style nowadays.
Admiral Rickover goes on to recommend that the Proceedings stop publishing leadership articles. What, then, should a naval professional journal publish—articles on nuclear physics? With some temerity, I suggest that leadership is even more important to a naval officer than nuclear propulsion. If we concentrated more on leadership, and less on autocratic technocracy, perhaps we would be as well prepared to fight as we are to pass inspections.
While it may be true that immature minds sometimes turn out sophomoric drivel, I think the Navy and the Proceedings are better served by immature innovative thinking than by pat repetition of long-discredited 18th century “leadership principles.”
By definition, the Naval Institute
was established
. to provi
ide naval
officers with an unofficial forum
for
the exchange of ideas about the deve opment and improvement of the Navy.” The authors of these articles do nothing more than make use that forum by relating their expef ences, offering solutions, and present ing ideas.
I am not able to go as- far back as Admiral Rickover to see how many af tides dealing with leadership have been written, but I did go back °'er
the past three years. During
that
period, there have been 3 articles
22
leadership forums, and 25 comment^ and discussions. The distribution rank of the “young and inexperience all of eh*
officers” who wrote "sophomoric drivel” is as follows
0-10
0-9
0-6
0-5
0-4
0-3
0-2
0-1
E-7
2
3
3 9 4 18 3 3 2
Officer Candidate 1 Civilian 1
I recommend that the Naval InSt
tute continue with its efforts to P
riot
leadership articles and make every fort to encourage more of them, dally through such means as the cent Astor Memorial Leadership L ^ Contest. Remember, the sophornore today is the senior of tomorrow.
“Leadership”
(See H. G. Rickover, p. 82, January 1981;
G. W. Loveridge, J. R. McDonnell, and L. D. Chirillo, p. 15, March 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Barry J. Coyle. U. S. Naiy—I couldn’t believe Ad
Electronics Technician First Class (SS) John G. Hazard. U. S. Navy—I think that Admiral Rickover has lost sight of, or perhaps chooses to ignore, the fact that leadership means different things to different people. No two people will express themselves in exactly the same way. But they all share a common goal: they want to get people to do the Navy’s job effectively.
r
Captain Wayne P. Hughes. Jr- > p0 Navy—When we senior offieerS^vC longer listen to young advice, we lost our usefulness. Some great o 1 have debilitated themselves by ta . when they should have been listen>n^ Whenever I grow impatient the folly of junior officers, and c^r, ^ a great deal of it, 1 remind myse* before the age of 30: j,e
► Oliver Hazard Perry had won
Battle of Lake Erie. J
►Alexander the Great had conque the Persian Empire.
►Hannibal had crossed the Alps' ^
►Don John of Austria had won
1
I I ; I
80
Proceedings
/ Apr*1
R £ shear [J s Navy Mired)—Admiral Rickover hits the
on the head in his succinct com- nts on leadership. Entirely too j^Uch has been written in recent years F ‘nexperienced people and pseudo-
Battle of Lepanto.
^ Napoleon had conquered Italy and Austria.
^ Frederick the Great was in the m<dst of winning the War of the Au- str'an Succession.
J' F. B. Stuart was a major general Commanding Lee’s cavalry corps.
Henry V, King of England, had ''’on the battle of Agincourt.
George Armstrong Custer had al- teady been, at the age of 23, the youngest general in the Union Army.
e "'as at the ripe old age of 37 at the Llttle Big Horn.
Combat is a young man’s business, our future combat leaders need to “e heard.
wperts, both military and civilian. t, Ucb °F *t has been rot. One would CQ^ ^leadership” had just been dis-
'■pi
e , . e Fundamental principles of lead-
*P have not changed over the years Tv, r ,
no1 iney were enunciated to me in
uncertain terms by my first cornending officer, Lieutenant Comer Haiah Olch, U. S. Navy, the areported on board my first ship, orth Atlantic destroyer, in De- Cernber I94p
si ^apta‘n Olch was a seagoing profes- ^nal 0f t|1e ancj a jsjaval
na erT1y classmate of Admiral Rick- to u °1S Words were almost verbatim K; °Se Used by Admiral Rickover in l S/°Ur principles:
► wr? your i°b-
1 -j- °r* hard at your job.
^ ij8111 y°ur people.
)oh Spect Frequently to see that the ls done.
> £aPtain Olch added one more:
peo ?0w y°ur people, take care of your rnjm e’ and demonstrate a little of the Th° human kindness. bf06 Subject of leadership was never pect^ r UP again. I was simply ex- sib;,it. t0 carry out my respon- “What’s Happening with JEFF?”
(See W. D. Siuru, pp. 93-94, February 1981
Proceedings)
Colonel John G. Miller, U. S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Ships Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps—Colonel Siuru ably reviews the technical development of the LCAC (landing craft, air cushion) program. This program got an important shot in the arm in December 1980 when the Secretary of Defense decided to support the funding of three LCAC starts each in fiscal years 1982 and 1983. This has opened the way for lead production of the six craft, which will satisfy the lift requirements of the smallest Marine Corps air-ground task force, a marine amphibious unit (MAU).
System design competition is currently under way, and should be completed by the time this letter is published. The design of the for-service-use LCAC will track rather closely with the prototype craft, and will incorporate features approved by the Navy’s Ship Acquisition and Improvement Panel (SAIP) in February 1980. The initial production decision by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) is expected in October. Production contracts could then be negotiated soon after the Congress appropriates the fiscal year 1982 budget.
Besides meeting an operational requirement (i.e., support of a forward afloat deployed MAU) with reasonable speed, the decision for lead production of the six craft is expected to reduce costs and minimize production risks. By hard tooling for lead production, the contractor will be providing a continuous production line through the operational testing phase, thus avoiding multiple startup costs. At the same time, the contractor will be gaining actual production line cost and schedule experience prior to a full production decision. This should minimize trial-and-error procedures once full production commences.
The first six craft increment should reach the fleet by fiscal year 1987. It is estimated that between 70 and 80 LCACs will meet the ship-to-shore requirement for the assault elements of a division-wing team-sized marine amphibious force (a MAF [ae]). This MAF
Atfjit
The Marine Corps' air cushion landing craft program has been delayed many times. Finally, it appears ready to get off the ground.
(AE) capability can be carried in existing and programmed well-deck ships. The new LSD-4 l-class amphibious warfare ships, which will be able to carry four LCACs, will be the most efficient LCAC haulers once they enter the fleet.
A good bit of doctrinal concept development is still required, as lead production commences, because the LCAC offers a number of new amphibious capabilities:
^ Increased potential landing sites, by a factor of four
► Decreased vulnerability, through greater speed and standoff distance
\ Decreased vulnerability to mines and underwater obstacles
► Independence of tides and beach gradients
\ Reduced requirement for beach support units, because of its ability to offload inland.
The speed and versatility of the LCAC may, in time, call for altered command, control, and communications arrangements (possibly resembling those of helicopters) both during the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent operations ashore. In addition, concepts of conducting landings with mixes of LCACs and conventional craft must be developed to cover the lengthy transition period as we move to a fully LCAC-capable force. Finally, other uses of LCACs (e.g., in mine countermeasures work) must be considered and tested.
The LCAC represents, potentially, the most significant change in amphibious warfare concepts and capabilities since the introduction of the helicopter and the vertical assault concept. The LCAC’s arrival has been
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be
of
long overdue, and is still years away. But the Navy and the Marine Corps will need every bit of that interim construction period for planning to make best use of this new capability.
“The Classification Society Obligation”
(See J. W. McCurdy, pp. 99-102, February 1981 Proceedings)
Edward Taylor—In the case of the Prinsendam. it is significant that the Netherlands Government plans to convene a board to investigate the crew as first priority. In light of my personal observations as a cruise ship passenger, I suggest there is a need for classification societies entrusted to certify the seaworthiness of crews at sea.
As a passenger on the same line that owned and operated the Prinsendam, I observed the following:
► Two life jackets in a room reserved for three persons.
► An empty life jacket locker on the boat deck.
► A passenger tour of the bridge revealed nobody on watch. (Did they rely on automatic alarms?)
► The ship had to “back” into Nassau. The bridge (wheelhouse) was crowded with a group of giggling girls.
My written complaint about the lack of life jackets went both to the Coast Guard and the line. The Coast Guard replied that it planned to board the ship in New York. The line never responded.
“Their New Cruiser”
(See J. W. Kehoe and K. S. Brower, pp. 121-126, December 1980; N. Polmar, p. 83, January 1981; E. J, Grove, pp. 71-74, February 1981 Proceedings)
Ezio Bonsignore, Editor, Military Technology—The authors’ article is very interesting indeed; but, 1 am simply unable to understand the postulation that the Kirov’s auxiliary power plant is a conventional steam one, and that it could be used for “providing the boost power needed for high speeds.”
I agree that the likely function of the auxiliary power plant is to provide boost power. I cannot agree, however, that it is based on a boiler(s) and steam turbine(s). With such a solution, any additional power would be available only after the boilerfs) has been put under pressure—i.e., something which obviously requires a considerable time, especially if, as suggested in the article, the boiler(s) >s usually not on line in the "cruise mode. The only way to obtain quick boost power from an .auxiliary P°wer plant of the conventional steam tyPe would be by maintaining the boiler(s) always under pressure when there >s the slightest chance that such a boost in power could be required. This seems unacceptable.
Accordingly, my guess is that the Kirov has gas turbines, which can
started from “cold” in a matter minutes. According to my inform* tion, what is described in the article as “blowing tubes” was, in fact, the starting of gas turbines, which ** characterized by a sudden emission 0 dark smoke followed by nearly trans parent hot gases. j
If we assume (and even in this agree with the authors) that it is un likely that the Soviets have develope a completely new nuclear power p'ant for the Kirov, the only solution 1(1 sight is the power plant of the ice breaker Arktika, which develops some thing like 60,000 h.p. on two reaC^. tors. Two such systems (for a tota".°A four reactors) would provide 120,° h.p.—i.e., still too few, unless we 3s sume higher working conditio°s However, apparently there is no sp*c for four nuclear reactors and any s of auxiliary power plant. All t ^ seems to suggest that all the Ktr°v able to squeeze from her nuclear P0'' plant is something around 60,0 70,000 h.p.—perhaps sufficient ® the 24 knots quoted in the article for nothing more. t
Consequently, I strongly suSP j the Kirov has a combined nuclear *n gas (CONAG) arrangement: the part of it, used for boost, could ^ either the complete power plant “Krivak”-class frigate or half that ^ “Kara”-class cruiser.
Il9)
(Continued on page
-aj
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 86)
(See F,
K. Zi
rroceedings)
only reserve officer to reach flag ■ These may not be the exact ^ut that is the story as it has told to me. Admiral Evers was
cts
ln 1942 and spent the war
'Suted 11 was a ^onS time before I lirt6 bow my whites could get so
"^le Old (Fresh Water) Navy”
nn, pp. 71-72, January 1981 ^ ■ Evers—Commander Zinn’s
tlC/e brings back fond memories,
p'cularly since Captain Edward A. cvers rk •«
’ rne crusty old salt,” was my reference to his time and ’ it is my understanding that captain was the highest reserve rank I ,tair|able in those days. However, on Une ^941, he was promoted to rear and11^- an<^ Was’ ^ believe, the first
fa,
retired
years as o , .
Va . a naval inspector visiting the
Wer°Us yards on the Great Lakes that
engaged in naval construction.
it ^ess hectic days of the 1930s,
°ffice COrnrnon Practice for the reserve
etuis S rna^c‘n8 their annual summer
rbtjj.eS ln cbe USS Wilmette to bring
tenSons along. The magic age was
sUrri an^ f spent my eighth and ninth
teach*16FS *n eaSer anticipation of
l5^'nS chat ripe old age. Finally, in
ctuis' ^ WaS ab°wecf to make my first
apt)6 a*ong with three or four other
d0c^rent‘ce boys.” We arrived at
oUtp e on a Sunday morning, all
seaktte<^ with complete uniforms,
shlp^ and hammocks from the
ever, l Ucky bag. I remember that we
wj^ ac^ the old dress white jumpers
days 'Ue cuffs and collar. In those
Who’ 0nlv members of the crew
glnVVOre dungarees were the black
fi08’ and
lak/ °Ut *n the middle of that clean
ham stowing our seabags and the d , ’ We were assigned to one of
ingstC. divisions and given a clean- Was ,IOn' the captain’s nephew, I ill ered to keep the bright work Cabjn Passageway to the captain's
the offished to a high shine. What ICet making that assignment
didn’t realize was that the passageway also led to the captain’s pantry where the steward’s mates made sure that my daily ration from the crew’s mess was augmented by goodies from the captain’s table.
In addition to cleaning stations, we were also added to the watch bill as "Jr. Messengers,” and every day while the ship was under way, we stood a two-hour watch on the bridge. Those were the days before sound-powered telephones or public address systems, and a messenger was required in each watch to convey orders from the bridge to the various parts of the vessel. The Jr. Messenger was used only when the regular watch-stander was off the bridge, so we had a lot of time to observe and learn the bridge routine.
In 1935, I made my second cruise in the Wilmette, but by 1936, someone in the Navy Department had heard about my uncle’s unauthorized additions to his crew and the practice of taking boys on the ship came to an abrupt halt. In 1939, I was 15 years old and big enough to pass as one of the reservists, so I reenlisted for my third and final cruise.
It is true that my uncle was indeed a crusty old salt, but he was certainly one of the favorite members of my family when I was growing up. He was a very small man, and the story is often told that he was forced to buy all of his shoes in the boys department because of his small feet. To all of his nephews and nieces, he was “Uncle Ed,” and the Wilmette was never anything else but “The Ship.” He died in 1954 and is buried in Point Loma National Cemetery. I am told that the members of the Wilmette's, permanent ship company who live in the San Diego area make regular visits to his grave.
Although I never saw the Wilmette after 1943, I have been told that sometime during the war one stack was removed and the masts were replaced by a tower mast aft of the wheelhouse. If anyone has a picture of her in this configuration, I would be very much interested in adding it to my small collection of information on the ship and her captain.
“The AVF—Making It Work”
(See D. Evans, pp. 47-53, December 1980;
J. B. Hamilton, pp. 99-102, March 1981
Proceedings)
Major W. C. Gregson, U. S. Marine Corps—Major Evans and I agree that the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is in trouble, and that we must do all we can to get the most from what we have. The problem goes much deeper, however. Major Evans calls for better use of available manpower through improved systems and crisis management from Congress, the recruiting force, the services, and the administration. Were we even able to control all that, we would still be treating only the symptoms, not the illness.
The All-Volunteer Force was a political decision made to ensure the reelection of President Richard M. Nixon. The failure of the Selective Service System to manage a fair and equitable draft, or to accommodate logical and needed draft reforms contributed greatly to the political necessity of the AVF. Along with the AVF came the concept of “Realistic Deterrence,” which dropped the armed forces from a planning goal of a two- and-one-half war capability to a one- and-one-half war capability. Then came the “Total Force Policy,” which dropped our authorized active force levels lower yet, and placed enormous reliance not only on the active reserve establishment, but on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) as well. The cynic may well ask which came first, the reduced force levels or the policy. With the abandonment not only of the draft, but also against the advice of the Gates Commission, Congress abrogated its traditional role of maintenance of the armed forces.
As a result of these decisions, the
without
to the traditional democratic situ ^ of professional armed forces backe a citizenry willing to share, if nt .. sary, in the common defense on and equal basis. The nation " therefore, have an abiding interest^ the health, viability, and use ° active duty forces. The height6^ awareness of the armed forces c
of the Ptt
Id
ided by .. d fotccJ
mercr
.ndcU'
- - duly
cies toward independence from elected leadership and to 1 u ^ force levels in difficult times, h se, we have missed the implied me
-the l buy
al
armed forces now find themselves serving two masters. The first and most demanding master is the marketplace. The conditions and restraints imposed by the need to compete with colleges, trade schools, corporations, small businesses, the public aid system, peer pressure, and just plain apathy for our recruits are not at all understood by those unfamiliar with recruiting—and imperfectly by many familiar with recruiting. It is requiring the best and brightest enlisted and commissioned minds in the Navy and Marine Corps to keep us marginally successful at recruiting. The basic concept that must be understood is that when the United States abandoned the draft in 1973 (or, if you prefer, when the United States abandoned a fair draft some years earlier), we abandoned the concept of equal sharing of the common defense. As a result, our recruiters must now sell (and "selling” it is, as in insurance, real estate, or used cars) a period of service to sufficient numbers of the eligible population. The
basic modus operandi is to ascertain the immediate or short-range (three to four years) needs of a prospect, and then convince him that the sendee can fill those needs. The self-perceived needs of our youth tend toward salary, technical skills, education, and travel. Obviously, the greater or more immediate those needs of the prospect, the easier the recruiter’s task. Conversely, the better the applicant feels he has it where he is (less perceived needs), the tougher the recruiter’s task. We should not be surprised that, as Brigadier General Patrick McMillan succinctly stated, "The middle class has deserted the military.”
The other master the armed sendees serve is that of our national commitments. While our stated (and real) capabilities have declined, our strategic commitments have not. Hence, we must move what forces we have from hereto there and back again to cover our NATO, Persian Gulf, Caribbean, South American, and Asian flanks. It’s tough, especially on the Navy, when our interior lines cross oceans to meet at the furthest point of the globe. An examination of the supporting establishment, the war reserve stockpiles, and the reserve establishment (particularly the IRR), all of which are to back up the active forces, is not very reassuring. This point is not lost on our allies or our adversaries.
The All-Volunteer Force, therefore, contains a serious contradiction. The marketplace will allow us a finite number of recruits, based on the state of the economy, the perceived competence of the national leadership, the skill level of the recruiting service, and the entrance standards of the services. With this base, we must meet our national commitments, which are almost totally controlled by our adversaries and our allies. The resultant over-commitment, high tempo of operations, and constantly shifting priorities frustrate our junior officers and mid-career NCOS and petty officers as they try to manage this imbalance between resources and commitments. Recognizing this imbalance and sensing no viable national commitment to our armed forces, they leave for civilian life, and the problem gets worse.
Neither money nor more effective management will, by themselves, make the All-Volunteer Force work. Remember that the Gates Commission suggested three things: an increase w the basic pay for recruits; comptehen sive improvements in recruiting Pr0 grams and conditions of the milk^ life; and a standby draft system tl^ provide rapid augmentation in time crisis. Without the standby draft sys tern, the national climate indicates very little public interest in the arme forces. Without it, our limited acti duty forces are "hired” to provide ce tain services for a complacent society in return for agreed upon compenS^ tion. Without it, our recruiters are the mercy of the marketplace the arms to compete in that aren* Implementation of the standby system would have an impact fat yond “rapid augmentation in time crisis,” although that is most certa*
welcome. It would return this na
atioc
a faif would’
by this reemphasis of one
mary duties of citizenship "l .
. , k hv r^lS
greatly ease the recruiter s tasK oy ing his status from employee to 1 fessional in the public eye. tJ
Unless our national commit'11^ are reduced to a level commensU with the finite personnel base that ^ be provided under the current
* . 1 jj1i.ll*
petitive conditions, no internal
agement system can address the ^
of our difficulties. This nation n
1 h‘lCN
realize that without real nationa ‘
. i Uv *
ing, as would be prov standby draft system, our arme will suffer all the ills of other nary forces, including perhaps ten
from the Gates Commissionarmed forces that money can
ah’
nothing without real nation mitment to the common defens •
19®1