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On 19 Decetnber 1977, the CNO of the Brazilian Navy presented a plaque to the Chief of the U. S. Navy Mission in ceremonies terminating the Mission that had prospered for almost a half-century by constant, cordial, and sincere exchange of ideas between the two navies. It is improbable that we will ever see a resumption of this exemplary Mission that was done in, among other reasons, by our stiff-necked civil rights stand.
When 1 arrived for duty as an English instructor at the Brazilian Naval Academy in February 1976, I was surprised by the thorough integration of our naval mission into the Brazilian Navy. The U. S. admiral who headed the mission was carried on the lineal list of Brazilian flag officers. His aide, who doubled as a liaison officer, was an exceptionally sharp Brazilian lieutenant commander. Conversation at the mission was a mixture of English and Portuguese, embracing everything from the overhaul of submarine batteries to the results of the weekend soccer game. The credit for this exceptional degree of harmony rests not only with the efforts of the U. S. officers involved, but to an even greater degree with the Brazilian Navy. Mutual trust and common goals produced a tradition of friendship between the two allies.
The naval mission to Brazil had its beginning in 1920 as the result of a voyage of the USS Idaho (BB- 42) commanded by Captain Charles T. Vogelgesang. Under executive orders, the Idaho was directed to carry President Epitafio Pessoa on his return to Brazil following a visit to the United States. President Pessoa was impressed with the professionalism displayed by the Idaho's crew. He requested that the U. S. Navy send a mission to Brazil for the purposti of helping the Brazilian Navy attain a higher degree of professionalism. Additionally he asked that Cap'j tain Vogelgesang head the mission.
In 1922, in a contract signed by the two countries, a naval mission comprised of 16 officers and 19 petty officers was established. The stated purpose:
. . to cooperate with the Minister of the Navy and with the officers of the Navy in whatever may be necessary to secure a good organization of the Navy ashore and afloat; in improving the methods of work in the shops, the shore establishment, and on board ships; in training and instructing the personnel and in drawing up and executing plans for the improvement of the Navy for fleet exercise* and naval operations.”
The mission included experts in ordnance and gunnery, naval aviation, destroyer operations, supply and medicine, and advisors to the Naval War College- This contract was renewed with little change ifl 1926. In 1930, the contract was allowed to expire because of pressing economic reasons which forced the recall of the mission’s members. This initial eight-year period was noteworthy for studies containing important recommendations for improving the Brazilian Navy. Related reorganization of the ministry, the fleet, and the somewhat detached shore establishment registered considerable progress. I11 1936, with eight officers and five chief petty officers- the naval mission was reactivated. Its duties wef£ “. . .to cooperate with the Minister of the Navy and the officers of the Brazilian Navy with a view t° enhancing the efficiency of the Brazilian Navy. Among its officers were specialists in naval communication, ordnance and gunnery, engineering- naval aviation and naval construction, and advisors t® the Naval War College in tactics and strategy. Thh manning continued throughout World War II, evd1 though the U. S. Navy’s role in Brazil and the Soutd Atlantic skyrocketed. Until the outbreak of hoS'
'F°r foot,
Cl the mission fit the characterization of one of !!S mernbers, Captain Harold Dodd, as a firm of insulting engineers.”1 The mission continued in ls fole, and the fruits of years of cooperation and tearnwork were evidenced.
^ In sharp contrast to the difficulties experienced by e U- S. Army in securing cooperation and facilities y. ®razd, the Navy, under the sure leadership of ^1Ce Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, Commander South antic Force, found acceptance by the Brazilians on ‘^ unprecedented scale. On 12 September 1942, an ^ er from the President of Brazil, Getulio Vargas, aced the Brazilian Navy and Air Force under the operational control of Vice Admiral Ingram. In rapid Accession, the U. S. Navy established five bases, Seven air facilities, two hospitals, farms, coast watch- nS stations, radio stations, training facilities, and . er support activities along Brazil’s coast. Working "lt:h the Brazilian Navy and Air Force, U. S. con- °ys escorted hundreds of merchant ships with vital 2ar*°s t0 safety. Among the key convoys were AS-4 of July 1942, which carried tanks and other critical j^N'pment used by British General Bernard °ntgomery at El Alamain, and the Brazilian con- ^)ys July through September 1944, which carried ofC ^razi^lan Expeditionary Force to the battlefields 1 Italy. The final result of this lethal cooperation "as the sinking of 1 1 U-boats and the sinking or tapture of 5 blockade runners. Brazil lost significant *?erchant shipping with a corresponding loss of hun- ds of lives. Two warships sank, a corvette which
notes, please turn to page 57.
capsized with a loss of all hands, and the cruiser Bahia which exploded and sank on patrol with a loss of more than half of her 367 man crew of which 4 were U. S. Navy radiomen. The noted naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison considered Brazil’s entry into the war ‘‘an event of great importance.” Without Brazil’s help it would have been impossible to close the “Atlantic narrows” to German and Japanese blockade runners.2
Much of the credit for winning Brazil over to the allied cause goes to the confident diplomacy and personal ability of Admiral Ingram, but Frank D. McCann points out the important role of the naval mission in laying the cornerstone for mutual trust and friendship in the years preceding the war:
. . Ingram and the United States Navy were different [in contrast to the Army], The two navies had preserved close relations since the First World War, when Brazilian officers had seen duty on American warships in the South Atlantic, and the United States had maintained an effective naval mission in Brazil since the early 1920’s.”3 The advantages of this close naval cooperation were not lost to either country.
A 1943 U. S. Navy memorandum listed the following goals of the naval mission in postwar cooperation with Brazil:
“To assist in suring [j/r] the predominance of the United States in Brazilian and Western Hemisphere affairs; ... to introduce the use of United States material in the Brazilian Navy in order to promote American trade and to standardize the requirements of material and spare parts for United States and Brazilian ships operating to-
gether in time of war; ... to prevent the establishment of any other foreign Naval Mission in Brazil; to demonstrate to other Latin American countries by the successful functioning of the Naval Mission to Brazil the desirability of similar Missions in their own countries. ... It is the policy of the United States Government to maintain the Naval Mission in Brazil after the war for the purposes set forth above.”4
From the Brazilian standpoint the modernization of their navy using surplus U. S. warships was an important part of the postwar relationship. In the 25 years after the war, Brazil acquired 25 U. S. warships, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. The naval mission coordinated and planned with the Brazilian Navy for personnel training, ship overhauls, spare parts, blueprints, ammunition, and torpedoes, much of which was financed or purchased through the U. S. Security Assistance Program.
At the end of the war, the head of the naval mission took on the responsibility of Chief, Navy Section, Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission, a direct descendent of the World War II combined staff. The U. S. naval communications station Radio Rio, established during the war, continued to function and in 1962 was integrated into the Brazilian Navy Radio Station, Rio de Janeiro. The 1942 contract for the mission was renewed in 1946 and 1950. The mission was expanded to include an electronics officer, a medical officer, training officers, and an officer to provide technical assistance in torpedo construction. In 1949, the first Marine Corps advisor was added to the mission. The arrival of an aviation advisor to the Naval War College in 1948 completed the manning of the mission at 17 officers and 13 enlisted men. In 1954, by mutual agreement, the mission was reduced because of economic considerations to 10 officers and 7 enlisted personnel. At the same time, the contract was extended indefinitely, subject to termination as provided in the agreement.
In its final years, the naval mission moved once more into the role of a consultant as legislative actions by the U. S. Congress sharply curtailed U. S- ship, equipment, and training options open to Brazil and other non-NATO allies. In addition to the coordination of combined naval operations, research studies, presentations, and courses were given. The subjects included maritime pollution, Soviet Union capabilities, carrier catapult systems, systems acquisition and management, and other topics requested by the Brazilian Navy. This information role of the mission was important, but there was another function. Responding to what they considered the mission’s primary value to the Brazilian Navy, the mission’s last Engineering and Hull Advisor, Commander David Cowdrill, and the mission ’s final liaison officer, Brazilian Lieutenant Commander Rodin de Sa, agreed that its greatest asset was in presenting clearly the interests and concerns of the Brazilian Navy to the U. S. Department of DefenseCiting mine warfare as an example, they stated that obtaining adequate information for Brazil’s needs on the subject had been difficult, but without the advocacy by the U. S. officers at the mission, it would have been impossible. These officers exemplified a common belief among U. S. and Brazilian officers as to the importance of close naval cooperation in pursuit of their joint goals. Regrettably, these convictions were unable to weather recent political and economic storms.
The political fallout from President Jimmy Carter’s human rights campaign embittered many Brazilians. Rhetoric which compared Brazil wifi1 Uganda in human rights was grossly unfair. U. S- efforts to torpedo the already signed West German- Brazil Nuclear Accord, the retreat from the Nixon- Kissinger position on Brazil’s place in American pol' icy, maintenance of trade restrictions against certain Brazilian products, and media accusation of coffee market manipulation set the stage for the rupture. ^ U. S. embassy officer tactlessly delivered to the Brazilian Government, at 1600 on Friday, 11 March 1977, a congressionally required report of the human rights situation in Brazil, a prerequisite to the U. S- proposal for military assistance (some $200,000)- The reaction was swift. The following day, President Ernesto Geisel announced the termination of the bilateral defense agreement with the United States, and later, on 19 September 1977, denounced all de' fense agreements with the United States. These aC' tions emotionally charged a progressively changing view of defense needs by Brazil. These changing re' quirements indirectly contributed to the end of the naval mission, and they are important in evaluating future U. S.-Brazilian naval cooperation.
In a column published in the newspaper Estado
ian
——.— Pinal Composition of the Naval Mission:___________________________
Chief normally Rear Admiral
Sub-Chief-—Captain (Aviation Warfare Specialist)
Mine Warfare Advisor—Commander (Surface Warfare Specialist)
Engineering and Hull Advisor—Commander (Engineering Duty Officer)
Supply and Logistics Advisor—Commander (Supply Corps)
E‘vil Engineering Advisor—Lieutenant Commander (Civil Engineering Corps)
Cornmunications/Electronics Advisor—Lieutenant Commander (Surface Warfare Specialist)
Amphibious Warfare Advisor—Lieutenant Colonel, Marine Corps (Infantry)
(-liict Petty Officers—yeoman, personnelman, mess specialist
Paulo on 19 September, Carlos Conde claimed at the denunciations of the military accords were motivated by the desire to “clear the terrain” for a stage in the dialogue with the United States. c°rding to Conde, the Brazilian military had Pushed for abrogation because it wanted to establish _^0ctrine without “definitive links” to any country to diversify their sources of weapons. Conde con- Ut*ed that the accords had been virtually dead for many years because of changes in Brazil and the . m situation. That, combined with the human ^Mts report and nuclear pressures, eventually led to denunciations and the end of a long process of engagement in military relations.
S‘nce the Brazilian Revolution of 1964, the Brazil
armed forces have made substantial progress in sening their dependence on foreign arms sources. e nee<d for this progress has been especially under
scored by Brazil’s oil-aggravated balance-of-payment deficit. Pending accelerated development of its own fields and its bold alcohol fuels program, Brazil must purchase about 85% of its oil abroad. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of crude oil in 1975, the super-hot economy, which had recorded annual gross national product (GNP) gains of 10 to 11%, tailed off. In 1975, the GNP growth rate dropped to 5% and in the first six months of 1976, the country’s oil bill rose to $5 billion, sending its'foreign debt to $23 billion. In 1979, petroleum imports consumed $6.3 billion, or 40.7% of the value of Brazilian exports. In 1980, oil imports consumed more than 50% of the export income. The Brazilian Army has been the most successful in diminishing its dependence on foreign arms. Currently the majority of its weapons needs are filled by domestic factories. Heavy tanks, the one major exception, will soon enter into production. This independence and the Army’s basic missions give the Brazilian Army a perspective of military cooperation precluding the necessity for joint operations with the U. S. Army. In contrast, the Brazilian Navy’s role requires close cooperation with the U. S. Navy in a confrontation with a major naval power. The Brazilian Navy and Air Force have con-
The Niterof is one of the Brazilian Navy’s six Mark 10 frigates of English design. Four were built by Vosper Thornycroft in Britain, tu o under VT supervision in Rio de Janeiro.
tinued, though the trend is lessening, to depend on foreign sources for their most important weapons. The following chart drawn by the Naval Mission in 1976 underlines the resulting problem facing Brazil’s admirals:
Future Fleet Composition
Type | 19 76 | 1980 | 1985 |
Carrier | 1 | 1 | 1 |
LPH/Sea Control Ship |
| 1 | 1 |
Destroyers | 15 | 21 | 28 |
Amphibious Warfare Ships | 6 | 7 | 7 |
Submarines | 8 | 10 | 12 |
Support Vessels | 1 | 3 | 3 |
Helicopters | 30 | 45 | 60 |
Ship Sources |
|
| |
| 1976 | 1980 | 1985 |
United States | 25 | 23 | 1 |
European | 2 | 10 | P |
Brazil | _4 | _4_ | _4 |
Totals | 31 | 37 | P |
If the 23 ex-U. S. warships are replaced with European vessels, the Brazilian Fleet will be as European in 1985 as it is U. S. now.
The problem represented by Brazil’s 23 ex-U. S. warships growing obsolete together offers no easy solution for a country which must pay careful attention to its balance-of-payments deficit. Included are 14 (1942-1946) destroyers and 7 (1946-1949) Guppy II/III submarines. The Brazilian Navy plans to operate them into the 1980s though the U. S. Navy originally envisioned a 30-year, lifetime for the ships. Incorporation into the fleet of six English-designed Vosper Thornycroft Mark 10 frigates (the last one completed on 12 September 1980) and three Oberon class attack submarines constitutes the first phase in the naval modernization program. The first four frigates were built in England, but the final two ships
56
were built in Brazil with technical services and lead' yard services supplied by Vosper-Thornycroft. These Niteroi-class frigates are in ASW and general purpose yersions (4/2). They feature combined gas turbin® diesel propulsion and Exocet, Bofors, Seacat, Ikata and Sea Lynx weapons systems. Long-term plan* envision the construction of four more frigates, af though the escalating cost may pose a problem. Th£ technical experience gained in the construction of th£ frigates is providing the infrastructure for greatly &■' panded naval construction in Brazil. To date, Brazil has built an oiler, two successful classes of river pa' trol ships (Pedro Teixeira and Roraitna), and amphibi' ous landing craft.
The 1979-1989 naval construction plan calls for * new class of patrol frigates, gunboats, and a school training ship. In addition, on 25 April 1978, in $ address to the inaugural class of the new submari^ training center, then Navy Minister Azevedo HeO' ning announced that Brazil, using a European de sign, would begin construction of diesel submarine* within two years. Parallel with these programs, th£ complete overhaul of the country’s aircraft carrief Minas Gerais (ex-HMS Vengeance), has been completed in the Naval Dockyard of Rio de Janeiro. The nd results of these efforts is a considerable lessening traditional dependence on foreign warships. This de' sire for independent and varied sources of arms mus[1] be taken into account in any future naval cooperation between the United States and Brazil.
The declining arms dependence on the United States is partial justification for the statement in th£ Jornal do Brasil of 19 September 1978 that abroga' tion of the defense treaties with the United State* would allow the Brazilian armed forces to ope*[2] negotiations for new agreements with the U. $ armed forces on the basis of equality, since the coo' notation under which Brazil “was always the one aS' sisted” had now definitely been removed in the old accords.[3] Significantly President Geisel left the door open for each of the armed forces to establish agreements to promote their objectives.
Not surprisingly, in view of the tradition teamwork established with the naval mission, the Brazilian Navy was the first service to reaffirm a*1 agreement. On 3 March 1978, an agreement V
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renew the personnel exchange program (PEP) was ^ned by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, and the Chief of Staff of the Lilian Navy, Admiral Gualter Maria Meneses de
Nagalhaes.
phP offers the United States and Brazil the best f^y °f ensuring a smooth working relationship in the k Ure' The program is well suited to this purpose, tcause it is not based on arms acquisition or on the n°tion of any one party “being assisted.” Also PEP tquires no direct congressional approval or accompanying political reports. More importantly, each dvy can identify billets it needs and, at the same k e’ make a contribution to professional teamwork ctween the services. For these reasons PEP is an ef- 1Ve avenue for close understanding between the navies of the United States and Brazil. The history of id^ ^r°^ram before 1976 shows its potential. The dam eXchanSin« °ff*cers between the two navies j^tes ^ack to the Symposium of Maritime Power in 1- The actual exchange commenced in 1974. uring the second round for nominations of can- str ates *n December 1975, Brazil announced that re- on foreign expenditures precluded providing tufle s fot their PEP officers. The United States, in ja^n’ diverted three officers, who had not yet begun guage training, to other assignments. As of July uonlY three U. S. officers remained in Brazil cr pep Xhey are assigned to the Brazilian Naval ohmemy’ C^e Naval War College, and the Am- se/ *°US Warfare School. The last Brazilian officer ng under the PEP agreement, an instructor at the dVa Academy in Portuguese and seamanship, was Cached with no relief in July 1978. With the de- dou-e °b this officer the future of the program is in
the^tCr CNO"^‘recte<^ reduction in liberal arts at ian ^3Va^ Academy, instruction in Portuguese, Ital- fr ’ an<^ Japanese was suspended, and the officers to Brazil, Italy, and Japan were assigned to teach t ' L‘ssl°nal subjects. Brazil was the only country to mate its participation in the program. A false in Cf^>t'on cbe intent of the Portuguese cutback, e wake of current bilateral political and eco- dQ11110 ^‘^Terences, was that it represented a
C^dmg of Brazips
importance by the U. S. ce^- The value of the program never was that offi- Were teaching their native language, but that eWere learning about the host country and c*»g that country’s academy with their own • fine experiences and contributions. This objective a$aS easily met in classes of navigation or seamanship lr ls in language classes. The officer exchange pro- tm at Annapolis was started by Admiral Arleigh
Burke, and he assigned the first officer to teach American history; the officer was from Mexico.
The agreement of 3 March 1978 leaves the door open for expansion of PEP, but failure of the Brazilian Navy to support it by assigning officers will undermine its value and may be its death knell. The long tradition of cooperation and understanding, resulting from the dedicated efforts of naval officers from both countries since 1922, depends on officers with the perception and practical experience gained by working together. Exercises such as UNITAS, CARIBEX, and other joint naval operations serve well to put the edge on operational forces, but they alone cannot build the trust and confidence necessary for allies.
Political and economic differences between Brazil and the United States will continue to come and go as they should in a mature relationship; mutual interests and missions in the Atlantic will remain. Confidence, trust, friendship, and understanding are the legacy' of the U. S. Naval Mission to Brazil. Whether this ends with the mission or continues under new agreements is the challenge facing the two navies. The time to act and build is now, not when the crisis is upon us.
Lieutenant Burnett was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1972 with a major in foreign affairs. Following graduation, he was assigned to the USS Camden (AOE-2), deployed to the Western Pacific. He served successively as electronic warfare officer/electronic material officer, communication officer, and assistant first lieutenant. He qualified as a surface warfare officer in 1974 and was selected that same year for Destroyer School. Following his tour in the Camden, Lieutenant Burnett reported to the Defense Language Institute for six months study of Portuguese. From February 1976 until May 1978, he was English language/culture instructor at the Brazilian Naval Academy at Rio de Janeiro. Upon returning from Brazil, he transferred to the Naval Reserve and is now studying international and admiralty law at the University of Denver. Upon completion of his J.D. degree, he plans to resume active duty. * 2 [4] [5] 5
Pr
'Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, USN, Command History, Commander South Atlantic Force, (Historical Section, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, F945), p. 6.
[2]Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1959-1943. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947) p. 376.
[3]The Brazilian Army dominates government decision making over the Navy and Air Force. A summary of service manning demonstrates this fact. Brazilian Army—180,000; Brazilian Air Force—42,800; Brazilian Navy—49,000 (including 13,500 Marines) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Budget 1978-1979, p. 68.
Trank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 295.
[5]Memo: Background of Naval Mission Functions, Enclosure A. Functions of USN Mission-Brazil, NS, ND, QC/EF12, A14-15, Documents US 4th Fleet, Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1943, p. 2.