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Soon to become a museum ship, the NS Savannah still looks like one of tomorrow’s ships, doesn’t she? But a lot of yesterdays have passed since she got her 105-ton reactor, right, on 13 May 1959. Economically and technologically, the case for nuclear propulsion is persuasive. Why, then, do we lack the national will to move forward?
Anyone even minimally informed must sense the failure of the United States to sustain itself competitively in the world shipping market. lr°ugh technology we can do a great deal to restore Ur Merchant marine. The answer is in nuclear Power, which has proven itself to be both safe and economical.
Most commercial vessels are not appropriate for nuclear propulsion. Their trades may be too short, lr size too small, or their port entry considerations may Prelude use of nuclear propulsion. Vessels ICl should be equipped with nuclear propulsion j*r<- the very large crude carriers (VLCCs), the ultra . crude carriers (ULCCs), liquefied natural gas car- ltrs (LNGs), icebreakers, icebreaker-tankers, large c<)r>tainerships, and large bulk carriers. These nuc ear-propelled vessels would give us a competitive ^ under the American flag, would give us vessels ■ a tra*ned U. S. merchant navy capability, would Huprove our balance of payments, would reduce our . tc °f inflation, and would reestablish our shipbuild- tn8 capability.
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■th its increasing cost and diminishing supply, uncertain fuel. It is late to begin talking
oil
ls an
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
about alternative energy sources for our vessels. Certainly, solar energy is not available. The practicality of coal is being restudied, considering the critical cost disadvantage of present day bunkering. Natural gas would be not only unavailable but also impractical. Hydrogen might be an alternative, but a very expensive one, at least during the foreseeable future. Experimentation with sail power is currently under way, but it is not yet economically viable for major transport. Nuclear energy is the only alternative fuel source that lends itself to the peculiar demands of the sea.
Status of Nuclear Ship Propulsion: In 1955, the nuclear-propelled submarine Nautilus (SSN-57I) made her first voyage. Since that time, approximately 250 nuclear-propelled ships have been launched. All except three cargo ships and three icebreakers have been naval vessels. In 1959, the Soviet icebreaker Lenin, the world’s first nuclear-propelled surface vessel, went into operation.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his December 1954 “Atoms for Peace” speech, initiated the commercial nuclear program. Soon thereafter, work commenced on the development of a nuclear-powered merchant ship. She was designed to demonstrate the practicality of such a ship to the people of the world. The second purpose was to negotiate and establish satisfactory procedures for entry into world ports in such a way as to satisfy all levels of authority— political, regulatory, and safety. These efforts led to the launching of the NS Savannah in 1959.
The operational period that followed progressed through two stages. During the first, from 1959 to 1962, paying passengers and cargo were carried on all voyages; visitors in every port were encouraged to board and tour the vessel. During the second phase, from 1965 to 1970, she was used on berth line service as a cargo ship only. During these two phases, the Savannah entered 32 U. S. ports and 45 foreign ones. She logged a total of a half million miles. In 1971, she was defueled and laid up.
Considering her missions and the cargo-passenger mix, the Savannah was always considered a demonstration vessel and a prototype for future development. As such, she was a great success. Had 1980 prices of oil prevailed in 1970, it is quite likely that a following generation of nuclear-powered commercial ships would have resulted from the Savannah’s demonstration. She is now scheduled to become a museum ship in Charleston, South Carolina.
The NS Otto Hahn, Germany’s demonstration nuclear-propelled vessel, went to sea in 1968. Her record was much the same as that of the Savannah.
Japanese fishermen, fearful that Japan's first nuclear-powered ship could contaminate their fishing grounds, hemmed in the Mutsu at her home port in 1974. On 22 August llJ8<), a Soviet "Echo"-class nuclear submarine caught fire and uas eventually rescued by the Soviet vessel Ugra, center of picture. The Japanese have reason to dread nuclear power, but V. S. environmentalists and other groups are no less vocal.
The Otto Hahn visited 46 ports in 22 countries, extending the resolution of the port entry problem. After having traveled approximately 500,000 miles, burning two fuel cores, and confirming the lessons of the Savannah, she will be decommissioned shortly. An effort was made in late 1977 and early 1978 to develop international financial support for her continued operation. Without subsidy, her size precluded operation beyond the demonstration stage, and she was removed from service.
The NS Mutsu was developed in Japan and put to sea in 1974. Although the world press has generally depicted her as a failure, the Mutsu was, in fact, a success as a demonstration vessel. Leakage caused by defective radiation shielding created great political opposition. She returned from the sea trials to her home port of Mutsu city in 1974 on the condition that a new home be located. On her auxiliary oil- fired engine she moved to Sasebo Bay in 1978. Preparations are now proceeding for installation of more extensive shielding. Following completion of the shielding work, she is scheduled to return to her home port and continue sea trials. Energy is too dear to delay this important work.
The Soviets have three nuclear-powered icebreakers, the latest of which is being built with 150,000 shaft horsepower. These vessels have been immensely successful, demonstrating capabilities for penetrating ice barriers and of remaining at sea for extended periods of time without traditional support. At the Hamburg Nuclear Ship Propulsion Conference in December 1977, the Soviet representative stated that the U.S.S.R. is giving serious consideration to the construction of a full-scale commercial carrier with nuclear propulsion. When one realizes that there are almost twice as many nuclear steam- supply systems propelling naval vessels as supplying power to generators on land, one may see the extent to which the maritime industry has fallen behind in its commercial adoption of nuclear power.
The author is the U. S. insurance broker for Ravi Tikoo and Globtik Tankers. This appointment arose to support the task force consisting principally of representations of the law firm of Graham and James,
66
Newport News Shipbuilding, and Babcock and Wil' cox, the reactor vendor. A letter of intent was executed by Tikoo in early 1977 which, if implemented, would have led to the construction of three nuclear-powered ultra large crude carriers, each of approximately 600,000 deadweight tons. Ah though the letter of intent has been received, no existing program exists to proceed with the construction stage.
Later studies and proposals have been made fof nuclear-powered icebreaker-tankers to carry Alaska’5 north slope liquefied natural gas. These vessels await political rather than technical development. We have been through only a demonstration phase of applying nuclear technology to the modernization of our merchant marine. What are the issues preliminary to the construction of these commercial vessels?
Safety: The operation of the naval fleets of the world without a single nuclear incident testifies to the safety of this system of propulsion.
When preparations were made by the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) for the International Conference on Safety of Life at S& (SOLAS, London, 17 May to 17 June I960), a committee on nuclear ships was established. The provi-
Proceedings / January 198*
il' .ns C^e work‘nS papers drawn up by the corns' c established measures designed to assure the
0' w J an<^ protection of crew, passengers, and public of n(,terways- At the same time, these measures were
-h So restrictive as to impede technical develop-
d' meet' ^0< SOLAS working group has been
S' const;ln® recently t0 establish safety codes for design, c' „i ruttion, and operation of nuclear-powered merChant ships.
°r i98()C WOr^'nS group held its final meeting June i’sanj ancf ‘s *n the process of reporting to the Design lit ^ ngineering Sub-Committee which in turn will VC of [l>rt C^1esc findings to the Marine Safety Committee Ratification of the participating countries is -r' i ected in 1981. The resulting code is expected to he SuPCrsede solas I960.
a MC° ant^ t^le International Atomic Energy nency (IAEA) have agreed that IMCO will issue its hemjnear ship certificate certifying compliance with t° fort *r|1Urn safi'ty standards. Participating in these ef- cl r 'aVL ^een rhe major countries of the world, in- iid pan'n^ t^1C ^n‘te<d States, the Soviet Union, and Ja- he j^n‘ d’he Third United Nations Conference on the re ^ rhe Sea has been meeting since 1974. The ii' sts °f the conference will undoubtedly have con- /i' IUcnces for navigation of nuclear ships.
Port Entry: Because the Brussels Accord of 1962 has not come into force, and because there is no other international agreement specifically providing for the entry of nuclear-powered ships, entry to foreign ports by both the Savannah and the Otto Hahn was accomplished through bilateral agreements.* In all, these vessels entered 107 ports in 40 countries. Although informed discussions were carried on between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, these discussions did not end in application for port entry being made nor in a port entry agreement permitting the entry of U. S. ports by the Otto Hahn, which has now been decommissioned.
As with the technology, the international regimes for financial responsibility can be in place for nuclear ship propulsion. Political climate may not. At some point, one would naturally relate the practicality of ship propulsion by nuclear power to the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear mishap near Harrisburg, Penn-
*The conference which produced the Brussels Accord met from 14 to 25 May 1962 and ended with 28 delegations in favor and 10 against (the United States and 9 socialist countries). This country voted "no” because of the act's failure to exclude military vessels. There were four abstentions. Sufficient instruments of ratification exist to bring it into force. What is required is an instrument of ratification by a licensing state. The Federal Republic of Germany, a licensing state, has passed the act but has not deposited its instrument of ratification.
sylvania. The political atmosphere for going forward with the sea program was not helped by these events on land. Had the mid-1980 fire on board a Soviet submarine in the Pacific occurred with a hypothetical U. S. nuclear-powered commercial vessel, one can readily visualize the TV crews attempting to transmit pictures of the sea full of fish belly up, crewmen sequestered behind protecting iron doors draped in radiation-repellant fabric. This prospect is enough to discourage any but the very strong and public spirited politician.
Nothing deters development of nuclear ship propulsion more than the fear of such an occurrence. This political climate can’t be changed in the near future by any amount of objective reference to relative hazard, to the remarkable demonstration of the safe hardware at Three Mile Island and elsewhere in the industry, or reference to the many years of safe experience at sea and on land. There is a critical need for nuclear technology. Shortage of fossil fuel and severe increases in fuel costs may change the present political outlook.
The Brussels Accord shows all the features of an international nuclear liability convention. In the interest of a possible victim of nuclear damage, compensation must be quick, certain, adequate, and enforceable. This is achieved by holding the operator of the ship absolutely liable for any nuclear damage caused by the nuclear fuel or radioactive products of waste produced in his ship. The claimant must only prove causation; he need not prove fault. The operator is solely liable. None of his employees, suppliers, and not even a saboteur can be held liable for nuclear damage caused by the ship.
The liability of the operator is limited to 1.5 rjiib lion gold ("Poincare”) francs. At the time of the adoption of the accord, this amount equalled about $100 million in U. S. dollars at the official gold price. It would now be approximately U. S. $133 million. The operator must maintain insurance of other financial security covering his liability for nuclear damage in such amount, of such type and if such terms as the licensing state shall specify. The licensing state shall ensure the payment of claims fo'
compensation for nuclear damage up to the established limit to the extent that the yield of insurances or the financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims.
]
The Price-Anderson insurance and indemnity Ac1 of 1957, enacted by Congress, was used to resolve the problem of financial protection during operations of the Savannah. It may be assumed this framework will again be extended to meet the maritime industry’s needs before the first order to construct a nu-
space, and it is more efficient and safer in
de:
fe
jear rnerchant ship is executed. It is likely that tra- ■tional insurance markets will respond generously Wlt 'nsurance capacity for both the public liability exposures for bodily injury and property damage, and <)r physical damage to ships themselves. This con-
Usi°n is based on my meetings within the insurance 'ndustry.
'T’i
lc' problem of port entry would be more readily ‘ nc ed through an international accord such as the Proposed Brussels Accord rather than bilateral Lreernents, so as to create appropriate rights and orpose appropriate duties on the part of participa-
lesf nat*°nS ^°rt entfy Pro^^em *s considerably 'mportant when moving vessels in fixed trades, C as would be required, for example, in ULCCs s^ing between the Persian Gulf and the United Gnly two ports would be involved, one at . en^- Should nuclear icebreaker-tankers be de- fro°^e<^ ^°r rnovement oil °r liquefied natural gas po- Alaska to East or West Coast ports, foreign s would not be involved. Since the international r s and national monitoring systems would not sjo^nit convenience with nuclear ship propul-
• ’ S0vernment entities would assume responsibil-
°r surveillance of safety considerations and for Coring maintenance and operations.
mad^'^0'^ Substantial improvements have been sjncC *n designing the nuclear steam supply systems vCc tf'e construction of the Savannah. After tests of jlas ^Us systems, the pressurized water reactor (PWR) ten selected as the preferred reactor coolant and conversion system for ship propulsion. The CoSt aclVanced of this type of supply system is the j.^obdated nuclear steam generator (CNSG). An ear- ^ csign of the CNSG was licensed to the Federal n i *C Germany and was used to construct the C()^ ear system in the Otto Hahn. This advanced PWR s ‘Uns How passages within the reactor vessel in- th a C^e external Piping formerly used for moving . c°°lant. Steam generators are located within the
essute vessel. The CNSG is more economical in its Use of
Slgn.
n illustration of the PWR’s acceptance as a presystem is its use in the U. S. Navy’s nuclear anjrnai’incs and surface ships. The French, British, ^°v'ets use this system, and so did the Japanese I'as^K extent to which nuclear propulsion at sea aj een accepted speaks not only for its safety but 0 ° ^<>r the development of an appropriate technol- fi which has addressed ship accidents, including v ’ explosions, grounding and collisions. Nuclear SSt s will differ importantly from most of the latest and best conventional vessels. They will be equipped with the latest and best navigation aids available. Crews will be specially selected and trained. Casualty rates will thus be significantly lower than for conventional vessels.
Politics: I hope the reexamination of nuclear applications on land will be complete by the time legislation is presented to Congress for financial protection, additional research and development, and “first-of- a-kind” ship subsidy. The expenses are properly the responsibility of the government, including a form of subsidy for costs associated with meeting regulatory requirements. The present reexamination is occurring principally in the executive branch of the federal government and involves the issue of nuclear proliferation. Subsidiary issues are reprocessing, breeder reactors, and waste disposal. International consensus indicates spent fuel will be reprocessed, breeder reactors will be used, and technology will exist to safeguard waste. In America, especially, there is a need for a political climate conducive to selecting existing technical options and implementing this choice with regulations supporting the continued development of the nuclear industry.
Economics: To make nuclear propulsion economically advantageous, there must be a maximum use of a high-cost capital plant, offset by lower fuel costs. In view of the efficiency associated with increased capacity, larger vessels and greater steaming speeds are possible. Quicker turnarounds and optimum operating efficiency are expected. In view of increased costs of fuel oil today, and current questionable availability—at least in the Far East—there is evidence that dry cargo vessels in the 20,000-ton class, built to steam at 33 knots, are steaming at 23 knots to save fuel, thereby losing the use-value of the capital investment expended to obtain increased speed. An excellent example of revolutionary economic impact on our merchant shipping is seen in the case of Sea-Land’s proposed sale of its SL-7 containerships to the U. S. Navy. In their place, Sea-Land plans to purchase diesel-powered ships, D-9s, to steam at 21 or 22 knots. When the SL-7s were ordered, bunker C fuel was $2.00 a barrel. The average barrel price is now almost $18.50 in the world market.
Studies of container vessels, dry cargo vessels, large tankers, and liquefied natural gas carriers have been prepared. The economic analysis of each of these classes of vessels demonstrates the economic advantage of nuclear power over fossil fuel. As the price of oil escalates, this advantage becomes more significant. Other applications being studied are petroleum
drilling ships, icebreakers, and icebreaker-tankers. Notwithstanding the heavy demands for power and long periods of time on station, these vessels show great potential for the nuclear ship propulsion concept. Increased power availability without the need for frequent refueling not only provides more economical operation but also provides a wider range of operation. This was illustrated by the penetration of the North Pole by a Soviet icebreaker.
Yellowcake (the fuel product of uranium milling) has increased in price from $6.00 per pound in 1969 to more than $43-25 per pound. Even so, it costs only about half as much for each shaft horsepower hour with uranium as it does with oil. Let us consider a nuclear and a fossil-fueled containership, each with 120,000 shaft horsepower and 33-knot service speed, operating over long trade routes with approximately 70% open sea operations at rated service speeds. In this case, the fossil-fueled ship will consume more than 650 tons of fuel per day at an annual fuel cost of amost $ 13 million. In the same situation, the nuclear-fueled ship’s annual fuel bill will be less than $6 million—a gross savings of some $7 million per year.
Estimating today’s fuel cost in tanker operations is not as simple as with containerships of similar performance and capacity. For tankers, the optimum speed and power for a given size ship depends on whether nuclear or fossil fuel is used. Therefore, for two 600,000-deadweight ton tankers on a Persian Gulf-to-United States or Western Europe route, the apparent optimums are as follows:
► The fossil-fueled tanker at 55,000 shaft horsepower and 141/2 knots service speed
► The nuclear-fueled tanker at 100,000 shaft horsepower and 19 knots service speed.
In an average year, the fossil-fueled tanker will deliver 2.71 million tons of crude oil, with an annual fuel cost of $7.31 million. In the same average year, the nuclear-fueled tanker will deliver 3-64 million tons of crude oil, with an annual fuel cost of $6.12 million. Using required freight rate as a measure of merit, the fuel component of the total for each tanker is as follows:
^ $2.7l/ton—fossil-fueled tanker;
^ $1.68/ton—nuclear-fueled tanker.
Personnel: Hardware for the nuclear steam supply system, radiation monitoring systems, advanced collision avoidance equipment, and overall administration of the nuclear-propelled vessel will all require specially trained personnel for operations. Their training and performance standards will be established by national and international regulatory
bodies. Except for those people who are being trained by the Navy, no pool of qualified personnel exists. Shipyards assert that during planning and construction stages of a full-scale commercial nuclear- propelled ship, adequate personnel can be trained' Courses of study and training are in existence, awaiting orders for implementation. As stated above, an important safety aspect of the nuclear ship program has to do with the anticipated quality of ship personnel. A large percentage of accidents, both trivial and serious, are the result of human errors, many which could be avoided by more intensive personnel training and/or more sophisticated equipment.
Conclusions: The case for nuclear ship propulsion may be persuasive from the points of view of economics and technology. But without the will to put this technology to work, it will not happen. The will must be in industry, in the people, and in government.
On land, industry has committed itself to nuclear power at staggering costs. Congress has consistently appropriated large sums of money to develop technology. Administrative machinery is in plac£ within the executive branch for a greatly expanded program. Two-thirds of the people (except in Montana where the use of nuclear power was not contemplated) have consistently voted in favor of nuclear power. The mandate is clear on land. Yet develop' ment and use of nuclear power in the existing federal administration and in the state of California is fruS' trated by executive prejudice. Whether this executive restraint is motivated by a fear of nuclear proliferation, a genuine concern for possible inadequacies technology, or payment of political debts to the environmentalists, the results are the same—a disbelief in assurances that the energy crisis is in fac1 worthy of sacrifices to meet the energy challenge.
There must be the will in all of us to bring ou* personal power to bear on both individual and collective levels to make this an effective program. Sinc£ the most critical problem is political, the “will t0 do” transcends all other problems in its importance-
Mr. Maynard holds a bachelor of science degre| in business administration from the University 0 1
Oregon (1941) and a doctor of laws from the S»n | Francisco Law School (1955). He has been assis1" ( ant division manager for the National Lead Corf' pany and account executive for Marsh & McLe”" ( nan, San Francisco. In the latter capacity, ^ '
managed heavy industrial, construction, and international ^ t counts. Since 1962, he has been president of Earle V. Maynard ^ g Company, specializing in the establishment and servicing of Pf0' grams for international marine risks.