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would significantly contribute to the survivability U. S. forces at sea. Protection of the sea lines
Other Elements of Shock Force Strategy: The ackno edgment of tactical nuclear warfare as a credible P°s sibility is essential to the development of futU strategy and force structure. Shock forces must designed and trained for nuclear warfare. The Sov1 indicate every intention of using tactical nud weapons if necessary. A nuclear weapon Navy can’
without question, overwhelm one not sim
*1-
Current U. S. Navy strategy, which is offensive in nature, is subject to challenge, primarily because the credibility of the means with which to carry it out has eroded. Our strategy and force structure have remained constant while technology and the relative power of the Soviet Union have advanced. I believe that an offensive naval strategy is essential in support of the U. S. national security policies of forward deployment and deterrence and that “shock forces” are required for the execution of that strategy.
Rationale: The principal concept behind shock forces acknowledges the Soviets’ advantage in their own “backyard” and seeks to gain the initiative in these areas through use of more survivable forces than we have now. The new forces would be dedicated to providing an offensive threat to Soviet forces on both land and sea. Because of the mutual fear of escalation, it is likely that a war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would be of short duration. Thus, in a quick-strike scenario in areas of concentrated Soviet force, the U. S. Navy needs shock forces on station in many critical areas. These forces would be designed to seize the initiative by delivering strikes against critical targets—Soviet air and naval bases and command and logistic centers—in the opening hours of a conflict. It would be important to have the conventional cruise missile strike capability in order to gain the advantage before a war escalated to nuclear weapons and, we hope, to keep it at the conventional level. Once an acceptable degree of survivability for larger forces has been attained, carrier battle groups could be brought in to conduct sustained strike operations.
With shock forces available, peacetime deployments would be altered by replacing some battle groups with advanced shock forces in areas of concentrated Soviet force. Battle groups would be operated on a worldwide basis in a more flexible deployment pattern. With a shock force strategy, land attack would take first priority, based on gaining capability in the Soviets’ primary concern: the ability of the U. S. Navy to affect a land war in Europe or in overseas areas where Soviet forces or proxies are involved. Also, since much of the threat to the U. S. fleet is composed of land-based Soviet naval aircraft, destruction of airfields, logistics, and aircraft on the ground
communication would remain important to the V- Navy mission, and significant forces would still f devoted to it. However, allies and other component of U. S. naval power would be used to support sea lane protection on an increasing basis.
Structure: Ships of the shock force would be sub marines and new types of surface ships. These forcej. would be highly specialized to survive in areas concentrated Soviet force and to negate spec*'1 Soviet strategies. Submarines would be the cover1’ more survivable force with limited numbers of cru'se missiles. Surface ships would be the overt, visible <le terrent with large cruise missile magazine capacitieS, The surface ships would also be useful in land-attaC missions for worldwide non-NATO contingencies 1(1 which aircraft carriers are not quickly available- *n eluded would be destroyer-type hulls with cruise missile concentrations, SWATH (small waterp*ane twin-hull) ships, and surface effect ships. The surfa^ ships would also carry various types of vertical & short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft to pr°vl extended horizon surveillance for defense and to suP ply targeting data for offensive cruise missiles.
virl'
ilafly
equipped. As long as the Soviet doctrine ackn° edges tactical nuclear warfare and U. S. doctrine - not, perceptions of deterrence and the usabil,cy ^ naval forces in crisis management will favor Soviets. Equipping U. S. ships with credible sive and defensive nuclear weapons will enhance U. S. ability to control escalation and preset much magnified problem to Soviet planners. .
Shock forces would distribute offensive str power among aircraft carriers and other ships- P senting Soviet planners with a nearly unsoWa j targeting problem, compared with the relat*v
70
Proceedings / June 1
Destroyer-size ships, equipped with cruise missiles and V/STOL aircraft, could restore a credible offensive capability to surface vessels and give the Soviets many more threats to contend with.
Slrnple problem today of matching U. S. carriers VVlt^1 Soviet anti-carrier task groups. Putting offen- SlVe striking power on today’s cruisers, destroyers, submarines would convert the Soviet problem r°rn 12 threat platforms to more than 100. Development of surface ships and submarines armed with Cru>se missiles and able to survive in areas of concen- ^ated Soviet force would multiply the number of reat missiles from hundreds to thousands.
Shock forces would be the vehicle for bringing the .' S- Navy fully into the missile era. The conven- tlonal and nuclear warhead land-attack cruise missile Presents the foremost technology force multiplier in recent times. It permits massed offensive power to e*,st on relatively small ships. It supports forces that ^v°uld reconstitute the threat to Soviet land and sea °rces that has been partially neutralized by Soviet ^‘-earner forces. It is a proven technology in which ^^nited States leads the Soviets in development but is far *nd in deployment. Though the land-attack cruise j^'ssile is considered the primary force multiplier, ^ cruise-missile technology supports other pur- h°Ses which are also significant. For example, the Ue of antiship cruise missiles is being proven by CUrrent fleet exercises for Harpoon. The Tomahawk ant‘ship cruise missile will complement Harpoon ^ ^ a longer range and larger warhead capability. ru*se missile technology also supports such uses as ^otely piloted targeting and reconnaissance vehi- es for intelligence communication links, damage 'Ssment, and many other uses. For these reasons as
u
surface ships to avoid revealing their positions through electronic emission. As technology has given antiair systems an advantage over manned aircraft, the synergism between unmanned cruise missiles and an eye in the sky provides another strike alternative.
Summary. These are some advantages that would accrue from having shock forces:
► The threat of carrier strike aircraft is significant, but it has been countered to a large degree by Soviet anti-carrier capabilities. Restoration of the threat to the Soviet forces afloat and ashore requires either many more aircraft carriers or the distribution of offensive power among many ships.
► A shock force would lessen the defensive requirements of the carrier battle group and permit more concentration on offensive systems with a higher benefit/cost ratio.
► The land-attack missile with nuclear and conventional warheads would be a significant contribution to deterrence and escalation control in NATO. It would also counter Soviet advantages in naval nuclear warfare worldwide.
► Cruise missile forces would be smaller and less expensive than carrier battle groups to defend and maintain in a forward deployed status.
► Destroyer-size ships with cruise missile power would be impressive representatives of U. S. resolve and could be sent to many places in the world. More of the world could be covered with credible offensive power when shock forces are added to our limited number of carrier battle groups.
The U. S. Navy should never accept a “faint of heart” strategy that deserts the offense. It is time for the Navy to begin the evolution toward forces having increased credibility in offensive missions.
asse;
Well .
11 as strategic weapon considerations, the SALT II
tocol which would limit sea-launched cruise mis-
e range through 1981 should not be considered.
force deployment and escalatory decisions are best
_e °n the basis of real-time intelligence. This is
farti
and
'nCre,
colarly so in war at sea, where forces are mobile Present a high threat. Long-range weapons have
'Hi,
reased the distance at which naval forces can en- e> and overhead surveillance is the key to provid- ^ Oaval forces with targeting data. It also enables
Commander Powers holds degrees from the Naval Academy (B.S., I960), Naval Postgraduate School (M.S.E.E., 1967), and George Washington University (M.S.I.A., 1977). He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in international affairs at the Catholic University of America. He has served in five destroyers, including tours as XO of the USS Lawrence (DDG-4) and CO of the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5). Tours ashore have included U. S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, the National War College, and the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-354). He is now military assistant to the Defense Science Board.
*>0,
'°eedings / June 1980
71