This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
| By Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired) |
^>n>easing Strength and C^Mdities | nuclear-powercd and “Tango”-class part of the Soviet Navy. The construc- conventionally powered torpedo attack tion rate of the Tu-22M (“Backfire”) submarines continued to join the fleet, missile strike aircraft likely remained |
One^ ^eca<^e °f the 1970s has been j significant development and y ^r°Vernent for the Soviet Navy, of ’,rrorn a“ indications, the decade anJ e 1980s will bring even further , ■** dramatic advances. During liar' ' at^*t'ona‘ ships of several sub- the 116 ar"^ surface ship classes joined 0p naval order of battle as a number k °nS°ing building programs were tj '^ht to a close and others con- (1j- 'Ct ' More important, a whole array n<-‘w construction submarine and surfacp . . . . f . , snip programs had come to uion and was about to produce new ly^rat'0nal ships for the fleet of the We-, S likewise, newly developed tVa/'°nS 'vere undergoing test and op, Uatl0n’ while research and devel- .. . Cnt continued on a wide range of er Projects. Order of Battle ^-eral “Delta IIl”-class nuclear- jo' Cre<^ ballistic missile submarines p.'nt'd the fleet in 1979; probably, the j a. t‘le c‘ass was launched r<n8 the year.* The “Victor”-class | while the new and smaller “Alfa”-class at about 30 per year in 1979 in ac- SSN made her operational debut. This cordance with an understanding ar- submarine is said to have a titanium rived at in connection with the SALT II hull permitting operational depths of Treaty. Since ratification of that treaty about 300 fathoms. She underwent has been delayed, and, perhaps preshakedown operations in the Barents eluded by recent Soviet actions, the and Norwegian seas during the year entry into production of a second and is reported to have demonstrated a “Backfire” assembly plant may be of speed in excess of 40 knots. significance for future naval aviation During 1978-79, the surface force force levels. Soviet Naval Air con- received the large ASW cruiser Minsk tinues to receive new vertical takeoff (Kiev, CVHG), the second of a four-ship and landing Yak-36 (“Forger”) aircraft class. Likewise, two large ASW ships, as new AT/w-class ships are commis- Petropavlovsk. and Tashkent (“Kara, sioned. In addition, Su-17 ( Fitter ) CGs), were added, concluding the fighter bombers have been added to "Kara” building program. Also the the Baltic Naval Air arm. The appear- large landing ship Ivan Rogov (Ivan ance in the August issue of the Soviet Rogov, LPD), the first of her class, navy’s monthly journal Morskoi Shornik entered the inventory. The Grozyaschiy of a painting showing a group of naval (“Krivak,” FFG) and others of the class pilots posed in front of a MiG-27 also continued to be added to the (“Flogger-D”) suggests that aircraft or fleet a naval version may also be entering Concurrent with the construction of the naval inventory. The principal large combatants for the blue-water ASW aircraft of the Soviet Navy, the division of its fleets and eskhadras, 11-38 (“May”), and long-range recon- the Soviet Navy has continued to naissance aircraft, Tu-95 (“Bear ), build numerous classes of minor com- continue to be upgraded, batants for a distinct portion of its fleet often overlooked by the West— Construction Programs the OVR or Off-shore Defense Force. There appears to be no slowdown in |
by ^enever possible, Soviet ships are referred to e*r ^ov‘et designators and names. In these si, assigned class names and de- tjje ‘ °rs follow in parenthesis—for example: c . ar^e ASW ship Ochakov (“Kara,” CG). The 0{- Navy has been changing the designators si, Te *ts sh*ps since late 1977. The most ‘cant change has been that some units pre- no^Sly designated as “large ASW ships” have c<)rr ^Xtn ^designated as “patrol ships” or “es- sj| r ShiPs” (e.g., “Krivak,” FFG) or “large mis- ^ shlps (e.g., “Mod-Kashin,” DDG). In CuiSSian> Korabl' (the word for ship) is a mas- to n° n°Un‘ Therefore, the Soviets would refer j* S^‘P as he. To conform with standard Proceeci- Style, feminine references are used. | Missile cutters continue to enter the the pace of ongoing shipbuilding proforce in two classes, the larger grams nor any decrease in the number “Nanuchka” in an improved version of follow-on new construction pro- and the smaller “Matka,” the modern grams being undertaken by the Soviet hydrofoil and up-armed equivalent of Navy. Additional ships of recently ini- the famous “Osa” class. The appear- tiated programs were under construc- ance of the early hulls of the tion during 1979, and a number of “Sarancha” class, a shortened and hy- new programs became evident, drofoil version of “Nanuchka,” and the The first “Typhoon”-class large even larger gas turbine hydrofoil, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub- as yet, lightly armed “Babochka” il- marine probably remained under con- lustrates the Soviets’ commitment to struction during the year. The con- high-speed missile-equipped ships for struction schedule of this class had coastal defense. undoubtedly been set by Soviet exAviation has become an important pectations of having to remain within |
| 113 |
the SALT II limits and by the necessity of developing and testing a new large submarine-launched ballistic missile. That schedule probably cannot be advanced by much and, thus, while the first hull may be launched in 1980, it will be several years before the first “Typhoon’’ enters the force. Additional “Alfa” SSNs are fitting out and under construction.
Construction continues on two more large ASW cruisers of the Kiev class, on additional Ivan Rogov LPDs, and on three more support ships similar to the Berezina (Berezina, ARS).
Reportedly under construction at Severodvinsk in the Northern Fleet is an aircraft carrier which, while as yet unobserved and apparently being built
well as sevei miss’
and antiship missiles as varieties of surface-to-air
(SAMs>- . . , Bal'
Soviet Naval Order of Battle, 1979
NUCLEAR-POWERED | |
SUBMARINES | 157 |
“Delta I,II,III” (SSBN) | 32 |
“Yankee” (SSBN) | 30 |
“Hotel” (SSBN) | 8 |
“Charlie” (SSGN) | 13 |
“Echo” (SSGN) | 28 |
“Papa” (SSGN) | 1 |
“Alfa” (SSN) | 1 |
“Victor” (SSN) | 26 |
“November” (SSN) | 13 |
“Echo” (SSN) | 5 |
DIESEL-POWERED | |
SUBMARINES | 200 |
“Golf,” “Zulu” (SSB) | 17 |
“Juliet,” “Whiskey” (SSG) | 28 |
“Tango,” “Foxtrot,” “Romeo,” “Whiskey” (SS) | 155 |
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS | 2 |
Kiev (CVHG) | 2 |
CRUISERS | 37 |
Moskva (CHG) | 2 |
“Kara” (CG) | 6 |
“Kresta I" (CG) | 4 |
“Kresta II” (CG) | 10 |
“Kynda” (CG) | 4 |
Sverdlov (CG) | 1 |
Sverdlov (CL) | 9 |
Chapayev (CL) | 1 |
DESTROYERS 71
“Kashin,” “Mod Kashin”
(DDG) | 19 |
“Kanin” (DDG) | 8 |
“Kilden” (DDG) | 1 |
“Kotlin” (DDG) | 8 |
“Kotlin,” “Kilden,” |
|
“Skoryy” (DD) | 35 |
FRIGATES | 161 |
“Krivak” (FFG) | 26 |
“Kola,” “Koni,” |
|
“Riga” (FF); |
|
“Grisha,” “Mirka,” |
|
“Petya” (FFL) | 135 |
PATROL COMBATANTS 120 | |
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS | 91 |
Ivan Rogov (LPD) | 1 |
“Alligator,” “Ropucha” |
|
(LST) | 25 |
Various (LSM) | 65 |
AUXILIARIES | 285 |
Underway Replenishment | |
Ships | 85 |
Material Support Ships | 65 |
Fleet Support Ships | 135 |
MINE WARFARE | 405 |
MSF | 165 |
Craft | 240 |
MISCELLANEOUS 455
under cover, is expected to be of about 50,000-60,000 tons displacement and conventionally configured with catapults and arresting gear. During the year, the construction of this ship was confirmed to U. S. diplomats by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, S. G. Gorshkov himself. The likelihood of the appearance of a conventional Soviet aircraft carrier had already been strongly indicated, however, by the writings of Vice Admiral K. Stalbo. Over the past two years, this close associate and spokesman of Admiral Gorshkov, who previously had criticized Western carriers and cited their vulnerability, discussed the importance and cost-effectiveness of
carriers while again addressing nerability in his writings. <
In Leningrad, a nuclear-powe
battle cruiser- sized, ship, rePort j a named Kirov, is now fitting out an^ second ship is under construct!
This ship, of about 25,000 tonS^sW, placement, is armed with bot1 ^
les
Also under construction in t <- • tic are two other new large com * classes. One, of about 7,000 tons placement, will probably be e nated a cruiser by the Soviets. I£ ted with antiship missiles, guns, and SAMs. The other wil ably be a large ASW ship 0 a 8,000 tons. . „e
In the Black Sea, another ^ combatant is under construct^,, probably as a follow-on to the class built there. At least three of this class are reported in va stages of construction.
Weapons ■
The specific types of ve
stalled on these new surface ships not yet been fully identified. appearing in the July 1SS1^.°. for- Soviet Military Review, the °^ICIgoVjet eign language magazine of the .£
.Ministry of Defense, may P re a some clues, however. Shown ^ modified “Kara” and a modifie Kashin.” These ships are proba / test platforms for the new weapon ^ terns to be fitted on the new c under construction elsewhere. ,
The “Kara” had her after SAMJ* associated fire control radar tern° Qte The radar had been replaced by a ^ modern-appearing installation- ^ SAM was visible, although the s^t for one existed. This sugges^s ^ either one had not been insta et more likely since the ship was that a flush-deck, vertical tu^e launched SAM had been fitter- ^ “Mod Kashin’s” former SAM an ^ control radar had been replaced wi ^ new launcher and new apparent ^ search and fire control radars, sugg ^ ing an entire new air defense sy ^ In addition, new antiship miss’ f
1 Up ntteu
ASW missiles appeared to o forward of the bridge.
//
’Maritime theaters of operations,
fo
'tees
'erranean Sea
Mediterranean Sea remains the
es?arch and Development
Cognizing the most serious deftly *tS navy’ t^ie Soviet Union
Qa Passive ASW research and devel- ^ nit'nt program under way. All k ans ASW detection are apparently t.tln8 explored. In addition to tradi- tec 4 acoust'c sensors, means of de- ti0 'n^ Wa^es °f submarines and radia- ln sea water have been tried. Des- f10n °f submarine hydrodynamic ^natures has also been attempted.
iJ^Panding Operations ev- Ur‘n8 1979, the Soviet Navy was C.Cnt 'n all the oceans of the world. a)«r exercises were conducted in ^ which the Soviet Navy consid- ^ — were deployed to ocean areas eyond the Soviet defensive perimeter, j a naval presence was maintained most regions of the world’s seas.
Th
j 1 ncipal deployment area for the °Vlet Navy and provides a major j r'r°und exercise locale. Twice dur- S 1979, unusually powerful Soviet al forces gathered there for major *ercises.
^he Soviet Mediterranean Eskhadra otrnally consists of from 40 to 60 ^‘ps. These usually include 10-20 j.r ace combatants, as well as about 8 lesel-powered and several nuclear- ^OWered submarines and some 20-30 P Pport ships. The composition of the rce has long included both ASW and ^‘carrier groups and involved the
°st modern ships in the Soviet lNavy.
January 1979, the Kiev deployed the Mediterranean from her North- trn Fleet home base, accompanied by
a “Kresta II,” a “Krivak II,” and the new supply ship Berezina. This force was joined in February by the new large landing ship Ivan Rogov, escorted by the patrol ship Grozyaschiy from the Baltic. In late February, the Minsk and two large ASW ships, Tashkent and Petropavlovsk, exited the Black Sea and joined the Kiev group in the Gulf of Solium.
This force was the most formidable Soviet naval force deployed to the Mediterranean since the 1973 Arab- Israeli War and displayed more firepower than had ever been assembled in one Soviet naval grouping. It continued its operations until midMarch, when the Kiev and Minsk and accompanying escorts exited the Mediterranean via Gibraltar en route to their respective Northern and Pacific fleet home ports.
In July, the Mediterranean Eskhadra conducted another major exercise. The force level was augmented at that time by the deployment of eight principal surface combatants from the Black Sea, bringing the total of such ships deployed to 20, the highest of the year.
By December, the Kiev, accompanied by the large ASW ships Marshal
Timoshenko and Admiral Isachenkov (“Kresta II,” CGs) and the patrol ship Gromky (“Krivak I,” FFG), was again returning to the Mediterranean for what has become a standard winter operating period.
During 1979, the Soviet Union expanded the facilities available for support of the Mediterranean Eskhadra by negotiating access for the overhaul and repair of Soviet ships at the newly reopened Greek Neorian shipyard at Syros Island in the Agean. The first two ships to call there were apparently merchantmen but, undoubtedly, from among those which normally service and supply the naval Eskhadra. Access to the yard is probably intended to relieve the strain on the overhaul and repair facilities to which the Soviet Navy has access in Yugoslavia, Syria, Algeria, and Tunisia. It is likely that, before long, the Greek yard will find itself playing host to a Soviet naval ship and, eventually, a combatant under some pretext or another.
Atlantic Ocean
Major Soviet naval-initiated exercise activity in the Atlantic and Norwegian Sea was concentrated during the spring. In mid-March, the Minsk —
leted
the
accompanied by the Petropavlovsk, Tashkent, Ivan Rogov, and Berezina — entered the Atlantic from the Mediterranean. This group was immediately followed by the Kiev and her escorts. After operating together for several days, the force split. The Minsk group turned toward the South Atlantic for a port call in Luanda, Angola, followed by Indian Ocean operations, and eventually, movement to the Pacific. The Kiev group turned northward, conducting apparent ASW exercise activity with additional surface units and aircraft west of the U. K. before returning to home waters in early April.
The traditional Soviet spring exercise was larger in 1979 than in past years. It involved at least 24 surface ships in the Norwegian Sea, as well as a large number of submarines. Soviet Naval Air, featuring “Backfire” antiship strikes, figured heavily in the exercise evolutions.
In the fall, two groups of Soviet surface ships, reconnaissance aircraft, and undoubtedly, submarines deployed in reaction to NATO exercises. One group, including the large ASW ship Admiral Yumashev (“Kresta II,” CG) and a “Krivak II,” observed NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea. Another group, including the large ASW ship Admiral Nakhimov (“Kresta II,” CG) and a patrol ship, conducted independent operations.
Throughout the year the Soviet Navy maintained the now traditional presence on the South Atlantic patrol station in the vicinity of the Hump of Africa. One ship operating there for a period in 1979 was the destroyer Zorky (“Kanin,” DDG).
Indian Ocean
Despite the dramatic events of the year in the region, Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean during 1979 was not any higher than in previous years. In fact, throughout most of the year, the number of Soviet ships present was even lower than the average level of 20 maintained in past years. If the number of Soviet ship days in the Indian Ocean were higher in 1979 than previously, it was because of the extended stay of the Minsk group while en route to the Pacific, rather than as any direct response to the continued U. S. naval deployments. One aspect of Soviet naval activity that did increase in response to the U. S. presence, however, was air surveillance.
A gradual drawdown in forces had reduced the regular Indian Ocean contingent to only ten ships, led by the large ASW ship Vladivostok (“Kresta I,” CG), at the beginning of the year. The deployment of the USS Constellation (CV-64) to the area in March as a response to the Yemeni crisis prompted the movement of one Soviet ship (“Riga,” FF) from the Mediterranean. The U. S. presence also stimulated reconnaissance flights by long- range Tu-95 aircraft flying from Tashkent, U.S.S.R., and the deployment of 11-38 aircraft at Aden, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.) or South Yemen. The addition of the USS Midway (CV- 4l) in mid-April caused the increase of only one other ship in the Soviet Indian Ocean force and even further air recon activity. •
The major Soviet reaction to the presence of U. S. forces seems to have been the extended stay of the Minsk task group. That group arrived, via the Cape of Good Hope, in mid-April
and conducted operations off oz ^ bique as well as port calls to country at Mauputo and Nacala- ^ force lingered in the western ” Ocean throughout April ant calling in Mauritius in late Apr1 ’ j choring at Socotra in mid-May. anchoring off Aden at the end o This latter visit involved a demons^ tion of the Minsk’s and Ivan capabilities for South Yemeni ea As the Minsk and escorts comp their stay in the Indian Ocean. ^ force level returned to a total of - ^ early July, a relief contingent, c another “Kresta,” departed the Fleet, and in late August, the tu^ over was complete when a f‘ve , force from the Indian Ocean retufoJt to Pacific Fleet home waters. For rn^ of the rest of the year, the n^ut Ocean contingent consisted of a ten combatants, including a err (“Kynda,” CG), large ASW s (“Kresta,” CG), large landing s ^ ("Alligator,” LST), and tw0 marines (“Echo II,” SSGN, and trot,” SS). ( e
Late in the year, the Soviet level began to return to more n0t. levels. Three ships were adde ^ November, and two others acco ^ panied the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63 ^ she deployed in December. Seve more Soviet ships deployed by the e of the year so that the total force sto
at nlwhirh is were combatants-
has er^0ln8 a long-expected buildup, ^ not been developed to the point re >t can support major deploy- ta^ts t0 the South China Sea and sus- to H L^*e Prev'ous level of deployments nil C| 6 ^nc^an Ocean. With the tur- w1 occurring in those parts of the av i an^ t*le many opportunities ai able to the Soviets to use naval . r> it is likely that the augmenta- V t^e Pacific Fleet will continue.
I hatever the reason for the low j of activity in the Indian Ocean, int0eS n0t ‘n<^'cate a lach Soviet cj e.rest ‘n the area. A 21 August artiS l,r|.t^e Soviet newspaper Pravda by
D naval
•j,^ase ln activity by the Soviet Navy.
, e normal level of operations was u led to more than 600 ship days, considerable portion of the in- j asc‘o naval activity in the area was
response to the Si no-Vietnamese c°nfl
l:t'b
ruary. Early in the month,
Ch
imitriev emphasized that the situation in the Indian Ocean y . ' hears directly on the Soviet n'on. The waters of the Indian . 1 and its shores and island ter-
criCS are relatively close to our ntry, bearing in mind the range of ^ em strategic offensive weapons.
oteover, the only year round sea jj. te hnking the European part of the tL ^ w‘th the Soviet Far East crosses SfC Indian Ocean. ... It is under- naa^ahle that the Soviet Union can- 0p e 'ndifferent to the rapid buildup a . e military presence and military fivities in the Indian Ocean.”
?acific Ocean
th ^ring 1979, the Pacific became e 1qcus of the most significant in- •ct which broke out in mid- lnese forces massed on the Viet- ^amese border, the large ASW ship aas'h Chapayev (“Kresta II,” CG) and other ship, deploying from Vladivos- ( ’ arrived off Vietnam. In addition, felp ^atro* sf'‘Ps (“Petya,” FFs), five in- ngence collectors, and several support ships were directed to the area.
Later in February, as war occurred, this Soviet contingent was joined by a command cruiser (Sverdlov, CL), a destroyer (“Kotlin,” DD), a missile ship ("Kashin,” DDG), and a patrol ship (“Krivak,” FFG). The “Krivak” returned northward again to escort a southbound large landing ship (“Alligator,” LST), which participated in apparent logistic support operations in support of the Vietnamese.
In mid-March, as the war was winding down, another Soviet naval force exited the Sea of Japan and moved southward. The deployment of that group was coincident with the deployment of the Kiel' and Minsk from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic and, therefore, may have been principally for the purpose of coincidentally scheduled exercises. Nevertheless, it provided an additional demonstration of concern over the Vietnamese situation at a crucial time.
In April, 14 of the Soviet ships returned to home waters, reducing the Soviet presence in the South China Sea to the command cruiser, destroyers, and a submarine (“Foxtrot,” SS), as well as a number of intelligence collectors and support ships.
One of the ships returning home was the Vasily Chapayev which, in March, had entered Cam Ranh Bay to become the first Soviet warship to call in Vietnam. That was only the first visit of more than 60 calls by Soviet ships in the Vietnamese ports of Haiphong, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh during the year. Among those were the first visit of a submarine in April and repeated visits by the command cruiser, destroyers, submarine, and tender, all of which were present in Cam Ranh on 1 November. In addition to these ship visits, long-range reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Da Nang in April and September.
The Minsk and her accompanying ships entered the Pacific via the Straits of Malacca in mid-June and transited directly, via the South and East China seas, toward their future home port of Vladivostok. The northward transit was not uneventful, however, as several “attacks” were made on the Minsk in the East China Sea. One involved Chinese gunboats passing so close aboard they had to be driven off by firehoses, while a second involved low-flying aircraft rented by Japanese press photographers.
The addition of the four impressive new ships of the Minsk group to the Pacific Fleet is the most recent indication of what the Japanese are now calling a “remarkable buildup” and a “quantitative and qualitative improvement in naval forces.” In part, that buildup which they so accurately describe has been made possible by the Japanese themselves. Last year, Japanese enterprise constructed and delivered to the U.S.S.R. an 80,000- ton drydock which will, undoubtedly, be used for the maintenance and repair of the Minsk and the other principal combatants of the Pacific Fleet.
Japan is also concerned about an increase in Soviet troops and air search radars on the two southernmost islands of what the Soviets call the Kurile chain and the Japanese refer to as the Northern Territories. This puzzling buildup may have a naval-related explanation. The U.S.S.R. could be attempting to increase the security of the Sea of Okhotsk as a sanctuary for its long-range SSBN force.
Other Pacific nations share Japan's anxiousness about the expansion of Soviet naval activity in the Pacific. During the year, the nations of the regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turned down requests for port visits by the Soviet naval training ship Borodino (“Ugra," AS) and accompanying destroyer Gnevny (“Kashin,” DDG).
Caribbean Sea
Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean was reduced and less well timed during 1979 than in the past. For some ten years, the Soviet Navy has generally paid two visits to the Caribbean annually. In the fall of 1978, four surface ships and a submarine called in Havana and Cienfuegos, Cuba, and operated in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in the Caribbean. During 1979, only one Soviet force, smaller than usual and poorly timed, entered the area. That group consisted of a large ASW ship (“Kresta II,” CG), patrol ship ("Krivak,” FFG), and nuclear-powered cruise missile sub-
ASSOU'
JAMES L. L°"S
The delivery of two Soviet-built and supplied “Foxtrots” to the Cuban Navy creates an ASW problem for the U. S. Navy in the Caribbean.
marine (“Charlie,” SSGN). It entered the Caribbean in August but soon departed without calling in Cuba or operating with Cuban units. The likely reason for the low profile maintained by the force was the coincidence of the visit with the conference of non-aligned nations being held in the Cuban capital.
The ill-timed arrival of the Soviet force suggests a lack of coordination between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Navy. Such a problem, in turn, brings into question how clearly Soviet leaders recognize the utility of naval operations and visits as an adjunct to foreign relations and the degree to which the Soviet Union plans to use its navy in support of its foreign policy. Clearly, if that recognition and those plans were well advanced, it would seem that a mechanism for navy/foreign ministry coordination would be also well developed. If that coordination were well developed, it would seem that the Cuban deployment of 1979 might not have occurred as it did.
Likewise, there appears to have been a lack of Soviet-Cuban coordination. If the Cuban Government, at least at the highest levels, had been informed of the prospective visits before the ships were en route, surely it would have advised against the timing of the visit. It is worth noting that later in August the Commander of the Cuban Navy is reported to have called on Admiral Gorshkov in Moscow. One can only speculate on the topics discussed but, undoubtedly, the abortive Soviet naval visit was one.
From the Soviet-Cuban point of view, it appears that no harm was done, since the Soviet ships did not sail into Havana harbor in full view of the non-aligned delegates and remind them of Cuba’s real allegiance. The incident does indicate, however, that even in the most centralized of command structures, the system of coordination may not exist or can break down.
Besides the decrease in surface forces deployed to the Caribbean during the year, the number of deployments of long-range reconnaissance aircraft was also lower. There were only two deployments rather than the normal four or five. As if to compensate for the decreased level of Soviet activity in the Caribbean, the strength of the Cuban Navy was enhanced by the addition of Soviet-supplied ships and facilities in 1979. One front-line diesel-powered attack submarine (“Foxtrot,” SS) arrived in March and another was en route at year's end. Additionally, the seventh missile patrol craft (“Osa,” PTFG) was added to the Cuban Navy.
Meanwhile, development of a submarine base was well under way near Cienfuegos where a new pier was under construction, other facilities were being built, and an older class submarine hull (“Whiskey,” SS) from the U.S.S.R. was emplaced, probably as a training facility. This establishment of a submarine capability athwart U. S. critical material supply lines and within mine-laying range of U. S. ports and shipping lanes provides one further way in which the U.S.S.R. can rely on Cuba to act as a surrogate for projecting military power into areas where the U.S.S.R. may not be welcome.
Intelligence Collection Operations
Soviet intelligence collection ships (AGIs) remained on station throughout the world during 1979. Those work
ing in the area of U. S. bases particularly obvious. :j.
The Krym (Primorye, AGI), c0”cecj ered one of the Soviets most a v‘j intelligence collectors, was on a Cape Canaveral in June to monlt® -s_ initial test firing of the Trident sile by the USS Francis Scott Te)
657). As the year proceeded, how ^ Soviet collectors monitored 011 )
iates
J AM J
The Krym is pictured on her Tride patrol off Florida.
. ., ^sts in
more of ten additional missile ^ the area, perhaps foiled by en an
security procedures. r 'Iro-
The intelligence collectors G> graph (Pamir, AGI) and Gavril J j - (Nikolai Zubov, AGI) operated abou miles off the California coast l1^.^ September. They were in the [1]*c‘ ^ _ of the early stages of a major • Canadian exercise involving an operations at Camp Pendleton.
One of the Atlantic intelligent ^ lectors was also in the vicinal another landing, observing^ ^ marines as they went ashore at tanamo, Cuba, in October. -A1 ^ time, a second collector was also so of Cuba. -ej
Off Guam, another collector to collect a souvenir of her vislt' ,, observing a U. S. submarine ire
torpedo, the Soviet ship re-
yztva, F°xtrot,
On ocean voyages our ships paid official visits to and made
Pfactice
the torpedo and only returned ‘ ter a government-to-government °test was registered. The Soviets ar)Stomarily keep an AGI off Guam in y atterr>pt to monitor movements of • ■ SSBNs based there. tors'1 at^'t'on to intelligence collec- > numerous other Soviet ships are 8ath . tbrou8hout the world’s oceans t'ring other data (oceanographic or rographic) valuable to the Soviet 0 aV^' During the year, the Soviet ^'anographic ship Bashkiriya (Ab- az‘Va agor) and a submarine --> SS), involved in work in anj Pacific, called in Mexico, Peru, shn C°lombia- A Soviet oceanographic also worked in the vicinity of the th 1S^fal'an ^reat Barrier Reef during atter part of the year.
hrt Visits
p Admiral N. 1. Smirnov, Deputy 0rnmander in Chief of the Soviet tjaVy\ emphasized in his Navy Day ar- 'n the military newspaper Red
have
jD’tation calls at many foreign ports.” ijHS 1979, most of the ports vis- ^ were those to which the Soviet i av7 bas become a regular visitor dur- ho p,reV'0US years of expanding opera- nik S 'n tbe Mediterranean, Dubrov- Al'',uS°s*avia, Latakia, Syria, and its^lerS, Algeria, received regular vis- « ’ *n the South Atlantic, Luanda, ^n8olai arKj Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, ^>r|tinued to be open to the Soviet avy. In the Indian Ocean, Victoria,
mpia, Aden, P.D.R.Y., aputo, Mozambique, were busy
ng Soviet Navy ships.
*j-
*he Sovi Soviet v
means of cementing relations with those nations from which the U.S.S.R. needs support for its expanding operations. Admiral Gorshkov visited Algiers in November for the 25th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. In December, he visited Hanoi for the 35th Anniversary of the Vietnamese armed forces.
Naval Air Operations
Soviet Naval Aviation conducted varied worldwide operations during 1979. These clearly illustrated Admiral Gorshkov’s claim in his annual Navy Day interview that, “A characteristic feature of the postwar development of the Navy has been the creation of a long-range and highly mobile force of naval aviation which has also become seagoing.”
Soviet naval 11-38 ASW aircraft operating from Aden conducted reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean throughout the year. These aircraft often approached close aboard U. S. ships. In May, two Il-38s came so close when observing the Midway that they interfered with flight operations. Coincidentally, Soviet Vice
Admiral P. N. Navoitsev and his delegation had just arrived in the United States for the annual navy-to-navy meetings on the “Incidents at Sea and the Airspace Over It.” Thus, a convenient forum was readily available for a U. S. protest.
Long-range Tu-95 reconnaissance aircraft conducted operations over most of the world’s oceans during the year. Operations over the Pacific were conducted from the U.S.S.R. and Da Nang, Vietnam. Atlantic operations were conducted from the U.S.S.R., Luanda, Angola, and Havana, Cuba. Indian Ocean flights originated at Tashkent, U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Navy’s increasing strength and capabilities and its expanding operations have been the focus of Western press coverage. Yet, these are not the principal topics of the Soviet military press. Training, readiness, and personnel are. These main concerns of the Soviet Navy itself will be discussed in detail in “The Soviet Navy in 1979: Part II,” which will be published in June.
[1]is^e ”er<^e islands. The more than 60 pj lts to the Vietnamese ports of j aiPhong, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh t ,ri.n8 the year have permitted the es- ‘shrnent of a major and cocitinuing ^ a Presence in the area. A rumored irn'Ct V'S't t0 Kampuchea is the first Nation of a spread of such port Cal‘s.inthatatea.
'sits by Admiral Gorshkov himself
are • , . . .
s important as ship visits as a