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The Mobile Channel Ballistic Missile (MCBM)
®y Commander Roger P. Hulson, U. S. Navy
The Triad concept—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched bal- hstic missiles (SLBMs)—has been a cornerstone of the U. S. nuclear deterrent posture for almost 20 years. Today. the questionable survivability of 0ur ICBMS, the age of the B-52s, and the potential of a Soviet technological reakthrough in ASW weaken the legs °f the Triad. Maybe it is time for the United States to go to the “Quadrad” concept.
A new strategic deterrent “leg” could be developed by marrying mod- 1 'ed dry cargo barges and towboats to tbe Trident I or II missiles. This deterrent system would be known as the Mobile Channel Ballistic Missile” (MCBM).
This Quadrad concept would ensure t at the United States would have a toodern, survivable strategic deterrent system in the 1980s and beyond. The operational MCBM would be highly ^nrvivable, a cost-effective supplement or the ICBM and Polaris/Poseidon/ r*dent systems, and capable of deliv- et*ng payloads to a greater range than c e Polaris/Poseidon systems.
have been improved for navigation by the construction of systems of locks and dams, particularly north of St. Louis on the Mississippi. However, the Mississippi is open river for 1,000 miles south of St. Louis. At the present time, many redevelopment projects are under way for improvement of the country’s waterways.
Most freight moving on U. S. inland waterways is carried in unmanned, non-self-propelled barges having drafts of 6-14 feet. These barges are towed or pushed by tugboats or towboats which are capable of moving up to 40 barges. Barge service is safe and reliable. Shallow-draft water carrier operations provide service principally for transportation of bulk-loading commodities moving in barge loads up to 3,000-tons per barge, with the average barge carrying five times its own weight. No other type of freight vehicle compares with it in this measure of efficiency.
Low cost is the inherent advantage of water transportation. Cost of barge service to shippers averages three mills per ton-mile. For purposes of comparison, rail service costs the shipper about 16 mills per ton-mile; truck service costs 8/t per ton-mile; and air freight service costs about 22Vtit per ton-mile.
The barge and towing vessel industry has kept pace with shippers’ needs. Navigation techniques and aids have been developed which permit around- the-clock operations of vessels in all kinds of weather. Origin-to- destination speed averages about six miles per hour, with some high-speed
delusive of the Great Lakes, the nited States has 25,543 miles of usa *e navigable inland channels, of which 15,675 miles have a depth of m°re than nine feet.
. U. 5. COAST GUARD
The MCBM system is a relatively cheap strategic option which is designed to use off-the-shelf technology and the nation’s inland waterways.
With the exception of the upper ■ssissippi waterway, the Missouri *Ver, and the New York Barge Canal> which are usually closed by icing ^ooditions from December through arch, U. S. inland channels are open t0 navigation the year round. At tlrnes, ice forms on the Illinois Waterways, on the Mississippi River ^orth of St. Louis, and on the Ohio . 1Ver, but it seldom impedes naviga- tlon for any length of time. Channels
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Therefore, | the overall | dimensions of |
the largest | MCBM weapon system | |
would be: | Length | Width |
Barge | 195' | 35' |
Towboat | 160' | 4<y |
Total | 355' | 40' |
integrated tows making 15 miles per hour. Operating costs of towboats average $50-$ 100 per hour.
“Towboat,” as used here, means to push, and the "tow” is a barge which is being pushed. There is a wide variety of towboats and barges plying the nations waterways today. Towboats are considered for the MCBM system because of their habitability, size, and compatibility with river/canal operations. Tugboats are primarily used in the open ocean.
Towboats range in overall dimensions and power from approximately 36 feet to 170 feet long, from 12 feet to 50 feet wide, from a 6 foot to a 10 foot 3 inch draft, and with engines that develop from 100 all the way up to 9,000 horsepower. The towboats of 6,000 horsepower and more are capable of pushing barges carrying 40,000 to 50,000 tons. The towboat operating at the rear of barges can handle a greater number of barges at greater speed under more absolute control than one engaged in a towing operation. The relatively flat-bottomed towboat has from one-to-four propellers, each driven by a diesel engine, and a set of multiple rudders which afford maximum control for forward, backing, and flanking movements, such as are required to navigate the restricted channels of the rivers and canals.
Sizes of the lock chambers which pass vessels from one level of water to the other in canalized streams have tended to dictate standardization of the dimensions of vessels using the inland channels. The Corps of Engineers has established the following standard usable lock dimensions for the waterways of the United States: lock width of 66 feet with length of either 400 feet or 600 feet; lock width of 84 feet with length of 600 feet, 800 feet, or 1,200 feet; and a lock width of 110 feet with length of 600 feet, 800 feet, or 1,200 feet.
This towboat-barge system is capable °f passing through the smallest exist- lng locks while remaining intact at all times. There is the possibility of expanding the system to two barges side-by-side (70 feet), which would be capable of transiting two of the larger locks, or the building of a special Barge (60 feet) wide enough to accommodate a larger weapon system and yet be capable of transiting all of the locks. The average lock is de- s'gned to accommodate the passage of vessels in 20 to 30 minutes.
Barge vertical clearance of aerial ca- ^es, bridges, etc. will present no Problem to the “modified missile Barge” which would rise approximately 28 feet above the waterline of cBe channel.
The communication and navigation systems for normal barge operation are adequate, ranging from bullhorn to ‘nstant radio communication with any Part of the vessel. Radio-telephone is required by Public Law 92-63 of 1 January 197.3. Therefore, VHF and AM radios are standard equipment. In Periods of reduced visibility, the tow- oat pilot can rely on radar to present >m with a constant map of the river. n addition to radar and the depth ■nder, the towboat pilot also has a ^Wlng indicator to tell him the second is tow starts to drift off course. Thus, e can apply corrective rudder even etore the deviation shows on radar.
Th
ne use of automatic pilot is becom- 1,18 popular as a more accurate steer- lng device when visual steering ability ls restricted. In clear weather, the automatic pilot, carefully used, will steer the tow with less rudder angle—and consequently give more mil« per hour.
Living conditions are recognized as important to operating efficiency. Working conditions on board river- boats have improved immeasurably in recent years. Four full meals are served every day; laundry service is provided; and crew quarters are set apart from the noisier parts of the vessel, and in some cases are soundproofed. Many crews now enjoy the advantages of airconditioning, television, and other recreational activities. Barges are capable of operating with two working crews on board the vessel at all times with a third and sometimes a fourth crew ashore for relief.
The barge industry has achieved an outstanding safety record. As a measure of the concern and accomplishment for safety, records show that in the performance of inland waterborne freight service the fatality rate per billion ton-miles in one year was 0.54. To appreciate this figure, the fatality rate per billion ton-miles in the same year for rail freight service was 2.5; the fatality rate per billion ton-miles for motor carrier freight service was 10.8.
The missile system proposed for this Quadrad concept would be the Trident I (C-4) (for a total of 16 tubes), using existing Poseidon missile packages initially. This system would offer a range of 4,200 miles and would progress into the Trident package for the larger Trident II missile with 24 tubes and ranges from 6,000 to 7,000 miles. The missile guidance package, gas generators, missile control panels, launcher control package, missile test and readiness equipment, fire control computers, inertial navigation system, engineering spaces and limited berthing could fit entirely on board a modified dry cargo barge which has the following dimensions: length, 195 feet; breadth, 35 feet; draft, 9 feet; and capacity, 1,500 tons. Personnel to man the system could be SSBN weapon crews who possess the necessary training to perform the assigned mission. The advantages of the MCBM are:
► Availability of numerous channels
► No new holes have to be made in the desert
► Can use existing barges
► Can use existing Poseidon system
► Mobility
► Survivability
The disadvantages of the proposed new leg to the U. S. strategic deterrence are:
► More strategic nuclear weapons on continental U. S. soil, which would provide more lucrative targets to the U.S.S.R. of the U. S. mainland and its population
► Seasonal weather conditions in the North restrict flexibility of the system for four months
As a proposed member of the U. S. strategic forces, the MCBM would provide a means of maintaining nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R. and would continue to provide a credible deterrence of nuclear war. As such, it provides additional safeguards to the nation as we continue to work for an equitable armament limitations agreement.
ASW; The Advantage of Experience
B'eutenant Alan M. Harms, U. S. Navy
T1
0 combat the submarine effectively requires a surface, subsurface, and air ASty team effort. Our ships and airCraft must be technologically up to e and materially ready at all times.
Ur officers and enlisted personnel rriUst Be fully trained and prepared. In
the aviation ASW community, however, inexperience in tactical proficiency adds to the numerous advantages of the enemy submarine. The problem is particularly acute in the patrol (VP) community.
A VP squadron is composed of nine
aircraft and 12 aircrews. Each aircrew consists of two naval flight officers (NFOs), three pilots, and seven enlisted aircrewmen. The quarterback of this aircrew is the tactical coordinator (TACCO), normally the senior NFO on the crew. But his level of ex-
is as follows:
Assignment Months
Flight training/
replacement squadron 18-24
First squadron tour 36
Shore tour 30-36
Disassociated sea tour 24-30
Shore tour 24-30
Replacement squadron 4-6
Second squadron tour 24-30
perience operating his ASW platform is about one-fourth that of his subsurface adversary (based on total time assigned to the respective platform). If the TACCO is a second-tour NFO, his experience is quantitatively half that of the sub skipper’s, and qualitatively less since the NFO has been away from a VP squadron for several years. The same situation exists for the patrol plane commander (PPC), the senior pilot of the VP aircrew.
This situation arises from an aviation career pattern which attempts to produce a generalist but leaves little time to accrue enough ASW experience. The normal VP NFO or pilot career pattern
After the first VP tour, as much as seven years could elapse before the NFO or pilot returns to a squadron. Second-tour TACCOs and PPCs (eight to nine per squadron) are assigned throughout the aircrews in the VP outfit. Many times a second-tour TACCO will fly with a first-tour PPC and vice versa. Yet, even with an experience match such as this, their combined experience is not that significant when compared to the submarine skipper’s experience. The first-tour TACCO or PPC is particularly inexperienced. Of the 36 months he spends in his first squadron tour, 17-24 months are spent achieving the TACCO or PPC designation. The vp NFO or pilot must achieve his Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) designations (navigator- communicator [NavComm]-TACCO/ third pilot [3P]-second pilot [2P]-PPC) while carrying out his primary ground billet on a full-time basis. And the primacy of the ground billet is unmistakably impressed upon every officer in the VP squadron, even to the neglect of tactical expertise.
For the new NFO, this problem is made more difficult because he will normally fly as NavComm in the P-3C for from 9-12 months before being allowed to actually train in the TACCO’s station. Unlike in the P-3A/B, the jobs of the TACCO and NavComm are quite different in the P-3C. And unlike the transition from third pilot to PPC, which is an uninterrupted progression of learning and improving pilot skills, the NavComm must begin a new and different training regimen when he begins his TACCO syllabus.
Moreover, squadron-level training programs for NFOs are neglected in favor of pilot training. The reason for this stems from the fact that the NFO is to be trained to prosecute submarines, while the pilots are trained to safely fly the P-3C. And flight safety is a high-visibility objective, that is highly achievable, and is highly rewarded. In peacetime, flight safety has become an obsession in the vp community to the point that it is no longer a means to an end (the destruction of enemy submarines) but it has become an end in itself. This attitude draws attention and resources away from developing tactical expertise. Although tactical training gets high- volume lip service, in actuality it receives a low priority.
The NavComm receives virtually no training once he reports to the operational VP squadron. The instruction he received in the VP replacement squadron was barely adequate, and the amount of flight time/simulator time was clearly inadequate. The new NavComm reports to his squadron with no NATOPS check, a personnel qualification standards (PQS) manual is put in his hand, and he is immediately flying operational missions without the help of an experienced NavComm.
NavComm training does have flight safety implications, but they are ignored. Neither the Fleet Readiness
System nor the P-3C NATOPS requires that the NavComm receive training opportunities to exercise the manual navigation skills he learned in the training command. Although the P-3C navigation system is automated, manual navigation procedures would allow the aircraft to safely proceed through ■ts mission in the event of failures or malfunctions in the navigation systems.
When the NavComm begins his TACCO training syllabus, he gets another PQS manual but little flight or simulator time. Combined simulator- flight time amounts to about 40 to 50 hours. This compares rather poorly with the 800 hours the pilot receives t° make PPC. Again the gross disparity arises because PPCs are trained for flight safety, and all else seems secondary. But the current Atlantic hfoet on-station evaluation grades do not assess pilot skills. Instead, the TAcco and NavComm are severely scrutinized during the typical debrief- lng. And while squadrons tend to be in general or ASW in particular. There is considerable pressure to produce in the assigned ground job, however. And the second-tour VP officer, who is near to command screening, is particularly susceptible to pressure to devote more time and energy to the ground job than to tactical proficiency. So when the pressure to perform in the ground job is combined with an obsession for flight safety, the end result is an unnecessarily low level of operational readiness, despite the claims of paper readiness reporting.
Clearly, higher levels of maritime warfare skill can be achieved without the slightest degradation in flight safety. Warfare skill and safety of flight are complementary goals, with the former being the end and the latter being the means to achieve it.
The primary vehicle for VP tactics training is the 2F87T P-3C tactical crew weapon system trainer. But the 2F87T does not produce sufficient tactical training of the quality it is capable of providing. First, there are not enough tations. Each 2F87T session is only three hours. Often a portion of this time must be used to prepare the trainer for the flight. A three-hour ASW evolution is not realistic because contact must be guaranteed. Contact on station is never a sure thing, and only a few ASW skills can be exercised by the TACCO and PPC during the trainer period. Furthermore, the 2F87T is limited to ASW training only. No training can be conducted in coordinated operations, direct support, or maritime surveillance and targeting, although these missions comprise a significant amount of the P-3C squadron’s operational tasking.
Based on recent experience, the 2F87T is of limited value as an operations readiness evaluation tool, for Mediterranean-bound squadrons. The opposite is true of the Bermuda-bound squadrons.
The 2F87T provides almost no training for the P-3C sensor operators and NavComm. There are no electronic support measures (ESM) installed for
discriminating in the selection of inductor pilots, a similar commitment t0 quality in selecting instructor NFOs °foen does not seem to exist.
For designated TACCOs and PPCs, there is little or no formal impetus to stay current with ASW tactical developments or to maintain and refine e,r warfare specialties. The majority °A their primary ground billets do not relate directly to either naval warfare
2F87Ts. Each squadron has nine P-3Cs which can be used for pilot training. But a P-3C wing has only two 2F87TS for use by the four non-deployed squadrons. Each of these squadrons receives, on the average, 15-18 trainer periods per month to be used by its 12 aircrews.
The training value of each trainer period is restricted by time constraints as well as hardware and software limi-
the nonacoustic sensor operator. Software limitations severely restrict the number of radar contacts in the trainer.
A similar situation, again software related, exists for the acoustic sensor operators. The antiquated computers used to simulate the submarine, surface ships, and oceanographic conditions are so limited in digital storage capacity that they derive poor simulations. These computer simulations are a small challenge to the rookie sensor operator and a pushover for an experienced operator. It is, of course, not surprising that wing staffs are concerned over an apparent diminution in acoustic analysis skill by squadron operators.
The importance of the antisubmarine warfare operator (AW) to the P-3C should not be overlooked. His ability to assess sensor information is the key to the entire weapon systems’ capability to subsequently localize and attack subsurface and surface targets. The AW does not receive adequate training from the replacement squadron. Acoustic and nonacoustic training devices are limited in number. This same problem exists after the new AW reaches the operational VP squadron. The instructors in the replacement squadron are often A school graduates without fleet experience. Once the AW arrives in the operational squadron he usually is assigned temporary additional duty for three months— compartment cleaning, mess cooking, and aircraft washing. Whatever was learned in the replacement squadron is often forgotten during this period.
The squadron’s ability and desire to raise the level of proficiency of its AWs are quite limited. In addition to the problems with the 2F87T, acoustic and nonacoustic training devices are very limited. With the limited availability of the P-3C for acoustic training, which will be described later, the AW is left to his own devices and vulnerable to the lowest of ambitions because the assets and equipment to keep his level of proficiency high are not available. Even the other enlisted crewmembers—flight engineer, inflight technician, and ordnance- man—have more training opportunities. Consequently, the AWs are often accused of goldbricking by their peers and officers. It is no wonder that the retention rates of these sensor operators are low.
For the NavComm there is also no worthwhile training in the 2F87T. The navigation systems are inoperative. Communications exercises cannot be carried out because the 2F87T has only one instructor/operator, and he is fully occupied operating the weapon system trainer (WST) as well as evaluating the performance of the crew.
The TACCO and PPC do receive worthwhile ASW training but the opportunities to use the 2F87T are few. When those opportunities do arise, many times the trainer is not working. The trainers are more than ten years old and are showing the effects of their age. They are operated 12 hours a day, five days a week. Unfortunately, the 2F87Ts do not receive a high enough parts priority to be kept fully repaired. This parts priority situation is perpetuated by a maintenance reporting system that does not recognize the 2F87T as ASW down when 50% of the installed sensors could be unusable or malfunctioning. No VP squadron would begin a mission with over half of a P-3C’s sensors broken.
Some corrective measures must be established to bring about an improvement in the tactical readiness of VP aircrews. Clearly, more and better 2F87Ts are needed. But this solution would probably be rejected as too costly. As an alternative, more trainer maintenance personnel could expand the number of hours of trainer use. Perhaps an equal number of trainer periods of longer duration could be arranged. Certainly, there can be no increase in 2F87T use without an increase in the amount of available spare parts.
Beyond the 2F87T issue, each VP squadron could do much more to improve aircrew readiness.. First, a TACCO training syllabus requiring more flight/wST time would be useful. Next, a rigorous instructor TACCO syllabus on par with the excellent instructor pilot training program should be established. Each squadron should follow a policy to maximize the training value of every operational flight or exercise by ensuring that student TAC- COs are given the chance to fly missions in the TACCO seat with an experienced TACCO guiding and instructing. Consistently, the ground job has taken priority, and a valuable flight training opportunity is missed.
The P-3C could be used more as a trainer for TACCOs and acoustic sensor operators. But many squadrons are reluctant to do this for two reasons. First, there is the matter of fuel costs to operate the P-3C’s auxiliary power unit (APU). Squadrons must be extremely careful to precisely match fuel dollars with flight hours. APU fuel costs dollars without buying a single flight hour. Thus, the all important “fuel cost per flight hour” figure climbs to a high level. Ground power and air-conditioning units are in short supply.
Second, if a properly repaired and equipped P-3C is ready to be used as a trainer, the maintenance department usually objects to this ASW asset not being saved for flight. Once again, readiness and training take a backseat.
More training for the nonacoustic sensor operator is less obtainable than for the acoustic operator. He may get some experience using his radar for weather avoidance, but this is doubtful and haphazard training at best. But opportunities for the nonacoustic operator to use his MAD, ESM, and radar for ASW or maritime surveillance and targeting are a function of scheduling electronic warfare ranges, fleet exercises, and radar trainer facilities. The squadron has little or no influence on the availability of these training events. Nonacoustic training could be increased if the 2F87F were updated and improved.
Keeping aircrews intact is a means by which the VP squadron can derive a real improvement in overall readiness. But the 36-month initial tour for VP NFOs and pilots disrupts crew stability. A 48-month initial squadron tour would seem to have two major benefits: increased experience levels and reduced personnel costs. Fewer NFOS and pilots would be required from the training command. The longer tour would keep aircrews intact much longer, and the junior officer would have more time to develop his warfare specialty. Reduced numbers of pilots and NFOs could mean that VP officers
too could have the opportunity for an intermediate squadron tour like their Va/vf contemporaries.
The current level of ASW/maritime Warfare skill and experience in the VP community needs to be improved if the weapon system is to effectively fulfill its role in the vital sea control mis- s*on. Because VP squadrons must do virtually all of their own training, they should demand quality TACCOs and PPCs from the training programs. Those who do not measure up should not have their designations rubber- stamped in order to avoid official em- barassment to the command. More attention to tactics and weapons delivery is required. The NATOPS program should be understood for what it is, the best means to achieve safety of flight and nothing more. Therefore, warfare skill should be the goal of ultimate importance, not NATOPS for the sake of NATOPS.
The submarine’s advantages are too numerous to settle for less than the
best from the Orion and its aircrews.
Lieutenant Harms, designated P-3C tactical coordinator and mission commander, an Air- Lant NATOPS evaluator, and a squadron tactics instructor, served as an aircrew training officer, public affairs officer, and squadron ASW TACCO while assigned to Patrol Squadron Fourty-Five. He is now the ASW and TD&E Officer for Patrol Wing Eleven.
VP Specialization—Upstairs and Downstairs
By Lieutenant Vining A. Sherman, Jr., U. S. Navy
A patrol (VP) squadron has officers upstairs" who know what they are doing, have confidence that they can d° it, and can direct their subordinates in a successful effort.
Now bring these same officers downstairs" and have them return to cheir ground—"primary”—duties, ^o they know what they are doing? Are they as confident? Can they direct their men in a successful effort? The answers, in many cases, are no. Efficiency is lost if the officer in a Particular billet is unfamiliar with it, as one year to become proficient, and 116,1 > in many cases, takes his expertise with him to a completely dif- erent job in a different department.
At present, a junior officer can expect three job assignments during his three-year tour. The cost of rotating °fficers into unrelated jobs can be considered in terms of money and time, ue same officer may be required, uring this tour, to attend three dif- erent schools. The cost of sending one 0 beer to learn these dissimilar skills can be considerable. In addition, the Period the officer is in school is time °st to the squadron—a billet empty, a )°b not being done.
Work efficiency suffers from frequent )0b rotations. Time is spent learning e Basics of the work, how things are °ne, what the characteristics are of each subordinate, etc. With no expe- r'ence in a somewhat-related job, ^JUch time is spent relearning the job 0 the predecessor and making some of
the same mistakes. (Figure 1 depicts a percentage of officers having a corresponding number of months of experience in their present job, based on a sampling of 48 officers for one year.)
Top management in the Navy is similar to top management in business in that it relies heavily on lower levels of management to administer the organization, anticipate potential problems, and provide a timely and accurate upward information flow. When the commanding officer and department heads cannot rely upon the actions and inputs of lower-level management, since frequent job rotation, in effect, debilitates knowledge, they must spend more of their own time doing the work of those under them.
The operational goal of a squadron is to be in a peak state of readiness. The most visible measurement of this readiness is the performance of aircrews on station. Long periods of operation, however, are dependent upon ground support from all departments if a squadron is to achieve success. A mismanaged electronics branch could easily keep an aircraft from ever reaching its station. The managers of that branch and its associated division have an average of six months of experience in maintenance.
Periods of change, as when assuming a new job, are times of stress for an individual and times of loss of effective manpower for the military unit. Constant job rotation adds just that many more stressful and unproductive periods to a tour which already in-
Total squadron success depends on the proficiency of the aircrews “downstairs” as well as “upstairs.” Specialization at ground-level jobs is one way of getting total proficiency.
eludes the initial managerial challenges of a career, the initial exposure to a warfare specialty, and the initial adjustments to long separations from the family. (Although comparing procedures in the U. S. Navy and the Soviet Navy can become meaningless because of differences in initial assumptions of value, the following observation by Captain James W. Kehoe [February 1978 Proceedings p. 58] is interesting to note: "The end result of specialization, as practiced by the Soviet Navy, coupled with infrequent rotation, is that only a limited number of officers in any ship are in the initial stages of a learning process.”)
The average junior officer, when reporting on board, is stepping into his first real experience as a manager—a leader of men. The squadron will benefit in the following three years to the extent that the officer can become an effective leader in his assigned positions. And knowledge of the task at hand is an essential quality of good leadership.
One rationale for frequent rotation of officers is the need to develop a “well-rounded” naval officer; the junior officer must be exposed to as many different aspects of the squadron as possible so that he can become a ca
NAVAL RESERVIST NEWS (E. FRANCOIS)
pable commanding officer in 12 years. Today, I submit that the price is too high for this future profit. The officer and his squadron would benefit more if he could, in his first tour, experience what it is like to be a knowledgeable, confident leader.
Effective management and leadership are qualities sometimes thought to be totally transferable. To a certain extent they are. But there are limitations to the belief that a leader can function in any situation into which he is thrown. In Management: Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965, pp. 535-6), one writer on this subject makes the following observation:
“Those who hold th[e] view today [that the true manager can manage any type or phase of business] argue that the management job is fundamentally the same, no matter what type of organization is being managed. . . . Essentially proponents of this view are devotees of the school that defines management as the direction of people. They leave unanswered, however, the question of how a manager who is completely unfamiliar with the field knows what he wants to direct people to do.”
Times of transition, as mentioned before, can be stressful periods. Methods used to adapt to one set of circumstances may not work in a different situation. The ensuing frustration affects the morale of the individual. Although not specifically measurable, any loss of morale can be expected to have an adverse effect on the squadron. Frequent billet changing reduces the likelihood that an individual will have both the necessary information and resources and the selfconfidence to do a good job.
Much is heard of the “short-timer” and the “short-timer’s attitude.” Normally the terms refer to an individual who is due to leave the squadron soon and has accordingly turned his energies away from his immediate duties. Although understandable, this psychological phenomenon is not beneficial to the squadron. This same mental attitude can also be present as when an individual is due to change responsibilities.
Because of transfers into and out of the squadron and increases in relative seniority during the interim, job rotation must continue. Billet changes, however, can be controlled in a more efficient manner—horizontal changes, which are made just because one has been in a billet for a specified time period, must be stopped.
I propose that an officer, when reporting on board, be assigned to a department in which he can expect to remain for his entire tour. Any subsequent job changes could be made within that department. The following examples illustrate the proposal: y Electronics Branch Officer to Maintenance Administration Officer to Assistant Maintenance Officer ► CMS Custodian to Assistant Communications Officer to Communications Officer
y Assistant Schedules Officer to Aircrew Training Officer to Flight Officer The end results can be impressive. The officer would be more confident in his job, and the squadron would have more highly qualified personnel- improvements in the four areas of administration, operations, leadership development, and morale can also be expected.
Cost efficiency can be improved if an officer is trained in only one department. The number of schools an officer must attend would decrease, and the education he receives would be complementary, resulting in more time spent contributing to the squadron effort.
Productivity would be increased. A more knowledgeable division officer
w'll make fewer false starts in attend- <ng to a problem; he will waste less time exploring blind alleys. Obviously, this and most other advantages °f specialization will be more fully realized during the second and third billet rotation.
A higher level of expertise in the lower levels of administration would free the department heads from much °f the monitoring and basic education chores. Recommendations would be more extensive and more forthcoming. Upward information flow would be more educated and meaningful.
Operational performance can be improved to the extent that management °f ground support is improved. Leaders who are specialists in their departments can be expected to be more positive factors in ensuring that work ls coordinated, goals are understood, and schedules are more realistic. Long-range planning of exercises, detachments, and deployments could be acilitated as prior experience and deeper familiarity with various areas of responsibility would be available.
U is most beneficial for a junior officer, in his first squadron tour, to learn and develop solid leadership tech- P’ques. Evidence is strong that a pol- lcy of job specialization would aid him tQWard this objective. And since U. S. Navy Regulations require those in au- th°rity to “promote and safeguard the morale, physical well-being, and general welfare of all persons under their cf'arge,” it js almost necessary that an officer specialize so that he is able to °°k after his men and to distinguish etween them. In each department, rocn have unique needs, unique problems, and unique working conditions and demands. The specialized officer is more capable of understanding, helping, and evaluating the men in his department.
A policy which serves to improve morale while not adversely affecting squadron efficiency can only help. Job specialization can improve the morale of officers by instilling a greater sense of identity and consistency and by allowing confidence to grow as complementary experience is gained.
Like any new policy designated to alleviate certain problems, job specialization would create new problems.
An important consideration is the danger of departmental polarization. Just as loyalty to one’s own division and department can be a powerful asset, it can also serve to split a squadron into counterproductive interest groups. Fortunately, there are already many built-in mechanisms available to control polarization. For example: i The commanding officer, executive officer, and department heads are in positions to detect and correct conditions of tunnel vision and to coordinate various collective goals. i All-officer meetings provide information cross-flow, where an officer from one department can gain insight on total squadron goals and problems and is briefed on the actions of other departments. Through these meetings, a spirit of squadron teamwork can be nurtured.
► Flight crews—groups of individuals from all departments—acting together as a close team in the air can maintain that spirit of close cooperation when they are on the ground.
Obviously it will not always be possible or practical to keep an officer in the same department for his entire tour. But, to the degree that specialization can be achieved, the squadron would benefit. Job specialization will, however, require more advanced planning and charting of jobs. Within each department there must be a detailed plan of job progression with various billet succession alternatives based upon an individual’s performance in his present position.
If it is to maximize the effectiveness of necessary bureaucracy, a squadron must assign its sources of leadership to more specialized areas of concentration. The theory of the development of well-rounded officers is perhaps not as valid now as in previous times. Outweighing it now are the advantages to be gained in the areas of administration, operations, leadership, and morale.
To be an effective fighting unit, a squadron must have excellent ground support in addition to excellent flight crews. When called to action, the squadron which can depend on the expertise of its officers in their management roles will be that much more mission-capable.
Lieutenant Sherman served as Gunnery Assistant Officer on the USS Brewton (FF-1086), one year prior to his flight training. Subsequently, he served in Patrol Squadron Eleven for three years and is now assigned to Patrol Squadron Thirty.
Soviet Access To Cam Ranh Bay: Political and Military Implications
Tai Sung An
Thanks to U. S. efforts during the •etnam War, Vietnam has superb Military facilities for a superpower *Uch as the Soviet Union. The air 'elds at Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh lty> formerly Saigon, plus the deep 'Vater port of Cam Ranh Bay, are feady-made for servicing long-range Planes, ships, and submarines.
Uam Ranh Bay, situated on the
South China Sea 200 miles northeast of Ho Chi Minh City, is one of the most strategically located naval ports in the Western Pacific. The United States spent $145 million to construct this naval base.
After the final victory of the North Vietnamese Communists in 1975, it became known that the Soviet Union had approached Vietnam about the use of Cam Ranh Bay by the Soviet Navy’s fleet. During 1975-78, Hanoi was reported to have resisted granting the Soviet Union base rights. Apparently, the Vietnamese Communists still preferred to avoid exclusive reliance on a single major Communist power in line with their primordial desire for some degree of balance in their relations with the Soviet Union and China. Be-
sides, they had had too many bitter experiences with the Russian “fraternal comrades’’ over the past quarter century to believe that their interests at critical junctures would not be sacrificed at Moscow’s convenience. It is also possible that the Hanoi regime wanted to use Washington’s fear of military base rights for the Soviets in Vietnam as a useful bargaining chip for the establishment of beneficial relations with the United States.
The Soviet use of Vietnamese ports and airfields for military purposes began during the recent war between China and Vietnam and has continued since those hostilities ceased.
Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Nikolai P. Firybin confirmed in Japan on 14 May 1979, during the opening session of Soviet-Japanese working-level consultations, that his country was using Cam Ranh Bay under a friendship and cooperation pact signed between Hanoi and Moscow in early November 1978. The Soviet official argued that the use of the Vietnamese naval base by Soviet warships was a “conduct of duty under the friendship and cooperation treaty” (The Washington Post, 15 May 1979)-
The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry admitted on 11 May 1979 that Soviet military ships had access to Viet
namese ports but denied that his country harbored foreign military bases.
In short, since 1978, Hanoi seems to have clearly thrown its lot in with the Soviet Union, partly because of the traditional Vietnamese fear and distrust of China and partly because of the current conflict between Vietnam and China over hegemonic control of Indochina. Hanoi was granted full membership in the Soviet-bloc economic group, Comecon, in June 1978, one month after China began to withdraw its aid projects from Vietnam. The Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in Moscow on 3 November 1978, binding the two nations more closely together against their bitter adversary in Peking. Through this 25-year, nine-article treaty, which is the first pact by the Soviets with a Southeast Asian nation, Moscow and Hanoi pledged to take jointly “appropriate and effective measures” against any attacker who threatens the peace and security of either country. (This treaty was accompanied by economic and technical aid programs.)
This treaty also signaled a steady expansion of Russian support for Vietnam. Moscow not only had supplied Vietnam with arms for its war with Cambodia, but supported Hanoi against Peking during the recent Sino-Vietnamese border conflict.
In early 1979, Russia began to send military advisors and technicians to Vietnam, bringing their number there to 4,000. Eleven Russian warships, intelligence-gathering vessels, and support craft had been cruising off Vietnam for weeks, starting with the rise in tension that culminated in China’s invasion of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. Moscow sent weapons and equipment to Vietnam, dispatched surveillance aircraft to support Vietnamese operations, reportedly airlifted Vietnamese troops to the battle zone, and reinforced the squadron of Soviet ships already cruising neat Vietnam by dispatching important elements of its Pacific Fleet (a missile-armed destroyer, an undisclosed number of submarines, and the fleet’s flagship, the 16,000-ton cruiser Admiral Senyavin) to demonstrate its
support for Vietnam. The Kremlin also constructed near Cam Ranh Bay a dish antenna radio signal-monitoring station to be manned and operated by Soviet technicians, evidently to monitor Chinese communications.
Whether permanent or temporary, the use of Cam Ranh Bay (and other Vietnamese bases) by Soviet military forces is clearly linked to the Soviet Union’s grand strategy to move southward into the Pacific and Southeast Asia in order to expand its military and political influences in these strategic areas. Russian military ships and aircraft operating from southern Vietnamese bases can affect the secu- tity and peace of Southeast Asia in a regional sense as well as the overall ruditary equilibrium in a global sense, In coordination with the ever- exPanding Russian Pacific Fleet. Since che early 1970s, Moscow has con- t'nued to build up its naval power in the Pacific region to the extent of giv- lng rise to the apprehension of Asian nations, particularly Japan.
U is important to note that Cam Ranh Bay is the first warm water foreign base in the Pacific to which the Soviet Navy is permitted to have ac- ccss. There is little doubt but that the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay would [lave a powerful effect on the naval balance in Asia to the advantage of Russia and the disadvantage of the United States, Japan, and China. For °ne thing, Moscow would gain a sea- power “pincer” that could control Vltal sea-lanes between China, Japan, and the West, as well as springboard f°r the projection of Soviet seapower n°rthward along the rim of the Pacific.
U peacetime, Soviet ships based in
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea would be able to woo potential allies and threaten real or potential enemies. In war, Russian ships, which could refuel, rearm, and repair in the Vietnamese naval base, would be astride one of the world’s major ocean routes.
Having a right to use Cam Ranh Bay would enable the Soviet Union to deploy more naval units in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and would provide a base for Soviet naval air operations over the South China and Philippine Seas. This enlarged Soviet naval presence may be designed in part to scare off China or at least signal the world that Moscow intends to stand by Hanoi in its conflict with Peking. Soviet naval forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay would be on the flank of China’s South Sea Fleet, which is deployed from major bases at Whampoa, Chankiang, and Yulin, and covers the areas from Tanshan to the Vietnamese frontier.
Russian naval units in the South Pacific area would also be a counterweight to the American sea and air forces based at Subic Bay and Clark Field in the Philippines.
A Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay would greatly increase the range, flexibility, and maneuverability of its Pacific Fleet, now based far to the north at Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Petropavlovsk (in the Kamchatka Peninsula), where mobility has been limited by weather and th£ narrow waters between Japan and Korea. U. S. Navy strategists have long regarded Vladivostok, on the Sea of Japan, as a port they could bottle up easily if war came. Dispersal of some of the Russian Pacific Fleet to Cam Ranh Bay would free the fleet, at least partially, from its huge geographic disadvantages.
Unmistakably, the Soviet Union and Vietnam together represent a very powerful Pacific alliance which complements each country’s expansionist policy.
Russia’s position in the Asian power balance is unique. It is not only a naval and air power, but, qualitatively, the strongest land power.
The Kremlin has a strong and capable ally in Vietnam. The 50 million population of the combined North and South Vietnam makes the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the 16th largest nation in the world and the third largest Communist nation, after China and the Soviet Union. Hanoi’s army of 600,000, 300 combat aircraft, and shoals of motor gunboats and torpedo boats represent the strongest military establishment in Southeast Asia.
It should be emphasized that the U. S.-Soviet detente itself can be sustained in a state of stable strategic balance between the two superpowers and will begin to lose its effect when the balance is disturbed gradually and seriously in favor of either side. Nuclear arms are not the only element of the balance. Geopolitical influence is important as well. The United States and its allies need to make a sober appraisal of the acceleration of the Russian military buildup in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
Soviet Bases in Vietnam: Implications for the Seventh Fleet
Lieutenant Commander William H. Walls, U. S. Navy, and leutenant Commander Edwin R. McDaniel, U. S. Navy
Shortly after the withdrawal of Ch[1][2]
mnese troops from the northern Provinces of the Socialist Republic of *etnarn in March 1979, Hanoi an- n°unced the arrival of Soviet warships ln Vietnamese ports. In mid-April, e U. S. State Department released
information that two Soviet Navy Tu-95 “Bear D” reconnaissance aircraft were located in Da Nang. In early May, U. S. press reports stated a diesel-powered “Foxtrot”-class submarine had been photographed in Cam Ranh Bay.
Geographically, Vietnam offers tactical and strategic advantages to a naval power seeking to influence events in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Both Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang provide excellent natural harbors with sufficient anchorage to shelter large
fleets. The major airfields located near each port can support reconnaissance, surveillance, or strike aircraft. The harbors afford ready access to the South China Sea, through which run important sea lines of communication (SLOC) between the Middle East oil fields and Northeast Asia.
The presence of warships and naval aircraft in Vietnam demonstrates a Soviet intention to expand its presence in Southeast Asia. While it is by no means certain that the Vietnamese would acquiesce to the renewed presence of a foreign power on their soil, it is conceivable that important base concessions could be negotiated in return for substantial Soviet aid.
If the Soviets obtained base rights in Vietnam, the ensuing buildup could be expected to follow patterns established in other parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Soviet experience in those areas reveals a tendency to expand slowly and deliberately with a gradual and seemingly calculated increase in both force levels and support capabilities until an intended level of activity is reached. The status of the repair and support facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang is unknown, but the structure could have been allowed to deteriorate since the U. S. withdrawal. In order to use those ports the Soviets would probably refurbish needed facilities and deploy auxiliaries to provide additional support. The presence of “Bear Ds” at Da
Nang reveals that the airfield remains capable of supporting large, sophisticated aircraft.
Initially, one would expect to see periodic port calls by a few combatants or auxiliaries, possibly during transits to and from the Indian Ocean. Stationing a repair ship or submarine tender in Cam Ranh Bay or Da Nang would allow the Soviets to conduct extended naval operations in the Southeast Asian area. The repair capability would also benefit ships transiting between the Indian Ocean and Vladivostok. A gradual expansion of force levels to include surface combatants and logistics support ships is likely.
Aviation presence in the foreseeable future will probably be limited to unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. Precipitate introduction of strike aircraft would unduly alarm regional nations to such a degree that they might be tempted to turn to the United States for support; strike aircraft deployments may therefore await the development of a clear requirement for their presence, such as the threat of active hostilities.
With these factors in mind, the U. S. Navy should consider the military implications attendant to Soviet naval forces operating from bases in Vietnam. .The considerations must encompass not only Soviet capabilities, but also their options in both war and peace.
In a war with the United States, the Soviet Navy could be expected to use
Vietnamese bases to support combat operations against the Seventh Fleet and the SLOC carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia.
Soviet options for fighting in Southeast Asian waters range from attempting a full-scale engagement with the Seventh Fleet to endeavoring to divert U. S. assets to deal with a Soviet “fleet in being.” The number of strike and support forces required for a fleet encounter in the South China Sea probably precludes that option in the near term. On the other hand, by engaging the Seventh Fleet at long range from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Fleet can minimize the likelihood of damage to the homeland. This advantage suggests that the Soviets would attempt to engage some U. S. forces in the South China Sea.
Four courses of action appear feasible for Soviet employment of a South China Sea squadron in a war:
► Attack U. S. forces within range
► Mine the approaches to Subic Bay
► Tie down U. S. forces as a “fleet in being”
► Disrupt South China Sea lines of communication
In a worst-case scenario, it is possible to imagine the Soviets massing sufficient intermediate-range bombers at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay to execute a preemptive attack on U. S. forces and installations in the Philippines. It is conceivable that a surprise strike would catch the many Seventh Fleet ships in Subic Bay and unable to
*
of
surprise for success. If the United
fully defend themselves. Such an attack depends heavily upon the element
States were forewarned or had established an active defense of Subic Bay, t'le attacking force could pay a high Pfce for minimal accomplishment. A strong alert posture at Subic Bay, therefore, could foreclose the option of a tuajor surprise attack.
As a second option, a preemptive strike by sub marines and aircraft °Perating from Vietn am, could sucCeed in surprising and destroying isolated U. S. ships in the South China ^ea- A rapid strike could deny the Seventh Fleet some of its destroyers and frigates—assets badly needed to °Perate with carrier battle groups or to Provide SLOC protection.
Simultaneously with striking fleet tttuts at sea, Soviet intermediate-range
°mbers could mine the approaches to Subic Bay. With the paucity of U. S. rnineclearing assets, minefields would prevent ships in port from departing for a considerable length of time. If a significant number of ships were confined in Subic Bay the Soviets could exploit the opportunity to engage the remaining U. S. Pacific Fleet elements in isolation.
In the event that the Soviets do not take early, decisive action to counter the U. S. Navy at Subic Bay, they could find their South China Sea assets in danger of being overwhelmed by a superior force. A carrier battle group could, with a high probability of success, detect and destroy Soviet air and surface forces operating from Vietnamese bases. The submarine threat could probably be contained through judicious employment of air and submarine ASW forces and through destruction of Soviet submarine repair and support ships. Unfortunately, destruction of hostile forces consumes time and assets. Using a carrier battle group on a peripheral mission deprives the Pacific Fleet of a substantial portion of its strike force. A carrier engaged in the South China Sea is not available for more critical fleet engagements elsewhere in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
As an alternative to seeking an active engagement with the U. S. Navy, the Soviets could employ their South China Sea squadron as a “fleet in being.” Operating from bases in Vietnam, Soviet ships and aircraft could harass U. S. ships in the South China Sea or conduct occasional raids on lightly defended Allied bases. The purpose of the squadron would be to divert attention away from strategically important regions of Northeast Asia and to tempt the United States to expend considerable effort in dealing with the nuisance. Cleverly handled, a small force could occupy a large number of U. S. ships for a lengthy period of time. To counter this action, the United States might consider mining Vietnamese ports in an effort to contain the Soviet squadron until major forces could be spared from the main battle areas of the Pacific to eliminate it.
A Soviet South China Sea squadron, whether actively engaging the U. S. fleet or acting as a “fleet in being,” poses a threat to ships carrying oil through the South China Sea to Subic Bay, Guam, and Japan. Aircraft, surface ships, and submarines can mine the Indonesian straits and attack ships transiting the South China Sea. The
effect would be to force allocation of SLOC protection assets or require tankers to use longer routes around the Indonesian archipelago or Australia. It is obvious that lengthening the distance tankers must travel effectively reduces the total amount of oil that can be carried in a given amount of time. A Soviet South China Sea squadron operating alone cannot interdict the SLOC, but it can force an expensive routing change and can also divert U. S. fleet assets to deal with the problem.
In view of current U. S.-Soviet relations, the likelihood of hostilities between the two nations in the foreseeable future appears remote; peacetime ramifications are, therefore, more immediately relevant. A Soviet squadron deployed to the South China Sea on a continuous basis would significantly affect U. S. naval peacetime operations in the region.
Operating from Vietnam, the squadron could easily maintain a minor combatant on an early warning patrol west of Subic Bay. In addition, the current intermittent presence of an intelligence collector could be expanded to provide continuous coverage of the Subic-Cubi complex. Surface ships and submarines would find it difficult to sortie undetected. The Soviets would be forewarned of U. S. intentions in future crises by observing naval movements. Exercises that are currently conducted in the benign environment of the Subic operating areas would be subjected to the scrutiny of Soviet intelligence analysts. In short, all operations the Seventh Fleet conducts in the South China Sea could be more easily monitored by Soviet ships or aircraft. If submarines are deployed to Vietnam, the possibility of covert observation is raised as well.
Soviet maritime aircraft flying from Da Nang can range over the entire South China Sea, conducting surveillance and collecting intelligence on regional merchant and naval activity.
Depending upon its composition, the South China Sea squadron could afford the Soviets the option to respond rapidly to crisis in Southeast Asia by dispatching a naval force to the affected area. It is possible that in the future the United States will find Soviet ships already on the scene of trouble spots when Seventh Fleet ships
While U. S. overreaction is clearly undesirable, it is evident that, as a minimum, the following points must be considered in conjunction with planning to counter a Soviet buildup in Vietnam:
► The necessity to enhance the defensive posture of the Subic complex
► The capability to clear mines or to prevent them from being implanted in the Subic area
► Increased surveillance resources required to ascertain Soviet Navy deployed orders of battle, force locations, and operations
► Early warning of Soviet flight activity from Vietnamese airfields
► The requirement to consider increased Soviet presence in the South China Sea when planning peacetime operations
► The ability to determine the appropriate U. S. force mix and deployment pattern necessary to counter the Soviet presence
The Soviet Navy’s Pacific Fleet is strengthened by having access to Southeast Asian' military facilities. This development and the arrivals of the V/STOL carrier Minsk and the Ivan Rogov LSD in the Pacific have complicated the U. S. Seventh Fleet’s position. The U. S. response will determine whether the balance in the Western Pacific is maintained.
Lieutenant Commander McDaniel served in the USS Shenandoah (AD-26) and had tours with I Corps (as a naval intelligence liaison officer in Vietnam), OpNav, Amphibious Group One, and Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One. He is currently assigned to the CinCPacFIt staff.
Tai Sung An is the Everett E. Nuttle Professor of Political Science and Chairman, De
[2] . partment of Political Science and International Studies, Washington College, Chester-