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^ I here is a growing concern today that the Navy has yet to establish a completely viable approach to tactics and to tactics development and evaluation. Although the number of published tactics documents is growing rapidly, many do not provide, either individually or collectively, a sound basis for solving tactical problems. This failure is often attributed to a lack of effort in tactics development, but the widespread involvement in tactics argues a deeper cause. The real problem is a misunderstanding of the nature of tactics and a consequent lack of an effective approach to tactics development.
Tactics is much more than doctrine, procedure, or standardized maneuver. Tactics is the entire process of thought by which a tactical decision-maker analyzes and reacts to a real situation. Procedures seldom provide the entire solution to any problem; they are only a part of tactical planning. Procedures do not reason, make decisions, or adapt to changing circumstances. Men do these things, and the essence of tactics is the ability of a tactical commander— aided by tested procedures—to employ his assets effectively against any threat that arises.
Consider some of the dynamic and unpredictable factors which affect a tactical problem. These include mission, rules of engagement, the nature and number of enemy and friendly forces, casualties, environment, and even personalities. The tactical commander with his on-scene perspective is indispensable in blending these unique elements of the real world into an effective plan of action and adjusting the plan as conditions change. Whether this involves a series of split-second decisions by a flight leader or an admiral’s planning in a surface engagement, the product is true tactics: reasoned tactical actions tailored to an actual operation.
This view suggests that the function of tactics development is not simply to develop sound procedures. More importantly, it is to educate tactical commanders in decision-making and to acquaint them with the systems, interactions, and considerations which govern tactical problems. Tactics development cannot predict the proper response to a future situation, but it can support the commander’s effort to devise and employ effective action. It can do this by describing the elements of the generic problem, providing insights or analysis, suggesting proven approaches, and supplying concise procedures and signals to implement potential responses. Viewed overall, therefore, the fundamental obligation of tactics development is to provide naval commanders with the analytic and procedural tools they require to make and execute sound tactical decisions.
In contrast to this, tactics development in the
Navy frequently has focused solely on the development of procedure and instructions. NWP-O, the Tactical Warfare Publications Guide, describes the purpose of warfare publications to be “. . . to promulgate currently approved tactics, doctrine, procedures, and terminology for the U. S. Navy,” and it relates tactics to a “. . . concise outline of methods, pr°' cedures, plots, diagrams, profiles, initial positions, sequence of events, optional movements. . . . Fur' thermore, NWP-O instructs that the doctrine contained in approved tactical publications is mandatory, and deviations are permitted only when "the needs of unusual operations dictate otherwise.” This concept of tactics relegates the tactical commander to the role of executor rather than planner or thinker, and it reveals the strong belief that tactics development should formulate tactical action rather than support individualized tactical planning.
The doctrine concept of tactics permeates much o the current tactics effort. Tactics documents reflect this in their titles, which so often read “Procedures to . . . ,” “Doctrine for . . . ,” or “Employment °
. . . in. . . .” In practical terms, the attempt to encompass tactics within doctrine affects tactics development in three important ways. First, the focus on finding structured solutions has fragmented the tac' tics effort into hundreds of independent problem solving ventures. A quick perusal of any tactic5 directory will confirm this fact. The result is a dis^ jointed and increasingly unmanageable collection 0 documents which sometimes overlap or contradict and are rapidly becoming too numerous to be read or digested. Even today, with many documents still ‘n development, a tactical commander preparing multi-threat defense can easily become involved & scores of separate tactics documents and hundreds 0 separate diagrams and procedures.
The second problem results when tactics develop ment efforts become so intent on procedural or tech nical matters that they provide little in-depth insig into the operational decisions inherent in the pr0 lem. Without such an insight, no procedure can applied or adapted intelligently. A good example 0 this is provided by a recent tactical memorandum °n countermeasure employment. This memorandum lfl^ volved a lengthy technical description and outlme very precise positions for escort ship placement protect an aircraft carrier. However, it provided litc understanding of how adjusting those positions because of sonar screening requirements, example—would affect the protection of the f°rce^ Accordingly, this document was of little use t0 commander attempting to design an integrated tact‘ cal response involving many separate tactical need ■
Finally, the preoccupation with doctrine has resulted in a large library of procedural guidance, but relatively little in the way of a coherent reference source on combat systems, tactical principles, and other basic tactical information crucial to operational planning. Data on the at-sea performance of combat systems, for example, is still spread through hun- reds of separate sources, many of which are not even available to the fleet. In addition, much of the in- otmation available is generalized, technical, or deals 10 realized specifications. The tactical commander who desires to know the documented operational per- °rrnance of a particular system often has few useful sources of information to call upon. Yet, how can he P an intelligently without such data?
^ As a result of all these limitations, and although it generated many good ideas and fostered much ought, Navy tactics development has performed flnly Part of its function in supporting tactics in the
Correcting these deficiencies requires some insight nt0 why the doctrine-tactics approach has become so ^grained in tactical thinking. First, it promises (al- ^°ugh it cannot deliver) straightforward guidance r complex problems. This promise is particularly tractive to officers who, because of nontechnical ^grounds, non-tactical specializations, or the em- asis on steam-plant engineering, are unfamiliar or easy with tactical operations. In addition, the ef- Q , ‘ t0 define “how to” in tactical problems is akin to ^ er forms of management-by-checklist in the tavy- an increasing dependence on detailed instruc- ns to outline action; lessening acceptance of indi-
vidual initiative in favor of standardization; and the definition of work in terms of detailed steps and methods rather than goals and principles.
The problem before the Navy now is to reorient and expand its approach to tactics and tactics development. At the outset, this reorientation requires a change in concept about the individual’s role in tactical planning. Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., has stated that “We must be imaginative and innovative. ... As in all other areas of surface warfare, we must be professionals in the tactical business.”* This sound instruction underscores the requirement for naval officers to be resourceful tactical thinkers. Tactical skill and awareness must be sought after, instructed, and developed. Officers and senior petty officers must be exercised in tactical problem-solving throughout their careers. They must be encouraged to know and use proven procedures as well as to research and employ innovative tactical actions wherever the situation permits or demands.
Fortunately, many recent developments have already begun to aid in this effort. Pierside simulators, combat information center trainers, tabletop war gaming, and tactical action officer (TAO) courses are all important steps in this direction, although sometimes even these indulge more in doctrinal training than in individualized problem-solving. Nonetheless, such efforts must continue and grow if tactical planning is to improve substantially. Only through improved tactical skill will the man, rather than the procedure, become the focal point of tactics.
The role of tactics development and evaluation in improving tactics is to establish a program of investigation and documentation which will genuinely support decision-making in the fleet. To do this successfully, the program must supply decision-makers with three basic elements of information:
► An understanding of combat system capabilities
► Concepts for applying these systems in tactical problems
► Procedures to implement or guide specific actions •James H. Doyle, Jr., "Personal From the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare),” Surface Warfare Magazine, August 1977, p. 1.
The introduction to the fleet of new warships such as the VSS Belleau Wood (LHA-i) and USS John Young (DD-973) provides operational commanders with enhanced combat capabilities. At the same time, it necessitates a revision of tactical thinking to use these new vessels to best advantage.
It is important to consider each of these elements in more detail.
Combat System Capabilities: These are concise summaries of combat system performance and cannot involve technical specifications or sterile design criteria which are of little use to operational thinkers. They must accurately describe demonstrated or predicted operational performance against adversary systems in real environments. They must also provide a complete view of system idiosyncrasies, vulnerabilities, and limitations. Such summaries would not, for example, describe an electronic surveillance receiver by its sensitivity or the nomenclature of its parts but would instead describe in detail its performance in detecting, identifying, and locating radars of interest. Such data provide a foundation for tactical analysis by documenting how combat systems interact in the operational environment; how equipment performs in various situations, maneuvers, modes, and system integrations with other equipment; what operating procedures or methods are particularly effective or ineffective; in what ways various environments modify performances; and how a system operates in concert with other systems.
The most important element of tactics support is combat system data, but, as noted earlier, it is the most lacking. Consider how often today the fleet operates with and against systems or ships whose operational capabilities are unknown or are poorly documented. Authoritative and unified data in this area will ensure the intelligent use of assets and accurate assessments of enemy capabilities.
Tactical Concepts: These ideas, principles, and concepts for using combat systems to counter specific tactical problems draw on combat system capability data, past experience or testing, and sound tactical thought. Their purpose is to identify the key relationships and considerations which govern a problem, and to suggest actions or geometries which will employ these advantageously. A simple example is “crossing the T,” the very successful concept for maximizing naval gunfire by crossing in front of an enemy column.
The importance of tactical concepts is that they do not focus on mechanics, but rather on underlying principles. They provide the decision-maker with analytical tools for viewing individual problems and offer him sound conceptual approaches as a foundation for his own planning.
Tactical Procedures: These are detailed plans and signals for executing specific tactical actions, and they perform two related functions. First, they provide a library of tested, ready-to-execute plans and maneuvers which a tactical commander can use as is or modify as required by his specific circumstance. Included in this category are recommended procedures for emergency action situations (for example- torpedo evasion) in which precise operating directions are required because of time and urgency constraints. Second, tactical procedures must establish a complete body of operating rules and signals to ensure safety and coordination among naval units- Command, control, communications, and maneuvering procedures make up this second category, and they comprise the only part of tactical documentation which must be obligatory. This is so not because such procedures are the only or best solution, but because uniformity in these areas is essential to ensure that ships can talk to each other and can order and execute actions effectively and safely. Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures and the Allied Maritime Tactical Signal Book (ATP 1[B], volumes 1 and 2) provide excellent examples of both categories of procedures. Tactical procedures are not doctrines or sure-fire solutions; they are simply the guiding and implementing mechanisms for tactica action.
An ideal illustration of how combat system data, tactical concepts, and tactical procedures shoul combine in tactical planning was provided by the Third Fleet tactical memorandum Passive-Active (no" incorporated in NWP 33-1). The purpose of this effort was to develop an emission control plan for a aircra carrier task force which would provide maximum fense with minimum counter-detection risks. This e fort might have outlined a specific plan detailing which radars should be de-energized and which le on. Instead, it researched and tabulated the opera' tional advantages of important U. S. radars (h°* well they detect missiles, aircraft, etc.), and the,r operational liabilities (how easily they can be de tected and identified). It provided other key factS’ such as how quickly the radar could be brought fr0111 a standby condition to full operation. Finally, it °ut lined principles for using this information to c°n struct a thoughtful emission control pattern for an^ situation. Given this, a tactical commander can aS sess the advantages and risks of using any emittef and can develop an intelligent emission control for his unique problem. He can then order that P1 using signals found in the signal book. That is 1 tactics process at work. .
The Passive-Active example underscores the infif* ^ variety which real tactics can take. Two separate tical commanders in similar situations may ^ mately design two different but equally correct eIlllSs sion control plans. The difference between the P would represent a differing appreciation of the Pr°
e;
SOURCES
FOR
tactical DOCUMENTS
TACTICAL LIBRARY MAINTAINED BY NAVAL TACTICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
SERVICES TO THE FLEET AND OTHER USERS
• responds to requests for bibliographies, including detailed document abstracts based on the subject of interest.
• provides standard format microfiche copy of tactical documents, upon request.
• reviews information requirements for fleet projects and performs literature searches for tactically related documents.
LITERATURE
SEARCH
DOCUMENT COPIES
Tactical Notes Tactical Memos Lessons Learned CINC Tactical Notices Project Development Plans Cruise Reports Letters of Instruction Operalional Orders Exercise Reports Fleet Tactical Notes Advanced Evaluation Notes Analysis Reports
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^. or a separate concept of how to solve it. This Vergence reemphasizes the basic proposition about actics that tactics development need not be so conCerned about designing detailed actions; professional naval commanders will do this on their own and do c better. The real challenge for every tactics devel- °Prnent effort is to collect the necessary information c 'deas and present them in a compact, concise °rrnat for the fleet user.
Similarly, the principal problem to be solved in ganizing the entire tactics program is to define t, Clsely what information and ideas are needed in fo 6 ^Cet an<^ t0 ^es*&n a concise format of documents Qp c°mmunicating it effectively. Applying the ideas ta^0rnbat system capabilities, tactical concepts, and I |Cal procedures to this problem provides the fol- w*ng basic guidelines and recommendations for ac- ^°mplishing this goal:
must establish a special series of documents to v*de a foundation for tactical thinking and plan- unif PurP0Se rb‘s sefies is to form a compact, s1 ,ed> and authoritative reference source of combat fo ern caPabdity data and related operational in- lov at*°n' "^bese documents should address the fol- °Us sPec*^*c areas: basic background on how vari- PerfC^aSSCS sensor and weapon systems operate and sj 0rm; specific operational capabilities for every (fr' * *Cant combat system, aircraft, or ship class £r ?■ anc^ enemy); environmental and geo- ^On 1Ca^ edects, such as ducting or convergence • enemy tactical employments and tendencies;
Although some effort has been made to coordinate the information provided by sources with the requirements of users, there is still a plethora of tactical material which is not readily accessible to those who need it.
basic tactical concepts and considerations, such as maintaining weapons advantage or mutual support among forces; operational capabilities of friendly and threat support systems (intelligence, surveillance, command and control, communications). Intelligence is a field of essential information which has been particularly inaccessible in the past. There are probably few commanding officers in the fleet today who possess a clear understanding of the type and quality of intelligence which will be supplied in a real engagement. The intent of this series is to ensure that every tactical commander has quick access to authoritative information on the fundamental forces and interactions of warfare.
► Tactical procedures and signals must be kept current and must be integrated into one concise set of documents. Although the Allied Maritime Tactical Signal Book and related publications are a good start in this direction, significant problems remain which tactics development must correct. Tactical plans, signals, codewords, and procedures continue to be scattered through many separate documents, making
cohesive implementation and employment extremely difficult. Furthermore, the allied signal book contains many needless signals (such as Air Bedding ) which further reduce its usefulness. In addition, the role of tactics development in maintaining an effective command, control, and communications framework requires more attention, because many basic operating procedures have become outdated and awkward. A current example of this problem is in antiair warfare in which outmoded reporting and coordination procedures hinder effective action.
^ Tactics development efforts which treat specific situations or equipments must carefully focus on elements of decision-making and not on technical descriptions, sterile procedures, or long-winded theorizing. Like Passive-Active, they should strive to find and communicate the essential elements of information, concepts, and procedures required for effective decision-making. An important benefit of this approach is that rather than producing guidance which applies only to a particular situation, it Pr° vides support with a wide range of applicabihty Note that Passive-Active established a basis for ernis sion control planning which covers almost every situ' ation, not just for an aircraft carrier task force.
This point suggests that tactics development should attack broader tactical problems, as oppose to limited situations or limited warfare areas. In regard, consider that the majority of tactica encounters involves the same basic stages of interac tion and planning: detection vs. counterdetection-
locating, tracking, and targeting; attack; defens > formation planning; and command and control. ' organizing around these stages of action, tactics velopment can establish a compact yet effective bo ; of tactical support covering almost the entire speC trum of naval operations. (It is interesting to n0 that the tactics development program for submarm is organized in a similar fashion. The seven stag addressed there are approach and attack, tact'c ^ weapons employment, search, tracking, tactical secu rity, sensor employment, and special operations.) ^ ^ Since tactics development exists to aid decis*0^ making, a special role for tactics documentation provide quick reference summaries of data, templates, etc., for rapid use on a watch station- j Tactical Action Officer’s Handbook (NWP 12-5) is a g°°
procontrol aids
res. fleet training; command and
(c0rn ' iiauuug; commana ana control aids
s PUters> information displays); fleet intelligence ^°rt’ and war plan strategic nuclear policies. s,r>gle agency is required to integrate all these
example of such a document, and it demonstrates the need for more efforts along the same line.
Finally, any effective tactics-support organization nnust have a system of feedback and update. Alt ough the NWP library has such a system, it is s °w, involves infrequent reviews, and is very formal nature. What is required is an avenue for rapid ex- f an&e of ideas, information or suggestions, both °trnal and informal. If a destroyer discovers a new aPplication for a sonar, there should be a method for a vising other ships without a lengthy write-up or eview process. If a ship needs a particular piece of In ormation about a combat system, there should be an expeditious mechanism for requesting it. Finally, ^te must be a simple conduit for ships, aircraft, and analysis groups to report the performance of seniors and weapons so that other units can use this insolation in their own planning or experimenting. t ohout this sort of precise and informal system, no oaCt,cs development organization will remain useful r responsive in the long run.
^ Following these guidelines, an effective program tactical support can be developed. By design, this ar^rarn will provide operational performance data ideas on how to use this information in various at^1Cal settings. It will also include a system of plans procedures to guide, implement and communi- ^ate actions. Finally, it will establish a workable sys- er^ ^or keeping all of these updated. the last step to upgrading tactics development is structure an agency to implement all this. The rQj rent controlling agency is active but small, and its bcs ^ Pfimarily t0 orSan'ze the many individual tac- •p,S eff«rts under way in laboratories or in the fleet. t *S is a<fequate for the current effort. The system of the 103 SUPF>ort outbned here, however (particularly anj real'time feedback system), will involve effort ^resources on a much larger scope, ex e^0n<^ rkis, there are other sound reasons for an per^n^e<^ agency to lead tactics development, q aFs even one headed by a Deputy Chief of Naval fjlerat'ons For Tactics Development and Evaluation, test f°^e tact*cs development is often thought of as a ‘cted to the area of tactical planning. Viewed as ?fe Un*versal attempt to support effective tactical r‘gh r^,ment *n cke fleet, tactics development can c°nibU ^ *nclude many other considerations, such as c0np at system development and integration; ship (ClC)Trati°nS’ 'nc^uc^n& combat information center cedu-ay°-tS; WOfldwide command and control profacets into one coherent body of support. For example, are war plans and worldwide command and control policies consistent with fleet capabilities and operating procedures? Are developing combat systems mutually compatible and together will they support future fleet tactical employments? These are representative of important questions which materially affect tactical planning and fleet effectiveness, but which are currently administered by many separate agencies. In this light, a tactics development agency can be seen as a focal point for review of all fleet tactical issues and for ensuring that the hardware, guidance, and information provided to and imposed on the fleet are mutually supportive. Without this final link, the complete problem of tactics and intelligent tactical planning will not be entirely solved.
This article has admittedly ranged over a wide field of thought in order to provide a fairly complete overview of tactics and an indication of how the Navy should proceed in the future. From all of this, one important idea should be clear. Tactics is an individual planning process undertaken by every man with a tactical responsibility. Proven procedures and doctrine are important to this process, but more critical are the skill and preparation of tactical commanders.
This idea of tactics expands the responsibilities of tactics development far beyond the simple preparation of procedures to a wider sphere of effort. Investigation, education, and support are the key goals in this view of tactics development, even to the extent of tactics development being involved in all those warfare-related issues which have an impact on operational planning. Making these changes will not be easy or inexpensive. Involved are important modifications of structure, mechanics, and attitudes. But all these are necessary if Navy tactics is to be truly effective and if the ingenuity, intelligence, and creativity of individual officers and men are to be utilized to their highest potential.
Lieutenant Johnson is a 1970 graduate of Stanford University, where he majored in electrical engineering and received his commission via NROTC. His sea tours have included service on board the USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31), USS Cook (DE-1083), and with the staff of Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Five. He has served a tour with the Deputy Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force, where he was involved in several tactics development efforts and in the testing of electronic warfare and communications equipment. This past summer, Lieutenant Johnson completed the department head course at the Surface Warfare Officers School, Newport, Rhode Island, and has recently been ordered to a guided-missile cruiser in San Diego.