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The Pacific Command Divided: The “Most Unexplainable” Decision
By Captain Charles O. Cook, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
President Franklin D. Roosevelt meets with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, his two Pacific theater commanders, on board the heavy cruiser Baltimore (CA-68) at Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1944.
L n last month’s Proceedings, Captain Cook described the "strange case of Rainbow-5,” a war plan which designated the strategy to be used in a global conflict. It posited a Europe-first concentration of U.S. forces because Hitler’s Germany was considered a greater threat than Japan. An unstated corollary in the plan was that the Philippine Islands would be lost before the U.S. Pacific Fleet could relieve them from Japanese attack. Because of political considerations—notably the negative effect this information would have on the Filipino people and their army—it was not at all in the interests of the Roosevelt administration to let it be known that the Pacific archipelago would have to be sacrificed in the event of war. General Douglas MacArthur, though privy to Rainbow- 5, seemed unwilling to accept its provisions and made overtures which assumed a greater role in the expected war than had been planned for the fighting forces in the Philippines. When war did come, the Roosevelt administration falsely attributed the failure to reinforce the Philippines to the losses at Pearl Harbor, because FDR did not want to admit that the islands’ loss had been foreseen all along. In this month’s installment, MacArthur continues his insubordination, but his heroic defense of the Philippines makes it inexpedient for the president to get rid of him.
“Of all the faulty decisions of war, perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific.”1 The failure to which General Douglas MacArthur referred was formalized at the end of March 1942, nearly four months after the Pearl Harbor attack. The end of the struggle for the Philippines was in sight. MacArthur had already been detached from the Philippine command and had arrived in Australia two weeks earlier. On 3 1 March, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved two directives that had been submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They established two military theaters, the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean Areas, and defined the boundaries, command arrangements, and tasks pertaining to each. The first was to be commanded by MacArthur, the second by Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Though each man would have a unified U.S. command and MacArthur a substantial combined (containing forces of other nations) command as well'' with operational control of all land, sea, and ai> forces assigned—there would be no unity of command in the Pacific as a whole. Why this region should have been so divided has never been satisfactorily explained.
MacArthur’s criticism has merit. Differences be tween the two Pacific commands regarding strateg! and the allocation of forces had to be settled regularlj in Washington by the Joint Chiefs. At the Battle 0 Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the naval forces of th‘ two commands had no common operational superb1* short of Washington, and near-disaster resulted. Th‘ records of the Joint Chiefs are incomplete and do no1 indicate that any other arrangement was ever discussed. One authority, Professor Louis Morton, suggested that the omissions may have been deliberate.
In the absence of evidence, one can only speculate Perhaps, as Morton suggested, the divided command represented a compromise. The Navy considered its role in the Pacific preeminent. It would no* gladly have placed the bulk of its forces there unde the continuing direction of MacArthur or any othe Army officer. MacArthur, however, was the out standing military leader in the Pacific, having th* support of the president, the Army, the public, am the Australians. It would have affronted a preponderance of opinion to have placed any other officer at tb head of a single Pacific command. The solution tb‘ president approved could be accepted by all.2
This seems doubtful. It implies the Navy couf somehow block a decision all others preferred an* disregards the president’s authority as commander 11 chief. It overlooks the earlier example of FDK peremptory imposition of unified command * Panama under an Army officer as early as 12 Decern ber 1941 in spite of disagreement in the Navy Ve partment. There is little reason to believe that he unduly influenced by the naval point of view. WN follows is also speculation, but it may, perhap* come closer to the truth.3
Roosevelt always professed complete confidence |! MacArthur, a necessity so long as he kept him in 1 position of responsibility. Certainly MacArthur conduct as commander of the Philippine garrison 11 the hopeless struggle to defend the islands was mirable. Whether or not all his military decision were sound, his resolute defense won a moral victof that would be essential to American aims after t^1' military victory was won. A certain attitude had
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,n> however, even before he had left Washington in ^935 and had intensified in the years that followed *n the Philippines. It was an attitude that Roosevelt, arn°ng his present superiors, had personally observed kut had apparently misinterpreted. It was MacAr- thur s inability to view objectively the indigenous Philippjne Army he had created. Beyond that, it seerned sometimes to have extended to a consciousness of a very personal mission in behalf of an almost Mystical concept, the Philippine Nation. It was undoubtedly these peculiarities that accounted for be- tavior that could only have diminished the confidence Roosevelt continued publicly to avow.
That behavior commenced after less than a week of VVar- The effective war plan, Rainbow-5, reflected, if s°rnewhat ambiguously, the expectation that the eilemy would capture the Philippines. Already the er>erny had isolated the major part of the defending §arrison, the part situated on Luzon. Nevertheless, a rn°st unusual message reached Washington. Every resource of the democratic allies in sea, air, and land should be converged here immediately and overwhelmingly^’ urged MacArthur. “The Philippine theater of operations is the locus of victory or de- eat- ■ . This was a radical proposal. The locus specified in Rainbow-5 was Europe where,, it was exPected, victory would be decisive. A defensive strat- e8y Was to govern in the Pacific until then.4
Though MacArthur held Rainbow-5, he made no attempt to compare these opposing concepts and to emonstrate why his “Philippines-first” was the better- This made it no easier to understand how a perSOn °f his experience could believe such a change adVantageous. As he should have known, the resources needed to hold the Philippines exceeded those then at hand even before other requirements were met.
There was nothing to commend his proposal as a Setiously considered course of action. Coming when lf might have indicated a sudden, perhaps
, loss of judgment caused by the pressures
. nent—or something even more disturbing.
n che months preceding hostilities, MacArthur had ^ecessarily been involved in the effort to conceal the p'Sfnal official expectations for the defense of the 'hppines by giving the appearance that they were substantially reinforced. The president s aim in *■ ‘s Was to prop up the morale of Filipinos in and °Ut °f uniform and to avoid charges at home after ^ar commenced that he, aware of U.S. weakness in C e Western Pacific, had done nothing to strengthen f e defenses there while he could. Such charges, . °Wever unjust, could have impaired his leadership, Coding his power to persuade the American people to accept the Europe-first strategy at a time when, as
was expected, the only U.S. territory under attack would be that in the Western Pacific. However worthy the reason for it, this effort at concealment had to remain secret. Were MacArthur moved by a resentful impulse to expose it now, he would tax the loyalty of Filipinos and the confidence of Americans. Until now the reassuring leader of a garrison expected to go down to defeat with honor, he had suddenly become, with this unaccountable proposal, a complete unknown, his motives a puzzle. When confidence in a subordinate is lost, it is usually wise to relieve him at once. Roosevelt, however, while determined to resist the effort to change strategy, apparently deemed it prudent in this case to make a temporizing reply through the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and, if possible, to leave MacArthur’s relief to be accomplished later by the enemy as was already anticipated in Rainbow-5.5
But even though MacArthur had been unrealistic, this reply could not have deceived him. His advice had obviously been rejected. That was disappointing but, more important, the suggestion of distrust inherent in the evasive wording would have upset anyone. MacArthur, as if unconscious of the justified alarm he himself had caused, appears to have become convinced that he and his personal mission and even the national interest had been betrayed.
In this momentous exchange, a president had— with no warning—-been given pressing reasons to doubt the reliability of a subordinate but had hesitated. Now, a deeply offended subordinate, possessed by concern for ends contrary to his government’s intentions, perceived that hesitation and in it a weakness. To all appearances he quickly resolved to force a modification of the Europe-first strategy. His desired change would provide new support for the defense of the Philippines as an alternative to having the gov-
58 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1978
proposal had been entirely sincere, he would prob«*
■
ernment’s intentions with respect to the islands exposed. This was not as audacious as it may seem. No overt act of insubordination was necessary. There was no need to threaten, much less to act. The threat was already felt, as the reply from Washington made clear.
The same reply had conveniently offered an opening in making a vague promise of air reinforcements while making no reference to Rainbow-5. Since forwarding any reinforcements after war commenced was contrary to the provisions of that plan, it was not implausible to assume that the Europe-first strategy had indeed been set aside. With this justification to fall back on if necessary, MacArthur soon initiated a series of pleas, some more nearly demands, for reinforcements and naval assistance that had never been contemplated. It was relentless intimidation at the hands of a subordinate, patiently endured and studiously ignored for the same reason it had been so unintentionally invited—to protect a secret. On 21 December, for example, MacArthur called for major naval action in Philippine waters. The next day, even though he had Rainbow-5, he asked in all seriousness, "... can you give me an inkling of the strategic plans of the Pacific Fleet?” On 27 December, he declared that “strong naval forces must seek combat with the enemy,” though he had no excuse
for being unaware that the Navy would have bef incapable of such action in the Western Pacific evf|^ had there been no losses at Pearl Harbor. On 1 Jan« ary 1942, he advised that “. . . it is vital to tl> conduct of this defense to be informed in tb* broadest terms of U.S. plans. . .” and that “. . .y general statement from which I can derive a baSi concept with a definite time factor is essential.” I:s spite of this vigorous baiting, the replies it elicit^ remained innocuous and completely free of any reft1 ence to Rainbow-5 and the intentions for the Philif pines reflected therein.6
Had there been a firm conviction that MacArthur'
bly have been relieved with honor as a casualty of tl fighting. Instead, his excursions into fantasy wer" permitted to continue, with all their pinprick- Thanks, presumably, to this policy, the goveff ment’s intentions had not been exposed, and pub^ opinion could be conditioned to accept the loss of tl> Philippines and the adoption of the Europe-fif strategy. Filipinos had remained loyal in adversitj and even MacArthur, except for the tone and contef of some of his messages, had done all that could ha' been expected. If the same policy, successful so & could be continued for a few more months, there vl hope that it might achieve its purpose. About th . time, nevertheless, an exchange of messages occurs that may have caused apprehension.
Anyone trying to persuade the U.S. Governme11 to take action along the lines desired by MacArth' had a natural ally in the Philippine people and the1 president, Manuel Quezon. On New Year’s Da! MacArthur, now at Corregidor with Quezon a® other Philippine officials, replied to a suggest^ from Marshall that Quezon be evacuated. He in<J cated the latter preferred to remain if possible a" quoted him as saying that "... our soldiers at ti1 front and the Filipino people in general have plad their trust in help coming from America.” approving of the evacuation as “too hazardous” (col1 trary to his usual deprecatory estimate of tl Japanese blockade), MacArthur added that “Pre5 dent Quezon’s departure would undoubtedly be & lowed by the collapse of the will to fight on the of the Filipinos. . .” and pointed out that the latd constituted a large majority of his troops. It quite apparent that he had made no effort to mod?1 ate Quezon’s unwarranted optimism, but his recoi’1 mendation, nevertheless, was accepted.7
Perhaps this devious, unmilitary way of deali11 with a subordinate would have succeeded, but a tally unanticipated development occurred tb3 changed the entire situation. Public emotion'
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^pressed in a demand for the immediate punishment ° Japan—that had at first threatened the Europe- ^fst strategy, may have seemed to be subsiding. In ct> it was only shifting to a new object as the inesCapable fate of the Philippines became publicly more aPparent. Attention began focusing more sharply on . e °ne-sided fight of the Philippine garrison, resist- stubbornly when all other Allied positions in the estern Pacific were falling. In this stout defense, and particularly in its leader, disenchanted Ameri- C^nS Cou^ see the one image of themselves of which ey could feel proud. Twice in January, the New i Daily News, anticipating his eventual defeat, a ed for MacArthur’s detachment while there was time to save him. Toward the end of the month, k°th houses of Congress took formal notice of his ./tthday. Adjectives such as "great,” “resourceful,” °Utstanding,” and “brilliant” embellished the re- j^arks. At about the same time, proposals that a k°ulevard in Washington and a federal power project th narne<J f°r him were enthusiastically received in e House of Representatives. It was the start of a . °°d of roads, schools, and other public works bear- 8 his name that still dot the country. Hero worship a set in. The New York Times, in declaring without k Servation that no U.S. commander had ever made use of the means at his disposal, suggested at had happened. MacArthur’s capture could no n8er be permitted, and neither could he be rele- ed to a position of no importance. This soldier, °se exercise of his command had been a cause for Cern, had been retained only because the enemy
would finally relieve him without the complications that might result were he to be relieved earlier. Now, suddenly, he was unexpendable.8
On 4 February, Marshall discussed with MacArthur a possibility never acknowledged before. Bataan might soon fall and the defense of the Philippines shrink to little more than Corregidor. In that event, Mac Arthur’s presence would not be essential, and therefore his detachment was under consideration with a view to saving him for later campaigns. His opinion was requested.9 This inquiry is unlikely to have caused much surprise. The administration had ignored MacArthur’s attempts to force it to change its strategy, and it apparently felt confident that it could continue to do so. On the other hand, his swift elevation to a hero’s status, suggested in the news, was now confirmed and appeared to justify a more daring attempt. A few days later, he responded to Marshall in a manner as unexpected as his original proposal for a Philippines-first strategy.
This involved two messages to the president. ‘‘It appears to us,” said Quezon in the first, ‘‘that our mission is only to fight as a sacrifice force here as long as possible in order to help the defense of the Dutch and British in this part of the world.” He then proposed:
► That the Philippines be granted complete independence immediately
► That they be neutralized by agreement between the United States and Japan
► That all U.S. and Japanese forces be withdrawn y That the Philippine forces be disbanded.
60 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1978
MacArthur warned in the second message that his command could fall at any time:
“You must determine whether the mission of delay [he seemed to share Quezon’s idea that he was fighting for Dutch and British interests] would be furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Every one of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betryaed in favor of others.”10
Quezon’s feelings might be understood. MacArthur, however, had never been given cause to believe this government was deliberately putting Dutch and British ahead of Philippine interests. Nevertheless, he had not, apparently, tried to dissuade Quezon from taking that view. Nor did it appear that he had done anything to discourage the assumption that the Japanese, who by his own account were on the threshold of victory, would accept so unnecessarily the obligations imposed upon them in Quezon’s plan. The Philippine Government might be about to repudiate 40 years of American tutelage, a much harder blow than the temporary loss of its territory. Perhaps nothing less than a full commitment to a Philippines-first strategy, if that, could prevent Quezon from quitting now. Or, perhaps, that was the impression these messages were intended to give. MacArthur would suggest as much years later when, denying he had ever endorsed Quezon’s proposals, he stated that he had added his comments at the other’s request only after hearing the Philippine president’s true motive—to shock Washington and presumably to force a change of strategy that might save the islands.11
The scheme succeeded, at least to the extent of producing a shock. Roosevelt met with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and General Marshall. The different interpretations that could be placed upon these messages could not have been overlooked. After painful consideration, separate replies were prepared for Quezon and MacArthur, and both were sent over Roosevelt’s signature. Quezon’s proposal was rejected. “Whatever happens to the present American garrison, we shall not relax our efforts until the forces we are marshalling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive out the last remnant of the invaders from your soil.” MacArthur was directed to continue the defense with his American troops “so long as the possibility of resistance remains” but was authorized to arrange for the surrender of his Filipinos whenever, in his opinion, it became necessary. Quezon accepted the decision ai» lifted a load of anxiety. MacArthur, referring to tk Filipinos, replied, “I count on them equally with tt Americans to hold fast to the end.” It was an assu> ance that had been conspicuously missing before.1'
Though this effort, too, had failed, it had cos nothing, and MacArthur had at least received an in dication as to what the administration would nC tolerate. In his message acknowledging the order[1] fight to the end, he finally alluded to the questio1 regarding his detachment. He and his family, ** said, would remain “to share the fate of the garrison as if that were a matter for him to decide. That all. That he really accepted so uncertain a future ft his wife and young son or that Washington though so may be doubted. It was obvious on all sides th* he would soon have to be pulled out, and it made n difference how extravagantly he might display his ft luctance to leave. Such was the effect of the decisft taken in December to treat him like a political advft sary instead of a soldier. Now that he was acting d part that had been assigned, he was much more S ficult to discard—it seemed impossible now—an his motives remained a puzzle.
Though the question regarding his detachmd was repeated, MacArthur gave it no further attef tion. Roosevelt waited until 22 February, then sd him a flat order to proceed to Australia as soon * possible, advising that arrangements were beft made to have him command Allied forces then Having received permission to delay, he and k party finally commenced the journey in four moft torpedo boats on 12 March.13
They left behind a confused situation. It had be£ supposed in Washington that MacArthur would tft over to General Jonathan Wainwright, next senior1 the garrison, all responsibility for the defense of d Philippines, leaving intact the direct line of auth®1 ity from Washington to Corregidor. Perhaps it not spelled out in his orders because it was too obv ously required to make that necessary. MacArtlft however, in his instructions to Wainwright, " enabled by this lapse to keep himself in the chain ‘ command. From Australia, 4,000 miles away, ^ would continue to direct the overall defense of d islands. The confusion resulted because he neglect to inform Washington.
Upon assuming his new duties, Wainwri^ commenced reporting to MacArthur, represented first by a member of the latter’s staff who had f mained at Corregidor. Marshall, however, was e pecting Wainwright to report directly to Washift' ton. The situation became clear only after ten d*1 and was corrected by Roosevelt upon Marshall’s d1
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, Whatever the advantages of a single command for ^ e entire Pacific, Roosevelt faced the possibility that . could not appoint any officer, whatever his serve, other than MacArthur w’ithout offending a large j ^ opinion and thereby weakening his own tadership at a critical time. On the other hand, he L°^d not have felt safe in giving to one who had aved so unpredictably all the authority that In U ^ concentratecI ln a single Pacific command.
sP*te of his demonstrated skill, MacArthur’s insis- rt .Ce uPon the primacy of the Philippines in a cor- P strategy, based upon arguments that ignored ^.CCs> reflected upon his judgment. More important, readiness to step beyond the bounds of his author-
,ry to
Ornrnendation. MacArthur, now in Australia, accepted the correction blandly. The annoyance felt in Washington was not mitigated when it was learned cbat MacArthur had taken most of his staff with leaving Wainwright the added task of improvising another to assist in directing the last opera- t,0ns of the expiring garrison.14
1° refusing to discuss his detachment before receives his orders and in omitting to leave behind a feas- 1 le command arrangement, MacArthur had deliberately avoided taking any step that might seem volun- ^ary in connection with his separation from the ilippine garrison. He had carried out the letter of ls 0rders but had done nothing that pertained either t0 framing them or making the subsidiary arrange- ^"t* his departure required. He could not, short of e most direct disobedience, have indicated more c early his disapproval of his detachment. His behav- ’or Was completely incompatible with the character a reliable subordinate and could not have increased e confidence of any president.
To all appearances, however, Roosevelt now felt at he would have to put his trust in MacArthur for a long time to come, and it was undoubtedly with r at understanding that, on 3 1 March, he formalized e decision splitting the command in the Pacific, oatever the Army and Navy may have desired, they c°uld only recommend. Whatever the scheme of dicommand they submitted through the Joint leis °f Staff, the president could have rejected it in heV°r a single commander of a single theater had e desired. Instead, he accepted the recommendation Promptly and apparently without question. The deci- t^°n rather than having been a compromise forced by e Navy as has been suggested, seems to have been ^ry much Roosevelt’s, communicated in advance to e Joint Chiefs of Staff so that, submitted back for Pproval, it would not appear to have originated him.
promote his own ideas was an unsoldierly trait whose danger would increase with the scope of his authority. What Roosevelt actually thought of him is unknown. What he may well have thought is quite clear. He could not trust this officer with the increased authority of an undivided Pacific command, nor could he substantially diminish the authority he already held. The solution was a divided command.
This, perhaps, is more nearly the nature of the compromise reflected in the structure of the Pacific command as it was approved on 3 1 March 1942. In his memoirs MacArthur excoriated the inefficient arrangement that limited his role for the rest of the war. One is led by the very bitterness of his comment to suspect that he, at least, was not altogether unaware of its origin and purpose.
-p^ A 1931 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain Cook
served in a variety of surface ships, including command ■fj of the USS Robert H. McCord (DD-822), Destroyer Division 22, USS Conecuh (AOR-110), and Destroyer r Squadron 14. He attended the National War College as
a student and remained for two more years as a member IBt of the staff. After retirement from active duty in 1961,
he obtained a master of arts degree in teaching at Brown University and later taught and wrote a book titled The Battle of Cape Esperance. * [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
'Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 172. ® 1964 Time, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
[2]Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: the First Two Years (Washington: Department of the Army, 1962), pp. 244-250.
[3]Ibid., p. 144.
[4]Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow-5, reproduced in Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress 2nd Session, Part 18, p. 2908; radio message, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 December 1941, Record Group 165, National Archives.
[5]See this author, "The Strange Case of Rainbow-5,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1978, pp 66-73; radio message, Marshall to
MacArthur, 15 December 1941, Record Group 165, National Archives. 8Radio messages, MacArthur to Adjutant General, 21, 22, and 27 December 1941, Record Group 407, National Archives, and MacArthur to Marshall, 1 January 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives.
[7]Radio message, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 January 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives.
*New York Daily News, 13 January 1942, p. 19, and 16 January 1942, p.25; The New York Times 27 January 1942, p. 5, 4 February 1942, p. 18, and 6 February 1942, p. 3.
MMorton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), pp- 353-354.
[10]Radio message, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 February 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives.
"MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 139.
"Radio message, Roosevelt to MacArthur, 9 February 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 397405; radio message, MacArthur to Adjutant General, 11 February 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives.
"Radio message, MacArthur to Adjutant General, 11 February 1942, Record Group 165, National Archives. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 355-359.
"Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 360-365.