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Hearts of oak were her ships, gallant tars were her tnen; they all stood ready . . . steady, boys, steady. But then everything went wrong for the Royal Navy in America.
-L he last vestiges of British authority in Amer>ca 1 collapsed immediately after the battles of Lexingt°n and Concord. Within hours of the beginning of h°s tilities, the militia of Massachusetts had laid siege J° \ the King’s troops at Boston, and elsewhere in Arned^ governors and other royal officials were forced to seek refuge on board warships. By midsummer of 1775, ^ | ships of the Royal Navy and the enclave at Bost°n , i were all that remained of the British empire in Amedca'
The Royal Navy in America was completely unpte pared for, and overwhelmed by, the outbreak of ReV° lutionary War. The main duty of the Royal Navy >n America was to enforce the Acts of Trade and Naviga' don. On 16 June 1775, the squadron consisted of $ warships, scattered along the entire length of the c°aSt of America from Nova Scotia to Florida. But with ^ advent of hostilities, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, commander of the squadron in America, suddenly found himself overtaken by events. The army waS pinned down in Boston, and he commanded the only
r
y e capable of salvaging royal authority in America. et his weak and scattered squadron could not even npt to contain or combat the revolutionary move- to 1 m ^mer*ca- hie was forced instead to use his ships in ?r°tect what little remained of the British position merica while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. raves deployed about half of the ships under his a ^and to defend Nova Scotia, Boston, and the s hs lines of communication. The remainder of the ^luadron was stationed either singly or in small flotillas t^V^ri0Us American ports, such as New York, to show nag and attempt to prop up what was left of royal
aatho:
milit;
the *t B,
ary, the rest of America would submit. But with
c°mmencement of fighting in America, the army
nty- However, poor communications—coupled 0£ policy of stationing ships along the length t^le American continent—prevented Graves from ctively commanding a large proportion of his g . uron. Thus, during the first year of the war, the and*5^ nava^ e®!)rt >n America was a series of unrelated ^ often contradictory actions. British warships in k' j^can waters simultaneously fought several different In iS war’ rang'ng in intensity from concluding a ttruce at Newport, Rhode Island to destroying the n of Falmouth, Maine. Without instructions, ham- Poor communications, and lacking coordi- r °n’ Graves’ small and ill-consituted squadron con- °bted a continent in rebellion.
^ ^r°ughout the winter of 1775-76, the Royal Navy f« rner‘can waters desperately fought to maintain the °dd ^°S*t*ons tbe British still held in America. The t0QS Were too great, however, and the British were 0£ Weak. During the winter of 1775 and the spring tg ^6, the British were forced to evacuate every place l ^ ^eld in America. They could not, for example, a K ^ew York Harbor with only two warships and ar>dful of troops. The British squadron in the Chesa- e and Delaware Bays was too small to blockade a j. entrances of those bodies of water or to protect 8 Cw loyalist-held islands. And even with an army of g 0 men, the British found it impossible to hold °ston. Indeed, above all during the winter of 1775- f ’ Boston came to symbolize all the difficulties and Orations of waging war against the American rebels. |j 0 the British, Boston was the cradle of the rebel- On*1' an<^ *c was there that the biggest strain was placed yea resources °f the Royal Navy during the first a^r the war. The British had originally sent army hep naV^ tinits to Boston after the 1773 Tea Party, eving the city to be the center of resistance to royal ant ^mertca anc^ hoping that, if the inhabit
s of Boston were intimidated by the presence of the
•gg °ston became a strategic liability to the British. e town could not be evacuated because of a shortage
of transports, nor could it be defended against a determined attack, for it was dominated by heights which the British did not have the manpower to occupy. Moreover, Boston was thought to be unfit as a base for offensive land operations because it was besieged by an army of hostile Americans in extremely strong natural defensive positions. Although militarily worthless, Boston had to be supplied and protected, and during the winter of 1775-76, the town severely strained the resources of the Royal Navy in American waters.
One of the most immediate and pressing problems confronting the British at Boston was a lack of supplies. Before the war, the British Army in America obtained its provisions, fuel, and forage locally. But when the fighting began, the Americans cut off the flow of supplies to the army at Boston. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1775, British warships, transports, and troops were sent to the coasts of Maine, the Bay of Fundy, southern New England, and Long Island in search of livestock, firewood, and forage. Other warships and transports were sent to Quebec and Nova Scotia for supplies. Arrangements were made to work the coal mines at Spanish River in Cape Breton. Despite these efforts, the British garrison continued to be short of provisions.
In addition to supplying Boston, men and ships of the Royal Navy were required to defend the town and harbor as well. Located on a peninsula at the western end of Massachusetts Bay, Boston was extremely vulnerable to waterborne attack. Although Graves stationed ten or more warships, or a third of his squadron, to assist in the local defense of Boston, it was soon found that the Americans could not be prevented from conducting raids against the islands in Boston Harbor. Although the defense of Boston severely limited the Royal Navy in America, Graves thought it an absolute necessity because the Americans had, he believed, "A numerous and well appointed Army . . . which without the protection of the King’s ships can utterly destroy this town and the troops pent up in it.”
Providing protection to vessels carrying supplies to the army was yet another task facing the Royal Navy during the British occupation of Boston. Supply ships proceeding to Boston encountered difficulties neither foreseen nor understood by the British at the beginning of the war. A shortage of pilots and the weather on the New England coast, which during the winter months is subject to fogs and gales, hampered activities. Moreover, ships entering Boston had to pass the American-held ports of Lynn, Marblehead, Salem, Beverly, and Gloucester before reaching the comparative safety of Nantasket Roads. Compounding these difficulties was the American decision to send a number
commander-in-chief of the North American squadron he was appalled by what he found. There were on ) 15 warships in Massachusetts Bay, and these were d manned, short of provisions, in a state of disrepair, 2fl| constantly cruising to prevent the capture of Britl:
sh ickly
of armed schooners to sea to attack ships carrying supplies to the army at Boston. On 7 September 1775, the Americans captured the unarmed British prize Unity off Cape Ann. In November, the Americans extended their operations northward, and the armed schooners Franklin and Hancock captured several fishing boats off Cape Canso and raided Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. However, the Americans made their most valuable capture within sight of Boston Harbor. On 28 November, the armed schooner Lee took without resistance the ordnance storeship Nancy, which was loaded with a huge quantity of munitions. The loss of the storeship so shocked and enraged the British that there was talk of treachery followed by charges of negligence, and one British officer expressed the fear that the loss of the Nancy would result in the Americans burning "Boston about our ears this winter.”
From the beginning of the fighting in America, Graves believed the British "ought to act hostiley . . . by burning & laying waste the whole country. . . .” By 29 August 1775, the Admiral’s belief had hardened into the resolve that the only way to prevent American attacks on British supply ships was to undertake a series of attacks against the New England ports in which the American armed vessels were based. Graves, however, did not have under his command the necessary troops for this type of operation, and the commander-in-chief of the army would not release from the garrison of Boston the number of troops needed to seize and occupy the seaport towns of the north shore.
Having failed to obtain troops to capture or destroy the ports of the north shore, Graves was forced to fall back on what he considered to be weak and ineffectual measures for dealing with the problem of American attacks on ships entering Boston. The ships of the Royal Navy in Massachusetts Bay were ordered to cruise off Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, and Cape Cod, locations Graves thought to be best situated to blockade American bases and at the same time intercept British supply ships as they approached Boston. Yet Graves knew that these measures would not be decisive, for as he informed General William Howe, "it was impossible for Ships to keep their Stations or prevent the Rebels from making further captures.” Nevertheless, on Graves’ orders, throughout the winter of 1775-76, British warships patrolled the approaches to Boston. It was a frustrating and dangerous task. Buffeted by winter gales, undermanned, and in need of repairs, the ships were at sea almost continually, entering Nantasket Roads only for provisions and repairs.
For the British at Boston, the winter of 1775-76 was a time of mounting frustration, humiliation, and bitterness. The king’s soldiers were hamstrung by what they considered to be a mob of country bumpkinS' Moreover, the Royal Navy appeared unable to pr°teCt British supply ships from American attack. On sh°rt rations, surrounded by a sullen and hostile popular*011’ and cooped up in what was considered to be the center of American rebellion and Puritanism, Boston w2S singularly grim place for the British that winter, the weather grew colder and wetter and the Americ2lj. attacks on British ships became bolder, a feeling 0 blind rage and isolation gripped the British at Bost°n' Out of 35 ships dispatched from England with pr°vl sions for the garrison of Boston, only eight arrived 2j that port. The remainder were either captured or fo[Ce by bad weather to the West Indies. The troops ^ Boston viewed the failure of provisions ships to rea America as a lack of support by the authorities |fj London, which in turn gave rise to feelings of betray and bitterness. One Scotch officer exlaimed in a letter to his father, "We are almost buried here.” Anoth^ officer lamented, "We are now almost as much block*-’ up by sea as we have been for these eight months 1 land.”
The humiliations and frustrations suffered by ^ king’s forces at Boston caused the more thought among the British to revise their attitudes toward the'r American enemies. Undoubtedly, Major John Pitcairn of the marines stated a widely held belief among C British before the beginning of hostilities when hc wrote, "I am satisfied that one active campaign, a stn;lft action, and the burning of two or three of their towns> will set everything to rights.” But under the imp2*-1 of such events as Bunker Hill, the burning of r2 mouth, and the capture of the Nancy, some of ^ British at Boston began to change their estimates 0 American military abilities. However, most of the angeJ and bitterness of the British at Boston was direct not at the enemy but at the navy in general and d5 commander, Admiral Graves, in particular. In an en less flood of letters to England, Graves was accuse of, among other things, nepotism, seizing provision| for his personal use, negligence and inactivity of 2 kinds, and being unfair to the army. The cascade 0 complaints from Boston and the government’s need *° make a political sacrifice for the failure of its pol*^ in America resulted in Graves being relieved at ^ beginning of 1776.
When Rear Admiral Molyneux Shuldham arrived 2t Boston on 30 December 1775 to replace Graves 25 supply ships proceeding to Boston. Shuldham qui
c°nt
c°nst^ VCSSC^S by keeping the ships of his command antly cruising in Massachusetts Bay.
^ en or> the night of 4-5 March, the American everij °CCupied and fortified Dorchester Heights, an c01 (bat the British at Boston had feared since the ran rTle.ncement of the war. From these heights Ameri- n>arartl^ery could bombard not only Boston but the hrj !t*rne approaches to the town as well. At first the - o planned to seize Dorchester Heights by means
*nue Graves’ policy of attempting to protect British
of fion ^atfi
^ y every future commander in America. As k0Vn^tbe first year of the war, all commanders of the of
oyai xT ” 1 ’ ..........
r oL. iNavy in America would have a mere handful
Ps> undermanned and short of supplies, with
shi
ich
, CARLYON T. CHAPMAN
Ijy^ s Action of Falmouth (now Portland), Maine in October b British Captain Henry Mowat.
saw fU .
at without a large reinforcement there was no fUr,ln which British ships sailing to Boston could be nort^r protected, for the Americans controlled the \jl shore of Massachusetts Bay. On 26 February sitUa’. ^huldham reported to the Admiralty that the rejn^. *°n m Massachusetts Bay was hopeless. Without otcernents, Shuldham had no alternative but to nsb°re-to-shore amphibious assault, but the opera- d^as called off at the last minute because of bad cje . er' Thereupon it was decided to evacuate Boston artlle tde shortage of transports and to remove the of t0 Halifax in order to prepare for the invasion Tork which was planned for that spring. at g e Hilures and frustrations suffered by the British thr °ston would be repeated over and over again aod U,^b°ut the war. The problems faced by Graves,
dpr> ater by Shuldham, would be faced in varying , 6rees b %in
hr-. t0 tackle the impossible task of supporting the watS ^rmy, protecting supply ships in American O’ and policing more than 1,000 miles of hostile hjalne- In the first months of the conflict, the Royal IPnia destr°yed Falmouth, Maine and Norfolk, Vir- Ujjg3' between 1 June 1775 and 24 April 1776, warships g fbe command of Graves and Shuldham seized can ^°ught into Boston and Halifax over 120 Ameri- Tevoi pS- Yet success in a conflict as complex as the of utl°nary War is not always measured in terms tvns destroyed or ships taken, and the Royal
Navy’s effort in America during the first year of the war was at best an ill-directed holding action and at worst a failure. British warships were unable to prevent the destruction of royal authority in America. Nor were the king’s ships able to prevent the importation of munitions into America. Rebel armed vessels, seemingly able to operate at will, captured a number of British ships. These problems were symptomatic of the difficulties which would plague the British effort in America throughout the war. For the Royal Navy, the year 1775 was a time of humiliation. The strongest navy in the world appeared to be rendered helpless by a rabble possessing a few whaleboats and armed schooners. If the rebellion were to be suppressed, it was clear that at the very least the Royal Navy in America had to be massively reinforced.
When word of hostilities in Massachusetts and the rout of royal authority throughout America reached London during the summer and autumn of 1775, the British government’s hopes for coercing the American rebels by a display of military force at Boston disintegrated. No longer could the government view the American problem simply as one of crushing a dominant minority or a single province in America; it now confronted a continent swept by revolutionary war. There was no question that the government would fight to reassert royal authority in America, for it was believed in London that the loss of America would result in Britain being reduced to a second-rank European power. The rulers of Britain were prepared to fight what amounted to a civil war within the British empire for America. Unaware of the dangers and difficulties of attempting to restore royal authority in America by force of arms and having unquestioning faith in the ability of the king’s soldiers and the overwhelming might of the Royal Navy, the resolve to resist revolution in America came easily to the government in 1775.
In the long run, the most potentially dangerous aspect of the government’s decision to fight lay not in America but in Europe. Gone was the Prussian alliance of the Seven Years War, and France, with a rejuvenated navy and the strongest army in Europe, was closely observing the progress of the rebellion with the idea that British problems in America could be used as a means of overturning the Peace of Paris. As British authority disappeared in America and fighting began, the French came to the conclusion that the British could never regain control of America by force. Thus France’s foreign policy began, secretly and slowly, to set the stage for intervention against the British. Care had to be exercised because Spain, coveting Minorca and Gibraltar but having a vast empire to protect, had to be courted and brought into the scheme. The combined French and Spanish navies would outnumber the
seiz£
hIo‘
neutral ships and run the risk of a European war. stopping it would result in the rebellion in Ante11*’ being fed by a flow of munitions from France. British government, which would not risk a Europe war in 1775-76, adopted the ineffectual policy of d*P matic protest and seizing only those neutral ships cztf. ing munitions which were clearly in contravention the laws and usages of war.
At the end of 1775, of far greater importance the British than preventing the Americans from obtalj' ing arms was the need for a plan which would te'eSti^s lish royal authority in America, for the first naon ^ of the war had shown that there were limits to effectiveness of naval power when applied againSt political movement such as the revolution in Amer*c3 Yet the British never understood that royal autho in America had not ever rested on power or rod1 ‘
force, but rather on consent of the American popu
a unique event ijj
del'
•vc*
more Americans who took up arms against the Brltl
sh.
the easier the victory for the king’s forces. Clearly
be
Royal Navy. As France stealthily moved toward intervention, it was perceived in London that unless the Americans were quickly crushed, the conflict would evolve into a world war in which Britain would be at a disadvantage.
As hostility to royal authority grew and fighting broke out in Massachusetts, the strength of the squadron in America was steadily increased. During 1775, the Admiralty dispatched 24 additional warships to America as quickly as they could be fitted and manned. And by the end of 1775, the squadron in America numbered 51 warships manned by 7,555 men, or roughly one-third of the total strength of the Royal Navy. But while reinforcing the Royal Navy in America, the Admiralty always kept one eye on Paris, for it was seen from the beginning that a French war was the greater danger to Britain. The central and overriding aim of the Admiralty, therefore, was to keep in Britain a force of ships-of-the-line capable of dealing with the French Navy, and possibly the Spanish Navy as well. Admirals, generals, and secretaries of state might protest and demand that ships-of-the-line be sent to America, but the Admiralty would not change its policy. Led by Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Britain was prepared to and did strip the nation of sloops-of-war, frigates, and 50-gun ships in order to reinforce America, but the ships-of-the-line were for the most part to remain in Britain to guard against the possibility of French intervention.
The dangers in Europe to Britain brought about by the revolution in America soon became evident when the government began to try to prevent arms from reaching the rebels in America. The British found it extremely difficult to prevent Americans from exporting munitions from Europe. By the middle of 1775, according to Lord Suffolk, "an extensive, illecit, & dangerous commerce is carrying on by vessels belonging to His Majesty’s Colonies under Foreign Colours. . . It was soon found that diplomacy could do little to prevent Americans from obtaining munitions. Even in those countries which were supposed to have prohibited the traffic in arms, the Americans still managed to obtain them. Moreover, France secretly supported the efforts of the Americans to procure military equipment and munitions. The British government had reliable information on the activities of American ships loading munitions in French ports, but could do no more than protest. Attempts by the Royal Navy to intercept American ships outside French ports brought forth violent protests from Paris. Even if the British had managed to prevent American ships from leaving European ports with munitions, the problem would not have been solved, for there was no way to stop American agents from sending munitions in neutral bottoms to the French, Dutch, or Danish Indies where they could then be transshippe° , America. The only effective way to stop the fl°'v arms to America would have been to seize all mul11 tions found on the high seas regardless of the nan°^ ality of the ship carrying them. Therein lay the Brltl dilemma. To stop the traffic they would have to
lace
_ # . jly I
A case can be made that America was lost police ^ in 1765 during the Stamp Act crisis, when f°r ^ practical purposes royal authority collapsed and never restored. When confronted with armed rebel*1 ^ in America, however, the British government failed 1 see the problem as one which could be solved 0 ‘ by a mixture of political and military measures. ^ thought in terms of restoring royal authority in Ar° ica by means of military conquest alone.
The rebellion in America was which the lessons of previous wars and revolutions ^ not apply, for a conflict with an ideologically motivat^ and armed insurgent population was unknown t° . . ancten regime. There was no society in Europe 's''*1 ^ was similar to America, and because of the uniquen j of American society, the rulers of Britain in 1775 fou(1^ it nearly impossible to assess the military potential the American rebels. Most British officials who had b* contact with the Americans loathed them and un1 rated their military ability. Sandwich, who had nc been to America, had the incredible theory that
had not thought out the maritime aspects of the p1 ^ lem, for the ability to wage war at sea was one of 1 ^ few aspects of American military potential which 1775 was susceptible to rational analysis.
America in 1775 did not have a navy, but it ^ have a large merchant marine and a well-develoP
y dispatch armed vessels to attack Cej s iar-flung seaborne commerce. It was thus con- tL e rhat the Royal Navy, the most powerful in could find itself bogged down in an endless Uirne guerrila war with the Americans.
P°sed * C °n^ dimly Pcrceiving the strategic difficulties ^ C ky America, the British government knew it ^ tahe a massive effort to crush the rebellion. It ecided that an attempt should be made to end in ,ebe H°n in one campaign by invading New York YrC e spring of 1776 with the bulk of the British gov ^ ^ concentrating an overwhelming force, the Cansernrnent intended to break the will of the Ameri- l0v ,.while seizing New York for use as a refuge for
°yalists.
as an area from which to draw supplies, and
industry. America’s maritime population, as g ,Was large and which engaged in such activities of nmg and the carrying trade, had a long history SkillP7ateenng and smuggling. Americans were so yearsat smuggling that in the years after the Seven satS ^ar> the Royal Navy found itself incapable of the fCSSlng American illegal seaborne trade. From even rria<j^1°st superficial analysis, which apparently was not °fh ' ^ sboidd have been evident that the outbreak °srilities would pose serious problems for the Royal ^Ee length of the American coast and the great (j-o- °y Americans as smugglers would make it very U c t0 prevent by means of naval blockade the qu re^els from importing the munitions re
in A C° Carrf on tlie war- Moreover, if the rebellion werica were not quelled quickly, the Americans
g..U d undoubtedly
as a l *—............. .......... —rr—>-------------
ase from which further operations could be un- en- The general line of reasoning behind this e Was ff*at rf*e Americans would be decisively ^ a large number of European troops and Ca ’Ten see the futility of further resistance. The
arri °f New York would as well open to British
’uious forces the Hudson River, which is naviga- of\j°r 0ver 2 hundred miles along the western flank firj ,ew England. Then New England, believed by the off f t0rEe center of the revolt, would be cut 0rn the rest of America and caught between the 'fork NaVy and Er‘tish forces in Canada and New
Th
e government, however, soon partially abandoned of Eunciple of concentration of force. In the autumn of j T in response to reports of the great strength reso]0yaEsm in the American South, the government of tVCd t0 sen<f a shipload of munitions and a handful as °°PS to assist the loyalists of North Carolina. But Arr^°re and more reports of loyalist strength in the a s^. lcan South reached London, the idea of sending ar)cj1^°ad °f munitions expanded into the ill-conceived mismanaged Clinton-Parker expedition to the southern colonies. The expedition proved to be a waste of time, ships, and lives. The force arrived too late to help the Loyalists of North Carolina. General Henry Clinton and Commodore Peter Parker then transformed what was already a fiasco into a debacle. They attempted, only to be repulsed by American militia, to capture Charleston, South Carolina. Aside from the loss of a frigate and the casualties suffered, the whole affair made the British throughout America look ridiculous. The failure of the Clinton-Parker expedition crushed any hopes of the loyalists in the American South for military assistance.
While the expedition to the southern colonies had weakened the British plan to concentrate their ships and troops in one massive campaign directed at New York, the American invasion of Canada forced the government to abandon altogether the principle of concentration of force. At the end of December 1775, news of the invasion reached London. On 23 December 1775, dispatches arrived from Quebec stating that the main British force in Canada had been shattered by the Americans before Montreal and that Quebec City, with its small garrison and weak defenses, was under American siege. This news forced the government to alter radically its plans for the campaign in America. The relief of Quebec and the reconquest of Canada now would have to take priority over the invasion of New York.
While undertaking the reconquest of Canada, the government’s primary objective remained to crush the rebellion in America in one campaign. It could not be the massive concentration of force originally planned. Nevertheless, they hoped to end the rebellion and retake Canada as well by reinforcing the squadron in North America to 70 ships and by transporting 27,480 infantry, the 16th Light Dragoons, and 1,000
horses from Europe to North America in time to begin operations in the spring of 1776. The success of this plan depended absolutely on the speed with which the government could carry it out. It was agreed by everyone in authority that the force had to arrive in North America in the early spring of 1776 if the rebellion were to be crushed in one decisive campaign. Thus, the success of the British effort in 1776 rested in large part on the skill of the administrators in London and the speed with which they could muster 27,480 troops and the ships required to transport them to North America.
Despite titanic efforts on the part of such government departments as the Navy Board and the Treasury, the chartering and fitting out of the shipping required to carry the army to North America were subject to a number of delays. Some of these delays were avoidable; others were not. But above all, the sheer size of the task tended to make difficulties which resulted in delays. Nevertheless, the conveyance of reinforcements to North America in 1776 was a considerable achievement in the organization of seaborne transport. By the summer of 1776, the Navy Board had 4l6 transports engaged in carrying troops, and the Treasury had another 76 ships transporting army provisions across the Atlantic. An official at the Treasury commented, "The country is drained of ships for transport purposes.” Yet the undertaking did not succeed as planned, for the troops did not reach America in the late spring. It was August when they arrived in New York.
The late arrival of reinforcements at New York in 1776 was for the most part the result of administrative failures and strategic miscalculations on the part of the government. Although the major military objective in 1776 was the formation of a large army at New York in the spring, the American invasion of Canada forced the ministry to choose between New York and Canada. Because of the shortage of ships, the government could not simultaneously mount the invasion of New York and the relief of Canada. The strategic mistake in 1776 was to allow the expedition to the southern colonies to sail. News of the invasion of Canada had reached London on 23 December 1775, which was more than enough time to prevent Parker from sailing. If the expedition to the southern colonies had been cancelled, more than 20 transports would have become available and perhaps the troops for the relief of Canada and the reinforcements for America could have sailed simultaneously. The fact that the ministry’s strategic plans for 1776 were beyond the administrative capabilities of an 18th-century government only compounded the strategic errors. In 1776, it was impossible to avoid delays when assembling and coordinating the movements of thousands of troops and hundreds of ships in such widely separated and distant places asc e Thames, the Clyde, Cork, and Germany.
The British bid to crush the rebellion in Afr>erlC3 with one mighty campaign finally opened on 22 gust 1776 when, under the guns of the Royal Na')’ British infantry landed at Gravesend, Long Island. 1 American Declaration of Independence had been issue little more than a month before, the summer almost over, and only a few months of the campaignin^ season remained. The question in everybody’s mind ^ whether enough time remained before the onset winter to inflict a decisive defeat on the Americans’ or had the late arrival of reinforcements from Eut°P precluded victory?
Infant insurgent nations are not inevitably triun1 phant on the field of battle. But the Howes, the °n. British commanders to have the opportunity to destroy the rebellion in America by force of arms, were sin gularly incapable of waging a war of annihilatl°n' Ambivalent at best toward the revolution in AmenC:1, the Howes in 1776 were confronted with a proble^ which could be solved militarily only by waging w with ruthlessness and determination. But they w products of the ancien regime and, as such, they 'v perhaps doomed to failure.
Although they arrived late in the campaigning son, the British at New York in the summer of 1' had the best opportunity of the entire war to mn ^ upon the Americans a decisive defeat. By the th*r week in August the British forces at Staten Island n^ grown to an army of some 25,000 highly-trained an well-equipped troops supported by 35 warships, sC°rej of transports, and all the special equipment requ‘re to conduct large-scale amphibious operations. ble^ York, on the other hand, was held by 19,000 ill-traine ’ poorly-led, and badly-equipped Americans with0 naval support. The American forces were stationed extremely exposed and weak positions, for New »° ^ City was indefensible against a combined naval atl land attack. If guns were mounted on Brookty11 Heights, they could command the city. Therefote> order to hold New York, Washington had to occ°P' Brooklyn, which in itself was indefensible. There no way the Americans could prevent the British fro111 landing on Long Island in overpowering strength keep units of the Royal Navy from entering the Ea$t River to block the retreat of the American garr‘s?*1 at Brooklyn. Furthermore, it was possible that if 1 British boldly exploited their amphibious mobility; n° only the enemy garrison at Brooklyn but also the entl j American army at New York would be enveloped afl destroyed.
If the British acted quickly and with determinati00. New York would be the crucible in which the Arr>erl
Can orrn
j my was destroyed. The effects of the capture or ^truction of Washington’s army at Manhattan in y^Ust °f 1776 would have been beyond calculation. Ind ^rner*cans had only one army, the Declaration of sti)iependenCe had just been issued, and loyalism was Hot h P°litical force. The rebellion in America might ave been able to withstand military ruin at New
Pond*" none of this was to happen. A slowness and g • erousness of movement and decision marked the grjtlSh effort at New York in the autumn of 1776. not ^ nava^ Power and amphibious capabilities were edl CXf> °hed, although General Henry Clinton repeat- UrSed they be employed to envelop and trap the Sej2.ericans on Manhatten by landing at Spuyten Duyvil, Ha 1°^ ^mgsbridge, then holding the line of the cansCrn ^*ver' Instead, the Howes forced the Ameri- fuU °ut °f New York by means of a series of master- raei^ Conducted but slow and cautious flanking moved S wh*ch permitted the American army to escape the UCtaon- The British swept all before them, for with datt|CXception of a skirmish at Harlem Heights, every ^ e °f the campaign was a British victory. The dacj r'cans had been driven from every position they cam °CCuP'ed; and in December, at the end of the [s| paign, General Howe’s soldiers controlled Staten re ’ PonS Island, the Bronx, Manhattan, a large of New Jersey, and Newport, Rhode Island. But ^ 'ngton’s army had eluded them, hri C conclusion of the campaign of 1776, the ^ lsh had the illusion of military victory in America. djsSeern>ngly fatally weakened American Army had *enPP.eared into Pennsylvania, while the king’s troops Ho lnt0 w*nter quarters and set up a string of posts tjj che Delaware River. The British appeared to be the VlCtors> and there were many who believed that g Evolution in America would be crushed in 1777.
«-L <
in i 06 reaHty behind an illusion is often cruel, and f0 'u the apparently victorious British were in fact er*ng into a quagmire. On 25 December 1776, ^Ha 0nianentaI Army made the famed crossing of the *he Lf'are Hiver and, in a surprise attack, overwhelmed g • essian garrison at Trenton. Several days later, the h attempted a counterattack, only to have an brigade surprised and mauled at Princeton. The •can victories at Trenton and Princeton imperiled
The British Fleet at Staten Island, 3 July 1776—Howe’s soldiers embarked aboard Shuldham’s warships for the capture of Staten Island from the Americans.
the king’s troops stationed along the Delaware River and forced the British to evacuate most of New Jersey. The American surprise counterattack in New Jersey inflicted on the British one of the most decisive defeats of the war, for in one stroke loyalism as a potential political force was crippled, and the British forces in America became permanently dependent on the British Isles for logistic support.
Politically, the evacuation of New Jersey was a disaster. When the king’s forces occupied New Jersey in the autumn of 1776, the loyalists of the region made their presence known and began to attempt to regain political control of the province. With the British evacuation of New Jersey, however, the loyalists were given the stark choice of either fleeing with the British army to New York or remaining in New Jersey to face political retribution at the hands of the American rebels. The withdrawal from New Jersey at the beginning of 1777 showed, as did the evacuation of Boston, that the British were unable to protect their political supporters in America and thus made it impossible to organize the loyalists into a meaningful political movement. This mistake would be repeated over and over again in Pennsylvania and the American South, and it spelled the end of loyalism as a potential political force in America.
Logistically, the loss of New Jersey deprived the British of an area in America from which to draw supplies. One of the main objectives of the occupation of New Jersey had been to gain a region in America from which the British forces could obtain provisions, fuel, and forage. But Trenton and Princeton and the threat of future American surprise attacks on isolated detachments forced the British, for the rest of the war, to concentrate their forces for the most part in a few well-defined defensive regions such as New York City. This made it impossible to obtain sufficient quantities of supplies in America.
In 1775, when the government began preparing to dispatch a large army to America, Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser was one of the few officials who wondered how it was going to be supplied. But the government apparently thought that the necessary supplies could be obtained in America, as they had been in the Seven Years War. By the beginning of 1777, however, the British faced a logistical catastrophe. With New Jersey
possibility of French intervention posed an imrne1
lost, not only troops and munitions but also the bulk of the provisions required to sustain the king’s troops in America now had to be supplied from Europe. Transporting across the Atlantic Ocean all the supplies required by the army in America placed a huge burden on the maritime resources of the British. The need for ships steadily increased, and by 1782 rations for 72,000 men in North America were being supplied from the British Isles. Throughout the war, scores of warships and thousands of tons of merchant ships were employed in supplying the army in America. From 1777 onward, the British Army’s lines of supply were vulnerable to naval attack, for they stretched across the Atlantic from depots in England and Ireland to the battlefields of America.
The problems caused by the dependence of the British forces in America on European sources of supply might have been overcome if the Royal Navy had maintained control of the Atlantic supply lines. But at the end of 1776 the Americans intensified and enlarged the war at sea by sending cruisers to European waters and by authorizing the American commissioners in Paris to issue naval and privateer commissions in European ports. Perhaps the first American cruiser to appear in European waters was the privateer Rover of Salem, which the British consul at Fero reported on 31 August 1776 had captured four British merchant ships off Cape St. Vincent. The Rover was quickly followed to Europe by a number of other American privateers and warships. The American objectives in sending cruisers to Europe were threefold: the capture and destruction of British shipping, to force a redeployment of units of the Royal Navy away from America by turning European seas into a major theater of maritime war, and most important but rarely noted, to assist in precipitating conflict between Britain and France by using French ports as sanctuaries from which to stage attacks on British ships on the high seas.
It soon became apparent to the British that the French intended to give American cruisers all possible aid while ostensibly remaining neutral. Commanders of American cruisers found that it was generally possible to dispose of prizes and obtain supplies, refits, and seamen in French ports. The British authorities viewed the opening of French ports to American cruisers as an act of French duplicity which posed a grave threat to British seaborne commerce and as a probable prelude to French intervention in the American War. The arrival of American cruisers in European waters thrust a grim choice upon the British. If harsh and decisive measures were not taken, Britain’s merchant marine would suffer greatly from American attack. At the same time, the only firm action the British could take against the American cruisers in Europe would be to deny
them the use of French ports by means of a n:1'' blockade, which would precipitate a war with Franc From the beginning of the war, British authority especially those at the Admiralty, had been obseo1 events in France with growing suspicion and fear. ^ reports of French and Spanish preparations for war afe of clandestine aid rendered to the Americans rear ^ London, Lord George Germain and other British 0 ^ cials persisted in the belief that the French would n° intervene as long as the British appeared victorious ^ America. But Lord Sandwich strongly believed that
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and grave danger. He feared that France might attemp secretly and quickly, to mobilize her navy and se control of the English Channel before the Royal N could muster sufficient ships to oppose such aCt‘0fl
Channel Fleet as a means of countering a p°sSl French naval threat to the security of Britain of naval preparations in French and Spanish ports, government decided on a limited mobilization- ^ would increase the number of guard ships in Engl'111 to 24, recruit additional seamen and marines, and cretly plan for a general press in the event of a tot’
intelligence reports on the expected operations
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mobilization of the fleet. By the autumn of ^
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tions in French ports, so alarmed Sandwich that informed Lord North:
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th C aCCOUnts French armaments multiply so fast at I must tell your Lordship that every hour is j 10us> as the French are certainly greatly ahead ^ their preparations, and I dread the consequence 1 eir being at sea before us.”
f0 ^ct°ber 1776, Sandwich drew up and submitted neceslnS a memorandum setting forth the measures Se, ^or tbe mobilization of the Channel Fleet. entirra da7s ^ater, the government decided to place the * * oS.NaVy °n a war footing. On the night Tham» ^tober, a general press was conducted in the
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articl^ry t0 be used to outfit cruisers. Although these Pren^ ^ad been specifically renewed by the Anglo- ahfuH Tfeaty 1763, the French government’s policy Com 7 violated them. According to the American r lssioners in Paris, this policy was one of pro-
atic means, the British were forced to use
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isc,.f!eS.^'*ver> ar>d in the next several days orders were or readying 34 ships-of-the-line for Channel Ce- Despite the mobilization of the Channel Fleet R0 J aUtumn 1776 to meet the French threat, the f0rNavY in European waters was still unprepared ec.ptloe °ns^aught of American cruisers. With the ex- tuttersn tW° ^Sates> e'ght sloops-of-war, and nine Cor^pJ’ ad t^le smaller types of warships suitable for sen,- Crce protection and hunting down cruisers were T‘n8 in America.
p0rt° dePrive American cruisers of the use of French preS’ tde British first attempted to employ diplomatic ^nder the articles of the Treaty of Utrecht, Btita >WaS not to Permit the cruisers or prizes of °f s enemies to enter her ports, except under stress her or shipwreck. Nor was France to allow her
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and f° En§land a res°iuti°n to observe all treaties, k Prov[ing] it by restoring prizes too openly asr°ught into their ports, imprisoning such persons are found to be concerned in fitting out armed c>s against England from France, warning fre- those from America to depart, and repeating Us pfs against the exportation of warlike stores. To v '-the American Commissioners in Paris] it pri- t>Ur Bro^esses a real friendship, wishes success to cause, winks at the supplies we obtain here as c “ as it can without giving open grounds of lnplaint to England, privately affords us very es- lal aids, and goes on preparing for war.”
bv^aVinS failed to close French ports to Americans V dlPlomau
Pean ^avy to combat American cruisers in Euro- VCre Waters. Great 64- and 74-gun ships-of-the-line dispatched to cruise in the Bay of Biscay, the rtl Approaches, and the Irish Sea in search of
American commerce raiders. From the autumn of 1776 onward, a succession of ships from the Channel Fleet sailed between such points as Cape Clear, Ushant, and Cape Ortegal; others were stationed off commonly frequented landfalls, such as Cape Finisterre. Still others were dispatched far into the Atlantic to intercept and escort safely to Britain homeward-bound trade. Month in and month out, the great ships of the Channel Fleet lumbered across the Eastern Atlantic in a vain search for small American armed vessels, but for the most part the ships suffered damage from the elements, and the cruises were fruitless. And despite the best efforts of the Royal Navy, the American cruiser offensive in European waters would grow in intensity. More than 300 British merchant ships would be taken by American cruisers in 1777, and the Royal Navy would manage to capture only a mere handful of American raiders. During 1777, the British suffered the humiliation of seeing the Royal Navy, the strongest in the world and a force with a tradition of victory, run ragged by a few American cruisers.
Had the Royal Navy been able to maintain an effective blockade of the vast American coastline, the American cruiser offensive would have been impossible. Indeed, the failure of the blockade was as great a failure for the British in 1776 as their inability to destroy Washington’s army, for it enabled the Americans to send forth cruisers to attack British shipping, and at the same time permitted them to import the munitions necessary to carry on the war. Because the shortage of ships was the primary cause of the British failure to blockade the American coast effectively during 1776-77, it is meaningless to compare, as is often done, the British effort then to the blockade during the War of 1812. At the beginning of the War of 1812, the Royal Navy had no rival and controlled the seas of the world. The British in 1776-77 were not only fight-
Howe’s squadron were deployed at New York supP' ing the army, while 12 more were supporting 1 .j operations in Canada; only 24 war ships, mostly ones, were scattered along the coast from Nova 6 to Florida in what amounted to no more than a to effort to blockade America. By 18 September, cl
ng the entrances of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, while
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for England. Six were in the St. Lawrence River- other 24 ships based at Rhode Island and Halifax^ ^ deployed to blockade the coasts of New Englan > cruise in the Gulf of Maine, or to protect .
and Nova Scotia. The remaining 15 ships (of ^ j five were under orders to refit in the West Indies ^
coast
ing a major war in America but facing the possibility of war with equal, or superior, European naval powers. With the limited number of ships available, the Royal Navy did not have the strength simultaneously to blockade America, maintain forces in England to guard against the possibility of a French war, and deploy the ships and men needed to support the operations of the army in New York and Canada. Because of the danger of war in Europe, the Admiralty would not commit ships-of-the-line to America, yet Lord Howe’s squadron of about 70 warships—for the most part 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops-of-war, and other small armed vessels— lacked the manpower required to support the army’s amphibious campaigns in Canada and New York and at the same time maintain an effective blockade of the American coast. Thus, in 1776 Lord Howe had to choose between deploying the bulk of his ships in support of land operations at the expense of the blockade, or strengthening the blockade at the expense of the British army’s mobility. Yet in many respects Lord Howe did not have a choice, for the government’s policy called for crushing the rebellion with a single blow at New York in 1776 which could not be done without massive naval support. As General Howe noted in a dispatch to Germain, the army was almost totally dependent upon waterborne transport and was incapable of operating more than a few miles from navigable bodies of water. Lord Howe, therefore, had to commit warships to support military operations in Canada and New York with the knowledge that this would weaken the blockade to the point of uselessness. At the time it must have seemed to be the right decision, for if the British army crushed the rebellion during the 1776 campaign, then the blockade would not be necessary. On the other hand, if the land campaign proved to be indecisive, the lack of an effective blockade would give the Americans the opportunity to mount a cruiser offensive and to import the materials necessary to carry on the war.
The decision to support the army’s amphibious campaigns in Canada and America in 1776 in effect required that the blockade be suspended. Warships had to be concentrated at New York and in the St. Lawrence River in order to provide the large number of seamen needed to conduct these operations. As one navy officer explained:
"The ships are ill manned & very short. You can have no idea of the number of men it takes to attend upon such an army as this; with the ships we have (which is two thirds of those employed in America) when all the flat boats, galleys, gondolas, horse stages &c &c are mann’d there is scarce men enough left on board many of the ships to move them so that
we really want six or eight line of battle ships> ^ so much perhaps for the use of the ships; as ^ their large complements of men for the purP° before mentioned.”
During the campaign of 1776, the strength of f°r^ Howe’s command averaged 70 ships, of which only ^ were ships-of-the-line. On 13 August 1776, 27 wars ^ (with an additional six expected to arrive) of were no ships of the Royal Navy blockading the ships were at New York and nine more m ^ Lawrence supporting the army. Only 42 ships were
did not change as the campaign of 1776 drew close, for on 24 November only 20 ships wctC j blockade duty. The remaining 54 were supporting operations. ..
With the end of offensive land operations in Dee ber 1776, a number of ships were released uofl1 f task of supporting the army, but because of a repair facilities in America and the need to defen British positions at New York, Newport, and Ha1 the blockade of the American coast did not mar* ^ increase in effectiveness. On 5 January 1777, out 0 ships under the command of Lord Howe, 24 (of 'v . three were under orders to proceed to the West 1 ^ for refitting) were stationed in the New York 11x Another 11 were either en route to or about to
one was unfit for further employment) were assig the impossible task of blockading the American ci southward from New York to St. Augustine- ^ 1 March 1777, there were 72 ships under Lord Ho ^ command and there was still no effective blocka ^ the American coast. Twenty-three warships (sl^f|< which were refitting) were stationed in the New . area. Two were en route to England. Twenty-f°ur ^ ers (of which one was ordered to the West refitting) were protecting Newport and Halifax blockading the coasts of New England. Seven °c^ ships were in the St. Lawrence. The coast of Ame south of New York was virtually unblockaded, f°r
abQu;PS Were stationed there, 11 of which were either f0r ^epart for or proceeding to the West Indies nottln&' Thus, at any given time there simply were efjr0rtenOu&h ships to fulfill the needs of the British such T y^rner*ca- The need to protect with warships p0rt P a^es as the St. Lawrence River, Halifax, New- °f ’ a^. hJew York when coupled with the necessity ty” ^8 ships either to England, Halifax, or the the a n *es P°r refitting reduced the force blockading
statir, jncan c°ast to a mere rump of the squadron ^t>ed in America.
of sC blockade of America did have some appearance higatCCCSS ^ur'ng 1776. None of the new Continental ade gS got t0 sea because of the Royal Navy’s block tJ etWeen 10 March and 31 December 1776, Lord
ent,
of
t|uel]ecj^ ttle revolution in America had not been severa] ’ an<^ t^le king’s soldiers were penned up in c°0tin SmaP bridgeheads on the edge of the American of Suan<l logistically dependent on British sources effect; P/’ Royal Navy found itself incapable of the 7 blockading the American coast to prevent t° Caericans from obtaining munitions with which
tQ ^ ' °H the WOT nnr] n t- enmo < f TTrnr unnklp
therl?fbe conclusion of the 1776 Vet atn° end in sight to the fighting in America, O'ibtarv e same “me Britain, with the bulk of her '•'■’as sjj P°Wer committed to the Western Hemisphere, the can^P*ng toward war with France. The failure of sOt)ae QPaign °P 1776 in America set the stage for what altvays f m°re Perceptive among the British had eared: a war with both America and France.
at ieasts<iuadron recaptured 26 British vessels and took XVarsh't ^meiacan ships. During 1776, American 34-7 g*Ps an<l privateers captured or destroyed at least hJav-y’j'i'i'b —Is. The success or failure of the Royal tiUrrth 0chade, however, cannot be measured by the to S^TS tahcn or lost, but only by the degree
of j^rn'C . che British were able to prevent the sailing the f]0CnCan cruisers and to cut off, or at least retard, the munitions to America from Europe and
At th/u ^ncPes' Here the blockade was a total failure, liajo/ Cginnin8 °P 1777, the Americans mounted a the firstrUlSer °Tcnsive in European waters, and during SUstai jtW° years of the war American armies were blockaj r7 f°reign munitions. The failure of the 177^ e °P ihe American coast during the winter of the n fave cbe Americans the opportunity to carry necessa War to Europe and the ability to obtain the
Atiw marerials with which to continue the war in Cflca.
bv e attempting to crush a rebellion in America erecjCe arms during 1776, Britain unwittingly a strategic trap. At the end of the campaign
the war, and at the same time it was unable >inCnt American cruisers from attacking British g* At the rnnrluciAn r\f 1 w/c campaign
The reasons for the failure of the British to subdue the American rebellion during 1776 are many. To begin with, the entire British effort in 1776 was based on two fundamental misconceptions: that the loss of America would result in Britain being reduced to a second-rank European power, and that the American problem could be solved by military action. On narrow strategic grounds, the British attempt to end the revolt in America with one grand effort in 1776 failed above all because of the great size and complexity of the enterprise. In 1776 the British undertook, with limited resources, to conquer by force of arms one-fourth of the North American continent while maintaining in England the naval forces required to counter any hostile act by the European powers. The plan to amass a large army at New York in the spring of 1776 and to split New England off from the rest of America while decisively defeating the Americans in battle was not totally without logic, but it was an undertaking without precedent and beyond the physical and administrative capacity of an 18th-century government. The unusually harsh winter of 1776, insuperable administrative problems, the dispatch of the ill-conceived expedition to the southern colonies, and the need to relieve Canada combined to cause a shortage of ships which delayed the departure of the troops to New York, with the result that the campaign did not get under way until the third week of August. Then the shortness of the remaining campaigning season and the generalship of the Howes when pitted against Washington’s growing skill at retreating left the campaign at New York inconclusive. When at the end of 1776 the Americans turned the tables on the British with the winter offensive in New Jersey and began the cruiser offensive in European seas, the British army in America became a logistical liability and the resources of the Royal Navy were stretched almost to the breaking point in a vain hunt for American cruisers. Moreover, the blockade, possibly the only means of choking off the rebellion, had its strength sapped by the shortage of ships. When considering the elusiveness of the objective, the alienage of the conflict, the necessity of conveying thousands of troops across the Atlantic, the vast size of America, and the physical, administrative, and strategic problems of the undertaking, the astonishing fact about the British effort in 1776 is not that the campaign failed but rather that it came so close to succeeding.
Dr. Syrctr earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Columbia University and his Ph.D. from the University of London. He is now associate professor of history at Queens College in New York, where he has taught since 1966. He is the author of two books, Shipping and the American War, 1773-83 and The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762.