Editor’s Note: Admiral Gorshkov has been Commander- in-Chief of the Soviet Navy for 18 years. He is a Deputy Minister of Defense. He and his First Deputy are full members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
What follows is a translation of an article which appeared in Morskoi Sbornik No. 2, 1972, having been approved for publication in the Soviet Union on 28 January 1972. Plainly, the thoughts and beliefs which appear in this article—and those which will be published on these pages over the next ten months—are views which Admiral Gorshkov wishes to share with the other officers in his navy. For that reason alone, they are considered to be of profound interest to the officers of his country’s principal rival at sea, the United States Navy.
For many centuries the ocean expanses have not only been a convenient means of communication between continents and between the suppliers of products vitally essential to mankind, but also an arena of fierce struggle and military conflicts. The scale of utilizing the water medium for military aims, i.e., for the defense of one’s own country and to seize overseas possessions, has grown in relation to man’s knowledge and mastery of the ocean. At the present time, in an era of far-reaching scientific discoveries and the utilization of them for military needs, the capabilities for conducting combat operations on the oceanic expanses have increased incredibly, while the naval arms race abroad, and the creation of diverse means of naval combat have Cached unprecedentedly imposing scales.
The hallmark of naval forces is their high degree of maneuverability, and ability to concentrate secretly and to form powerful groupings which are of surprise to the enemy. At the same time, naval forces are more stable against the effects of nuclear weaponry than land forces. All of this has catapulted the navies into the front ranks of the diverse, modern means of armed combat. Their employment in nuclear-missile warfare is related to the introduction of much of what is new in tactics and operational skills, in ship design, and in the outfitting of ships with equipment and armament.
The qualitative transformations which have taken place in naval forces have also changed the approach to evaluating the relative might of navies and their combat groupings. We have had to cease comparing the number of warships of one type or another and their total displacement (or the number of guns in a salvo, or the weight of this salvo), and turn to a more complex, but also more correct appraisal of the striking and defensive power of ships, based on a mathematical analysis of their capabilities and qualitative characteristics.
The military technical revolution is constantly introducing new things in all areas of military affairs, but the final goals of naval warfare remain the same: the defeat of the enemy and the destruction of his vital forces and materiel (i.e., his ships with their crews and weapons stores, and weapons or shore objectives located within range). Therefore, combat operations at sea, just as on land, by obeying the general laws of the dialectic which are constantly in effect, cannot be conducted separately from the goals of that policy which led to the war. Therefore, in today’s context it is interesting to trace, from a historical standpoint, the dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and the state policy goals which they were intended to serve.
V. I. Lenin pointed out that "Every war is inseparably linked with the political system from which it stems. That very policy which a certain power and a certain class within this power conducted for a long time prior to a war, inevitably and unavoidably will be continued by this same class during a war, changing only the form of action.”1 And further, "Policy is reason, while war is only the instrument, and not the opposite. Consequently, it only remains to subordinate the military point of view to the political.”2
The basic and sole means of waging armed conflict between states has always been the army and navy, which in peacetime have continued to serve as the instrument or weapon of state policies. Many examples from history attest to the fact that in the age of feudalism and capitalism all problems of foreign policy were always decided on the basis of, and taking into account, the military power of the "negotiating” sides, and that the potential military might of one state or another, built up in accordance with its economic capabilities and political orientation, permitted it to conduct a policy advantageous to itself to the detriment of other states not possessing corresponding military power.
The development of armed forces is linked in the most direct manner to the history of social-economic systems, and to the methods of material production characteristic of them. The flourishing or decline of them is determined by the process of the formation or decay or one social system or another. Thus, these periods when one social-economic system was being replaced by another, more progressive system have given considerable impetus to progress in the military area.
Technical discoveries have always had a revolutionizing effect on the development of armed forces and on the art of employing them. This demonstrates the pattern of the influence on the military field of the society’s economic development and the growth of its productive forces. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Military tactics depend on the level of development of military equipment. . .”3
Such highly important factors as the social and political system, the social composition of the people from whom the armed forces are drawn, the extent of combat training, the level of knowledge, and the moral make-up of the personnel also affect the condition of the armed forces and the level of the art of their employment. In turn, the above qualities depend on the character of the leaders of the fighting men.
Marxism considers the geographic environment, which also influences the character and direction of the development of armed forces, to be one of the constant and invariable conditions in the development of human society. Among the many elements embraced by the concept of the geographical environment and affecting the development of mankind, and, consequently, also of the armed forces of states, are the seas and oceans. In solving problems of commerce, of reliable routes of communication, of relationships between peoples, and of the fishing and maritime industries, men back in ancient history had already opened up individual littoral areas of the seas and oceans. The maritime location of many countries fostered the development in them of specific areas of industry (e.g., shipbuilding, the catching and processing of fish and marine animals, etc.) which had a beneficial effect on the overall progress of these countries that, naturally, also left an impression on the development of the armed forces of the states which, to one degree or another, were engaged in the construction of navies and to a greater or lesser degree employed them in wars.
In different historical eras the above factors have had a definite effect on the character and structure of the armed forces which were made up of various components. Without resorting to a detailed examination of the changes in the structure of the armed forces of states on a historical plane, let us simply note that all maritime countries, without exception, usually have had (or strove to have) both ground forces and a navy. Apropos of this, Peter I said: "Every potentate who has only ground forces has only one hand; yet whoever has a navy too, has both hands.” The role and importance of each of them, at the level of development of technology and the economic capabilities which existed, were always determined by the unfolding political strategic situation and the mutual positions of the states or nature of the coalitions. In some stages of the history °f states, ground forces have played the main role, and ln others, the navy.
The place and role of each of the branches of a country’s armed forces can change both in peacetime and in war depending on technical reorganization, on the enemy being confronted, the geographical conditions, etc. History presents many examples of this. From them we may recall the growth of the role of the Navy in the Northern War of 1700-1721, when Russia transferred operations from her own territory to the territory of the enemy, thereby forcing him to sign a peace treaty. Sometimes, however, wars which began with the Navy being predominantly important were ended by the overwhelming actions of the Army (for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905). Clearly, in all cases, one aspect remains unchanged: the results of the victory in a campaign or war can only he secured by ground forces capable of confirming the reality of it by their actual presence.
Moreover, the experience of history attests to the fact that each branch of the armed forces makes its own certain and always discernible contribution to victory. To achieve victory, the presence of all branches of armed forces, properly organized, equipped, and trained, is essential. Each of them has its own specific features, sphere of employment, and conditions for concerted action. The skillful (or on the other hand, the unskillful) employment and the consideration of these specific features often determine the success (or failure) of operations, campaigns, or even the war as a whole.
In the modern context, in speaking of the military might of states, it is a matter of harmoniously combining all branches of developed and rationally balanced armed forces, and it is precisely because of this that the principle of cooperation among all branches of the armed forces is the basis of Soviet military doctrine. Only by coordinating their efforts can victory be achieved.
As early as 1921, M. V. Frunze wrote about this in works devoted to the building up of the Red Army. The idea of the decisive importance of coordinated actions by the Army and Navy in all areas of armed combat was vividly expressed in his work "A Single Military Doctrine and the Red Army.”
An analysis of the employment of various branches of armed forces in time of war, or in peacetime, is of definite interest from the point of view of both the development of the art of war and the knowledge by the command personnel, of the specific features with which each of the branches of the armed forces is imbued.
Taking into account that such an understanding fosters the development of a unity of operational views in the command personnel of the armed forces, and is an indispensable and most important condition for skill in acting in concert, let us examine those questions applicable to the Navy, both in the historical and problem aspects. In this connection, we do not intend to cover the history of the naval art, much less define the prospects for the development of naval forces. We intend only to express a few thoughts about the role and place of navies in various historical eras, and at different stages in the development of military equipment, and of the art of war, in order, on this basis, to determine the trends and principles of the change in the role and position of navies in wars, and also in their employment in peacetime as an instrument of state policy. In this connection, the focus of attention on the Navy does not in any way imply any sort of unique importance of naval forces in modern armed combat, but stems from the above mentioned considerations.
Proceeding from the special features of the Navy as a military factor which can be used also in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military power of states beyond their borders, and from the fact that over a period of many centuries it has been the solitary branch of armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country beyond its borders, in our view it is useful to examine questions related to this specific feature of naval forces as a real component part of the military organization of a state.
In examining these questions, one should also take into account the ever growing interest in oceanic problems of various social quarters from different aspects—economic, political, and military—and in their dialectical relationship. In tracing the direct dependence of mankind on the World Ocean over the entire course of its centuries of history, it is impossible not to note how the ability of peoples to learn to appreciate the ocean, and to use it for their own needs, directly affects the growth of the political prestige of the country and its economic and military power.
Times Distant, Yet Important for Understanding: The Role of Navies
Navies have always played a great role in strengthening the independence of states whose territories are washed by seas and oceans, since they were an important instrument of policy. Naval might has been one of the factors which has enabled individual states to advance into the ranks of the great powers. Moreover, history shows that those states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power for very long.
And, it cannot be otherwise, for the sphere of naval operations are the seas and oceans which occupy seven-tenths of the surface of our planet. The continents are essentially gigantic islands whose total area is barely 150,000,000 square kilometers. They are surrounded, connected with one another, and kept in many respects (in particular, with regard to climate) in a constant state of dependence on the World Ocean, whose surface is equal to 350,000,000 square kilometers.
The seas and oceans serve as an inexhaustible source of diverse food resources, industrial raw materials, and energy. The most important and most economically advantageous routes of communications between countries, through which trade and other ties between peoples are carried out, pass through the seas and oceans. All of this determines the special role of the seas and oceans in the economy of states.
The development of maritime states has turned out to be so closely connected with the sea that, as a rule, their capitals and largest cities have grown up on the coasts. Seven of today’s ten largest cities of the world are located on the shores of seas and oceans. The building-up, in the maritime countries, of many areas of industry and the economy dependent on the sea, which has brought about higher industrial development in these countries, has fostered the overall growth of the economy of maritime countries and the rate of growth. Therefore, it is not by accident that civilization, as a rule, originated and developed most often on the shores of seas and oceans. It is also not accidental that countries whose populations have been connected with seafaring have become economically strong earlier than others. Among these we may cite in various periods ln history, Spain, England, Holland, France, Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S.A. All of the modern great powers are maritime states.
At the same time, for a long time wars have been Waged not only on land, but also on the watery expanses, at first on rivers and lakes and in coastal areas of the seas, and later on the seas and oceans. Military necessity, the development of an economy related to the sea, and political conflict have always, and on an ever increasing scale, forced states to build, possess, and maintain naval forces on a modern level within the overall system of armed forces. At a certain stage of development, many states (primarily Holland, Spain, England, France, Japan, and the U.S.A.) have formulated their military strategy primarily on the basis of sea power.
Every social-economic system has built up armed forces, including navies, corresponding to its economic and technical capabilities. Thus, in the slave-holding society, galleys were the basis of the navies. In the era of feudalism, sailing ships appeared, which were developed more fully up to the moment of capitalism’s entry into the world arena.
The scientific technical revolution of that day led, in the mid-19th century, to the following fundamental change in the material resources and equipment of naval forces—to the creation of the steam fleet, and lateral to undersea forces. And finally, recently even more profound and revolutionary changes have taken place in connection with the construction of the nuclear-powered navy of the nuclear-missile era.
These stages of naval development were not just stages in the technical improvement of warships. At the same time as the material resources and equipment were being altered, changes were also taking place in its position within the system of armed forces, in its basic mission, and in its role in the policy of the state in peacetime and in military operations at sea.
Even in ancient times, in solving problems concerning trade, routes of communications, ties between people, and of the fishing and marine industries, mankind developed several coastal areas of the seas and oceans. Parallel to this, knowledge was accumulated and expanded, at first about the individual regions of the earth; and later about the entire planet, including the World Ocean. It is difficult to overestimate the role of the Navy in this.
At the same time, from the era of the slave-holding society even up to our day, navies have been employed in numerous wars as the most important (and often the only) means of supporting the transport of military cargoes and land forces or the invasion by troops of the enemy territory, as well as to protect their own sea routes and to attack the enemy’s merchant ships.
In the 16th to 17th centuries, one of the most important periods in the history of mankind began—the era of great geographical discoveries, the era of the initial accumulation of capital, and the development of capitalism. The major countries of Western Europe converted their navies into one of the instruments of the initial accumulation of capital: they were used to seize colonies, for the enslavement of peoples of entire continents, and to plunder them, and as the agents for the fierce struggles between rivals in the plundering of colonies, and also for control in the colonies and of the sea routes.
"The discovery of gold and silver mines in America, the eradication, enslavement, and the burning alive of the natives in pits, the first steps toward conquering and plundering East India, and the transformation of Africa into a preserve for hunting blacks—this was the dawning of the capitalist era of production.”4
Spain and Portugal were the first to rush to discover new lands and colonize them. Sailing expeditions by Columbus, Magellan, Vasco da Gama, and other seafarers not only opened the American continent, extended the water route around Africa to India and China, and discovered many Pacific Ocean islands, but also initiated the colonization of these regions and countries. The English, French, and Dutch joined the Spanish and Portuguese in participating in the geographical discoveries and in the colonization of the new lands.
In the 16th century it seemed that Spain had firmly established a position as a great power, possessing vast colonies. But due to political backwardness and the inability to compete with rapidly developing England, she was not able to exploit the riches plundered from the colonies, to rapidly develop her economy and her industry, and consequently, to build up armed forces, and particularly a navy, which were modern for that day. Soon after the defeat of the "unbeatable armada” by the more modern English Fleet, Spain, being in no condition to protect her overseas possessions, lost them and was gradually transformed from a great power into a third-rate state.
In the middle of the 17th century, Holland, which had taken the capitalist path of development earlier than the others, and had the strongest navy in the world at its disposal, became the largest colonial power and reached the apex of its power. But soon England, where industrial capital played the leading role as opposed to trade capital which held sway in Holland, became its main rival. The struggle between these countries became the hottest in several wars which history has named the Anglo-Dutch wars. The North Sea was the main arena for their struggles. After losing several naval battles and after attacks by the English from land, Holland acknowledged defeat and became a second-rate colonial power. Its fate was sealed by the victory of the industrial capital of England over Holland’s trade capital, which was manifested militarily in the superiority of the English Fleet (or, in the final analysis, in the naval might of England).
Karl Marx wrote about this in this manner: ". . .Trade domination is now already related to the greater or lesser predominance of the conditions of the existence of major industry. It pays to compare, for example, England and Holland. The history of the fall of Holland as the dominant trade nation is a history of the subordination of trade capital to industrial capital.”5
England also often used her Navy for direct enrichment. It is sufficient to recall that many English ships and merchantmen in the service of the King acted as pirates: they robbed the merchant ships of other countries, seized them, and dragged them away into English ports. Thus, instead of a consumer, the Navy became a source of enrichment to the state.
At the beginning of the 18th century, France also took the path of capitalist development. Through the enslavement of overseas countries, in which the Navy played an important role, she was also transformed into a vast colonial empire possessing Canada, large territories in the Mississippi Valley, several West Indian islands, part of India, and broad regions in Africa. The core of England’s policy was to attain the position of "Mistress of the Seas”, personifying a world economic and political power; she chose to use every possible way to bring down her rivals at sea to the level of the states which were incapable of opposing her Navy as one way of achieving this goal. At this time the struggle in the world arena for economic hegemony, colonial possessions, and domination in world trade shifted to the sphere of rivalry between England and France. The culmination of this struggle was the so- called Seven Years War, in which almost all of the states of Europe were involved. "England and France fought over colonies in the Seven Years War, i.e., they waged an imperialistic war. . .”6
The principal events at that time unfolded at sea, as a result of which the navies played the most important role. The outcome of the battles between the English and French Fleets played a decisive role in achieving the political goals of this war. As a result of their hostilities, France, having lost any hope of domination, or even a predominant position on the sea and having lost control over the sea lanes, was forced to relinquish North America and India to England.
In the middle of the 18th century, having surpassed the other countries in economic development and possessing a developed industry and numerous colonies, England became the first world power. Backed by a powerful economy which provided England the supremacy of having the strongest fleet on the World Ocean, she assumed the leading position among the capitalist countries and held it for almost two centuries.
The desire of the British capitalists to hinder the development of industries in the colonies by every
means, in order to keep them as mere suppliers of raw materials and as consumers of the goods of British industry, produced the war for independence of the more developed of its North American colonies. The navies of England’s former rivals, France, Holland, and Spain acted on the colonies’ behalf. The position of Russia, which declared a so called "armed neutrality”, supported by the power of the Russian Navy, did not permit England to blockade America, also played a positive role for the Americans. The "mistress of the seas" had to fight a war under conditions in which her Navy was considerably inferior to the united fleet of the enemies. After England had lost several battles on land, considering the unfavorable relative strength of the forces on the sea which prevented unhindered supplying of reinforcements via the ocean, she was forced to recognize the independence of the United States of North America.
Despite the fact that the main missions in the war for independence were executed by the armies, it once more affirmed the growing influence of naval forces on the course and outcome of armed conflicts fought on land. In this war, naval operations were shifted from European waters to distant ocean regions which sharply increased the importance of communications, and problems of defending and hindering them in support of military actions on land arose on such a scale for the first time.
The new conditions of naval combat operations imposed higher demands on the seakeeping ability of the warships and on their combat stability. In connection with this, their dimensions were increased, designs were changed, armament strengthened, and subsequently armor made its appearance. The considerable growth in the capabilities of the rapidly developing capitalist industry fostered the building up of warship inventory, taking the new demands into account. All of this speeded up naval development, and at the turn of the 19th century permitted the naval role in political struggles and in military operations to be enhanced even further.
The main organizing force of the wars in the above period was the English bourgeoisie, which intended to seize France’s remaining colonial possessions. In this connection, England tried to transfer the weight of the battles on the continent to her European allies, while limiting her participation in the wars mainly to operations at sea and against France’s maritime territories.
It should be noted that the large bourgeoisie which came to power in France after the Thermidorian coup, also made it a primary task to reduce England’s colonial power. Bonaparte’s expedition into Egypt was undertaken for this purpose and with the future goal of seizing India. The French troops, which were transported across the sea unbeknownst to the English, began successful combat operations in Egypt. Within just two and a half months the English Fleet, under the command of Nelson, found the French warships anchored in Aboukir Bay and defeated them. The destruction of the French Fleet primarily affected the combat capability of that part of the army which was in Egypt and which turned out to be cut off from its main supply bases located in Europe. Moreover, it also affected the operations of the main forces of the French Army which, within six months of the defeat of the French Fleet at Aboukir, surrendered to the enemy, in a few months that which Bonaparte had won in his day in dozens of victorious battles. 7
Thus, the weakness of the French Fleet became one of the main reasons for the failure of the plans for the conquest of Egypt, the passage to India, and the curtailing of English colonial power, even though France had the necessary ground forces at its disposal.
Continuing the struggle, Napoleon decided to land a large landing force directly on the British Islands, for which 2,343 diverse transport ships were readied. It seemed that a fatal threat hung over England. However, the preparation for the invasion was delayed. An attack, initiated by Russian troops under the command of Kutuzov, forced Napoleon to abandon entirely the landing of a force in England.
On 21 October 1805 in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Spain, the battle of Trafalgar took place in which the English, under the command of Nelson, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Franco-Spanish Fleet. The significance of this battle, as well as the role of the English Fleet in the struggle with Napoleonic France, were actually great, but were exaggerated to an even greater degree by a Western European historiographer who asserted that "at Trafalgar not only the greatest naval victory was won, but also the greatest and most remarkable victory of all those won on land and at sea in the course of the entire revolutionary war. No single victory nor any series of victories by Napoleon had such an effect on Europe.”8
One cannot agree with this. As is well known, the struggle against Napoleon lasted many years and the main and decisive role in it was played by Russia, which destroyed the French Army in the Patriotic War of 1812. The victory gained by Russia actually had a greater effect on the political situation in Europe.
As for the Battle of Trafalgar, with respect to its consequences, it, of course, was not an ordinary military clash of fleets. After the series of defeats of the French Fleet, its final rout in this battle demonstrated France’s inability to carry on a battle at sea with an enemy having a more modern fleet consisting of better quality ships, manned by more highly trained personnel, and employing tactics which were new for that time. The main result of the victory achieved in the naval engagement was that the home country and the British colonies became practically invulnerable to attacks from the direction of the sea. England was able to deprive the enemy of the weapon which was most dangerous for her—the navy. Only a navy at that time could directly threaten the home country and the security of the communications connecting England with the colonies which supplied the raw materials for her industry and food products for the population. The liquidation of the threat from the sea freed the hands of the English bourgeoisie to organize and finance new alliances to continue the struggle with Napoleonic France. France, however, was forced to refrain once and for all from combat operations at sea and to seek other ways not connected with the sea to combat her main enemy.
Thus, the course of the war at sea and the gaining of domination by the English Navy had a great effect on the further policy of the belligerents.
From all that has been said, it follows that from the dawning of the capitalist era, the navies of the Western states have represented not only a part of the armed forces, which were employed in war in the naval theaters, but also a weapon of state policy in peacetime, which permitted them to enslave underdeveloped peoples and countries overseas and to transform them into their own colonies. The fleets of the Western European powers travelled the path from "privateers in the service of the King” to regular naval forces which received an organized structure and official operational tactics. The employment of this naval force in wars, especially when it was the main force in achieving the goals of the war, had a considerable influence on state policy, which was determined and conducted taking into account the disposition of the forces at sea at certain times.
Maritime states having great economic capabilities have widely used their naval forces in peacetime to put pressure on their enemies, as a type of military demonstration, as threats of interrupting sea communications, and as a hindrance to ocean commerce.
Navies have served these states as an important means of further enrichment and of extending expansion and colonization.
In addition, navies have also carried out the pleasant mission of being discoverers. Naval ships of the great powers, including Russia, have carried out wide-scale oceanographic studies and have made an inestimable contribution to the science of geography. This tradition of mariners (including also naval mariners) still continues even today, when the "blank spots” in the ocean are becoming fewer and fewer, yet the knowledge of the secrets of the ocean represents a very great scientific task even today.
1 V. I. Lenin. Poln. sobr. soch. (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 32, p. 9.
2 Leninskiy sbomik (Collection of Lenin’s Articles) XII, 2nd Ed., 1931, p. 437.
3V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 13, p. 374.
4K. Marx. Kapital, Vol. 1, 1949, p. 754.
5K. Marx. op. cit., Vol. 3, 1954, p. 345.
6V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 30, p. 7.
7 Ye. V. Tarle. Napoleon, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1957, p. 74.
8Fyffe’s History of Modern Europe, Vol. 1, p. 281.
Commentary
By Rear Admiral George H. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Since the early 1950s, the world has watched the Soviet Union build up its merchant and combat navies and break out into the Great Oceans in a comprehensive program of political, commercial and coercive penetration of less developed areas. Their overall approach is an updated version of that taken by the more successful, durable great powers of history. Particular effort has been funneled into three important geographic crossroads: Mediterranean-Suez- Arabian Sea; Southeast Asia-Straits of Malacca; and the Caribbean. Soviet actions appear to reflect systematic exploitation of strategic geography and the lessons of history to further their overseas interests.
Now we have the words of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov to confirm these carefully planned and executed actions.
In the opening paragraphs of this, the first of his 11 articles, Admiral Gorshkov points to the historic importance of the oceans in human affairs: communications between continents, between suppliers of products vitally essential to mankind; utilizing the water medium for peaceful purposes, for defense of one's own country and to seize overseas possessions. He calls attention to the fact that naval forces have a high degree of maneuverability; they can form powerful groups secretly which are of "surprise to the enemy."
Admiral Gorshkov and his countrymen know something about surprise attack. The Japanese fleet Opened the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 with a surprise attack on Port Arthur. In 1941, while German and Soviet leaders talked and signed treaties of friendship, cooperation and detente, the German army deployed secretly and launched the most devastating surprise attack in Russian history. The Soviet leadership remembers.
Admiral Gorshkov rejects the time-honored political and budget game of comparing numbers of ships of one type or another, in comparing relative naval strength. He suggests a more complex and accurate method of appraisal.
Final goals of armed conflict at sea are still regarded by the Admiral, as defeat of the enemy and destruction of his vital forces and material. Targets Specifically listed for destruction are ships with their crews and provisions, and weapons or shore objectives within range.
Lenin is quoted on the inseparable link between war and the political system from which it stems. He points out that national policy is the controlling factor; war is only a weapon. On the basis of what Leninism has achieved in the past 50 years, one might suggest that Lenin himself may be classed among the most successful strategists of recent history. His writings are of importance to those Americans who wish to know more about their principal competitors.
Admiral Gorshkov highlights the role of geography, and particularly the seas and the oceans, in influencing the character and direction of development of the armed forces, as well as human society. He discusses armed forces under the groupings Army and Navy, and he suggests how the place and role of each of the branches does change in peacetime and in war.
He points to "the special feature of the Navy as a military factor which can be used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military might of states beyond their borders. . . . it has been the solitary form of armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country overseas”. No comment is made on the stationing of land forces on foreign soil in peacetime.
Admiral Gorshkov says, ". . . it is impossible not to note how man’s ability to comprehend the ocean and to use it for his own needs directly affects the growth of the political prestige of the country and its economic and military might”.
In a very brief summary of "distant past” history, the author begins with this paragraph: "Navies have always played a great role in strengthening the independence of states whose territories are washed by seas and oceans since they were an important political weapon. Naval might has been one of the factors which has enabled certain states to advance into the ranks of the great powers. Moreover, history shows that states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power for a long time”.
He notes how civilization developed and flourished most often on the shores of seas and oceans; and how the large countries of Western Europe used their fleets ". . . to seize colonies, for the enslavement of peoples of entire continents and to plunder them. . . .”
The Soviets of course are also using their maritime fleets as a "weapon of state policy” for peacetime penetration of less developed areas. However, they package their own operations with more internationally palatable phraseology such as Trade Missions, Wars of National Liberation, and Peoples Democratic Republics.
It is important to remember that the advice and influence of Soviet maritime leadership are injected personally and directly at the highest political and security levels of the Soviet government.
Admiral Gorshkov is without doubt one of the foremost authorities on naval strategy of modern times. His writings should be studied as assiduously as European statesmen studied Alfred Thayer Mahan’s works during the years preceding World War I. They are of considerable importance in determining the nature and scope of the big-power competition to be expected in the years to come.
One can find very little if any material in this first installment which is not important. All of it is deadly serious.
After battleship, cruiser, and destroyer service prior to World War II and command of the USS Brennan (DE 13) in 1943, Read Admiral Miller lectured on seapower and maritime strategy while serving as plans officer at the Naval War College from 1947 to 1949. He was the Navy member of the joint strategic survey council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from I960 to 1962, and director of the Navy’s Long Range Objectives Group from 1964 to 1967. From 1967 to 1970 he served as Director of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Miller is now the Naval Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs.