Elsewhere in this 100th anniversary issue the nature and extent of a century of naval thinking and writing—as reflected principally in the Proceedings—have been reviewed and assayed in retrospect. From these assessments and examples the reader may reasonably conclude that naval professional thinking and writing—like the Navy itself—have experienced trends characterized by both crests of achievement and troughs of apathy. And as the reader considers these trends—the laudable and the lamentable—there may emerge a further conclusion: a profound regret that more observers were not moved to think and write on more aspects of their profession.
On that premise the remainder is made that the progress of the U: S. Navy in the next decades will be even more critically dependent upon the validity and durability of professional thinking and writing which, even now, must be forthcoming if, indeed, there is to be progress.
For the membership of the Naval Institute, two questions are then posed for consideration: How best can this century-old professional partnership between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Naval Institute continue to function in the coming decades? How may you, the members of the Naval Institute, who have traditionally represented a significant source of naval professional thinking and writing, make contributions which will equal and, hopefully, exceed those of your colleagues of the past?
Having asked the question, this observer suggests that the answers are contained in, respectively, the availability of suitable vehicles for presentation of naval thinking and writing, and the stimulation of good quality writing in sufficient quantity which will define and discuss naval and maritime problems that exist today and that will undoubtedly evolve in the future.
The fact that many publishing vehicles do exist becomes evident on noting, for example, that, since the publication of its third book An Aid for Executive and Division Officers in 1899, the Naval Institute has provided the sea services and related maritime professions a remarkably large and diverse assortment of books. In the early years, virtually all of them were handbooks and reference works for the professional Navy man, and textbooks for midshipmen and other officer candidates. Many of them were the ancestors of books that are in today's catalog—Notes on International Law, Naval Engines and Machinery, Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, The Watch Officers Manual, The Recruit’s Handy Book, and, of course, The Bluejacket’s Manual.
The mainstay of book publishing under the Institute's imprint has always been the professional book designed to educate or train Navy men in the ways of their work. The need for books of this kind has not diminished, for as the work becomes increasingly more complex and specialized, the need for sound, up-to-date professional books also increases. In the past, some of the most valuable books have come from individual authors, both inside and outside the naval services, who have drawn on their experience, their special talents, and their concern for "getting the word out."
And thus it is apparent that, now and in the years ahead, the Naval Institute and the Navy will need and continue to need new and fresh book ideas and proposals on every aspect of our national and individual involvement with seapower and maritime matters.
Perhaps in no other manner has the tradition of excellence of professional writing been so well sustained as in the Naval Institute's Prize Essay Contests. For, beginning in 1879, with Lieutenant Commander A. D. Brown's award-winning discussion of "Naval Education," the Essay Contests have been consistently impressive both for the names of the authors—whose subsequent professional careers often attained the highest levels—and for the significance of their writings, which have been widely quoted, debated, and discussed, even on the floors of Congress. The admirable record of this valuable aspect of-the Naval Institute's forum has helped to gain for it an international reputation as a medium for the expression of progressive professional thought.
The accomplishments of the Proceedings itself, as a forum for professional discussion needs little reemphasis here. For the potential contributor, however, there should be the awareness of the combination invitation and challenge extended by a journal which presents, each year, more than 200 major articles and Professional Notes. And except for those essays in the Naval Review, virtually none of these are solicited or obtained on assignment. Stated otherwise—and far more encouragingly for potential contributors—this simply means that, each month, there are some 100 pages available for the presentation of useful ideas. These "useful ideas," it is pointed out, may be developed, submitted, considered and published in a number of ways other than the well-known article format. The forum of the Naval Institute's Proceedings is equally available for the many contributions that range in variety from prize essay entries, prize photography entries, pictorials, comments on other's views, independent discussions of other facets of professional interest, book reviews, and even the widely-enjoyed "Old Navy" accounts and anecdotes which impart their own special flavor to Proceedings pages.
As to what to write about, the range of subject matter is, quite literally, as broad and as deep as the sea itself. And other than repeating that oldest of caveats, to write about what you know about, the writer should remember that, while the subject itself may understandably be an old, familiar one, the successful writer seeks not to offer a resifting of factors that merely provides a restatement, but to project forward the discussion of the subject.
Constructive criticism, innovative proposals—including those certain to be unpopular with some readers—are now and will continue to be sorely needed if we are to avoid the professional writer's Scylla and Charybdis of unconstructive rock-throwing on the one hand and unproductive preaching-to-the-choir on the other.
On the always-appropriate subject of controversy, most Proceedings readers will likely concede that their journal has long since established a reputation that is justifiably a matter of pride. A brief statement of that aspect of editorial policy would include the view of the Board of Control that it is less concerned with the matter of controversy than with the ability of the author to back up his opinions with facts, however at variance with S.O.P. they may be. Beyond that, the record of thoughtful, provocative discussions presented, along with the consistent interest accorded by the media, should provide for any potential contributor the assurance of an interested appraisal of all manuscripts submitted.
There is, then, ample evidence that the need for professional thinking and writing is greater than ever, and that the opportunity and encouragement for presenting that writing is also greater than ever before. Let us now consider a list of certain "things" which demand attention and which will not be resolved simply by the passage of time or by interim-measure Band-Aid solutions. Each reader will, of course, be able to think of additional subjects, equally important of consideration, in the months and years to come. Meanwhile, this listing may serve as a pump-primer, to direct professional attention along lines which may be productive of new approaches and new solutions to problems that, left unsolved, promise to impede the progress of the Navy as it assumes its new roles for the future.
Two major areas of concern come immediately to mind. First, there is the problem of strategic and critical materials. There is a bill now before Congress which reduces the size, scope, and value of our strategic and critical materials policy. In effect, it decreases to 49 the previously established 91 objectives on the critical and strategic list. The value of the stockpiles will be reduced by sales from $6.7 billion to the order of $730 million. The guidelines for the reduced stockpiles reflect an emergency of one-year duration involving both oceans. It assumes that supplies would be available from all sources except Communist countries and countries in the war zones. Shipping losses are assumed to be on the order of 3% in the Caribbean area and 5% for the rest of the world. The Office of Emergency Preparedness has been disbanded, and there remains no central point in our government where our strategic and critical material matters can be addressed in a coherent way.
Second, the critical energy shortage is becoming a matter of great concern, as is known to every motorist as he or she finds service stations closed and fuel rationing predicted. There is much evidence in the public domain that he will be increasingly dependent on overseas oil imports. What limitations can the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps live with?
Another problem area, as significant as it is appropriate to the Proceedings forum, is the lack of a central organization in our government for maritime matters. With the creation of the Department of Defense in 1941 and the Secretary of the Navy and CNO effectively displaced as principal advisors to the President, we have no central maritime authority within our government for pulling together all agencies concerned with our national maritime needs. The Navy Department is located in the tri-service Department of Defense; the Coast Guard is in the Department of Transportation; the Maritime Administration is in the Department of Commerce; the National Marine Fisheries Service is under NOAA in the Department of Commerce; and oceanic research is conducted by several departments. Many other agencies and interests such as seagoing labor unions, ship-owners, shipbuilders, and the critical and strategic materials business have no central contact point in the government. It is a strange anomaly that a nation so increasingly and directly dependent on seapower has its maritime affairs lo spread out and uncoordinated.
Other problem subjects, noted below, and well-meriting the interested, professional attention of Naval Institute members, are intended to suggest the broad spectrum of matters which should be considered, and hopefully, may evoke a spirited response, even from those who have not previously undertaken to write for publication.
(1) How do we resolve the conflicts between the unique organizational requirements of the Naval Service and the individual needs of those we need to achieve the organizational ends in a draft-free society?
(2) What has been the experience of other Free World nations with a draft-free situation and how might these lessons be applied to the Navy?
(3) Does the Navy have plans and methods for integrating itself with national social changes while still maintaining the capability and capacity for fulfilling its mission?
(4) How can we adapt modern social theory to serve the unique needs of the Navy, e.g., group dynamics, career education?
(5) If a single Service (such as the Canadians have instituted) were directed in the United States, what would be the Navy's role and how would it best be organized to fulfill its missions and tasks?
(6) How will we recruit and retain officers and enlisted men for the Navy in the all-Volunteer Force era? And, if a recent GAO study is correct that the Navy may not be able to recruit sufficient volunteers, what do we do? Do we lower our quality standards for recruits, or underman the Navy?
(7) What are the scenarios for the 1980s and 1990s for the Navy and what efforts do we have now to determine the requirements to play out those scenarios and the methods by which they might be played?
(8) What is the U. S. Navy's role in the nation's accommodation to the energy crisis?
(9) What might appear to be the optimum plan-pattern for U. S. Navy base-closures likely to be demanded during coming months/years? How will the Navy cope?
(10) What should be the realistic nature (force structure) of the postwar Navy (Built around two nuclear-nucleus Fleets)?
(11) In the postwar era, and once the now-developing TraCom concept is established, how does TraCom plan to retain a capabil~ty to expand or contract on signal? What requirements? What priorities?
(12) What are the maritime lessons to be learned from the Vietnam experience?
(13) What are the problems and prospects for undersea transport, specifically of oil, especially in time of war?
(14) How near are we to "environmental warfare"—e.g., the diversion of a storm toward enemy concentrations, the instigation of a new "ice age" on the enemy, the blacking out of the enemy's communications by artificially induced storms?
(15) What kind of nuclear power, what kinds of nuclear weapons will future generations be likely to become familiar with?
(16) In what ways must the Naval Academy, NROTC, AOCS, and OCS curricula be modified to produce the kind of officer needed to lead the enlisted men of the future—the volunteers?
(17) What possible shift of tasks/ capabilities will result from The Sea Control Ship concept; SES vehicles; VSTOL, etc.?
(18) What matters should be considered regarding the "6.5 Fleet" concept (Indian Ocean Fleet)?
(19) What should be the role of the Reserve in the upcoming decade(s) ? How can it fill the Quantity-Quality gap which the GAO report predicts?
(20) What will be the impact of the F-14/Phoenix Missileer concept on Fleet posture?
(21) What will be the impact of instantaneous communications (including TV) upon the traditional principle of on-scene command, when the White House itself can literally assume OTC of any combat unit at any spot on the globe? (The example of Pentagon War-Room intrusion into the bridges of the Maddox-Turner Joy promptly comes to mind).
(22) Assuming no revolutionary technical breakthrough can be expected, what areas of ASW should be reconsidered by every professional Navy man for the possibility of a yet-unexploited improvement?
(23) Will the Navy be given a specific area of responsibility in space—e.g., navigation, geodesy, and mapping—as opposed to merely vehicle recovery?
(24) How will the ships of the future be propelled and can we foresee the day when propulsion systems will have no moving mechanical parts?
(25) What will be the U.S. Navy's role in implementation of the foreign policy of the 1970s?
(26) Education and training efficiencies are being implemented. Do we need to overhaul our manpower planning and personnel management system to ensure the most efficient utilization of personnel, thereby gaining the greatest dividends on the education and training investment?
(27) How do we make effective use of manpower in any environment of reduced ships, people, funding, but with little commensurate reduction of tasks/missions?
(28) Describe the U. S. Navy's role in a SALT-free world.
(29) In the post-Vietnam retrenchment, is another "Hump" situation in prospect? If so, what can the individual do to improve his chances?
(30) The postwar U.S. Marine Corps—how much is enough?
(31) How will the Navy undertake to offset the depleting effects of a long-term war—i.e., how does present planning/ procurement intend to recover and replenish shelf-stocks and accomplish repairs, refurbishment made necessary because of a high, extended . wartime usage rate?
(32) Who will oversee and enforce the environmental regulations/ definitions that will result from law of the sea/sovereignty conferences still to occur? Example: will there be a sort of international Coast Guard-type force?
(33) What is the nature of the policy changes that will be necessary and compelled by the paradox of reduced ships/ men/ appropriations vis a vis increased tasks in the post-Vietnam years-at-sea/in-port periods; deployment lengths; overhaul/yard cycles; sea-duty tour lengths; overseas homeporting; Blue-Gold manning?
(34) What other command-at-sea equivalents might be considered in an era of reduced opportunity/eligibility?
Finally, for those who, still, may doubt the efficacy of the written word and the printed page, the suggestion is made to turn now to the cover of this special issue of the Proceedings, there to consider, again, the significance of the Naval Institute seal which depicts the professionally admirable combination of the pen and the sword, for a truly balanced forum. And for those who may soon join our century-old list of contributing authors—Welcome Aboard!