The Navy cannot perform its mission without aircraft, pilots, and maintenance personnel. This aeronautical need cannot be met if the forces are detailed from another corps in which the personnel are dependent for development technically and professionally, and for pay and promotion, upon such corps foreign to the Navy, and in which the material is dependent upon the decision of officials outside the Service. This responsibility for the national defense at sea is carried by officers of the Navy and cannot be shifted.
The employment of aircraft in war can be grouped into the following main divisions:
- Securing command of the air
- Scouting, reconnaissance, patrol, and photography
- Fire control, observation and spotting
- Protection of the fleet (smoke screens)
- Attack on enemy surface and sub-surface craft (illumination; bombs, torpedoes and guns; and gas attacks)
- Escort of convoys (submarines and mine search)
- Transportation
- Evacuation of the wounded
- Control of operations from the air
Of these, the first is the most important. There must be enough fighting planes to control the air. There must be enough scouts to keep informed of the enemy’s movements. Then, the rest of the carrying space available (considering one large plane carrier with the main body, one with the scouting force, and each capital ship carrying her own observation or spotting plane) can be given up to bombing and torpedo planes.
Aircraft as Projectiles. We might even class aircraft as projectiles in view of their limited range and endurance from their base. The base may be a plane carrier at sea and is thus analogous to the capital ship as an establishment for hurling projectiles against the enemy.
Considering aircraft in this light, their effect upon tactics can be estimated. The aeroplane is a projectile of much greater range than a shell or torpedo; capable of being aimed and controlled and, if not destroyed, returning to its base after attack, but also susceptible of being intercepted and stopped during its flight before it reaches its target. The obvious result is to greatly increase battle ranges. The enemy, however, also sends out aircraft to accomplish similar ends and a battle of projectiles thus ensues to determine whether either target shall be reached.
Carriers as Capital Ships. The greatly enhanced importance of the carrier becomes obvious, viewed not as an auxiliary, but as a capital ship in her own right with projectiles (aircraft) which far outrange those of the present battleships. From her very nature, and the requirements of aircraft she is to launch as projectile the carrier must be protected from enemy surface craft by battleships and other sea types. Accordingly, we must recognize the advent of the new type of capital ships without discarding the old, and the backbone of the modern fleet will consist of both types—the carrier and the battleship. It is evident that these two types will become the prime target for attacks by destroyed submarines, and aircraft. It cannot be seen from above that the broad principles of naval warfare have been upset, merely that the tactics have been altered by the introduction of the third dimension to hostile operations. In the future, command of the sea and air must go hand in hand, but it must be kept in mind that as long as planes are of short endurance and limited striking power there is an absolute need for the battleships.
Securing command of the air, then, is analogous to an action between light surface forces to get local command of such area as to permit reconnaissance or attacks upon the enemy main force.
Securing Command of the Air. To secure command of the air, the enemy’s aircraft must be destroyed or driven out of the air. To accomplish this an absolute number of pursuit or fighting planes suitably armed must be provided.
Scouting: Reconnaissance and Patrol. The chief care should be to scout the assigned areas thoroughly, leaving no unsearched spots, and to this end as well as to pick up the mother ship again, the greatest attention must be paid to navigation. For long distance, scouting aircraft are far superior under good weather conditions to surface ships. This is on account of the greater speed and vision of aircraft which enables them to cover an area many times larger than the area a surface vessel can cover in the same time.
As to photography, the plane is well suited since it can take a great many shots from different angles very rapidly.
Fire Control, Observation and Spotting. Aircraft have many advantages in this type work inasmuch as they can spot fall of shot at any range, are not interfered with by blast, vibration, spray, or enemy gunfire. They can spot over smoke screens, mist, and the shipboard horizon. The great disadvantage of planes is that they must be kept going at high speed throughout the entire time which, in a prolonged action when reliefs cannot he furnished, subjects personnel to great strain. Communications in spotting should be by radio-telephone because of its quickness and accuracy.
There is a type of aircraft thus far little developed which promises to be ideal for spotting owing to its ability to hover and ease of handling on board ships. This is the helicopter.
Protection of the Fleet. Protection of the fleet could be enhanced by use of aircraft in scouting to advise of the approach of the enemy, laying of protective smoke, and attacking enemy units.
Attack on Enemy Surface and Subsurface Craft. Attack on enemy forces may be made by planes employing bombs, torpedoes, and guns. However, it will be absolutely vital to land the first attack on the opposing fleet for the same reasons that apply to early hits in surface gunnery actions. Air attacks must be made as frequently and in as great a force as possible well protected by fighter aircraft.
Escort. This includes escorting fighting ships as well as convoys. Here, aeroplanes are useful primarily against submarines and enemy aircraft.
Transportation. Personnel and small, vitally needed articles may also be air-transported as the most serviceable means.
Evacuation of Wounded. This operation is within the ability of aircraft to perform, but consideration must be given to landing fields and the limited number of personnel that could be handled this way.
Control of Operations from the Air. Future operations may indicate the necessity of the commander being embarked in aircraft in order to get a proper appreciation of the battle problem. In fact, it is conceivable that the major action may be fought in the air with surface craft as the auxiliary force.
Comment
This article predicts with accuracy and few exceptions, the roles of aircraft as they actually developed in World War II. Even the exceptions were, and are not today, necessarily invalid. The author mentions gas warfare for instance. Poison gas was not used; but had it been, the method of delivery would probably have been by aircraft, if we may judge by what was done with atomic weapons in that struggle. His advocacy of control of operations from a command center in an aeroplane is a similar case. This means of command was seldom if ever employed in the sense that is indicated by the writer, but the idea is not dead.
In reference to the part the carrier would play in hostilities, it is apparent that the forecast of its becoming a capital ship was fulfilled in the actions at Coral Sea, Midway, and the First Battle of the Philippine Sea, as well as a score of other engagements. However, the temperate view held in the case of the battleship also proved out. The “wagons” paid for themselves at Savo Island and Surigao against their opposite numbers in the Japanese Navy. Both types complemented each other in the vast majority of operations where the long-range strikes of the carrier aircraft were backed up by the big guns and antiaircraft batteries of the dreadnoughts.