Practically no discussion of the role of aircraft in naval warfare has touched upon the influence of a campaign by operations against a fleet in port.
Such disproportionate attention to war by fleets at sea instead of attacks on ships in ports seems unwarranted when it is considered that fleets underway are, or should be, at a maximum condition of security since the purpose of a fleet is to fight at sea. Therefore, a fleet in port is not at a maximum defensive posture and hence, is more vulnerable to attack than when underway.
When a fleet is in a known port, an enemy may choose the time for an attack; he may concentrate his air forces, and would need only minimum scouting to precede the action. Contrast this with having one’s opponent at sea where a large effort must be made to locate him and time and concentration of one’s own forces may not be available.
Bearing a relation to the time factor is the ability of the enemy to extend his hours of attack to periods of darkness against ships in port. This is so since night attacks at sea are hard to conduct in view of the visibility and navigational problems of aircraft. That is, it is hard to see a force underway at night from an aircraft if the force is blacked out, and of course the navigational problems concerned with locating the target fleet are immense. Not so, though, with a fleet in port since navigation is reduced to fixing a geographical position which under normal conditions, is not difficult for airplanes, and, since the targets are immobile, flares may be dropped for illumination thus solving the lighting problem.
On the tactical side, the disadvantages of a fleet in port are lack of mobility, which operates to ease the fire-control problem of the attackers (since course and speed are eliminated), and also the fact that the targets have lost their ability to evade bombs and torpedoes.
Next, the disposition of a fleet in port is more liable to be the result of hydrographic and logistical considerations rather than tactical. Hence the defensive cohesiveness of a fleet at sea, with its defensive anti-aircraft screens, will be missing. Also, the batteries may be masked by other ships, cranes, buildings, and the like. There is also the logistical angle to be considered. The basic reason for a fleet putting into port is to ready itself for sea again by refueling, rearming, making repairs and other operations which for the time being reduce its fighting efficiency. Concomitant is the personnel problem wherein surcease from the rigors of sea duty is expected by crews when in port. This aspect would be chiefly lost if large numbers were required to remain on board to man the air defense battery in expectation of attack. Past history indicates the advantages to be gained by attacking a fleet in port through bold and resourceful measures. The chief difference between past and present threats lies in the fact that the solution to each menace to the fleet was fairly obvious. Shore batteries have kept heavy ships at bay and mine fields the submarine, for example. The air menace, however, cannot be defeated so easily. It must be destroyed at its source rather than over the fleet base that is the goal of the attack.
We may rule out attacks by land-based aircraft since it has long been obvious that a fleet base is vulnerable if located within range of such airplanes. Therefore, it follows that the serious threat comes from aircraft on board carriers. Accordingly, the safety of the fleet demands that such mobile bases be detected and destroyed before they are able to launch their attacks.
As to the weapons of the attacker, he may employ aerially launched torpedoes, if the harbor is not too restricted in size and, in any event, bombs.
Naval base defenses, then, must extend considerably beyond the immediate vicinity of the anchorage and to the outer limit from which hostile carrier planes are able to attack. This calls for the maintenance of a large and continuous search effort by defending aircraft, many defensive fighters, and numbers of shore-mounted anti-aircraft batteries.
For illustrative purposes, let us apply the foregoing to the defense of an island base at least 2,000 miles from the hostile mainland. Assume that 400 miles is the maximum distance from which an attack against the base may be launched. With 12 hours of darkness and an enemy carrier speed of 30 knots, we must cover a circle with a 760-mile radius from our base each day prior to sunset. This would only allow us to ascertain if hostile carriers were in a position to launch attacks prior to daylight next morning. Such an effort on our part would of course require many patrol planes. In addition, we would need an aerial striking force with sufficient power and speed to reach and destroy the enemy before they could launch their strikes.
In discussing the above, it is the writer’s belief that, despite many hazards and risks, any potential enemy would consider our fleet as the prime target of an extensive long-range, over-water operation since the number of planes he could employ against other targets, such as our cities and factories, would be too small to materially hurt us commensurate with the risk of losing his vital fleet air-arm either before or after such attack. To risk the loss of such a vital part of his fleet by using it against any objective other than our fleet would constitute a blunder unexcelled by any in naval history.
Comment
The excellence of Lieutenant Commander Ramsey’s logic is attested to by the crippling aircraft strikes made against warships in port in World War II. Taranto and Pearl Harbor are probably the most famous, but there were many others.
The splendid Taranto operation was conducted by the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm on the night of 11 November 1940. Well-timed and executed, despite their obsolete planes, the British so damaged the Italian Navy that the course of war in the Mediterranean was altered.
Perhaps the Japanese learned more from the Taranto affair than any other nation.
It seems fair to say then, that Ramsey’s thinking was representative of a sound concept, possibly developed independently by others, that had an important bearing on the outcome of the war.