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Admiral N. N. Amelko, one of the leading officers of the Soviet Navy, is shown at a ceremony on Soviet Navy Day in 1967, when he was commander-in-chief of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Now 58 years of age, he is a likely candidate for the position of First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy when that post is vacated by Admiral of the Fleet V. A. Kasatonov. The position of First Deputy can be equated roughly to that of CNO in the U. S. Navy or First Sea Lord in the Royal Navy.
T
JL he "Great Patriotic War” which brought such acclaim to Soviet arms found the Soviet Navy at a de- pressingly low point in its fortunes. The nature of the war had effectively deprived Soviet sailors of both big- ship experience and the handling of large-scale operations, since Soviet naval forces had operated almost exclusively as the seaward extension of the land battle- fronts and even within those same fronts in the form of the river flotillas, such as those on the Volga or the Danube. Naval manpower was expended heavily in the guise of infantry brigades fighting, frequently with distinction, in the great sieges of Leningrad, Odessa, and Sevastopol, and in the defense of Moscow. The destroyer force was consumed in coastal support operations or sunk in harbor. Submarines were either bottled up in the Baltic or used in desperate supply runs in the Black Sea, fighting in anything like their true role only in the northern theater. Naval aviation employed its fighters on the land fronts and only latterly launched its strike aircraft against a fleeing and disorganized enemy afloat. As for gains, in 1945, the Soviet Navy could scarcely regard its rag-bag collection of trophy enemy warships as any kind of structured or balanced force, although the acquisition of the Type XXI U-boat was certainly a technological windfall. Badly overloaded and barely seaworthy, the half- constructed prototype German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin sank under tow in the Baltic.
It was nonetheless at this juncture, amidst the uncertainties of a changing strategic environment, that the
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new found "peace” carried with it (at least by Sov# reckoning) a major maritime threat involving a possiW seaborne assault aimed against Soviet coasts. If tb! Soviet Army could fight the land battle in Europe, thd the Soviet Navy must be made fit to counter the thre»: against the homeland from the sea—a task for whit* Stalin himself lent his personal weight and prestige[l the Navy, affording it a high priority in resources. Bb he, in the process, even with what looked like a bif ship policy, tied it as tightly as ever to its coast1 confines.
The postwar building program assumed impressi'1 proportions, but the operational concepts underlyiflf it bordered on the absurd. Alongside the "fleet i11 being” Stalin amassed his fortress fleet; while "«# mand of the sea” became synonymous with "contm of the coast;” and the Navy inevitably was confirm^ in its role as a "mere assistant to the Army.” Somewh*1 later, with Stalin gone to his reward, Admiral Scrg( Gorshkov savagely derided this confused concep1 which, somehow, supposed that a powerful enemy to be brought, or would indeed bring itself all uff wittingly, into the inshore zones simply in order be destroyed by a defensive force of submarines, surfa1 vessels, shore-based aviation, and coastal defend Within such an operational framework, and again*1 such a background, the Soviet Navy could never asp'1* to an independent naval mission. It is to the profB sional credit of Soviet naval commanders that, for r the distortions and warped strategic notions of d'1 postwar Stalinist period, they never lost sight of tF independent naval mission as a necessary operation*1 reality.
For all practical purposes, Stalin’s Flottenpolitik pass^ away with him and none too soon for the Soviet NaV) In July 1954, with the wicked autocrat not long 1,1 the ground, a new plan for "transforming the arm* ments of the Navy” was adopted, envisaging a na'! with a submarine fleet as its main basis. The Defense Minister, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, was n1’ friend of the big fleet idea, but he did at least ackno"1 edge the increased significance of naval theaters in an! future war; though small, this was a useful advan^ in notions about naval power and its value. On other hand, the new leader, Nikita Khrushchev set o'1' with radical fervor to curb the appetite of the "met^ eaters” in the Navy, abruptly scrapping previous pla*11 and displacing former commanders without furth^ ado. Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov along with his cruise1* was consigned to the scrap heap, to be replaced wi1' Gorshkov and his missiles.
The Soviet Navy perforce had to move with times, and the main threat was now envisaged as arisinl from surprise attack by nuclear weapons. In terms 0
The Soviet Naval High Command 69
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naval operations, this meant countering the aircraft carrier rather than massive invading armadas. The advent of the cruise missile promised both relief for the naval program—relief from a crushing building burden and in that an effective navy could be raised, offsetting inferiority with a plentitude of missiles serving surface ships, naval aircraft, and submarines. Surface units there might well be, but no longer large ones. Naval aviation was summarily stripped of its fighters (which went to the Air Defense Command enjoying its newly won status as an independent arm of the Soviet forces) and entrusted instead with big aircraft carrying antishipping missiles. However crudely, the submarine also was adapted as a missile-launcher. The results, when realized, were in their own way formidable. Here was a technological revolution in its own right, but it came to fruition after another revolution propelled with even greater momentum—the improvement in the range of American carrier-borne aircraft and the concurrent emergence of the Polaris submarine.
To counter the aircraft carrier and to circumvent the Polaris submarines now meant not only re-equipping ships and reviewing weapons systems, but also moving precipitately out of the confines of the four fleet areas and on to the high seas. It was not simply that the potential enemy would no longer come within range of a coastal battle to be fought at the convenience of the Soviet forces; he could now stand off at great range and avoid that encounter for which the newer Soviet units had been designed in a combination of surface, submarine, and air attack. There was no option but to go out and meet the threat which meant advancing the maritime frontiers of the Soviet Union.
Caught between the traditionalism of the Soviet military establishment in general and the eccentric exuberance of Nikita Khrushchev in particular, Admiral Gorshkov picked his way with great care. Supported by a whole eskadra of Soviet admirals safely in retirement, he deftly turned Khrushchev’s main argument against him, repeating in all political dutifulness that submarines may be the "main striking force,” but adding the rider that they require "comprehensive combat support.” Much turned on that term "comprehensive.”
Against heavy political odds, Gorshkov mustered substantial support for a better balanced naval force, which included large surface ships. At the same time he diligently propounded the concept of the naval mission as such. He was assisted in this enterprise by the threat of the Polaris submarine and improvements in the carrier-based striking force which drew the Soviet Navy out of the internal seas and into the ocean theaters, albeit for defensive purposes. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and its maritime backdrop also played into the hands of the naval leadership, illustrating as it did the
dangers of undue reliance on a single weapon system, the inherent disadvantages of over-simplification, and the calamitous consequence of attempting short-cuts to superiority.
With half a dozen nuclear submarines of its own under construction, the naval command could also begin pressing the concept of its strategic mission and thereby embark on a struggle which was of vital importance for the future of the Navy. Thus it was that, in 1963, after overcoming what evidently was an ingrained predilection to think only in terms of a defensive role for submarines, the missile-firing submarine joined the Strategic Missile Forces and Long-Range Aviation as a component of the Soviet long-range nuclear strike forces. The attainment of full and assured status for the navy was bedevilled for some time to come by technological failures and shortcomings. It was not until 1968 that the Soviet Navy embarked without further hindrance on the build-up of a major SSBN force, using the new Y-class submarines as its mainstay.
With these new additions, the Soviet Navy emerged as it is today, strong in surface ships, as well as in submarines, and naval aircraft. This force has provided and will continue to provide an ability to participate in many forms of activity both in peace and in war. As its contribution to Soviet strategic strike forces the Soviet Navy disposes of 560 SLBMs in 61 submarines. Twenty of these boats are SSBNs, each armed with 16 SS-N-6 missiles, a further 10 SSBNs and 16 diesel submarines are fitted with three SS-N-5 missiles each, and 15 more diesel submarines are armed with pairs or triplets of SS-N-4 missiles. In addition, there are 60 submarines armed with cruise-missiles (35 of these submarines are nuclear-powered), 235 attack submarines, 25 nuclear-powered and 210 diesel-powered. The surface ships include two helicopter ASW cruisers, three classes of missile-armed cruisers (Kresta-II, Kresta-I, and Kynda classes), a dozen ships in all, with a similar number of older, larger, gunnery cruisers, seven classes of missile-armed destroyers totalling about 40 ships, with about 60 older destroyers without missiles, and a large number of smaller surface ships, including over 100 ocean-going escorts, over 200 coastal escorts, several hundred FPBs, many with missiles, several hundred minesweepers, and 105 landing ships for amphibious operations.
To this must be added the naval air force, except for a few helicopters all based ashore, of over 1,000 aircraft (including 300 Tu-16 bombers armed with antishipping missiles and 100 ASW aircraft), and the naval infantry (morskaya pekhota) mustering some 15,000 officers and men.
Commensurate with this expansion and diversification has been the growth of a significant support fleet,
specialist research, experimental, and intelligence vessels and naval auxiliaries, not to mention the steady expansion of the Soviet merchant marine and the continued investment in a massive fishing fleet on the scale of a giant seafarming industry.
At first sight, the basic organization of the Soviet Navy would appear to be little different from that which prevailed some two decades ago, with the four main fleet areas (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific) and the three main inland waterways flotillas (Danube, Azov, Caspian, and Amur). But, in truth, nothing could be more deceptive. An unadventurous stationing of ships along the coast has given way to an emphasis on deployment of the submarines in the Northern and Pacific fleets, from which they can best reach the central oceans, to the standing squadron (eskadra) or mini-fleet in the Mediterranean, to intensified naval activity in the Caribbean and to peacetime naval deployment in areas such as the Indian Ocean.
While the prime naval mission has been to counter the direct threat posed to the Soviet homeland by Western maritime strike capability (and the Soviet Navy has developed roughly in proportion to the increase in Western reliance on seaborne weapon systems), the Soviet naval command with admirable professional persistence has pressed diligently for that elixir of Soviet naval being, the independent naval mission. It requires little demonstration to show that this has been far from easy, complicated as it was by the inescapable fact of overall naval inferiority and made increasingly intricate by the impact of an all-consuming technological revolution. Yet, despite all its vicissitudes, the Navy’s role has changed from its old one of being that branch of the Soviet armed forces most frequently and disastrously purged, to a position in which it has come to enjoy an unprecedented stability of command.
All this spells transition and promises further transformation. Much has been achieved by the present naval command, which is itself in a transitional phase in terms of its experience, organization, outlook, professional skills, and personal cohesion; and in terms of the continuity of policy and of the navy’s emplacement within the Soviet military system as a whole.
High Command, Fleet Organization and Officer Structure:
Ranking as the second largest navy in the world, the Soviet Navy presently musters somewhere in the region of half a million men, the numerical inexactitude arising from the difficulty of identifying all branches and services (including extensions into the mercantile marine), as well as auxiliaries and bodies such as the "water guard,” not to mention the Naval
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Air Force with a strength ranging from 75 to 100,000; out of this norm of 500,000, some 50,000 represenf officers and officer cadets (kursanty). In round figures, the four Soviet fleets probably break down to 100,000 men for the Northern Fleet, 140,000 for the Baltic,
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120.0 for the Black Sea and some 130,000 for the Far East, a total of 490,000 men; to this must be added the strength of naval aviation, estimated in the region of 75,000 men (with an upper figure of 100,000). Those serving afloat number about 200,000 (approximately1 3:1 ratio in favor of those ashore, allowing for a gene1' ous addition of logistics and auxiliary personnel). W addition, however, it is necessary to take into accoufl1 coast defense and other activity ashore, which coul^ subsume another 200,000 men, though this would iff elude men from other services and civilian elements. Thf naval infantry component may reach well above the
15.0 of its unit strength (to some 25,000 at least! and there remains the question of estimating flotilh strengths, complicated by the fact that the Caspi^ flotilla (based on Astrakhan and Baku) may well funC tion as a training force, particularly for submarine^ In any event, flotillas come under the operational coil1' mand of the local ground forces (military district! commander and might thus be discounted from nav^ strength pure and simple.
Finally, under land forces and echelons, the Sovk1 Navy disposes, in addition to the naval infantry, ol naval assault pioneers (frogmen, and other inshot* underwater specialists), coast defense troops (from th Ground and Air Defense Forces), and rear service (logistics). Though naval infantry and assault pioneO1 come under naval command, they are organized on th lines of the ground forces.
The coast defense forces have been largely S equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air m1! siles, though in the air defense role, they overlap th‘ Air Defense Command (PVO Strany). Coastal defend also comprises Ground Forces (Army) motorized rit^ regiments which fall under naval operational contre' The rear services include naval base commands specialist supply services, as well as maintenance, repf'1 and salvage branches, with a growing emphasis 0< afloat support. It includes both naval and civilian sonnel.
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In its present form, the command, administratis and military-political organization of the Soviet dates back some 20 years, to the re-organization of ^ Ministry of Defense in 1953. Along with the co^ manders of the other four arms of the Soviet fof^ (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense, "Strategy Missiles), the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet N»v' is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defe^ with the Commandcr-in-Chief in turn being assist
The Soviet Naval High Command 71
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in his duties by a First Deputy Commander-in-Chief.
Immediately subordinate to the C-in-C and his First Deputy is the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, followed by the head of the Naval Political Administration (who, in addition to being responsible to the C-in-C, is also responsible, through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, to the Military Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) and the Naval Soviet. The latter is a collegiate body, presided over by the C-in-C or the First Deputy, or, in select occasions, by the head of the Naval Political Administration, which appears to act in a purely consultative role. Precisely as is the case in other arms *n the Soviet military establishment, it appears to lack both operational and command authority. It provides
the conjunction of naval-professional and naval political leadership; its functions are advisory and admonitory. It reviews morale and the state of combat training, and concerns itself with such matters as "socialist emulation” (competitiveness). The Chief of the Main Naval Staff, whose duties and appointment are most readily identifiable with non-Soviet naval organizations, is responsible for operations, training and intelligence, though he is not empowered to sign orders on behalf of the C-in-C himself.
The head of the Naval Political Administration, assisted by his own First Deputy and Deputy head, is responsible for discipline and general conditions of service within the naval forces. In common with the other branches of the Soviet forces, the Political Ad-
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ministration also aids in promoting combat readiness, in assisting training, and in carrying out a welfare function. Finally, the line of direct command or control from the C-in-C to the fleets, flotillas, and squadrons, includes as well the central administration, the Main Naval Staff, the naval educational administration, the naval infantry, the naval air force, and the rear services.
By appointment, status, and precedence, the first deputy commander is senior to the chief of staff; still, some first deputies are not assessed as the really "bright boys” and the chief of staff may impress himself on others more effectively. The rapid rotation among officers in chief of staff billets suggests heavy pressure on personnel and an attempt to pick out the bright ones.
The deputy commanders in the central administration—probably some ten or so—usually are lower in rank and status than the chief of staff. But occasionally in the fleet commands, depending on personalities, some of the hierarchy of deputy commanders may tower over the chief of staff. Not in the Northern Fleet, however, whose current chief of staff is professionally a formidable personage.
The four Soviet Fleet commands incorporate this same type of organization at their own level, with a C-in-C, a head of Fleet Political Administration and a Fleet naval soviet made up of these two senior officers plus the chief of staff. The command is completed with a First Deputy and a Deputy C-in-C, as well as, more recently, a Deputy C-in-C for Rear Services. The Fleet itself is made up of seagoing units, forces ashore, aviation, hydrographic and weather services, bases and support facilities, dockyards, schools, and training establishments. The component ashore includes coast defense forces (missiles and troops) as well as naval infantry. The logistics command ("Rear Services”) as such seems to be concerned most immediately with the supply and replenishment of seagoing units—the preparation and support of long-distance cruises, for example-while the base command administers and operates the depots, docks, harbor installations, and the like with its own dockyard labor force, part of which is semi-militarized. There is nothing like this in British or American practice.
The Flotillas, operating on inland waterways, have the same naval and Party-political command, and a staff organization and services on a scale corresponding to their smaller size and miniaturized forces.
In general descriptive terms, therefore, the Soviet naval high command can be divided into two categories, the centralized command and staff, together with the fleet commands and their supporting arms and services. The apex of the command is distinguished by a unique rank, that of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, held presently by—and only by—the
for tl rank: of thi deput and n of thi vice-a men : tion. alsob but t portai tweer comn admit mand schoo In at the tively down the di graded logist promi Bochl in the Bel group at the tion, experi the hi In select to kee the fc the A: forme are ec acquit a fran Th. appeal Urge is also ing be sions The e ^ith t a leve accept shipm, frainir
C-in-C, S. G. Gorshkov, who took over from Kuznetsov late in 1955* and has thus occupied this post for the astonishing period of some 17 years (though it should be remembered that Gorshkov was only in his mid- forties when he became C-in-C). The post of First Deputy Commander, currently held by V. A. Kasatonov, carries with it the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, an elevation also extended in 1969 to the C-in-C of the Northern Fleet (at that time Admiral Semen M Lobov) and to the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, N. D. Sergeyev. The most obvious explanation of these promotions in grade is that they were designed to give the naval command parity in rank with its opposite numbers in the Soviet strategic forces, and also to acknowledge the leading role of the Northern Fleet Below Admiral of the Fleet come the rankings of admiral, vice-admiral, and rear-admiral, in the conventional fashion.
Similarly, the head of the navy’s Political Adminis- tration, V. M. Grishanov, has been invested with the rank of admiral. Grishanov, who has shown a durability in his post not unlike that of Gorshkov himself, tool1 over his post in 1958. The chief of naval logistics, G. G. Oleinik, holds his post with the rank of admiral The engineer-in-chief, whose authority encompass^ ship design and procurement, is Engineer Admiral P. G. Kotov. (The present Soviet fleet is largely th£ achievement of Gorshkov and Isachenkov, Kotov; predecessor, who died quite recently.) The commande* of support ships and the salvage and rescue fleet is a” engineer rear-admiral.
Naval aviation takes air force ranks and is present!) headed by Marshal of Aviation 1. I. Borzov. Th£ aviation commanders in the Baltic and Pacific fleets ah° carry the rank of colonel-general though the preset11 aviation commander in the Black Sea is as yet only a major-general, a sign perhaps of his relative ine*' perience.
The head of naval medical services also carries 1 non-naval ranking and is currently a major-gene^ (medical services). Similarly, the naval infantry carri^ army titles and is commanded by a major-general. Tl>£ naval educational and training establishment is pf£* ently headed by Vice-Admiral I. M. Kuznetsov, is responsible both to the naval command and to d* Main Administration for Military Educational Estd’’ lishments (VUZY) within the Ministry of Defend under General I. N. Shkadov of the Ground Forc^
The foregoing illustrates both the nature of ^ interlocking directorate within the centralized co® mand and its immediate administrative apparatus.
* Admiral Gorshkov relinquished his Black Sea Fleet command in 1955 and was officially named C-in-C on 5 January 1956.
The Soviet Naval High Command 73
for the fleet commands, these again are replicas of the rank and command structure within the highest reaches of the Soviet Navy. The C-in-C is an admiral, his first deputy is a vice-admiral, with variations for seniority and responsibility among the chiefs of staff. The heads of the separate Fleet political administrations are also vice-admirals, though again this must vary as younger men are appointed and then await one step in promotion. As in England, senior naval base commanders can also be full admirals—witness 1.1. Baikov in Leningrad— but these seem to differ in proportion to the importance of the facilities. Flotilla commands vary between rear- and vice-admiral rankings. Finally, command of the Naval Academy devolves upon an admiral, presently A. Ye. Orel who was formerly commander of the Baltic Fleet, and the principal naval schools are headed by rear-admirals at least.
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In general, commander and first deputy commander at the fleet level are admiral and vice-admiral respectively, with the political administration "stepped down” one rank, to vice- and rear-admiral (and with the deputy chief being not infrequently a captain 1st grade). There seems to be a tendency to upgrade the logistics officers, a recent example of which is the promotion of the Black Sea Fleet logistics chief, M. Bochkarev, from captain 1st grade to rear-admiral
the summer of 1972.
Before discussing the singularities of this command group, it is essential to take a somewhat broader look at the structure of the naval officer corps, since selection, education, specialization and differing types of experience all would seem to play their part in shaping dre high command.
In many respects, the Soviet naval officer is a very select fellow and there appears to be every intention t0 keep him so. Officer selection begins in practice with 'be four Nakhimov schools, the naval equivalent of rbe Army’s Suvorov schools, where the sons of officers, former officers, other naval personnel and senior officials art educated from the age of seven onwards. They acquire a sound secondary school education, but within a framework of military discipline and association.
Though the intake from the Nakhimov schools aPpears to fill up the manpower requirement in very Jarge measure, entrance to the officer schools proper Js also open to candidates without previous naval train- lng between the ages of 17 and 21 with special extends for promising candidates up to the age of 23. ^be entrance examinations follow a common pattern, ^*th the emphasis on mathematics (if not too advanced a fovel) as well as on Party and Soviet history. Once accepted, the successful candidates (kursanty, or mid- sb‘pmen) pass through six or eight weeks of basic lining and then proceed to their four-year naval
schools, the most prestigious of which is the Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad, the alma mater of many of the present Soviet naval high command and where rigorous selection ensures that only about one in ten of the applicants is admitted. Other general duties officers will go to the higher naval schools in Kaliningrad, in Baku (the Kirov school), in Sevastopol (the Nakhimov school) or in Vladivostok (the Makarov school). The significance of the designation "higher military/naval school” also merits some further explanation. Ordinary or secondary military schools in the Soviet Union embody a 3-year course of study and turn out officers qualified as technicians, whereas the "higher military/naval school” puts the kursanty through a 4-year or 5-year course and graduates the officer not merely with a professional emblem befitting his status as a graduate of a higher military/naval school (a badge worn on the breast-pocket) but also with a recognized degree, namely, the "All-Union diploma in engineering.” All naval schools now belong to the "higher” category and provide for a 5-year course of instruction and education, resulting in officers with this graduate status.
The list of Soviet higher naval schools, which is set out below, also indicates the range of specialist schools:
Frunze HNS (Higher Naval School) Submarine navigation HNS Pacific Makarov HNS Caspian Kirov HNS Kaliningrad HNS Black Sea Nakhimov HNS Popov Radio-electronic HNS
Dzerzhinskii Naval Engineering HNS Leningrad Naval Engineering HNS
Sevastopol Naval Engineering HNS
Officers who have opted for the political branch go to the Higher Naval-Political School in Kiev. Engineer officer-cadets, though they have already elected to become naval engineers, undergo a joint course for engineers and naval architects in the Dzerzhinskii higher naval engineering school, delaying their final specialization until a later stage in their careers. Candidates who have opted for naval aviation attend a pilot-training school at Nikolayev, the aviation-technician training school at Perm, and the signals school in Novaya Ladoga. Once having selected his specialist branch, however, the fledgling officer is rigidly bound to it. He will stay within the educational orbit assigned to him and will only under very rare circumstances be allowed to switch.
Thus, annually, 1,500 men are commissioned (avia-
tors, naval infantry and medical officers excepted) with the junior rank of mladshii leitenant, two hundred of whom come from the Frunze Naval School. Engineers and other specialists carry their branch identification with their rank prefaced by, for example, inzhener. After a short post-commissioning period of service with an operational naval unit—ship, shore establishment, or naval air arm—the junior officer proceeds afresh to school for further specialized training. Depending on his branch or specialization, he might go to the artillery schools in Murmansk, Sevastopol or Tuapse, the radar school in Arkhangelsk, or the Naval Infantry School in Viborg. Naval logistics officers attend the Rear Services School in Leningrad, while it seems that officers requiring merchant marine training for the replenishment and supply fleet attend the higher marine schools run for the Soviet Merchant Marine—the Leningrad engineering school, the Engineering Institute in Odessa and the marine schools in Rostov, Vladivostok, and also Odessa. The next stages of his career take him through the categories of leitenant rank—from mladshii leitenant (or ensign), to leitenant (lieutenant, j.g.), starshii leitenant and kapitan-leitenant (full lieutenant), after which comes kapitan 3-go ranga (lieutenant-commander, or major, if he is following a branch with ground forces or air force ranks). Under the law on military service introduced in 1967 and promulgated in 1968, the retirement ages for all officer ranks in the Soviet armed forces were carefully stated and specifically codified, in order to overcome that abuse of apparent endless service which left the military establishment with such a surplus of old men. Now a lieutenant must go out at the age of 40, and a senior lieutenant, a kapitan-leitenant, and a kapitan 3-go ranga at 45. A kapitan 2-go ranga (commander) must leave at 50 and a full naval captain (kapitan 1-go ranga) at 55. Rear- and vice-admirals must retire at 60 and full admirals and admirals of the fleet at the age of 65.
Obviously, not all officers become admirals. The question of who achieves flag rank and why will be examined in the subsequent section, but it is clear that the question of specialization at almost all levels plagues the manpower planners of the Soviet Navy. To man the ever-more complex ships of the fleet, the flow of trained specialists must be maintained, but a navy with its eye on global horizons also has urgent need of men with wider outlooks. Hence, the promotional processes which, on the one hand, encourage specialist training and, on the other, the officer with a sound ideological background, an adequate technical grounding, and that oceanic cast of mind which is presently at a premium. The latter is presumably the concern of the academy level of education for senior officers, as opposed to the tactical training and com
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mand courses which are still confined within the narrow training and testing of the Soviet naval officer Formerly, at the senior level the educational process was split along the lines of branch specialization, with command officers going to the Naval Academy, engineers to the Krylov Engineering/Ship Construction Academy, and the political officers to the Lenin Military-Political Academy for their two-year course Since I960, however, the Naval Academy has combined both command and engineering personnel for a single senior course, the rationale being that command needs technical knowledge and vice versa.
Out of the 50,000 officers in the Navy, between 500 to 750 form the high command; i.e., those associated with the fleet commands, the support organizations, and the central command and administrative apparatus
There do not seem to be any specific rules of estab lishment for seagoing appointments, which seem to comprise up to 10 admirals, up to 50 vice-admirals* 70 or more rear-admirals, and between 250 to 300 captains. Task force, special group, and squadron com' manders vary between the mark of vice- and real' admiral. Cruising squadrons frequently come under * rear-admiral.
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The rank of captain—kapitan 1-go ranga—seems to be one of considerable flexibility both in scope and applicability. In a formal sense, this rank marks tW lower edge of the high command level, where (°l example, Captain N. I. Shablikov was a First Deputy Chief of the Naval Administration (and duly promoted to rear-admiral in 1971), or where deputy chiefs of fled political administrations are captains and presumably in line for promotion to first deputy. The Fleet Navig3' tion Officer, Northern Fleet, was a captain, D. £• Erdman, though latterly he has been promoted to rear-admiral. At the same time, the head of the North ern Fleet’s hydrographic service was a rear-admiral, and the head of the meteorological service an aviation col0- nel. Ballistic missile submarines and major surface ship* also come within a captain’s seagoing appointment as might be expected, though sometimes a kapit 2-go ranga (commander) does assume command of 3,1 SSBN or SSN, in the fashion of Commander Yuri »• Beketov who commanded an SSBN of the Northed1 Fleet in 1971. Captains A. A. Pinchuk and S. £ Korostelev duly commanded the 5,200-ton Kynda-clf missile cruisers Varyag and Admiral Fokin with tb£ Pacific Fleet. Nor, surprisingly, the helicopter-carrid ASW cruisers Moskva and Leningrad are commanded b) captains, in a posting pattern which suggests that 3 number of senior officers are being given experien^ on this type of ship and her operational capability so that in one case, at least, an appointment as exec3' tive officer of one vessel was succeeded by an appoid3'
The Soviet Naval High Command 75
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Not unnaturally, the strains in the Soviet Navy are considerable, as much as some of the achievement is impressive. A decade of intensive professionalism and fervent specialization has transformed the Navy, though the groundwork was laid in those far-off days of Gorshkov’s predecessor, Kuznetsov, who labored to give the navy bigger ships and wider experience, not to mention a body of trained manpower. The gyrations in naval affairs have inevitably produced a peculiar
c°nfiguration within the command, particularly within Its higher reaches. Undoubtedly the command has been stabilized, but promotion prospects are complicated at the highest leyels by similarities in age-levels Gorshkov and Kasatonov are the same age), Lobov ls °nly three years younger at 59, which, assuming that retirement provisions of the 1967 law are to be observed, promises him another appointment but noth- *ng more. The two "high fliers” are Admiral N. Smirnov "offi the Pacific Fleet, who had served until 1969 as bfad of the Operations Section of the Main Naval Staff 3nd Admiral G. M. Yegorov, who, until October 1971,
was Director of Combat Training and is now C-in-C of the Northern Fleet. Both men are in their very early fifties, both have had central staff and fleet command experience. It can be assumed that the accent will continue to be on professional competence and qualification.
What, then, are the key appointments and commands in the Soviet naval system, what is the relation between specialist skill and general experience, and how will the command system develop in the light of pres-
The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, signs the agreement between his country and the United States for the prevention of incidents on the high seas, in Moscow in May 1972. His post is analogous to that of Secretary of the Navy or First Lord of the Admiralty and his rank might be equated as one of six stars in the American system. Among those with the Commander-in-Chief are the Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, the Foreign Minister, Air. Gromyko, and the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Kasatonov.
ent imbalances, promotion blockages, and opportunities for advancement?
Key Positions, Selection Processes, and Promotion Prospects.
To ask what constitutes a key position is simply another way of asking who runs the Soviet Navy. To answer this, one must examine the institutional arrangements and interpret them in terms of personalities, cliques, the influence of professional associations, and the dominance of particular professional ideas, or even schools. It is not without relevance, for example, that the earlier history of the Soviet Navy has been interpreted largely in terms of the competition between two strategic outlooks, the "young” and the "old” school. If there is a particular stamp to the present leadership, then it might best be identified as the "professional” school, with its emphasis on effective performance, technical competence, ingenuity, and originality, and not least, an oceanic outlook.
Commitment to the high seas, however, is not an innovation confined to the last decade. Recent authoritative Soviet naval writing on previous naval theoretical work in the U.S.S.R. has emphasized its approach to the conduct of effective sea operations, though admitting, of necessity, that there was a yawning gap between the means at hand and the preferred objectives; moreover, even at the height of the postwar Stalinist distortion, senior officers continued to stress the significance of the independent naval mission.
Where confusion lies is in the fact that this did not, and does not mean an automatic commitment to the offensive, but is rather a pragmatic mix of both the offensive and the defensive, resulting in singular Soviet solutions.
It is difficult to know whether such very senior rf
Obvious though it may sound, the post of C-in-C of the Soviet Navy is a key position, not only because of his role as spokesman for and representative of the Soviet Navy within the system much as if he were simultaneously CNO and Secretary of the Navy, but also because of his educational role in relation to a political leadership and a military establishment both of which are largely unlettered in or ignorant of naval affairs. From this point of view alone, Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov has been an unmatched success, outwitting the politician (principally Khrushchev) and outflanking the establishment. In technical terms, he has been the proponent of a highly advanced navy, in which his faith in, for example, the cruise missile, the gas-turbine engine, and the nuclear-powered submarine has so far paid off.
In Admiral Gorshkov’s navy, submarines and aircraft form the core of the striking power, though this has not precluded the search for other forces which can
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carry out effectively a variety of missions in peace an^ in war. This has meant in practice that the Soviet Nav) has passed through a protracted transitional phase and the difficulty is to know where transition ends and permanence sets in. This phenomenon is also reflected in the shape and composition of the naval command It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that th£ Gorshkov line will prevail for some considerable time that is, the provision of a navy which is built primard) for general war, which includes effective participate!1 in the "strategic” effort (both offensive and defensive)' while steadily expanding in the direction of more versified force. The submarine and the shore-based aif' craft will continue to predominate, but a substantial fleet of surface ships will be maintained, relying, as have seen, extensively on missile technology.
With such a fleet, the Soviet Navy could comm1’ a variety of force combinations, all well adapted to tk environment in which they would have to operate Briefly, for this argument must be pursued later, tk transitional stage is drawing to a close and it mig^ be expected that Gorshkov’s immediate successor (' Gorshkov retires at the age stipulated in the new reg0 lations), will be a caretaker appointment—an alread' very senior admiral, such as Kasatonov or Lobov' whose age would permit only a brief period of cof1 mand. The two men waiting in the wings, Yegor0' and Smirnov, would require at least one more stak1 appointment before being in line for selection. Wb’: seems most likely is that the practice of seeming^' interminable service in posts—fleet commanders oft£f serve seven years or so—will end.
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There are, of course, established lines of success!011 within the Soviet naval establishment, involving ^ posts in every sense of that term. Admiral of the Fk1 S. M. Lobov, for example, has recently followed one su°; track by moving from command of the Northern Fl^ to the central staff, possibly at this juncture to over as the naval representative on the Soviet Gcflrf Staff. With his all-round experience and his prestigi011 command of the Northern Fleet behind him, plus short spell at the center, Lobov could well be a erf taker C-in-C, but only that. Another senior officer #l[ a major Fleet command behind him is Admiral N N. Amelko, 58, and, from 1962 to 1969, command of the Pacific Fleet, after which he returned to central staff as a deputy commander of the Soviet But he is at this stage outranked by Lobov and migl well be a successor to Kasatonov. J
goes with the job or is invested in the man. Probd1 the latter is the case, for the Northern Fleet comn^11 is invested with both operational importance and
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taches to the appointment of Admiral G. M. Yegorov, lately Director of Combat Training, to this particular post. Yegorov is a submarine officer by specialization, a graduate of the Frunze Naval School in 1941 and a wartime submarine officer in the Baltic. His post in combat training was important enough, coming as it did after a period of service as Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet between 1965-67, but this recent advancement to a Fleet command can only enhance his prospects for further promotion. Ranking the C-in-C of the Northern Fleet as Admiral of the Fleet simply underlines the importance of the command.
Also waiting in the wings is Admiral Smirnov, Amelko’s successor in the Pacific Fleet in 1969, a relatively young officer who might be expected to return in the not-too-distant future to the center and possibly to a key post within the ambit of the Main Naval Staff, °r again as a likely candidate for the position of First Deputy to the C-in-C.
Normally, the line of succession for command, staff, and political administration positions runs directly from First Deputy Commander to Commander or C-in-c (nachal’nik in the case of the political branch).
In 1955, before taking over completely from Kuznetsov, Gorshkov was duly appointed First Deputy C-in-c but served only for a very brief period. It is 'nevitable that there should be variations and it is difficult to generalize about career lines, particularly in vkw of the transitional nature of Soviet naval organ- nation over the past 15 years or so.
Consider, for example, Admiral of the Fleet Lobov. A graduate of the Frunze Naval School in 1937, hav- lng worked previously as an apprentice fitter and then 1 fitter, Lobov served in destroyers in the Pacific, Black Sea, and Northern Fleets, commanded a destroyer division after the war, and then a cruiser, after which, in A955, he was appointed Chief of Staff to the Northern Fleet,
a six-year appointment which led to his promo- tion to First Deputy Commander and, finally, in 1964, to his elevation to C-in-C, Northern Fleet. Two years later came a further consolidation of his position when fie was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee, a mark of political recognition which is Sy no means unimportant and which may on occasions Slgnify further steps up the promotional ladder.
Meanwhile, the position of First Deputy Commander, Northern Fleet, seems to have lost some of lts desirability. In the beginning, Lobov had as First ^eputy, Vice-Admiral A. I. Petelin, the highly decorated Suhmariner who had commanded a submarine flotilla 'Vlth the Northern Fleet and who, in 1962, carried out ^ cruise to the North Pole in the nuclear submarine ^ninskii Komsomolets. But in 1970, Petelin gave way t0 Vice-Admiral N. Khovrin, who had served for many
years with the Pacific Fleet and played an important part in supervising the first long-range cruises in the Pacific command. And finally, as if to upset all the rules, Yegorov, newly promoted from vice-admiral to admiral, moved in during the late autumn of 1971 to take over the Northern Fleet command. In like fashion, Smirnov had been imported from the Main Naval Staff in 1969 to take over the Pacific Fleet from Amelko, thus bypassing the First Deputy Commander in this case also.
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Not that this disposes entirely of the legitimacy of the position of the First Deputy Commander. It signifies rather that the Northern and Pacific Fleet commands are of a different order from the other two and will in future be treated as such. So far, the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets have adhered to promotional orthodoxy. In 1967, the First Deputy Commander of the Baltic Fleet, V. V. Mikhailin, having served as First Deputy for four years, duly took over as C-in-C from Admiral Orel. A wartime officer who had served in minesweepers with the Northern Fleet, Mikhailin went to the Pacific and the Black Sea fleets, completed his course at the Naval Academy and, in 1953, was assigned to the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov in the Black Sea, after which came his own command with the cruiser Kuibyshev. At this time a captain, Mikhailin then passed through the important career stage of graduation from the General Staff Academy, took command of a squadron in 1962, and then jumped to the post of First Deputy Commander, Baltic Fleet. In not dissimilar fashion, Vice-Admiral V. S. Sysoyev, First Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, replaced Admiral Ya. S. Chursin as C-in-C in 1968. Sysoyev served a mere two years as First Deputy, before which he had commanded a destroyer division in the Black Sea and then spent a period as an instructor at the Naval Academy before returning to the Black Sea Fleet.
All this naturally raises the question of the career lines and backgrounds of first deputy commanders. It is necessary to look for our answer to the position of chief of staff at the Fleet command level, for it would appear that there is now an established line of succession from chief of staff to first deputy commander. In 1969, the chief of staff of the Northern Fleet, Vice- Admiral N. M. Baranov, moved from this post which he had held for two years to the post of First Deputy Commander, Black Sea Fleet (left vacant by Sysoyev’s own promotion). The position of Chief of Staff in the Black Sea Fleet was filled by Vice-Admiral L. V. Mizin, who took over on the promotion of the incumbent G. K. Chernobai to the post of commander of the Caspian Flotilla. After little more than two years as Chief of Staff in the Black Sea, Mizin moved to the Baltic Fleet as First Deputy Commander. Vice-Admiral
B. Yamkovoi thus became Chief of Staff to the Bla^ Sea Fleet, while in the Baltic two senior positions web changed—Mizin became First Deputy Commander an1 Rear-Admiral A. Kosov became Chief of Staff.
At the same time, the post of Chief of Staff in tb[ Northern Fleet has rotated through a two-year cycle first Yegorov, who went to Combat Training, the'1 Baranov who went to the Black Sea Fleet, follow^ in 1969 by Vice-Admiral Isai (a submarine special^ and graduate of both the Naval Academy and General Staff Academy), who was succeeded by Rea1 Admiral V. Kichev after another two-year period. Aft£l| six years, Yegorov has now returned as the Fie? Commander.
The fleet commanders, first deputy commanders, alb select chiefs of staff thus form a reservoir of experienb and ability upon which the central establishment draw for its own staffing purposes. The post of chi® of staff, in particular, can lead to promotion to Fib1 Deputy, or to a more senior staff position as was d1' case with Vice-Admiral V. N. Alekseyev, the preset1 First Deputy Chief of the Main Naval Staff, who beg)( his career as a navigating officer, commanded a secti°fi of MTBs and served as chief of staff to an MTB squadron graduating with distinction from the Naval Acadetf1' in 1943 and then going to serve with the staff of d1 Northern Fleet. After the war, Alekseyev was a g°h medalist at the Higher Naval Academy—no mean db| tinction in itself—and on graduation was appointed' naval base commander and, in 1957, Chief of Staff11 the Baltic Fleet. Nine years later, he was appointed Fib1 Deputy Chief of the Main Naval Staff and at the of 60 may well have one further senior appointntfb ahead of him. In sum, therefore, for both staff a” command purposes, the post of chief of staff seemsp be assuming growing importance.
The rules of the line of succession have also appbf with some rigor to the upper reaches of the Naval ^ Force. The present C-in-C of the Naval Air Fob1 Colonel-General (Aviation) I. I. Borzov, was appoint First Deputy Commander in 1957. He entered the nJv) aviation school for pilot training in 1935, served 1 the Baltic Fleet as a wartime torpedo-bomber squadb and regimental commander. He graduated from d Naval Academy in 1948 and held appointments as cb1. of staff and commander of the naval air force attach' to the 5th Fleet (based on Vladivostok). In May iS", Borzov went on to command the Northern Fleet nav air force, followed by that of the Baltic Fleet until b was appointed First Deputy Commander of the Nsv Air Force and finally C-in-C in 1962. At the age 1 57, Borzov can be expected to serve out the ptf1^ of his command until his formal retirement.
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The Soviet Naval High Command 79
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ant-General (Aviation) P. I. Khokhlov—a navigator by training—is now 60 years old and will no doubt be replaced before long, while the deputy commander, Lieutenant-General (Aviation) N. A. Naumov, a pilot who served with the Black Sea Fleet during the war, ls now 63 and his place has just been taken by the former commander of the Pacific Fleet naval air force, Colonel-General A. Tomashevskii.
This sets in train the process of replacement or rejuvenation within the naval air command, where one °f the most likely candidates for a senior position— possibly that of a future C-in-C of the Naval Air Force—is Lieutenant-General (Aviation) G. A. Kuznetsov, appointed in 1966 at the age of 43 to the position of Northern Fleet naval air force commander, a key post if ever there was one. Having graduated as a pilot from the naval aviation school in 1943, Kuznetsov went on to a dazzling war record, serving fost as a deputy squadron commander in the Black Sea, Moving to the Baltic as a squadron commander with foe 8th Shtumovoi Aviapolk (Attack/Ground Attack Regiment) and ending the war as a Hero of the Soviet Knion. After the war Kuznetsov broke through the crucial higher educational barrier, graduating from the Nation Academy, taking over the deputy command °Lan aviation division in 1959 and passing on to full c°mrnand of the naval air force with the Northern Fleet ln 1966. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1968.
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There are, of course, other candidates for promotion to senior posts, such as Colonel-General (Aviation) K A. Gulyaev who has commanded the Baltic Fleet na- Val air force since 1961 and is now in his mid-fifties, fifo was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1962 and c°lonel-general a year or so ago (that is, well within foe 8- to 10-year time span for this stage in promotion). Colonel-General (Aviation) A. A. Mironenko, who C()rnmanded the Black Sea Fleet naval air force for well °Ver a decade, is exactly the same age as Gulyaev, foough he has been a colonel-general since 1965.
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Even at the cost of prolonging this catalog of names, of it would be complete without reference to the Efoitical Administration, which also has its own cluster °E key posts and which, after its own fashion, exercises c°nsiderable influence within the navy. Once again, the Same general pattern of appointments shows itself, with senior men holding their positions for an inordinate Jerigth of time. Admiral Grishanov has been Chief of fov Naval Political Administration for full 14 years n°w. though while the lower echelons of the high CQl«mand are subject to much greater movement and ^bility. Grishanov joined the Soviet Navy through
c Komsomol, the Young Communist League, com- ^anded a shore establishment with the Baltic Fleet and '°ught in the Soviet-Finnish War, served with the
Baltic Fleet during World War II, and, after 1945, moved to the Pacific Fleet, where he was chief of the political administration of the navy’s Southern Regions. In 1957, he was back with the Baltic Fleet and in 1958 took over the post of chief of the Naval Political Administration, becoming ex officio one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.
In all, Grishanov seems to have managed the political administration with a minimum of friction. At the same time, he steadily expanded the competence of the political officer in the navy and aligned him with the training process as far as possible. In addition, the long-range cruises undertaken by the Soviet Navy, the complex problems associated with protracted underwater missions in nuclear submarines, the increasingly advanced environment of the warship itself, and the greater need for technical proficiency among officers and men have all contributed to diversifying the tasks (and the difficulties) faced by political officers.
Because the political administration is more deeply involved with the life and the work of the Soviet Navy, the post of chief of that administration is of considerable significance. Moreover, it carries political weight by virtue of its connection with the Party’s own Central Committee. The line of succession throughout this administration, however, is not clear. Where the head of a fleet political administration is a vice-admiral, his first deputy will be a rear-admiral, and the deputy chief
(who is invariably charged with responsibility for the agitation-propaganda section) will also be a rear- admiral, though fresh postings and relatively inexperienced officers can at times cause this to be stepped down one rank. The up-and-coming man in the central apparatus at the moment seems to be Rear-Admiral N. I. Shablikov, not long promoted from captain, and the First Deputy Chief of the Naval Political Administration; if the rules hold, he could well follow Grishanov.
It is apparent, nevertheless, from some recent changes that the rules are being severely bent, if not actually being broken. After no less than 14 years as chief of the Pacific Fleet political administration, Admiral M. N. Zakharov was not long ago installed as the head of the politotdel (political section) attached to the Naval Academy, a prestigious appointment befitting long service and good performance. The First Deputy Chief of the Pacific Fleet’s political administration, Rear-Admiral V. Pil’shchikov, was not in the event upgraded to nachal’tiik, for the post went to a newcomer, Rear-Admiral S. Bevz, with Captain M. Faleyev as the Deputy Chief. Thus far, Admiral Zakharov’s transfer has been the only major change at the level of chief of the four fleet political administrations, thus leaving Vice-Admiral Ya. G. Pochupailo, chief of the Baltic Fleet political administration since 1958, and Vice-Admiral F. Ya. Sizov, chief of the Northern Fleet political administration since 1961, undisturbed. Vice-Admiral I. S. Rudnev, chief of the Black Sea Fleet political administration, was appointed to this post in 1966 and is likely to continue in it for some time to come, judging by the other periods of tenure.
Through pronounced efforts to align itself more closely with combat training, combat readiness and proficiency training, the Political Administration will no doubt attempt to hold its own in a navy increasingly dominated by professionalism. In certain sensitive sectors, such as the maintenance of morale and the support of discipline, political officers will play a significant role for the foreseeable future and it is one which will grow in proportion to the expansion of the flag-showing, overseas presence of the Soviet Navy. For that reason, the senior posts of the Fleet political administrations will remain significant.
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Party membership and adherence to the Komsomol among ratings and petty officers also plays a pronounced role in attempts to induce high standards, good discipline, efficient training and education by example. The requirements are frequently exacting and the work arduous, as for example, with the Soviet squadrons in the Mediterranean. Owing to the need to carry out continuous servicing and repair work at
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It follows quite obviously that the training aflj educational commands in the Soviet Navy are then1 selves of growing importance and, in their own term* are key positions. Naval educational establishment come under the Assistant to the C-in-C for Na',J, Educational Establishments, who also operates un^ the aegis of the Main Administration of Militap Educational Establishments headed by General I. Is Shkadov, the present Assistant to the C-in-C beinf Vice-Admiral I. M. Kuznetsov.
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The most prestigious of the appointments with'f the naval educational establishments themselves is thJ of head of the Naval Academy or war college, a po? tion currently held by Admiral Orel, the previous con mander of the Baltic Fleet. This is in a sense the tof of the tree, for the post generally is a final appointing before retirement. The admiral-commandant is assist by a deputy commandant (Rear-Admiral A. •' Shabalin), the chief of the politotdel (presently Admin Zakharov), and an instructor staff at the level of capt^ and rear-admiral, with variations above and below tl>! line for specialists.
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If the Frunze Higher Naval School is the "hoi^ of the Soviet Navy, the Naval Academy is its "thin tank,” the focus of naval professionalism and the cra<h of an oceanic outlook all combined. Necessarily ^ staff exercises an influence which is pervasive and Ion? term rather than immediate and direct. The pr senior naval leadership is, in many respects, the prod1*1 of the cast of mind induced more than 20 years at the Academy, with its stress on the independd naval mission. Clearly, the command and the staff01 cupy positions of deep-seated persuasiveness and sw in the upper reaches of the Navy.
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Next in prestige come the higher naval schools ^ the naval schools. Their concern is with the essenm of training and education, proficiency training on ^ whole with an admixture of morskaya kultura—m;,f time manners and naval style. The Frunze School in Leningrad and the Makarov School in Vladivostok are commanded by while rear-admirals are usually in charge of the oth£f
The directorate of combat training also cornp1^ posts and responsibilities which exercise this ^ long-term influence. The Director of Combat Train||1?
The Soviet Naval High Command 81
a post held not so long ago by G. M. Yegorov, ranks as Deputy Commander, Soviet Navy, while the head of the naval-educational system is classed only as pomoshchnik, assistant to the C-in-C. Both posts call for a vice-admiral, and both have lines of responsibility running downwards through fleet commands to ship and aviation unit levels. The combat training directorate is responsible for instilling sound operational procedures and practices into the Soviet Navy and for carrying over that simulation which begins in the classrooms of basic training into the simulated stress of combat operations.
Once the junior officer, petty officer, or rating has left his primary training school, he is subject to a rigorous and almost ceaseless training cycle. The emphasis is on competitiveness, between units and within units, with the object of attaining the rating otlichnyi— excellent. (In 1971, for example, the Kynda-class guided missile cruiser Admiral Golovko won the Fleet competition for the best surface ship in the Soviet Navy).
Tactical exercises and weapon exercises, sea exercises for groups of ships and for individual ships abound. All of this forms the basis of confidential reporting on the officers concerned. Many reports are used in the military press to laud progress and to criticize shortcomings.
Finally, there is the logistics command of the Soviet Navy, a branch which has assumed growing importance is the Navy has left its coastal confines and embarked on long-distance cruises, with consequent reliance on afloat support. The present chief of the naval logistics service is Admiral G. G. Oleinik, who was transferred bom command of the Caspian Flotilla in 1967 to this post. About the same time the naval logistics command came under the newly reorganized Rear Services Administration for the Soviet armed forces. Each Fleet command also has a post for Deputy Commander, Rear Services.
Plotskii tyl, the Naval Rear Services, is responsible for the supply of all items necessary to keep surface, submarine, and naval air units in a state of combat readiness. Whereas, previously, the Rear Services could be understood basically in terms of a naval commissary (intendanty) and ship-chandlery, the former coastal logistics units have now become mobile units and their people have become specialists in handling a wide range °f weapons, ammunition, and machine parts, food, medicines, and other complex matters connected with long-distance cruises under varying climatological conditions.
Naval auxiliaries—vspomogatel’nyi flot—also come under the control of the Naval Rear Services and are being increased in numbers and improved in perform
ance (speed, capacity, and range). The small capacity of Soviet support ships, compared to those of the United States, has led, for example, to a greater number of Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean than American. But this advantage is being offset in part by larger ships and by the use of Soviet merchant ships for warship bunkering, as well as by continuous improvement in techniques, such as alongside underway replenishment. In view of the paucity of politically secure bases available to them outside the homeland, it can only be supposed that the Soviet Navy’s Rear Services will continue to expand and diversify.
In sum, therefore, key posts in the Soviet Navy (and access to them), vary substantially. First are the top posts, connected with the very essence of naval policy. Subject in the past to massive political interference, it is likely that future appointments to these posts will be made on the basis of professional ability rather than political acceptability.
It is obvious that the days of inordinately lengthy assignments—seven years within one Fleet command, or 14 or more for a Navy C-in-C—are coming to an end, to be replaced by the intensive round in key positions such as one finds in other navies.
The outline of the naval high command in the mid-1970s and up to 1980 suggests itself as a period of interim senior appointments, very likely either Lobov or Amelko holding the top positions, followed by a combination of Yegorov, Smirnov, and Kuznetsov of the naval air arm. There is now a wide selection of younger commanders from whom to choose other occupants of senior billets.
In the Political Administration, Grishanov’s successor could be any one of half a dozen.
Within the fleet commands the Northern Fleet will retain its primacy, with the Pacific coming a close second. First deputy commanders and chiefs of staff will continue to be rotated or cross-posted to ensure the greatest experience, and the most thorough testing of officers. This pattern suggests itself despite the marked reluctance of the top command to dispense with proven experience and overall reliability, a habit that will no doubt die hard and conceivably could even override official retirement ages.
In addition, there can be no doubt of the growing weight of the specialized naval air arm, which is already showing signs of replacing its highest command echelons. It will be a matter of some import to see in which direction the younger officers will move, whether cleaving more closely to the navy itself, or aligning themselves out of professional instinct with the Soviet Air Force. As the pattern of exercises and operations shows on occasions, the Naval Air Force executes its role with a mind of its own, so that the seaman-aviator rela-
tionship—as yet unaffected by the symbiosis of the aircraft carrier—merits watching!
On the other hand, a submarine-aviation apex at the head of the navy could rub off the rougher corners in this co-operation, which is essential to holding the extended maritime frontiers of the Soviet Union, implementing ASW tactics and supporting offensive maritime operations, in particular, by extending the range of strike aircraft (in which matter the Tu-22 seems to have fallen short of expectations and has been used, not in a strike role, but in a maritime reconnaissance role). The Soviet equivalent of the brown shoe admiral, save for the crucial fact that he is not an admiral, will increasingly hold the key to effectiveness in Soviet seapower and must push his way to the front. That might be made easier with the advent of VTOL fighters on helicopter carriers and with a new generation of yet more powerful land-based aircraft.
As for access to key posts, the laws of nature lend the largest hand here, for crabbed age cannot always hold its position. The majority of the very senior men have at the most one more appointment left to them (assuming that the provisions of the 1967 Military Service Law are observed). It is plain that an intensive effort has been made to build up an experienced senior cadre as successors, to furnish the necessary skilled manpower and to balance regional familiarization with posts of wider perspective and responsibility. There seems to be presently no single royal road to success in the career structure, though by sheer weight of numbers the submariners and aviators must ultimately come to predominate.
Though smaller than its predecessor in personnel strength and numbers of combatant units, the navy which Admiral Gorshkov has nurtured is demonstrably much more professional, disposes of a variety of skills, and commands a fund of experience derived from ocean cruises and distant voyages. The warships themselves, even if smaller by comparison with equivalent Western types or classes, mount more weapons and incorporate a greater assortment of launchers, developing also high speeds though with lesser range. The modernity of the technology in ship design is manifest, the relative newness of the vessels is a major advantage and a technological lead over the West in the application of gas turbine propulsion to large surface ships.
It is clear that Gorshkov’s long tenure of office has neither stultified naval developments nor stifled innovation. Equally, the trainers have produced a generation imbued not only with the elements of morskaya kultura but also with a whole new mentality.
What, then, or where are the sources of this professionalism in its widest sense, the dimensions of thinking suited to a three-dimensional navy? It should not
be forgotten that the present Soviet Navy owes a sub" stantial debt to its retired admirals, who dogged!' slugged it out with derisory or ill-informed soldiers an<! others. In similar style, naval veterans have labored assiduously to foster an appreciation of seapower an<! an understanding of the navy with their clubs, associ* tions, and societies. Meanwhile, the active naval con1' mand, though of necessity involved with the signib cance of Soviet seapower, is immediately concern^ with the quantity and quality of the naval forces afl' their operational roles. It is here that the cogency 0 strategic ideas and the soundness of tactical notions ^ count, wherein experience is translated into expert^ in the commands, the academies, and the research & tablishments alike. This is the true test of proff* sionalism.
Trends in Soviet Naval Thinking Though there are Western commentators who ins'5’ that the Soviet Navy has been designed and even df ployed to "win without combat,” such a prescripti011 must strike the professional naval man in the Sovi^ Union as somewhat bizarre in view of his own training indoctrination, and background. There is, for examp^ none of this metaphysical meandering in the b*51. textbook on the history of naval operations comp‘d for use in the Soviet Navy’s higher naval schools. Wb1' determines the development of the Soviet Navy is $ assessment of naval capabilities on the part of a tial enemy, as well as the nature of the war in Soviet naval forces presumably will participate. NATO naval forces are the potential enemy and thfl capability is exemplified most formidably in nuclf|1
submarines and attack carriers. In 1967, Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov stressed that a third of America’s nuclear arsenal would be sea-based (in submarines or on carriers) and that by 1970 this proportion would rise to one half. The Soviet Navy is assigned to counter these maritime threats, in addition to cooperation with the Soviet ground forces on "coastal axes” and attacking enemy maritime lines of communication. This was also to be an oceanic navy capable of undertaking "strategic tasks of an offensive nature,” though the absence of aircraft carriers meant that surface units could not operate under war conditions save within the operating limits of shore-based air cover. For this reason, Soviet designers and theoreticians lighted on the "submarine-naval air fleet" -podvodno-aviatsionny flot—as that "balanced and harmoniously developed” combination of force which is best suited to long-range operations.
Even as a statement of the obvious, it is worth recapitulation in order to indicate the actual substance on which Soviet naval officers are reared. It is not an abstraction about "sea-power,” but rather the clarification of the naval mission and the justification of independent action, in place of the supporting role assigned to the Soviet, Navy. Such a view also represents the basic continuity of Soviet naval thinking, which struggled to press the relevance and singularity of the naval mission even amidst the obscurantism of the postwar period dominated by Stalinist military thought. The Stalinist concept of "active defense” tied the Soviet Navy to the coast lines, while his quest for a prestigious navy with its big ships still failed to include the aircraft carrier and thus further shackled the fleet, despite all
the unequivocal postwar statements by Soviet naval authorities that powerful carrier forces were essential to pursue modern naval operations. But there were those, like Admiral V. A. Belli, who labored to set out rational criteria for the conduct of independent naval operations and who steadily encouraged an oceanic outlook in the rising naval generation—that is, in the men who now command the Soviet Navy. Like others, Belli paid for his stubbornness with disgrace.
The post-Stalin period saw not only a radical approach to technology but also the steady revision of tactical ideas and principles. To use Gorshkov’s own words, "balanced fleet” came to have quite a different meaning from that understood in other navies, but one which would comprehend the Soviet Navy undertaking offensive assignments as well as being deployed on an oceanic scale without the provision of seaborne air cover. The problem was how to meet the challenge of maritime supremacy on the part of the potential enemy, combined with continuous multilateral techno-
logical innovation. Soviet exploitation of cruise missile technology, which became the hallmark of the post- Stalin period, provided a counter—in theory, at least— to the problem of meeting and matching a numerically superior enemy. This is to say that the Soviet naval command radically re-assessed the role of surface firepower. In so doing, they also re-evaluated some of their basic tactical notions. The advent of the ship-to-ship missile fitted with a nuclear warhead signified a major shift in the meaning of massing of force and the massed blow, for fewer units could deliver a more powerful blow. Massing, or concentration, of force now had to be understood in terms of concentrated firepower. Similarly, engagement at close range was less likely than before and maneuver, though still of primary importance, had also to be re-assessed in the light of the performance of the new weapons. (Maneuver becomes in certain instances a particular form of tactical deployment.)
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In the exposition of these ideas two trends are clearly discernible in professional Soviet naval writing. The contentious issues which bear more generally on naval policy—the place of the Soviet Navy and the relevance of naval capability to Soviet policy at large—have been left with what seems deliberate design to retired senior officers, who air their views with a certain immunity. This is both collective wisdom and corporate identity combined, which seems to have served the Soviet Navy reasonably well. The same group also propagate the idea of Soviet seapower with similar fervor. The term "retired,” however, needs some qualification. These officers usually have the appointment of professor and an academic qualification (the degree of Candidate of Naval Sciences, for example), thereby suggesting that they do carry out specific academic-instructional activities. Admiral V. A. Alafuzov, who so savaged the naivete shown over naval affairs in Voennaya Strategiya {Military Strategy, edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii) is an excellent illustration of this practice. In short, here is the Navy lobby in a public sense and used for public pronouncement, or used in an in-house role (as with the compilation of the textbook htoriya voenno- monkogo iskusstva, designed for use in higher naval schools and produced under the imprint of Admiral S. E. Zakharov, assisted by Rear-Admiral K. A. Stalbo).
As for the C-in-C himself, Admiral Gorshkov, his contributions to the open professional press are carefully spaced. One of his most significant interventions came in 1967 in Morskoi Sbomik outlining the past and present of Soviet naval strategy, and it is obviously a matter of some relevance that throughout most of 1972 Morskoi Sbomik has carried an extensive series of essays on the evolution of naval power at large. These, too, have appeared under the imprint of Admiral Gorshkov
and their appearance cannot be accidental. By implication, they suggest that the Soviet naval command has been taking a long hard look at its present status and future commitments, though it would be unwis£ to dogmatise at this juncture on the real meaning of this excursion into print. Much of the argument proceeds by analogy, but the theme is that of the problem* of maintaining ocean-based naval power—in wh)1 form, at what cost, and with what results. At this short range, what is read into Gorshkov’s articles must V speculative, but there is the obvious and intriguing stress laid on the place of naval aviation in modem naval operations. On the other hand, this is scarcely surprising since Soviet naval thinking has always accorded such aviation a key role in modern operation* The contentious issue is whether aircraft carriers art indispensable in furnishing such capability. Thus faf- in what promises to be a mammoth series, Admits Gorshkov has argued that, on the evidence of Wo^ War II, naval operations exercised a major influent and even in secondary theaters affected the econom>£ position of the combatants. The same historical expert; ence demonstrated that combat operations demand^ balanced fleets, that is, naval forces suitably equipp^ to carry out a wide range of tasks. The most extrem( example of a non-balanced fleet was Germany, whid1 was consequently limited to carrying out only a so!( mission, attacking British maritime lines of commurt1' cation. Even the Imperial Japanese Navy, tered powerful attack forces, was seriously through its lack of antisubmarine capability. Though as yet incomplete, Gorshkov’s series of articles dead' stress the strategic significance of naval operations, the relevance in secondary theaters also, and the need 11 develop balanced naval forces in the special sense c being equipped to carry out a variety of tasks. Thr can only be a prescription for the further expansi^ and diversification of the Soviet Navy.
There are reflections of this, albeit indirect, in dj present Soviet naval replacement programme. The tteft in surface units is towards fewer but more powerf11 general-purpose ships, particularly in the destroy'd frigate class, though priority seems to lie for the ft® ment with the submarine building program. The vent of a sea control ship or even a class of such ship* would not contradict this trend towards more effecti'( general-purpose forces. It is late in the day for ^ Soviet naval command to place its faith in the mob^ power of the aircraft carrier when the improved shif to-ship missile offers growing tactical advantages, an“ even more, when such missiles do not have to ^ launched from surface ships. In what seems to be ^ present stand-off between the carrier and the miss^ weapon system, the Soviet command does not appd
The Soviet Naval High Command 85
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to have relinquished even a particle of its faith in the missile. The new Krivak-class ships, which have a "pocket battleship” look about them, and may embody greater cost-effectiveness than the Kresta and Kresta II classes, mount on the forecastle a quadruple launcher for the SSN-9 anti-ship missile and twin 12-barrelled antisubmarine rocket launchers, amidships twin quadruple torpedo tubes, and aft two twin fully automatic 3-inch gun mountings, together with minelaying facilities. In addition, the Krivaks also incorporate two launchers for the new anti-aircraft missile—all at a displacement of some 3,800 tons and a speed in excess of 30 knots.
Meanwhile the older Krupny-class surface-to-surface missile destroyers are being converted to surface-to-air missile armament. Thus, a large combat vessel of the Moskva type, or the newer and larger sea control ship, can be armed with long-range ship-to-ship missiles, equipped with VTOL aircraft as they become available and ASW helicopters (and possibly RPVs for the all- important reconnaissance role), becoming in this fashion the core of a surface strike force supported by fast, medium-sized missile armed ships and submarines.
Provisions of this nature, some of which are foreshadowed in the introduction of the Krivak-class and the improved missiles, not to mention this mysterious new vessel building in the Black Sea, seem already advanced enough to demolish any notion of the Soviet Navy "winning without combat.” On the contrary, Soviet attention seems to be riveted on the problem of survivability and winning in the coming ship-to-ship missile environment.
Mention of Morskoi Sbomik (Naval Almanac, to use one translation) identifies the chief professional organ of the Soviet Navy, a monthly publication which has Admiral Shchedrin as its chief editor and a representative mix of command, political administration, logistics, and technical officers on its board—such as Admiral G. G. Tolstolutskii, head of the Soviet Navy’s signal/communications branch. Combat training is also represented by V. M. Prokof’ev. Admiral Shchedrin is a distinguished Soviet wartime submarine commander. The journal comprises political exhortation, usually in rhe editorial or initial article, news of events and appointments in the fleet commands, naval art (usually technical essays,drawing on non-Soviet technical expe- r>ence or findings), combat training and political preparation, armament and naval technology, and an information bulletin dealing with foreign navies. In format, Morskoi Sbomik has no real equivalent in non-Soviet publication—the closest comparison is possibly Marine Rundschau published in West Germany. For obvious reasons, great attention is paid to technological devel- °pments in foreign navies: it is also evident that the
rubric "material drawn from the foreign press” can be used to pursue arguments or issues which might be wholly sensitive—a feature particularly noticeable in discussions of ASW warfare. The bulk of the authors come from highly qualified naval instructors (Candidate of Naval Sciences, with the rank of captain or commander) or else from the naval technical staff with similar qualifications in engineering and science (Doctor of Technical Sciences).
Since it is impossible to list all this work, a representative sample might be presented by looking at Morskoi Sbomik for 1972. Pride of place goes, of course, to Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov’s marathon series of articles on "Navies in peace and war.” Captain N. Aleshkin contributed a substantial and careful analysis of developments in American naval policy in the first issue for 1972. Captain G. Kostev produced a short but perceptive study of the role and effectiveness of German surface raiders in World War II (No. 2, 1972); two captains, V. Germanovich and N. Klimov, wrote on the destruction of large surface units by air attack (No. 3, 1972); while in No. 5, 1972, Captain-Engineer V. Skugarev produced an informative essay on the basis and methods of long-range forecasting (prognozi- rovanie) and the development of naval forces, based largely on American assessments and experience.
In the second half of the year, two captains, Yu. Bol’shakov and M. Chuprikov (both obviously academic-instructor staff), wrote on the role of the submarine in attacking large surface units and emphasized the growing versatility of the submarine whether nuclear-powered or conventional (No. 6, 1972); while in No. 8, Admiral V. Alekseyev analyzes the development of the MTB, the FPB, and the small, fast missile-carrying vessel. The Admiral appears to conclude that the progression in this type of vessel is far from finished, pertinent enough in view of the commissioning of the new Nanuchka-class extended-range missile craft displacing some 800 tons and armed with six tubes for the SSN-9 missile. Captain K. Titov in No. 9 surveys reconnaissance and surveillance methods, an analysis based "on material from the foreign press,” but strongly recommended to Soviet naval officers for their attention and their further study. This was followed in No. 10 by a complementary study by Captain (Retired) N. Gordeyev on intelligence and disinformation (a subject on which the author wrote a small but interesting monograph, Maskirovka v boevykh deistviyakh flota in 1971). Latterly (No. 11, 1972), Engineer Commander I. Balin analyzed mine warfare during the Korean war and concludes that the mine remains a potent weapon.
The sections of Morskoi Sbomik devoted to training and to technical information would each require sepa-
rate and detailed treatment. It is clear, nevertheless, that the instructor staff and engineering or technical specialists use this journal to disseminate general ideas about naval warfare and operations, to furnish a commentary on technical progress and developments and, not least, to raise the level of morskaya kultura. In a sense, this is only the tip of the iceberg, for there is a vast and growing technical literature on all aspects of marine technology. One of the common denominators in this great surge of publication is the stress laid on modern planning procedures, whether in shipyard practice, in organizing long-range cruises or the application of cybernetics to naval problems. In the last-named context, an interesting study appeared in 1972, Nauka upravleniya i flot by V. D. Skugarev and K. O. Dubravin, a work directed to "a broad circle of naval officers.” This study is a combination of cybernetics, systems analysis, and information theory, as well as network planning.
In sum, this growing weight of publication reflects the advancing professionalism of the Soviet Navy. The retired admirals, secure in their prestige and safe from retribution, can talk of naval power and naval policy in general and even controversial terms. Currently active senior officers tend to argue by historical analogy, but the emphasis is on a fleet capable of maintaining an oceanic presence and balanced in the sense that it can meet differing commitments and can win in terms of the modern naval engagement. From the point of view of naval technology, the engineers press for the most up-to-date innovation and an all-round understanding of it. Finally, the pressure of print, example, and instruction is for higher levels of seafaring competence, morskaya kultura in the widest sense. No propaganda can replace basic skills and true professionalism, though exhortation, pressure, and the efforts of the naval political administration have a special part to play here and will surely intensify. After all, this is a relatively young navy and must struggle not only for its own professionalism but must also compete with the remainder of the Soviet military establishment for its due place and for recognition of this.
The Soviet Navy and the Soviet Military Establishment
■i*
It was for long assumed—incorrectly, as it turned out—that the Soviet military establishment was not afflicted by inter-Service dissension. It is true that while the hegemony of the Ground Forces lasted, other arms and services were pushed somewhat abruptly into the background. But advancing technology, intercontinental strategy, and the diffusion of Soviet power beyond the confines of the land perimeter made drastic inroads into this military monopoly. The re-organization of I960 which established the Strategic Missile Forces as
a separate arm also provided a chance for the SoviC Navy to break into the "big league,” though it tool some time for this opportunity to be realized. Twd the Soviet Navy has been rebuilt to meet the technological challenge facing it, once in the 1950s and old in the 1960s. This inevitably slowed the advance o> the navy, but the process is now done; and having wof emplacement within the system, the naval commani- shows every sign of working to stay there.
At this juncture it might be useful to look quick! at the whole institutional arrangement involving no1 only the naval but also the total mercantile effort. Th( chief feature of this activity is centralized direction d£ tight coordination. Admiral of the Fleet of the Sovk1 Union Gorshkov is simultaneously Naval C-in-£ Deputy Defense Minister (one of the most senior), a member of the Central Committee. The construed0*1 program, both naval and mercantile, comes under $ Ministry of Shipbuilding Production and is thus ti^ in centrally to the whole Soviet economy. Ranks d£ postings are interchangeable between the Soviet Nd! and the merchant marine, whose vessels (particular tankers) not infrequently act as auxiliaries for nd* units. The vast Soviet trawler and ocean fishing fl#c are handled by the Ministry of Fishing Economy, wfik maintains a communications center to track and sigf' its fleets. This is a prestigious and productive emp‘r£ and Gorshkov and his associates have labored to exploit and bring its potentialities to the notice of othC
The Navy’s contribution to the strategic detect force through its SSBNs and its part in strategic defe°* has obviously made it much more significant in intC Service terms than it was as a mere coast-defense fid’ tied to the apron strings of the Ground Forces. two principal naval promotions of 1969, to the rd of Admiral of the Fleet, were clearly designed to p' the premier fleet commander (Northern Fleet) and [- Chief of the Main Naval Staff personal and institution parity with other officers involved in the Soviet & tegic deterrent force.
Put briefly, the broadening and the diversified1)’ of Soviet naval strategy in both theory and prat1’1 have led to the emplacement of naval representat*\ within the strategic commands, as might be expe°t£l How far this reflects real influence—especially in g3‘f ing acceptance, of the special tasks of the Nav)"' extremely difficult to assess. Here is the nub of1 matter: in 1967, Gorshkov stated explicitly that "Sovl sailors . . . well understand the meaning of naval p°",
in strengthening the international prestige of our °° , try and its military capacity,” but how far are ! implications of Gorshkov’s basic position underst°l by the present collective leadership and by a mu,r establishment encased in traditionalism, conserv'd1
The Soviet Naval High Command 87
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and specialization? Though joint training is frequently practiced (amphibious operations, for example, and naval-air co-operation), the joint warfare or combined Services mentality is inculcated only at a late and senior stage in Soviet military education and training. The General Staff Academy does include naval and air force officers and here a limited amount of inter-Service combination is fostered. The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (presently headed by Army General Kulikov) has its naval representative—formerly Admiral Chabanenko and now possibly Lobov—but this key organization functions more like an inter-Services committee and coordinating group than as a joint staff in the true sense of that term.
Within the prevailing alliance system, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the Soviet naval command coordinates the training and potential operations of Poland and East Germany, the two signatory states with more than nominal naval forces. The joint staff and command exercises involving these three navies (Soviet, Polish, and East German), code-named "Sever” and held in July 1968, were the first full-scale test of WTO naval capability, though the exercises in the Norwegian Sea were confined to Soviet naval units only. "Sever” probably represents the maximum use of the WTO northern naval forces.
There is also that mysterious body, the Defense Council (or the Supreme Military Soviet), which presumably acts as an advisory group to and a consultative organ for the higher political leadership: its composition may well change as different subjects come under review. If, for example, the question of presence in the Persian Gulf is under discussion, the naval command will presumably be called on to advise, the naval staffs having duly prepared position papers and estimates of strength required. In this fashion naval influence has increased, but only insofar as there are more decisions necessitating naval advice and even participation— minesweeping in the harbors of Bangladesh, the Middle East situation, Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, Soviet-American talks on avoiding incidents at sea, and so on. Much more fundamental perhaps, though virtually unexplored in any open writing, is the role of the Soviet Navy in the SALT formulations and the negotiations. Here the naval command had a vital interest at'Stake and in the event cannot have been disappointed at the outcome, though possibly it had to be overridden.finally in the last frantic arrangement over SSBN strengths. Even so, the generous replacement terms must be construed as a Soviet advantage and will not have escaped the attention of the Soviet Navy.
It could be argued, therefore, that institutional representation is no real index of the influence of the Soviet Navy. Such an indicator will also become less
significant as the shape of the whole Soviet command and the establishment in general changes (due to natural wastage and the reduction in overall age-levels), with a tendency to diminish the number of very high- ranking officers. Joint operations may thus come to have a wholly different meaning, and already there have been signs of what shape this could take. In Egypt, the Soviet Navy was committed in a situation which comprised economic aid and penetration, military protection, an element of political control, and an attempt at technical infiltration. This brought the navy into close contact with the main processes of Soviet diplomacy and the pursuit of Soviet "state interests” on a scale which had not been seen before. This is much more than "showing the flag;” indeed, it can be seen as implanting the flag. The fact that the Egyptian experience has presently moved into a doleful impasse is no reason for dismissing its relevance and future application. And it is here that Gorshkov’s view of the naval mission takes on a new cast. In addition to accepting the amplifying the deterrent role of the Soviet Navy, Gorshkov has suggested possible missions in limited war and a peacetime role of supporting "state interests” which has the widest implications. In this sense, therefore, the Soviet Navy is definitely and unequivocally on the offensive. The defensive-deterrence posture has long since been abandoned as insufficient. While the primary effort is still confined to building up the seaborne deterrent and the submarine force at large, there are signs now of a search for greater flexibility with regard to the naval forces. The Soviet Navy may not measure its success solely by how many places it buys within and alongside the strategic commands, but to what degree it can conjointly support, maintain and even initiate the pursuit of "state interests” in a style which has never before been seen in the history of the Soviet Union.