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On the preceding pages, a Sea Hawk fighter rises from the carrier Vikrant’j catapult, and another is made ready to launch for an attack on the East Pakistani port of Chittagong during the war between India and Pakistan in December 1971. The Indian naval commands in both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal sought the use of this ship in the war they foresaw. When she and her 22 aircraft (18 Sea Hawks and four Alizes) were allotted to the Bay, the eight new Soviet-built Osa-class missile boats were assigned to the Arabian Sea. As this account by an Indian officer makes clear, the naval war was conducted mainly by submarines, carrier aircraft, and missile boats.
W e who live on the Indian Ocean had a momentous year in 1971, filled with surprises. The most important developments occurred on the subcontinent which dominates the northern reaches of the Ocean and gives it its name. At the close of 1970, Pakistan was surging ahead economically, with an apparently benevolent military dictatorship stabilizing the political scene prior to the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. India, in contrast, appeared to be a flabby, unstable giant. Indian economists had begun to praise the rate of growth of the Pakistani economy and to bemoan India’s. Worse, the split in the leadership of the National Congress threatened that there would be at least political uncertainty—and at most chaos—after the elections scheduled for February and March 1971.
The elections in the two countries confounded all prophets. In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi romped home with a comfortable two-thirds majority that left her the undisputed leader of the country with a mandate to bring in progressive measures that had been thwarted for years.
In Pakistan’s election, East Pakistan’s Mujibur Rahman won a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly on a program demanding maximum autonomy for Bengalis, excluding only defense and foreign affairs. The Army was not prepared to concede this demand and the crackdown of 25 March 1971 resulted in a civil war which escalated into war with India in December. China, providing equipment for three divisions, was the only country openly to support the Pakistani Army.
President Richard Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, used his visit to the subcontinent in July 1971 to meet Chou En-lai secretly in Peking. Their meeting resulted in the announcement of the presiden
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tial visit to Peking in February 1972. Not to be out ! done, the Soviet Union selected an opportune moment in August to sign a 20-year friendship treaty with India. I which had been sorely disappointed at the attitude of the major democracies over the events in East Bengal Kissinger had informed Mrs. Gandhi that India coull, not count on U. S. assistance in the event of Chined intervention in any Indo-Pakistani conflict.
All these events had an impact on the Indian Ocean region. But, before we attempt an analysis of how thest■ events in turn may affect the future, an examination of the background against which they took placed I be helpful.
The Commonwealth Conference
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The remarkable transformation that has taken pla^ in the Indian Ocean area during the quarter centui)' since the end of World War II was reflected in tl* Conference of the Heads of States and Prime Minister of the Commonwealth countries in the tiny island sta[C of Singapore in January 1971. Since his was the fif>‘ country to host a regular Commonwealth meeting m*1' side London, the Prime Minister of Singapore preside® at the meetings at which all 23 members were rep^' sented, including 13 Afro-Asian countries.
Another novelty during the conference was the ap pearance of two Soviet warships, the 19,200-ton crui^' Alexander Suvarov and the Kotlin-class frigate BM aschy. They were accompanied by a tanker and a salv^ vessel when they were observed in the vicinity of Sing1 pore harbor en route from Vladivostok to the Indijp Ocean. That the Soviets obviously wanted their warsh'f to be seen passing close to the port during a meed11' at which the Soviet threat to the Indian Ocean was11
be hotly debated has baffled many observers. Were
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adequate seapower to back its policy anywhere W world?
The most volatile issue—and the one over wh1'
to deliver these arms, consisting largely of frigates, re^ naissance aircraft, and helicopters, as a result of1 Simonstown agreement of 1955. But this had w contradicted by Harold Wilson, the former , Prime Minister, during whose tenure Britain had 11 only discontinued the supply of military hardware South Africa in response to a U.N. Resolution, but ^ had decided in February 1968 to withdraw' British f°ft
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The Indo-Pakistanl War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 175
Under the Simonstown agreement, Britain had handed the Simonstown naval base over to South Africa by a simple exchange of letters. The agreement was not formalized as a treaty because it was widely assumed at the time that Britain would continue to supply arms to South Africa almost indefinitely. The clause, therefore, was not written into the exchange of letters. The agreement further stipulated that the South African Navy would be expanded by 20 vessels, worth £18 million, to be built in British shipyards between 1955 and 1963. On delivery of the last of the ships in 1963, therefore, the British commitment ended; and, in 1964, the new Labour Government decided to implement the U.N. Security Council Resolution banning the sale of arms to South Africa. Thereafter, only 16 Buccaneers, spare parts, and radar, all previously ordered, were supplied. Britain retained base facilities until the agreement was revised in 1967, when South Africa assumed full responsibility for defense of the sea area around the Cape °f Good Hope route.
Heath’s case was further weakened by former Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s Commonwealth Relations Minister, Lord Alport, who called Heath’s determination to assist South Africa "politically unwise” and "militarily irrelevant.” It was politically unwise because it would alienate the Afro-Asian counties, and militarily irrelevant because Soviet interference with trade via the Cape of Good Hope route would bring about a disadvantageous confrontation with the United States. If the Soviets wanted to prove their Maritime competence they would do it nearer the Soviet Union in an area where they were strategically well situated for a concentration of maritime might. The Norwegian Sea would be the most suitable location for 'his and the Cape area the worst. Alienating the African c°untries would also be politically unwise because they w°uld be forced to turn to the Soviet Union and China though many of them might prefer not to do so.
Britain could not have forgotten that the Suez oper- a'ion in 1956 had to be scuttled under Soviet pressure *s soon as it was clear that the United States would n°t support it.,Today, when the Soviet Union is in a Hr more advantageous military position than it was in '956, the British position with respect to the Indian ^cean is unchanged. Yet, without the overt support
'he United States, Britain cannot challenge the Soviet Union militarily anywhere in the world. It has become 'oo weak tQ con(juct a global foreign policy indc- j*ndently. This is one of the prices it must pay for no ®nger being able to project significant maritime power a 'oad as in former years.
During the Commonwealth meeting, it was decided to set up a study group to examine the Soviet threat to the trade routes in the Indian Ocean. The countries represented on the group were Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, and Nigeria. The communique issued at the end of the Conference also stated that the heads of governments agreed on the desirability of ensuring that the Indian Ocean—one of the most unstable areas of the globe—remain an area of peace and stability.
Important changes have taken place in Indian thinking on defense affairs. A decade ago, the idea of a vacuum having been formed in the Ocean by the withdrawal of the colonial powers was ridiculed, and wild claims were made that the country would never "go nuclear.”
Let us review briefly the demise of colonial power after World War II. Those countries with interests in the Indian Ocean in the 1930s were Italy, Holland, France, Portugal, and, of course, Great Britain. While the Indian Ocean had been totally under British control since Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805, the other powers had established colonies or, at least, bases there. Italy had a base at Massawa on the Red Sea; the French had one at Diego Suarez in Madagascar (Malagasy); the Dutch had long held the East Indies; Portugal, the first of the colonial powers, possessed Mozambique in Southeast Africa and some pockets in India, notably Goa. With the subjugation of Europe by the Nazis early in World War II, the Dutch and French empires collapsed, although some remnants fought on the side of the Allies until Japan moved into Southeast Asia in 1942. The Italians were driven out of Ethiopia by Brltish-Indian forces soon after they entered the war. The Portuguese, bound by an antiquated alliance with Britain dating from the 17th century, held on grimly to their possessions although they had no power to project.
The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia was followed by a foray of their fleet into the central Indian Ocean in April 1942 which forced the withdrawal of the British fleet to East Africa, leaving the Indian subcontinent open to a seaborne invasion. With the defeat of the Japanese Fleet at Midway in June 1942 and the turning of the tide in the Pacific war, Britain was able to re-establish its control over the Indian Ocean. The Dutch climbed onto the Allied bandwagon and moved back into the East Indies, but they were forced to vacate Indonesia by 1949. With their defeat in Indochina, the French relinquished their interests in the Indian Ocean, but they continue to maintain their naval base at Diego Suarez in Malagasy, although that
small island became independent in 1959-
These withdrawals by the other colonial powers, however, were trivial in comparison to that of the British who withdrew from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, from Ceylon in 1948, from Malaya in 1957, and from their East African possessions early in the 1960s. With the loss of the Suez Canal, coupled with the granting of independence to Aden and Singapore, those observation points on, respectively, the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca, the most important springboards for the projection of power into and out of the Indian Ocean were lost to Britain. It should not be forgotten that the Indian subcontinent provided Britain with most of the manpower needed for the maintenance of imperial interests in West Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Indian troops had fought in China in the 19th century, in France during World War I, and had been employed regularly in punitive expeditions up the Euphrates, around the Persian Gulf, in Burma, and across the Northwest Frontier adjacent to Afghanistan. All these expeditions had depended upon British supremacy on the seas. It was British- controlled power based in the Indian subcontinent that prevented the Tsars and their Soviet successors from driving southwards through Persia to obtain outlets and warm-water ports in the Persian Gulf. In 1945, President Harry S. Truman had to issue an ultimatum before Stalin would pull Soviet forces out of that country (by then renamed Iran) which had been occupied by the British and Russians to safeguard the Lend-Lease supply route to Russia.
There can be little doubt, then, that the withdrawal of the British created a vacuum in the Indian Ocean region which it was not possible for any single power or group of powers to fill. Although India now has land forces, including paramilitary forces, numbering over a million (more than at any time during the British regime except during World War II), they are deployed before the Himalayas, to meet the Chinese Communist threat, and westward confronting Pakistan. The Indian Navy is unable to project the country’s sizable land power overseas to safeguard either the common interests of the region or even vital Indian interests.
On either side of the northern extremities of the Indian Ocean, the pressure is strong. In the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets are nearly equal in strength to the United States and have a number of advanced bases for their fleet. On the shores of the China Sea, the United States is still opposing Chinese Communism although since President Nixon’s visit to Peking, doubts on that score are being expressed by some Asian allies.
The reopening of the Suez Canal or the end of
the war in Vietnam, welcome as both should be, co result in a flood of Communist power into the Indi Ocean to fill the vacuum. The end of the war Vietnam could open the way for greater Chinese p sure on India or Burma; or with the eventual aim reaching Malaysia and Singapore, on Laos and Thailan The re-opening of the Suez Canal would cut the curre voyage distance from the Soviet Union’s Balti Barents, and Black Sea ports (via the Cape of Go Hope) to the Indian Ocean by more than two-thir- In addition to shortening the trade routes, whid would give the Soviets considerable leverage with tL undeveloped Third World, the reopening of Su£ would also make it easier to reinforce the Russia Indian Ocean fleet and cut turn-around time. Th^ possibilities could scarcely be discounted by country interested in the peace and security of the region.
Communism’s Helping Hand
On the other hand, "gunboat diplomacy” may havt ended with the eclipse of the British Empire. Atf attempt at a repetition of the imposition of influe^ in the Indian Ocean region by brute force is likely10 boomerang. The Soviet Union and perhaps China, f seem to realize this. The forcefulness of the Chinch diplomatic offensive on the continent of Africa dufw the 1960s lost China more friends than it gained. M*®' Chinese diplomats were bundled out of African capi^ because, during a visit to Kenya and Tanzania in 19$ Chou En-lai made the statement that Africa was "rirl for revolution.” Since then China’s only firm footho1* on the continent has been in Tanzania and Zamb* where they are building the 1,050-mile Tanzam rail*11- to link the copper mines of Zambia with Dar-es-Sala3"’ on the Indian Ocean. This came about because no oth country was willing to risk financing the $500-miUl project. It is no longer a secret that the thousa® construction workers are Chinese Army person^ China has also given some tanks and patrol boats a® a dozen MiG-l7s to Tanzania and has built facili1'^ including a naval base at Dar-es-Salaam and an aid'd 80 miles to the west, at Ngwenger. There have persistent reports that the Chinese are likely to test tb\ first ICBM on a range from Sinkiang, across India •1,> the Indian Oc?an to near the island of Zanzibar.
China’s limited ability to achieve its foreign p°b aims has become well known. Many projects taken in the under-developed countries have failed [' achieve their much-publicized purposes. The most f1’ table example is in Burma which has found that Cjjj nese aid is unproductive. Still, the Burmese seem . ing to accept more aid if only to limit the deg^ of Chinese interference in Burmese affairs through su versive activities and assistance to guerrillas. Howc'
Surma is on China’s doorstep, and most of the underdeveloped nations are not.
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So far, China possesses none of the major attributes required for the prosecution of a global foreign policy: (hose are a powerful economy backed by managerial talent, a sophisticated technology, and the ability to Project military power far afield.
The Soviet Union has been much more successful ln winning the confidence of the under-developed nations, partly by exploiting the anticolonial sentiment w>th which the region abounds. It has gained goodwill
The distances in the Indian Ocean are huge, the entryways few, and the truly strategic points correspondingly rare and valuable. To outsiders, the Ocean's main value stems from the oil found in the Persian Gulf, almost all of which passes either around the Cape of Good Hope or around Singapore en route to its consumers in Europe, Japan, and—increasingly—North America.
largely by an economic offensive, often as a result1 the Western powers’ failure to meet the requireme^ for aid requested by various countries. Thus, the So'1 Union gained a foothold for fishing rights in Mauri1'11 when Britain refused to assist that small island coun1^ in establishing a fishing industry. The Soviets’ protff assistance gained an important base for use by t*1 surveillance-oriented fishing fleet. j
Britain’s delay in transferring power to Aden’s fl11' erates earlier in the 1960s resulted in the South Yefl^1 government turning to the Soviet Union. Thus, c" strategic locations, one at Aden and the other on island of Socotra, became available to the Soviet Un>olj for fishing bases, or whatever they wished to makel' , them. These are in addition to the naval base I
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 179
lished at the Red Sea port of Hodeida in Yemen.
While the Indian foreign minister emphatically denied that the Soviet Union was building up a fortress at Socotra, stating that an Indian representative had recently visited the island, the expansion of fishing harbors for other purposes is always possible. Socotra is ideally situated for control of passage between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and for the support of forces equipped to keep track of submarines operating in the Arabian Sea.
Though the Soviet Union has moved into the Indian Ocean, Britain has not completely moved out. It has an airfield at Masirah Island, off the Muscat coast, and another at Gan in the Maldives, southwest of India. The significance of Masirah Island’s air strip, together with that at Gan, is that Britain can reinforce the Far East quickly by air to meet its remaining commitments to Malaysia and Singapore. These commitments are small, and, soon after the British decision to withdraw from the Singapore naval dockyard, Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, stated that the dockyard would be run on a commercial basis and that ships of the Soviet Union would be as welcome as any others on the same terms.
Britain is not the only Western state being replaced as a source of influence in the Indian Ocean area. The U. S. refusal to finance the construction of the Bokaro steel plant in India resulted in the Soviet Union taking over the job. With the Soviets now having aided many of the heavy industrial projects, Moscow’s stake in India is considerable. Because of the events leading to the civil war in Pakistan, and because of its inability to wean that country away from China and the United States, the Kremlin was forced to reconsider its policy of balancing India and Pakistan. As Moscow evidently saw it, the possibility of a Sino-U. S. detente required a strong, friendly India to counter Chinese expansionist aims. These aims appear as serious threats both to the Soviet Union and to India; they resulted in the Indo- Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971. While there is no specific reference to China in the Treaty it was obviously aimed at ensuring that the Chinese keep their hands off India in the event of Indo-Pakistani hostilities.
At the Singapore Conference, Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) proposed the establishment of a nuclear fee zone in the Indian Ocean. During the visit to Peking of Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Mrs. Srimavo banderanaike, in June 1972, China supported this move with the obvious intention of keeping India nonnuclear. This is a delicate matter for India, which has a nuclear China sitting on its shoulders. Owing to the Chinese threat, India would be unwise to support any m°ve aimed at precluding its option to go nuclear.
In the long run, if India does opt for nuclear weapons, because of the distances of the major Chinese population and industrial centers from possible Indian sites, submarine-launched weapons would be the most effective. A 500-mile-range, submarine-launched missile would expose Peking and 70% of China’s population and industrial targets to nuclear retaliation. While it is difficult for submarines to pass unnoticed between the Indian and the Pacific oceans there is sufficient room for them to operate off the Indian and Chinese coasts without being detected by the limited defenses of either country.
In spite of this, India would certainly support any moves to control the growing foreign interference in the region. The countries of the region are fortunate that the Indian Ocean is not nearly as important to any of the major powers as the Atlantic, the Pacific, or even the Arctic. Hence they might be willing to accept some control of military and naval activity in the region, provided their antagonists do not benefit from it.
It is generally accepted that the United States has for some years deployed Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean, where it is easy to avoid surveillance. It would be more difficult for Moscow to keep track of them in the Indian Ocean than in the much-more- easily-reached North Atlantic or North Pacific. With the advent of Poseidon the advantage will shift further to the United States since many more Soviet targets come within range of submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union appears to be planning to trade the reduction of its own naval forces in the region for a concurrent reduction of U. S. Poseidon submarines from the same region. Proposals for limitation of maritime forces by the major powers have been made by both Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, although neither Moscow nor Washington has referred to missile submarines or to missile cruisers.
The Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean
Russian sailors on a visit to Mauritius were reported wearing cap ribbons inscribed with "Indian Ocean Fleet.” Be that as it may, there does not appear to be any set pattern for the operation of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean. They have no base and are largely dependent upon their support ships which generally come in numbers equal to their combatant ships. Since the first visit of a Soviet squadron to the Indian Ocean in 1967 to recover space vehicles, the number of their ships rose to 21 in 1970. Since then, they have varied in number between 15 and 25, a peak strength reached when a squadron of six ships, including one Kresta and one Kynda-class guided missile frigate, entered the Indian Ocean close on the heels of the USS Enterprise
task force towards the end of the Indo-Pakistani War in December 1971.
Soviet ships generally stay in the Indian Ocean for from four to six months. They have a very large number of ports of call spread over the Indian Ocean and do not have to visit any one port too often. Just as ships of the West do, they obtain essential repairs at ports such as Bombay and Singapore, though they prefer to have them attended to by their own support ships whenever possible. They have minor facilities at Hodeida in Yemen, Berbera in the Somali Republic, Um-al-quasr in Iraq, Aden and Socotra in South Yemen, and Port Louis in Mauritius. In addition, they employ a system of replenishment and maintenance of ships moored to buoys located outside territorial waters. Among other places these are known to be situated off Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Malagasy Republic, Cargados Carajos (east of Madagascar), and the Chagos Archipelago.
There have been persistent reports that Socotra is the most regular port of call for most Soviet ships, for it is from this island that they can best shadow the U. S. ballistic missile submarines operating in the Arabian Sea.
The tasks of the Soviet ships include showing the flag, assisting in the recovery of space vehicles, and shadowing major units such as carrier task forces or missile submarines.
Until very recently, overt U. S. interest in the region seemed to be limited to a station on the British island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago which would complete the world-wide relaying system for a real-time satellite reconnaissance program and fill in gaps in other world-wide communications networks. Yet, in an interview datelined 1 October 1971 from Washington, Vice Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), was reported to have told a press conference that the United States plans to expand its operation in the Indian Ocean, because if
it does not, it will be turning that ocean over to the Russians, politically, economically, and militarily. He stated that the carrier Enterprise and the frigate Bain- bridge, both nuclear-powered, had just completed a four-day "swing” in the eastern Indian Ocean. The Admiral added that Washington had not decided whether to have a permanent force or to operate ships on a "random basis” in the area. Some months later, in June 1972, Secretary of State William Rogers was reported to have told the CENTO power meeting that the United States had decided to increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Local Naval Conditions
The current naval strength of the Indian Ocean powers is shown on the table below.
From the table, it is clear that none of the local navies is independently capable of carrying out a major operation for an extended period. The largest of them, belonging to Australia and India, can operate independently on a minor scale. Hence, a superpower would not find it difficult to control any sector of the Indian Ocean it wished unless opposed by forces of the other superpower. In the event of such a confrontation, a great deal would depend upon which local powers each superpower was backing and upon the bases each might have managed to acquire. The time/distance factor and the superpowers’ over-extension in the other major oceans of the world, to which any escalation in this ocean would spread, is a constraining factor against their deployment of major maritime forces to the Indian Ocean. However, in the event of a superpower being allowed to exercise control of a sector unopposed by the other, with afloat support it could maintain half a dozen ships in the area indefinitely. This is in spire of their nearest bases being as far away as Vladivostok and Subic Bay for the Russians and Americans respectively.
Country | Aircraft Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyers | Frigates | Submarines | c > in |
Australia | 2 | — | 6 | 6 | 4 | — |
India | 1 | 2 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 8 Osi |
Indonesia | — | — | 7 | 9 . | 14 (8 in reserve) | — |
Iran | — | — | 1 | .5 | — | - |
Malaya | — | — | — | 2 | — | - |
Pakistan | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | — |
South Africa | — | — | 2 | 6 (2 old) | — | — |
♦India is preparing to add to her Navy six Leander-class and five Petya-class frigates, and four more F-class submarines. Some corvettes of about 1,000 <of> are being considered, and may be built to French design. Australia is planning three new destroyers and two submarines, the former to home design, d* latter to be built in Scotland.
The additions to their navies that each country plans*
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 181
will probably enable the Indian Navy to become the strongest force in the region, a position presently occupied by Australia.
While on paper, Indonesia possesses a very large Navy, many of its ships are not operational, owing to the break in relations with the Soviet Union, which supplied them. Some are being repaired, although somewhat slowly. Eight of its 14 submarines provide spare parts for the other six which, even so are not always operational. Indonesia is turning increasingly to the West for defense hardware.
During the Sukarno regime, Indonesia had visions °f the Indian Ocean being called the Indonesian Ocean, with "Maphilindo” (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, combined into one) spreading from the Philippines to Malagasy. Sukarno’s dreams resulted in excessive military expenditure and his grandiose political and economic schemes ruined the country. A coup ln 1965, backed by China, failed by a hair’s breadth. Ever since, the Indonesian leaders have concentrated on stabilizing the internal political situation and rebuild- lng their economy, which has considerable potential, for the country has oil, rubber, tin, spices and other essential commodities.
Australia’s influence in Indian Ocean affairs has been "important for it has assisted economic development through the Colombo Plan without interfering in the 'Uternal affairs of any country. Militarily, Australia has keen helpful, especially in the Malaysian region, and, ■n cooperation with India, could play an important part in preventing Chinese entry into the Indian Ocean. Its 't'ost coast ports are very far south, but the Cocos islands and Christmas Island are situated so as to cover uiany of the passages through the Indonesian archipelago.
Even more important are the Andaman and Nicobar Elands in the Bay of Bengal. Owned by India, they are important to any navy aspiring to control the Bay and the entrance to the Malacca Strait. The Japanese captured these islands in 1942 before they attacked Ewma and before their fleet entered the Indian Ocean. India has built up an advanced base at Port Blair on South Andaman Island, and has an airfield at Car Nicobar. There are numerous bays that could be used as advanced b^ses, one of the best natural harbors in 'Ee world being at Nancowry in the Nicobars. If India ls to play its part in any security system for Southeast ^s'a, which seems more likely now after its friendship tteaties with Moscow and Bangla Desh and offers to Extend its treaties to other friendly countries, these elands will form the springboard for forces that might 'fieri be required at short notice. But, today, there is n° such capability. India is defensively poised as far 15 the security of the islands are concerned. There is
concern about Chinese submarines and fishing vessels and possible encroachments from Indonesia—a legacy of the Sukarno era. There is no question whatever of any foreign bases on Indian soil. All the navies of the world, except the Chinese and the Pakistani, are extended the same facilities on a reciprocal basis for bunkering and other normal nonmilitary replenishment.
No other Indian Ocean country has any pretensions for projecting its maritime power, although Iran is building up a fleet for control of the Persian Gulf. That country has been using its surplus oil revenues to buy sophisticated defense hardware, including Phantoms and the most modern light destroyers. These will give it a considerable local defense capability, provided it is able to develop suitable tactical doctrine and maintain and employ these modern weapons to advantage. None of these seem likely. Despite Iran’s military problems and despite the Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1972 between the Soviet Union and Iraq, a competitor with Iran for domination of the Gulf, there appears to be a good chance that Iran will be in a position to fulfill the Shah’s ambitions of becoming the Gulfs policeman. Gulf politics are more complicated than they were a decade ago, with innumerable sheikdoms adding to the problems of the region’s three larger countries: Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The area is in for a period of uncertainty and strife during this decade with possibilities of the major powers clashing over support to their rival proteges, unless the United States keeps Iran and Saudi Arabia in rein and the Soviets do the same with Iraq.
South Africa would like to have some naval forces, ostensibly for safeguarding the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. But, since this task is beyond South Africa’s capability, such forces would most likely be diverted to counterinsurgency patrols along that country’s long coastline, or for lifting troops.
Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, is as important strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or as Taiwan is to China. Sir Winston Churchill, discussing the importance of Eire and its ports during the battle of the Atlantic, stated that "if we had not been able to do without them, we should have retaken them by force rather than perish by famine.” The position of India in relation to Sri Lanka is similar. India might not need the ports at Colombo and Trincomalee because the larger country is well supplied with ports, at Cochin, Tuticorin, and Madras. India could tolerate a neutral Sri Lanka, but, although no responsible government spokesman has said so, if there were any danger of that island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, it would have to act to protect its integrity. When the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna
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responded immediately with five frigates to pat
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Far to the south lies Mauritius which for centu
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has provided an important harbor for ships approad the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean via the Or of Good Hope. Despite its small size, its locate astride this trade route will continue to keep h 0 of the more important islands in the region.
As a result of a I960 defense agreement, FrJfK I
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The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 183
continues to maintain its naval base at Diego Suarez, at the northern end of the Malagasy Republic, which strategically is on a par with Mauritius.
In spite of the recent political changes on that big island, France’s position continues to be influential in Malagasy. Two or three destroyers are maintained there by France as its presence in the Indian Ocean, with other ships calling from time to time. On a visit to Malagasy in March 1972, the French Defense Minister, Michel Debre, when asked if there was cooperation between the French, Americans, and British, stated that it was important that there should be cooperation with all countries "anxious for peace in this part of the world.” The French presence is unimportant unless there is coordination with other Western countries.
Viewed in the context of the maritime confrontations in the other oceans, naval activity in the Indian Ocean, though clearly increasing, is at a low level. Yet, unless an Indian Ocean Authority under U.N. auspices can be established to control such activity, the confrontations in the other oceans might soon spill over into the Indian Ocean. Andrew Peacock, the Australian Army Minister, stated at a seminar in Melbourne on 1 August 1971 that the Indian Ocean will be the focal point of future struggles in Southeast Asia and described the Ocean as the cockpit of the most unsettled region in the world. He added that China had no wish to see the Indian Ocean dominated by Russia or India, or both in alliance. For China, the sea permits access to East Africa and Western and Southern Asia and makes possible cheap transport of bulk commodities.
Trade In the Indian Ocean
China’s interest in the transport of bulk commodities by sea emanates from its desire to influence the countries of the region by economic and military aid on a scale comparable to that of the Soviet Union. Chinese a>d has gone to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Yemen, South Yemen, the Somali Republic, and Tanzania. In i971, China supplied five Shanghai-class gunboats, a fleet of personnel carriers, and large quantities of arms and ammunition to Sri Lanka, in addition to 200,000 tons of Burmese rice in exchange for rubber. Pakistan bas been promised aid worth $300 million, including dO MiG-i9s and 100 T-59 tanks, to be sent by sea, although it is also supplied by a road through Kashmir °n the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line. Because China would like to establish a firm foothold in Africa, Tanzania is a large recipient of aid and many other little countries are receiving small amounts. Persistent tumors that Pakistan is to receive Komar-class missile °ats from China have not been confirmed. China is a's<> trading clandestinely with South Africa where the h'nese arc treated as a "white” race. This, together
with some other deals, are carried out through Hong Kong and Macao.
Often, however, Chinese articles lack good workmanship. Sri Lanka, for example, received some rail coaches from China as aid, but found them not very good and is now buying coaches from India. Some countries such as Iran and Ethiopia have recognized China in the hope that the Chinese will not embarrass them by encouraging revolutionary extremists.
Trade between the countries of the region is small but has been expanding, especially after the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which cut off the short route for goods from Europe. India is now supplying engineering goods to all the countries of the region, except Pakistan. In turn, India imports oil from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Indonesia. All the states in the region are dependent upon importing sophisticated technology. Yet these underdeveloped countries have a greater resilience in getting along without technology than the advanced countries which are completely dependent upon it. This quite often results in the former being able to take considerable punishment without its making any appreciable dent on their economy, although, as they modernize, they become more susceptible to economic damage caused by other countries. To the extent that it is an industrial economy, India, the most advanced state, might drag on for six months or a year.
As far as the outside world goes, all the arteries of trade from the eastern coast of the Americas, Europe, and the Mediterranean to Southeast Asia and beyond to China and Japan pass through the Indian Ocean.
Ninety per cent of Japan’s oil imports and a little over 50% of its annual trade are routed through the Indian Ocean. European trade, both Eastern and Western, has been increasing over the years with the countries of the region, as well as with China and Japan, and is routed through the Indian Ocean. Apart from its enormous dependence on Persian Gulf oil, Europe still needs many raw materials from the Indian Ocean countries. Zambia ships annually nearly 50% of its half-a-billion-dollars’ worth of copper through Indian Ocean ports. Malaysia’s tin and rubber, India’s and Bangla Desh’s jute, and tea from India, Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka, and East Africa, all go to the United Kingdom. Japan and many European countries import iron ore and manganese from India.
The Soviet Union’s trade in the region, together with its aid program, is increasing. Soviet trade with India now amounts to half-a-billion dollars annually. Besides its assistance to North Vietnam, inter-regional Soviet trade between either wing is increasingly being carried by sea, because the Trans-Siberian railway is overburdened. This is an important means of developing
the Soviet Far East to meet the increasing Chinese menace.
For many countries of the region trade with the United States is still greater than with the Communist countries, although this is likely to be reversed fairly soon, especially in the case of India. In underdeveloped countries trade is considered a form of aid, and because the Eastern European countries officially encourage it, even though they sometimes adopt unfair practices such as buying from India and then selling cheaply to a Western European country thus under-cutting India’s direct sale, it is still popular.
The possibility of a detente between the United States and China is being viewed with concern by many countries of the region, especially in Southeast Asia, which have experienced being scorched by the dragon’s breath.
The Indo-Soviet Pact
It is against this background that the most important events in the region during 1971, namely the Pakistani civil war, the Indo-Soviet Pact, the Indo- Pakistani war, and the resulting emergence of Bangla Desh, must be judged. There can be little doubt that these events are the most important to have occurred in the Indian Ocean since World War II and the British withdrawal from the subcontinent. The Chinese attack on India in October 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965 resulted in stalemates. But after 1971, few would suggest that things could be the same again in the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. It is therefore not surprising that the governments of all the major powers were interested in this aspect of the situation more than the humanitarian aspect which had concerned the press and public opinion throughout the democratic world.
Moscow chose the right time to sign the pact with India. The Indian Foreign Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry disclosed on 9 August 1971, that the pact had been contemplated for over two years, perhaps since Brezhnev made the offer of underwriting an Asian collective security system in June 1969. In mid-1971, Pakistan was attempting unsuccessfully to cope with the civil war in the eastern wing. The possibility of the Pakistani military rulers making a desperate lunge at India as a last resort had increased, for President Yahya Khan had made threats of "total war,” and Peking had asserted its friendship and support to Pakistan against aggression from any quarter. Without China’s partnership, Pakistan could not succeed in a war against India. It was to thwart such an attack that India signed the agreement with the Soviet Union, for if the Chinese believed that the Soviet Union was looking for an opportunity to attack China, a Chinese
attack on India would be the best way to begin it.
The Chinese attitude toward India has shown a marked change since the signing of the agreement. Chou En-lai has gone so far as to state that it is not aimed against China, the only country whose aggressive designs it was obviously intended to check. This is the Chinese way of pretending that something with which they are very much concerned is of little consequence to them.
The military clauses of the Indo-Soviet treaty were somewhat similar to those signed by the SEATO and CENTO powers with the "consultation” clause boiling the treaty down to a "situational” approach, where assistance rendered to each other would depend more upon the current state of relations between the partners and their national interests than upon any obligation to come to each other’s assistance immediately after the first shot was fired. Article IX reads, "Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing an)' assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof the high contracting parties shall immediately enter mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.” Nonetheless, it was clear warning to China not to interfere directly in the affairs of the subcontinent.
The long-term effects of the treaty will depend a great deal upon the actions of the major powers attempting to maintain their interests in the Indian Ocean. Should the Russians feel that they will not be able to manage the Chinese single-handed in the future they might encourage India to go nuclear. In fact, no longer are they pressing India to sign the non-Prolife3' tion Treaty and other agreements that would stop India from going nuclear.
To be sure, the Soviet Union will not require Indian assistance in a war with China in which it is able to employ the full panoply of its power. But with Chin3 possessing a minimal nuclear capability already, tb£ period for an all-out cataclysmic war seems to ha'c passed. A conventional war of the border variety where both sides use only frontier troops for fear of escalation will suit the Chinese with their great numbers and 11 is here that India’s assistance will be most required b) the Russians to draw the Chinese along the long nn mountainous Himalayan frontier. Yet India coul scarcely afford to provoke a nuclear China unless it *’aS certain that the Chinese would not use nuclear weap ons. This can only come about if India itself possess^ the weapon in its armory. In land warfare against3 nuclear power, a power lacking nuclear weapons cann1’1 concentrate sufficient forces to defeat the enemy for
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 185
of providing targets for tactical nuclear weapons, but the nuclear power can always concentrate his forces at places of his own choice.
In any case, India cannot rely too heavily on the Soviets for its security vis a vis the Chinese, for if the anti- Chou group were to assume power in China and opt for friendship with the Kremlin, India would be left high and dry. Hence for India, the nuclear question is no longer whether, but when. Already the decision to use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes has been announced. When the first "bang” takes place, will anyone believe that the Indian armed forces do not have any nuclear weapons in their arsenal?
Clearly, the Soviets are beginning to realize that they will require the assistance of a great power if the Sino- U. S. detente should come to fruition. India is that power. Yet, after India’s victory over Pakistan, India is less dependent upon the Soviet Union than it was before.
Indian leaders have stated that they would be willing to sign treaties similar to that signed with the Soviet Union with other countries of the Afro-Asian region. A treaty with Bangla Desh was signed at the insistence of Mujibur Rahman, when the two prime ministers tiet in Dacca in March 1972. The United States was specifically mentioned to show that India was not against it. The chance that Malaysia might approach India for a similar treaty, if it finds lack of support from Britain and Australia in future is a possibility, and one that India would have to take up. The alternative would be to give notice that India is not prepared to assume responsibilities that are obligatory in the ■nterest of its own security. Should India abrogate these responsibilities, the smaller nations, especially those of Southeast Asia, would be forced to seek accommodation with China. For many years India’s nonalignment kerned to be nonaligned even where its own interests were concerned. The Indo-Soviet Treaty was the first tone India had taken concrete steps to protect its vital ■nterests. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has already proved a more pragmatic and flexible statesman than her father, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru had had to contend with a ten-million-ton food deficit owing to a century °f neglect of agriculture during the British period, which obviously limited his options in the international arena. Mrs. Gandhi is reaping the fruits that Nehru sowed.
The Indo-Pakistani War
The Gathering Storm
After the Tashkent agreement following the 20-day War of September 1965, India and Pakistan entered an armament race and the defense budgets of the antago
nists soared to new heights. Pakistan acquired 80 MiG-i9s, four hundred T-59 tanks, and equipment for two divisions from China. From the Russians it received 150 T-54 tanks, some SAMs and artillery, plus spares which would help maintenance of Chinese-built hardware. From France came 35 Mirage III-Es.
India acquired 450 T-55 and PT-76 tanks and 120 SU-7 ground attack aircraft from the Soviet Union, and over one hundred MiG-2 is to be assembled in India prior to commencement of production in its own MiG factories from April 1971. India was also producing its own tanks, the Vijayanta, of which about 300 had become operational by December 1971.
Both countries had considerably augmented the strength of their paramilitary forces and had been calling up reserves in the second half of 1971.
India’s 25 divisions and 35 squadrons of offensive aircraft were pitted against Pakistan’s 14 divisions and 18 squadrons. But a simplistic comparison of forces such as this will leave out the most important fact, viz., that the establishment of Bangla Desh was the result of actions throughout the whole spectrum of conflict—economic, political, diplomatic, guerrilla, and psychological warfare. When the Pakistani military junta forced millions of refugees into India to overwhelm its economy while simultaneously converting East Pakistan into a minority in relation to the Western wing of the country, Indians took it as a new form of aggression—invasion by refugees. India was quick to respond—initially unofficially—but later officially and most actively to pleas for assistance from the Mukti Bahini, the guerrilla organization that was formed out of the remnants of the East Bengal Rifles and the East Pakistani Regiment, to which were added recruits from the colleges.
For this the military junta had itself to blame. It would be difficult to find an example of more disastrous decisions taken by any country’s rulers. Had the Pakistani government’s decisions been calculated to wreck their country, they could not have been improved upon. With a civil war on their hands the junta should have played a pacific role with India to prevent the latter from taking advantage of every blunder. By lessening tensions in the West they would have been able to transfer more forces for dealing with the revolt in the East. By dealing less severely with the rebellion, instead of launching a mass extermination campaign, they would not have forced India’s hand and lost the world’s sympathies. But their hatred for India and the Bengali was allowed to predominate. During the monsoons it was not possible for the Pakistani Army to put down the rebellion, and afterwards, when they might have made an attempt, they were confronted by the Indian Army at the border and the Mukti Bahini,
a hundred thousand strong toward the end, cutting their lines of communication. Strategically, the military junta lost the war before it started. Because of the economic pressure of the refugees it was India that needed the war desperately to get the refugees back to their homes. With Indira Gandhi’s foreign tour fetching her only tea and sympathy the war clouds grew darker. The armed forces had been on the alert since August and by December their serviceability rate was reaching a point from which it would commence the dangerous downward curve. With the weather unsuitable for Chinese intervention and with Soviet support assured, it became India’s game to provoke the Pakistanis to a showdown and, after numerous threats on the evening of 3 December 1971, the military junta willingly obliged.
The War at Sea
In strong contrast to its performance in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, the Indian Navy’s reaction to the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971 was quick and effective. The Eastern and Western fleets had been marking time for well over two months. The most significant factor in the execution of their plans was the spirit of competition between the fleets. This resulted in attacks by both on the adversary within the first 36 hours of the commencement of the war. Aircraft from the carrier Vikrant attacked targets in Cox’s Bazaar and Chittagong on the afternoon of 4 December, and the recently acquired Osa-class missile boats attacked the defenses of the fortress of Karachi on the night of 4-5 December.
Conflict of 1965
Before we discuss the details of the naval operations in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea it is necessary to review the strategic situation, which was quite different to that obtaining before the conflict in September 1965. In 1965, India had left the East Pakistani Air Force severely alone, in spite of provocative action by the Pakistani aviators based in the region—a region that Pakistan’s military regime had always considered expendable. In spite of a six-to-one paper superiority in favor of India, the known concentration of the Pakistani Fleet at Karachi, and a month’s warning of the impending crisis while infiltration continued across the cease-fire line in Kashmir, the Indian Fleet had continued its annual exercises in the Bay of Bengal throughout the month of August. When hostilities commenced on 1 September 1965 it was still there, instead of at its war stations in the Arabian Sea. By the time the fleet reached the scene of war off the west
coast, two Pakistani destroyers, the Khaibar and the Badr, had already carried out a hit-and-run bombardment at Dwarka, just south of the Gulf of Kutch. Even then the Indian fleet lacked the leadership to seek decisive action and limited its operations so as to stay outside a 300-mile imaginary radius of action of Pakistani F-86 aircraft based on Karachi. This meant the Indian fleet would hardly go north of Bombay, while the fighting took place substantially to the north.
The Opposing Plans
Geography was unkind to the Pakistani Navy, requiring a circuitous passage of 3,000 miles between the East and West wings of their country, with the far superior Indian Navy located so it could easily command the route. Hence, there was no way, once war had begun, to maintain communications between East and West, and the Pakistanis did not attempt it.
Since 1965, Pakistan had acquired three 850-ton Daphne-class submarines from France, a dozen midget submarines, and a score of human torpedoes. For this reason a surprise attack on Indian ships in harbor, in conjunction with attack by French-built Mirage III-E aircraft (the kind which, used by Israel in 1967, had knocked out the Egyptian Air Force in a lightning attack), was a distinct possibility. The submarine threat weighed most heavily on the minds of India’s naval staff in planning their strategy, for Pakistani surface power, consisting of one old cruiser and five elderly destroyers, was slight. The answer obviously lay in dispersal of the major ships of the fleet.
The strength of the Indian Navy had been augmented considerably since the last conflict and its six- to-one paper superiority had been increased to at least ten-to-one. Under the Russian acquisition program India had received five 1,150-ton Petya-class frigates, four 1,700-ton F-class submarines, and eight 200-ton Osa-class missile boats. The Styx missiles with which the Osa class were armed had already won some fame when, in 1967, the Egyptians used them to sink the Israeli destroyer Eilat off the Egyptian coast. With only one aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, and one cruiser operational, the Indian Navy’s main concern was how to deploy its strength to enable both the Western and Eastern fleets to carry out their missions under the radically altered situation created by the secessionist movement for Bangla Desh in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan.
The Pakistani Navy had a clear-cut plan for its submarines. This was to sink the Vikrant. They planned to deploy their Daphnes in the Arabian Sea and the 27-year-old Ghazi (ex-USS Diablo) in the Bay °f Bengal. Later, when they learned that the Vikrant was operating in the Bay, one of the Daphnes appears to
187
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean
have been fueled south of Sri Lanka and dispatched to patrol off the coast of East Pakistan in the most obvious position to intercept the Vikrant if she sailed northward for air attacks on Chittagong.
They had no particular plan for their surface ships. With the Vikrant operational and the eight Osa-class missile boats in the Arabian Sea, and India’s considerable superiority in conventional surface ships, there was little those ancient ships could accomplish. Their only credible option was to go out singly on raider operations to "do or die.” This option they did not take; they stayed in Karachi harbor.
As the struggle in the Eastern wing of Pakistan intensified and the situation created by the millions of
the allocation of ships to the commands some months before the war began, the first "battle” was fought on paper between India’s Eastern and Western Naval Commands for the allocation of the Vikrant. The Eastern Command got the ship, mainly because the liberation of Bangla Desh had priority; in comparison, the bombardment of Karachi, the prime target of the Western fleet, was only a subsidiary aim.
mfugees increased the pressure on India, the war clouds ?rew darker and ships of the fleet were redisposed to c°unter the Pakistani submarine menace.
The Daphne-class submarines have a limited range j^'ich means that if they were based at their normal Orneport, Karachi, they were barred from operating ^ Bay of Bengal. Moreover, they cannot carry both Urnan torpedoes and their load of normal torpedoes, as such a combination affects their trim and results in ’’'stability while submerged. Only the older and larger 570-ton) Ghazi could operate in the Bay and carry c human torpedoes to their launch positions, during the discussion among the Indian officers for
It also seemed probable to the Indian naval staff that the three Daphne-class submarines would operate in the Arabian Sea and the Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal, for the reasons already discussed. With the Vikrant operating in the Bay not only would it be nearly impossible for a lone submarine to locate her, but also the absence
of any substantial enemy air strength in East Pakistan would enable her to act freely while establishing a blockade. A dividend was that, because of the limited threat in the Bay, the Vikrant would require fewer escorts than she would in the Arabian Sea.
The redeployment of the other ships to achieve a balance and provide flexibility in both fleets had also to be undertaken. With the Vikrant, two gunnery ships were transferred to the Eastern Fleet, while three of the Petya class, good antisubmarine and general purpose ships, and eight Osa-class missile boats, were made available to the Western Naval Command. All these considerations had to be weighed by the Commands in making their plans for the impending war with Pakistan.
Allocation of Tasks
The general tasks assigned by Naval Headquarters to the commanders-in-chief, eastern and western naval commands, were:
► The destruction of Pakistani maritime forces.
► The disruption of Pakistani trade and the protection of Indian trade.
►Attacks on shore targets of a military nature with a view to damaging the defense potential of Pakistan.
► The blockade of East Pakistan.
These covered in full measure the normal major aims of the antagonists in maritime warfare. In common with other navies, the Indian Navy assumes that control of certain specified sea areas, which will vary from time to time, to assist their own operations or deny this facility to the enemy, will have to be exercised.
Let us see how the various Commands met their responsibilities. As the war was fought for the liberation of "Bangla Desh,” we shall deal first of all with the operations in the Bay of Bengal and then those in the Arabian Sea.
Operations in the Bay of Bengal
Bearing in mind the major aims formulated by Naval Headquarters, the Eastern Naval Command Headquarters, under the Command of Vice Admiral N. Krishnan, laid down a bold offensive strategy to be pursued from the commencement of hostilities. Admiral Krishnan ensured the security of his ships from the Pakistani submarine threat by assigning them tasks which both kept them away from ports where they were likely to be attacked and also increased their readiness to act.
Once hostilities had commenced, every Indian Navy ship was employed, either enforcing the blockade or
attacking military targets aimed at demoralizing the Pakistani forces.
Carrier Operations
On the evening of 3 December, when the Pakistani Air Force made an abortive pre-emptive attack on 12 Indian airfields, and the Ghazi was searching for the Vikrant off Visakhapatnam, the latter, escorted by the Kamorta, Brahmaputra, and Beas, was cruising to the north of the Andaman Islands having left there the previous day. This enabled her to be in position to attack targets in East Pakistan on the morning of the 4th. In the two previous military clashes, that against Portugal for the liberation of Goa and the 1965 conflid with Pakistan, the Vikrant had been in drydock and the conflicts had concluded by the time she became operational. Her pilots had therefore never attacked targets in combat.
Because the staff was unsure about the response by the Pakistani Air Force by Sea Hawks, the first strike, on the airfield at Cox’s Bazar, was launched at extreme range (about 200 miles) at 1100 on the 4th. The Vikrant continued to move northward, which enabled her to launch her second strike, on Chittagong, at 1400 Surprise was achieved and, apart from anti-aircraft fife> no opposition was encountered. At Chittagong one hangar and the control tower were destroyed and an oil dump set ablaze; two gunboats and six armed merchant ships belonging to Pakistan were sunk of damaged. The Vikrant went ahead with her air attacks on shore targets while her escorts were engaged 1° action against a Daphne-class submarine. Probably this was the Mangro, which was sent to patrol south d Chittagong when the Pakistani Navy was certain that the Vikrant was operating in the Bay. She missed in opportunity to fire at the Vikrant from a position on the bow and was claimed sunk.
With the destruction of the Pakistani Air Force >n East Bengal by the Indian Air Force within the brst 48 hours, the Vikrant's task was made simpler. She could operate within 50 miles of the coast and the a>( strikes could be launched with full loads to attack pod* such as Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar. In addition t0 these ports, Chalna, Khulna, and many smaller inland ports on the Ganges-Brahmaputra estuary, which is1 maze of waterways, were under continuous air attack b) Sea Hawks and, once the requirement for antisubmarine protection and reconnaissance had receded in imp°r' tance, by Alizes.
Almost daily thereafter the Sea Hawks and AhzCS carried out attacks on oil dumps, harbor installation5’ coastal batteries, runways, ordnance factories, wirek5* stations, and any ship or boat that could be employ^ to evacuate the Pakistani Army from the Eastern Win#
Blockade of East Pakistan The blockade of East Pakistan, one of the primary tasks of the Eastern Naval Command, was declared on the morning of 4 December to take effect at 1400, with neutral ships being allowed 24 hours thereafter to leave the blockaded area. The two points between which the blockade was established were just 180 miles apart, a most favorable situation. The Western extremity was between the mouths of the Matla river in India and the Passur in East Pakistan on which the ports of Chalna and Khulna have been built. The eastern extremity was some 20 miles south of Elephant Point where the international boundary between Burma and East Pakistan joins the sea. Throughout the 14 days, and until all the Pakistani forces in East Bengal capitulated, a tight cordon allowed just one or two boats hugging the coast to slip through southwards to Burma and Malaysia. Six large merchant ships and numerous small craft were captured. Some that tried to escape when ordered to surrender had to be sunk.
After the fall of Jessore, the failure of the Pakistani forces in this sector to fall back on Dacca and their retreat toward the rivers in the belief that hundreds of river craft would be available for escape required offensive action against the ports. While ships could prevent small numbers of craft from leaving the area, if a very large number attempted to run the blockade, some would have escaped, but many would have had to be sunk with tremendous loss of life. Aircraft from
the Vikrant therefore struck the assembly points to forestall any attempt to escape by sea.
In common with other air forces, that of India is not at its best when operating over the sea. To prevent hundreds of craft from getting away could only be achieved by ships and aircraft working in very close cooperation, but this, unfortunately, never is achieved between air forces and navies. Just as all other navies inadequately supplied with aviation, the navy of India has been dissatisfied with the maritime reconnaissance support provided by the local air force. The latter is not interested in allocating a substantial percentage of its budget to a task to which it accords very low priority, even though it is of primary importance to the Navy. True, some of the antiquated Super Constellations discarded by India’s international overseas airline, were converted by the Indian Air Force to the maritime reconnaissance role. Even so, when the war commenced the intervention of a third party was required to make the Air Force lay on more maritime reconnaissance sorties. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that shore-based air reconnaissance achieved little, in spite of the Air Force having had a maritime squadron in existence since the early 1950s.
The only amphibious operation of the war was an impromptu affair forced hurriedly upon the Eastern Command. Although there was no opposition from shore, which was under the control of the Mukti Bahini, the attempt to land near Cox’s Bazar was a failure. It failed because the beach was unsuitable for a landing. It was attempted because the authorities, including Naval Headquarters, would not accept the facts. The force, comprising a battalion embarked in Polnocny-class LSTs and a merchantman, finally landed by boats at Cox’s Bazar jetty after the surrender ceremony had taken place on 16 December. The Indian services do not seem to have learned that combined amphibious operations are the most complicated of the operations of war and must be meticulously planned, and planning takes time. A couple of weeks at staff college are insufficient training for this mode of warfare; only a fulltime school will enable amphibious doctrine to be inculcated.
A naval aviator stands in front of one of the Vikrant’s Sea Hawks. Though quite old, these British-built carrier-based fighters were suitable for the task at hand. Weighing about 16,000 pounds, Sea Hawks, when armed as fighters, are capable of about 500 knots at sea level. As bombers, with two 500-pound bombs, their radius of action is reported us 288 miles.
Operations in the Arabian Sea
With the Vikrant having been assigned to the Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral Kohli, the Flag Officer Commander-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, had to reorient his strategy.- The forces available to him for operations in the Arabian Sea for the Western fleet were the old cruiser Mysore, with the 1st rate A/S frigates Trishul and Talwar; the Petya-class frigates Kadmatt, Katchall, and Kiltan; the 2nd rate A/S frigates Khukri, Kuthar, and Kirpan; the Betwa, an AA frigate; and eight Osa-class missile boats, which were the latest of the Russian acquisitions. The fleet tanker Deepak and the submarine depot ship Amba were available to the Western Fleet for replenishment at sea, enabling the combatants to remain in the operational area continuously. A second tanker was requisitioned from trade for the duration of hostilities.
The main tdsks of this fleet were to cripple the Pakistani Navy and attack the port of Karachi, destroying harbor and oil installations, so that no arms could be imported into West Pakistan by sea.
The superiority of the conventional ships at Admiral Kohli’s disposal were beyond doubt, but guns do not have the same impact on the enemy as surface-to-surface missiles, which have much greater accuracy, range, and lethal content. The missile boats had to be employed aggressively if a cataclysmic effect was to be achieved. A blockade of West Pakistan is more difficult than one of East Pakistan because, though the approach to the Eastern Wing is constricted, with weak defenses, the Western wing is wide open from the sea and has far better shore and air defenses. Hence, in addition to the dispersal of his major ships from the main ports to obviate a pre-emptive submarine strike on them in harbor, Vice Admiral Kohli had to devise new methods to obtain the utmost from his forces.
Missile Attacks on Karachi
The small, new Osa-class missile boats were the most obvious vehicles for attack. The missiles were known to be most effective against surface targets up to distances of 25 miles, with a lock-on system which became more accurate if jamming was attempted. The boats would normally be picked up by surface radar at distances up to 12 miles, whereas they could pick up a destroyer contact at well over 20 miles. What was not so clear was the behavior of the missiles against shore targets. It was decided that these craft would spearhead the attack on the Karachi fortress, against what were previously considered formidable defenses built up under large-scale U. S. military aid.
The bombardment of Karachi harbor had been a favorite exercise at the Staff College at Wellington (a
hill station in South India) for many years, attended by foreign students including some from the United States. While the attack could be dangerous without a coordinated diversionary attack by the Indian Ait Force on the Pakistani Air Force’s fields in the vicinity of Karachi, with such assistance the operation was considered a profitable venture.
On the night of 4-5 December 1971, a task group consisting of the Petya-class frigates Kiltan and Katchall escorted the Osa-class boats Nirghat, Nipat, and Veer to the vicinity of Karachi enabling them to carry out a daring attack on the fortress. Two Pakistani destroyers patroling outside the harbor were hit by missiles and severely damaged. Distress signals indicated that the ships were the Khaibar, whose commanding officer in the 1965 conflict had been decorated for the bombardment of Dwarka in a hit-and-run raid, and the Bade The Khaibar sank and the Badr’s bridge was hit by a missile, resulting in complete loss of command and control. Pakistan subsequently announced the positions of six wrecks in the approaches to Karachi harbor.
On the night of 8-9 December, a single missile boat was detached from the Western Fleet to attack shore targets in Karachi harbor and hit an oil storage tank and sank a British merchant ship. Contrary to press reports at the time no other ships carried out any bombardment of the West Pakistan coast. In spite of the Indian Air Force having kept the Pakistani airfield complex around Karachi occupied throughout the hostilities the major ships of the Western Fleet failed to take advantage of the obvious opportunities that this offered.
Submarine Actions
At about midnight on 3-4 December, a series of explosions off Visakhapatnam harbor woke people for miles around. Some thought it was an earthquake. The next morning two fishermen reported the position of the explosions and, when divers went down to investigate, they found the hull of a submarine which was later identified as that of the Ghazi. INS Rajput had left harbor that night soon after 2100 and dropped some depth charges while leaving, but had not made any report signifying the presence of a submarine- There are two possible answers as to why the submarine blew up: One is that the Rajput did manage to cause damage to the Ghazi with a depth charge, resulting in the explosion. The other is that the Ghazi had just started to lay a mine barrier to block the entrance to the port when, in spite of all the safety precautions that should prevent a mine from being actuated fof some time after being laid, one accidentally did blow up causing the chain reaction which destroyed the forward part of the submarine, leaving intact only the conning
tower and the after portion of the vessel.
The other submarine action in the Bay of Bengal occurred on the 4th, southwest of Cox’s Bazar, with 'he Vikranfs escorts, the Kamorta, Brahmaputra, and &<a taking part. Towards the close of the action, a submarine’s conning tower was sighted and a 4.5-inch broadside was fired by the Beas, after which contact ^ith the submarine was lost. There are reasons for believing that this submarine was the Mangro.
failed to take the mandatory antisubmarine precautions when entering the submarine danger zone and paid the supreme penalty. Her failure to proceed at high speed, to weave, and to tow her noisemaker astern resulted in three of the nine torpedoes fired hitting her in quick succession near the propellers. The ship went down stern first in three minutes.
The decision of Captain M. N. Mulla to throw his lifejacket to one of his men who had none and to go
j. Of the antisubmarine actions in the Arabian Sea the rst took place on 5 December, when the Trishul and pdmatt attacked a contact, with the Trishul firing at e submarine at periscope depth. On 6 December, the fated Khukri carried out some attacks on a contact ^bombay and recorded an explosion distinctly differ- ^ from those of her own antisubmarine mortars. On ^ December, she, in company with the Kuthar, was ^Patched to locate a submarine reported to the south- tst of Diu. For some inexplicable reason, the Khukri
down with his ship, made him a nationwide hero.
The only explanation for the Khukri not having taken the precautionary measures is that her captain was probably certain that 40 miles southwest of Diu was a most unlikely place for a Pakistani submarine which by rights should be looking for the larger units out to sea. In fact, this submarine was probably given a patrol between a position off Bombay to the Kutch coast to intercept any Indian ship sneaking up the coast, including the missile boats, although these would be difficult targets. Their submarines were the only Pakistani units to be employed aggressively and perhaps they deserved this singular success. Indeed, it would have been too much for India to have expected that luck would always be with it. Certainly they would have given the Indian Navy a false sense of security which could prove disastrous in the future against a more evenly matched enemy.
Three of India’s four submarines were employed in the Arabian Sea to patrol areas where the Western Fleet was not operating and one was in the central Bay. The deployments were meant to catch any Pakistani ships that might attempt to break out of Karachi on raider operations or to attempt to reinforce Chittagong. The Indian submarines were not involved in any action.
Naval Control of Shipping
India established naval control of shipping at the outbreak of hostilities, and ordered its distant merchant vessels to neutral ports. But with the Pakistani naval threat having been eliminated within the first 48 hours, the normal routing of ships, with only slight diversions, was soon permitted. Except for the two Pakistani submarines in the Arabian Sea, India had virtually established complete command of the sea. Ten Pakistani ocean-going merchant ships were captured on the high seas while the Pakistani Navy did not molest any Indian merchant ship. In this case, attack being the best form of defense, the crippling of the Pakistani fleet ensured the safety of the Indian merchant fleet. For the same reason Indian oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were uninterrupted while Pakistani coastal shipping, the little that did ply between Gwader and Karachi, and a few minor ports, was completely paralyzed. Though international traffic avoided Pakistani ports, foreign ships operated freely to Indian ports. They sometimes hugged the Indian coast with the Indian coastal shipping when it did not take them too far off their course.
It was apparent that the Pakistani surface fleet was content with the role of defending the port of Karachi. Their only cruiser, the Babur, has never been operational for combat. The age of the other ships, together with India’s vast superiority in numbers and its imme
diate attack on Karachi’s defenses on the second night of the war, frustrated any minor operations the Pakistani staff might have been planning. What was surprising was that no midget submarine or human torpedo managed to enter any of the numerous Indian ports or were caught attempting to do so. But the major share of the blame must go to the military junta which kept the navy so weak, not realizing that if the)' did go to war as a result of their bellicose attitude they would need assistance that would have to come mainly by sea. The only success by a Pakistani vessel was the sinking of the Khukri.
With two of its six major surface ships and two of its four submarines lost, the Pakistani Navy will have to rebuild itself completely because, except for the Daphnes, its ships were obsolete to begin with After such a shattering defeat, it is an unenviable task
Nor can the Indian Navy complacently rest on its laurels. In the Bay of Bengal there was no opposition at all after the first 24 hours. In the Arabian Sea the missile boats of the vastly superior Indian fleet could be employed with impunity because Pakistan’s navy did not possess any airplanes and its air force, like those elsewhere, found little reason to fly over the sea when so much land was nearby. Even so, the Indian admiral* had to be encouraged by their superiors ashore. Had Prime Minister Indira Gandhi not promoted four senior captains in the last promotion list to flag rank, *’c might have had less action than was witnessed. The intense competition between the fleets was partly the result of the rivalry between the two commander-in- chief for appointment as the next naval chief of staff Admiral Kohli has since been selected.
Lessons
The Indo-Pakistani war was the first in which a* many as nine missiles were fired at ship and short targets. If any of the missiles missed their targets 11 is not known on the Indian side. In any event, ninc missiles crippled one-fourth of the Pakistani Navy spread so much consternation in the port of Karad11 that some nights later the shore batteries were fidn£ at their own ships. The naval ships remaining moo#® to the north side of merchant vessels to avoid bo^l hit by missiles from southward; this must have ha a shattering effect on the morale of the Pakistani FW'
However, it must be borne in mind that the Pak1’ stani Navy had neither air strike capability nor modefn anti-aircraft weapons.
Had the Pakistanis had any naval aircraft, norm3 reconnaissance would not have allowed the India11 missile boats to get within firing range of a ship- ^ any case, the Osas’ steaming range was too limited [l' venture out to sea without replenishment. Certain
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 193
they would not be able to operate in the open sea even in moderately severe sea states.
The most important lesson of the war is the classical one—if you locate and destroy the enemy’s ships you achieve all your other aims simultaneously. Having taken the offensive, the Indian Navy had no worries about their very widespread defensive requirements, which they would have been unable to meet had they concentrated on defense alone.
With the overwhelming strength of the Indian naval forces, command of the sea was really not an issue. The Indian fleets had hit the Pakistani Navy too Quickly for anyone to judge whether the latter had a tound plan. However, since Pakistan struck first, their failure to get any of their midget submarines or human torpedoes to the Indian ports is conspicuous. Perhaps they were technologically too backward to maintain, and thus, to operate, small craft which have a high ^gree of electronic miniaturization.
The Indian deployments were basically sound, but 'be admirals at sea would have exercised more control 0ver their forces had they acted more boldly instead °f having to be pushed by the headquarters ashore.
^h'mgton Post, dated 31 December, that Task °tce 74 was sent, not for evacuation, but as "a show °f force.” This is probably true because India had 'topped the bombing of Dacca for specified periods on 13, and 14 December to enable foreigners to be ^acuated. Hence the U. S. action seemed incredible to n<fia, which had always hoped that Washington would Use its influence in Islamabad to caution the military tonta against war. Jack Anderson listed the objectives °f rhe task force as:
^To weaken India’s blockade against already-defunct ast Pakistan, and to divert the Vikrant from her
The Enterprise Task Force Task Force 74, comprising the USS Enterprise (CVan-65) the helicopter carrier Tripoli (LPH-io) with 800 Marines embarked, and seven destroyers and frig- a'es, was detached from the 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin to proceed to the Bay of Bengal, supposedly to evacuate Americans and other foreigners in Dacca. They sailed through the Strait of Malacca on 14 De- tomber and were followed three days later by six Soviet sb>ps including one Kresta and one Kynda-class frigate. The Soviet Union also sent one nuclear and two con- Vcntional submarines to join the forces already in the 'ndian Ocean. Columnist Jack Anderson, whose reports ^ave not been contradicted, however, stated in The
toil;
F,
^ l,tary mission.
To compel India to divert both ships and aircraft to 1(W the task force.
► To reduce the momentum of Indian operations by forcing India to place its aircraft on defense alert.
Radio Pakistan announced on 15 December that the task force "is now heading northward and may establish a base somewhere in East Pakistan.” But that was merely self-delusion: the Task Force stayed south of Sri Lanka, and left the Indian Ocean on 16 January 1972.
To a move called "provocative” by the New York Times, India’s reaction, after the initial bewilderment, was to laugh it off. It was my privilege, as Resident Naval Officer, Paradip, to welcome the Vikrant to Paradip after her 12-day "duck shoot” off the East Pakistani coast on 16 December. In the morning we learned that the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command, would be flying through to Dacca for the surrender ceremony that evening. He thus missed the pre-lunch victory drinks on board the carrier, at which the main joke was to get the pilots ready for "cross landing” with the Enterprise, an exercise normally carried out when two friendly navies hold peacetime maneuvers. There was never any serious consideration about treating the American task force as hostile, although in the Air Force there was some talk of a suicide squadron to "get” the Enterprise.
While India played the issue coolly, that does not mean that the action by the United States has not had its effect. The dispatch of TF-74 smelled of gunboat diplomacy and is one of the more recent reasons cited by the pro-bomb lobby in India, which is getting stronger. When India finally does go nuclear, the Enterprise's visit will have assisted the process. The proposition that India was going to dismember West Pakistan, too, was not a serious one. India did begin to move forces from East to West as soon as it was clear that it could win through to Dacca. This was only to ensure that Pakistan would be forced to stop the fighting in the West because of India’s vast superiority on the ground and at sea, with the possibility of air superiority also being gained within a few days. To dismember West Pakistan would be to act against the interest of India, as a number of small new states would make the area a hotbed of international politics and intrigue and difficult to deal with. Only China could hope to benefit from such results.
The Strategic Consequences of Bangla Desk
The strategic consequences of the emergence of the new state of Bangla Desh have immense significance not only for the subcontinent, but also as they affect the global situation. There is no doubt whatever that India has emerged as the dominant power in the region and that, in the future, no amount of military aid to Pakistan from any quarter will now enable that country
to continue to act as a counterpoise to India.
With a hostile China across the Himalayas, East Pakistan had been a danger to India because Pakistani forces there could snap the Siliguri corridor, a thin neck of India between Nepal and East Pakistan connecting the northeastern state of Assam and the hill states Maghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura to the rest of India. India had always to guard against the possibility of being stabbed in the back. This major threat has now vanished and, with the riverine system of the Ganges-Brahmaputra estuary being put back to use after a lapse of seven years, the northeastern region will have far better logistic support in the future. India will no longer need to maintain such large reserves in the Siliguri corridor. Although the existing air and naval bases will be suitable to meet the threat from China, the nuisance value of East Pakistan, which could be considerable if India were engaged in a protracted conflict with China, has been removed. The flexibility of aviation and seapower will enable the threat from China—a minor one if it does not use nuclear weapons— to be met from the current bases in northeastern India, and, for the minimal threat at sea, from the east coast and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
If the situation in Bangla Desh is stabilized, another great threat will have been neutralized. At one time the Naxalites threatened to wreck the economies of the two Bengals, that of Pakistan and that of India. An extreme brand of Maoist revolutionaries, the Naxalites were more dangerous in the long run than military confrontation, because they would have corroded the country’s vitals from within. It is for this reason that India is making an all-out effort to ensure the stability of Bangla Desh, for, if the Naxalites should gain a firm foothold there, the movement could spread to other areas of the subcontinent.
While West Pakistan is going to lament the shearing away of the Eastern wing, it might prove beneficial. True, Pakistan has lost the major part of its foreign exchange earnings, but if that country accepts the current realities and cuts its military expenditure after the Simla accord with India in June 1972, there is no reason why it should not be viable. This is especially so if it is willing to trade with India, which would at once generate two-way trade of half-a-billion dollars, as it has between India and Bangla Desh.
India is keen that durable understanding should be reached so that both countries could cut their military expenditure. It is easier to defend Pakistan as it is than as it was, with two units separated by a thousand miles of hostile territory, but West Pakistan lacks defense in depth and that will always pose problems as long as it is at loggerheads with India. But then, that is not a new situation.
On the naval side, Pakistan has only Karachi left for a base and, except for two Daphne-class submarines, no warship worth the name. All the other ships should have been scrapped long ago. While manning new ships will not pose any problem, their maintenance and operational readiness will.
China, of course, would dislike seeing friendly relations develop between India and Pakistan and therefore continues to arm Pakistan. India, as the dominant power in the subcontinent could challenge China’s position in Asia and, with Soviet support, would be a counterpoise to China, just what China has been trying to mold Pakistan into in relation to India. If India became a counterpoise to China, the Soviet position would be eased, and this is not to the advantage of the United States. The strategic consequences of Bangla Desh are therefore global in their repercussions. Hence the antagonistic attitude of the United States towards India is not entirely without logic as far as the pure balance of power is concerned. However, the major question of our time is whether the democracies will survive the challenges of the dictatorships. No brand of Communism is going to deal with democracy with a view toward its continuing, for the existence of the democratic tradition is the major threat to Communism. Hence, whatever temporary positions China or the U.S.S.R. might adopt to gain advantages in their struggle for international Communist leadership, they can never make a permanent long-term policy to live in peace and amity with the democracies.
There is every possibility that the dominance India has achieved will increase during the decade. With every advance made by China in the missile and nuclear field there has been a spate of criticism in and outside Parliament of the slow progress in these two fields in India. Two reports during the last week of July 1971, are significant. Answering a question in Parliament, Prime Minister Gandhi replied that the Atomic Energy Commission was investigating the possibility of conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes while ensuring that environmental hazards are eliminated. The other report spoke of the four-stage SLV-3 rocket weighing 20 tons which is to launch a satellite weighing 30 kilograms on a 400-kilometer circular orbit in 1974. On 12 April .1972, Parliament was informed that a large number of sophisticated components and assemblies required for control and guidance systems for the satellite launch vehicle has been developed in the country and that Srihasikota, the launch station on India’s east coast, has become operational. On 3 May, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reiterated that failures in rocket firing during tests were not going to affect the launch program. On 2 June, a Space Commission was established and the Prime Minister assumed personal charge
The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 195
of the Space Ministry. The Space Commission was charged with the responsibility for pushing the rocket program, which had not received sufficient attention from the Atomic Energy Commission previously responsible for the program. India could have its own testing program underway during 1973 and have warheads available for short-range rockets and aircraft delivery by the end of the year.
India’s engineering technology has made tremendous progress in the last decade. This is reflected by its winning numerous contracts in global tenders against severe competition from the United States, West Germany, Japan, and other advanced countries. There has been an unexpected spurt in engineering exports, as well as in industrial and agricultural development. Indeed, for the first time, a conference had to be called to discuss the problem of surplus food stocks expected toward the end of 1971. With that ended, seemingly forever, the major leverage the United States had in India, and, of course, on any neighbor of India formerly dependent on American food surpluses. Every month there was news of higher yields on the food front. In spite of colossal waste because of rodents and inadequate storage facilities, it is likely that, barring a complete failure of the monsoons, such as occurred in 1972, which called for the purchase of grain from the United States, the surplus will continue to increase. Even so, a million tons of wheat and rice were donated to Bangla Desh in 1972.
No Indian official whom former Secretary of Treasury John Connally met in July 1972, when he visited India as President Nixon’s representative, raised the question of resumption of U. S. economic aid stopped during the war. The country had watched with incredulity the lack of international response for the suffering of the people of Bangla Desh, with India left holding ten million "babies” from East Pakistan, while covert support was given by others to the military junta. The greatest criticism on this score has been against the United States which at one time was reported to have been thinking of sending in counterinsurgency advisors to advise the Pakistani Army on dealing with the Mukti Bahini. The visit of the Enterprise task force during the Indo-Pakistani War further exacerbated feelings in Indian If Indo-U. S. relations continue to drift *long these lines, the United States could find India as bitter a nuclear enemy by the end of this decade as the Chinese became in the last. Should the United States continue to provide military hardware to a tottering Pakistan in an attempt to reverse India’s dominant position in the region, this is a certainty. The Simla accord between President Bhutto of Pakistan and Mrs. Gandhi in June 1972 indicated both that the current Pakistani leaders are beginning to accept the
new situation on the subcontinent and that India is not keen on extracting its pound of flesh.
A unfriendly nuclear India dominating the Indian Ocean would cut the Western World’s seas in two and sever one of the lines of communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The facts of geography are in India’s favor for there is no other major power in the Afro-Asian region, and none of the current nuclear powers could pretend to have any vital interests in the Indian Ocean.
China’s position in the Pacific is not nearly so favorable. It has to contend with the possibility of Japan barring its northern exits to the Pacific, and the United States doing the same from a string of bases in the central Pacific and Australia in the South Pacific. Though China will never be in a position to dominate the vast Pacific, India, jutting out fifteen hundred miles towards the central Indian Ocean could easily dominate that ocean.
It would indeed be a pity if the world’s strongest and largest democracies found themselves on opposite sides just at the time they could be taking advantage of the rift in the Communist camp. India’s intellectuals have begun to ask that, if it is possible for a democratic United States to accept the legitimate interests of a belligerent Communist China, why is it not possible to accept the legitimate interests of a friendly democratic India? Must India, too, go nuclear and assume a belligerent posture before the country is accorded the status of a major power with legitimate interests in the region?