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The high endurance cutter Mellon photographed from her MI-52 helicopter, while she was on the Alaska fisheries patrol in the spring of 1972. The largest of the three ships of a Soviet shrimp fishing task force seen in the background is the factory ship Konstantin Sukhanov. The Mellon is one of a pair of high endurance cutters based at Honolulu which take part in this patrol. She has also served with distinction in antisubmarine exercises.
I want to tell you what the Coast Guard is doing in the Central and Western Pacific, discuss how our work affects others, and hazard some predictions as to what the future may hold for us.
Spread out across the Pacific from Singapore to the Bering Strait, the Coast Guard has its usual missions— loran, search and rescue, weather patrol, merchant marine safety, boating safety, port safety, pollution prevention, and enforcement of laws and treaties. Fewer than 1,800 men do all these things, divided among 44 stations, 6 ships, and 5 aircraft. I shall concentrate on the Central and Western Pacific, where these men are, and not discuss that portion of the Pacific that washes the U. S. West Coast and Southeastern Alaska.
Vice Admiral Mark Whalen, the Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, headquartered in San Francisco, has search and rescue (SAR) and military readiness responsibility for all Coast Guard forces in the Pacific. Fie also coordinates multi-district resources for enforcement of fishery laws and treaties. His Command includes the West Coast, the Seventeenth Coast Guard District (Alaska), and the Fourteenth District, which extends westward from Honolulu.
It is the Fourteenth District that I want chiefly to talk about. Last year, that District experienced a sizable reduction in forces. It lost the supply ship Kukui (WAK-186) and its Guam Air Station, and transferred
the Miyako Jima Loran-A station to Japan. It also closed Ocean Station Victor, located halfway between Midway and Tokyo, and this released two 255-foot high endurance cutters—the Chatauqua (WHEC-41) and the Winnebago (WHEC-40) for reassignment to the East Coast. The new 378-foot cutters Mellon (WHEC-717) and Jarvis (WHEC-725) are shifting their operations to the Alaskan Fisheries patrol, though they will conduct some weather patrols on Ocean Station November, which is located halfway between San Francisco and Honolulu astride some heavily travelled sea and ait traffic routes. Ocean Station November is now scheduled to close by 30 June 1974. Additional Loran-A stations are scheduled to be closed this year.
Some of our Coast Guard forces remained in Vietnam until the war ended. These included the two loran stations on Con Son Island and at Tan My, the Merchant Marine Safety Detail in Saigon, three explosive loading details, and those of our aviators who were flying rescue missions with the Air Force.
Only a small detail is left in the Philippines. The Sangley Point Air Station closure in June 1971 tvas followed six months later by the departure of Coas[ Guard Squadron Three, which had operated out of Subic Bay Naval Station for Operation Market Time off the South Vietnamese coast. At that time, Squadron Three’s last two 311-foot cutters were turned over to the South Vietnamese Navy. A commander assign^ to our embassy in Manila is primarily responsible f°r American merchant marine safety matters in the Philip pines. In addition, he heads a small group of loran specialists who assist the Philippine Coast Guard in the operation of the five Loran-A stations which, wetf transferred to them in 1971.
Our section commander in Tokyo is responsible f°r all U. S. loran activities in Japan, including Okinawa. Iwo Jima, and Marcus Island; Japan’s Maritime Safe1) Agency operates ten Loran-A stations, providing covet" age over all Japanese waters and their approaches.
In Guam, two buoy tenders under a section cotf" mander are responsible for the Loran-C station on Yap- four Loran-A stations in the Marianas and all aids n1 navigation (A/N) for the Trust Territories. The section commander is also responsible for prevention of 01 pollution at Guam and in the Trust Territories of ^ Pacific. The Captain of the Port, who is also the ofhcCt in charge of marine inspection on Guam, reports t(! him.
There are loran stations on Hawaii, Johnston- Eniwetok, Wake, Kauai, Kwajalein, and Kure islan in addition to the station on French Frigate Shoab Oahu has an air station at Barbers Point and, the Co$ Guard Base in Honolulu harbor is homeport for high endurance cutters and a pair of buoy tenders.
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 273
Historical Background
The Coast Guard has been protecting lives and property at sea and enforcing the customs laws in the Pacific for over 100 years.
The first cutter in this ocean, the 100-foot brig Lawrence, sailed into the Pacific in 1849 under the command of Captain Alexander V. Fraser. Passing around Cape Horn, she stopped at the Sandwich Islands en route to San Francisco.
Fraser’s orders directed him to report to the West Coast Collector of Customs and to operate on the Oregon coast until California commerce developed. He was also directed to assist merchant vessels in distress and to make scientific investigations of harbors visited. He was given specific instructions to help the U. S. Coast Survey, also newly assigned to the West Coast.
The Gold Rush complicated Fraser’s duties. Five to six hundred vessels anchored in San Francisco during these turbulent days, and Fraser was called upon day and night to aid masters of merchant vessels in suppressing mutinies and other violence.
The Service’s familiarity with Alaskan fisheries and the attendant international problems goes back a long way. Even before Alaska was annexed in 1867, U. S. Revenue Cutters were at work in the North Pacific and, for many years after annexation, much of Alaska’s law and order and a large part of its health and welfare resided in the small cutters which cruised those cold waters.
At one time, in fact, the United States tried unsuccessfully to declare the Bering a "closed sea.” In 1891, by agreement with Great Britain, the Royal Navy worked with our Bering Sea Patrol Force, prohibiting British as well as American poachers.
Meanwhile, during the Spanish-American War, one of the seven ships with which Commodore George Dewey destroyed Spanish power in the Pacific at Manila Bay in 1898 was the 219-foot Revenue Cutter McCulloch. Four other cutters patrolled the West Coast during that war.
During World War II, the Coast Guard performed its traditional roles of port security, merchant marine safety, and search and rescue. But a new role evolved, which was an extension of its then-newly-acquired aids to navigation responsibility—the development of loran.
In this war the Coast Guard manned not only its °wn ships, but also 351 Navy and 288 Army vessels. By June 1945, there were 80,000 Coast Guardsmen afloat, the majority in the Pacific.
In August 1946, only 12 months after Japan was defeated, 15 Coast Guard officers and petty officers were sent to Korea to organize, supervise, and train a Korean eoast guard. By February 1947, the Korean coast guard banned 19 ships, four bases, and an academy. More
than 200 illegally operating vessels were seized during that period.
The bulk of the U. S. training group left Korea in 1948; two years later, the Korean War was on and Guardsmen were back with a Loran-A station at Pusan. This war also nearly doubled the strength of the Coast Guard, from a 1947 low of 18,687 to 35,082 in June of 1952. An additional three Pacific weather stations, the Yokohama Merchant Marine Detail, and search and rescue units at Sangley Point, Guam, Wake, Midway, and Adak were established. After the Armistice, the rescue units and the three additional weather stations were closed.
Enforcement of Fishery Laws and Treaties on the High Seas
Several countries, including Peru, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and China, catch much more fish—two to five times as much—than we do, and, except for Peru, a lot of their catch is from waters along America’s coastline. Their fishing fleets along our shores are large and they have modern ship’s and equipment; their techniques are sophisticated and aggressive.
To protect our fisheries, legislation was passed in 1964 which prohibited foreign fishing in U. S. territorial seas. Legislation in 1966 extended U. S. jurisdiction to 12 miles, creating a 20-million-square-mile exclusive fishing area for U. S. fishermen. In and over this area, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft working with the National Marine Fisheries Service, patrol over 300,000 miles and fly 7,000 hours each year.
Patrol of the fisheries in the Hawaiian Islands and off Samoa is not difficult and, in fact, foreign fishing vessels require more search and rescue efforts than law enforcement.
In the Hawaiian Islands especially, very few violations have been found. One of the few occurred last September when a Japanese tuna vessel was found fishing for bait fish near Laysan Island. The boarding vessel, the buoy tender Buttonwood, was directed to release the vessel with a warning that, under a U. S.-Japanese agreement, only tuna fishing was allowed in this area; however, it was considered possible that Japanese fishermen honestly considered the term "tuna fishing” to include fishing for bait fish, though in American eyes the fish are quite different as are the means of catching them. The incident, the first of its kind, was probably not foreseen by either the United States or Japan at the time the agreement was negotiated. The Department of State has now informed Japanese authorities that it does not consider fishing for tuna bait species within the contiguous fishing zone
100
40
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20 N
0
KAMCHA1
OKHOTSK
SEA OF JAPAN
YELLOW
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EAST CHINA SEA
RYUKYU ISLANDS
A LORAN C
OKINAWA
LORAN A MIKAYO JIMA to Japan 7/71
PHILIPPINE
Far East Section
SS Grand Ocean afire 2/70
LORAN C
IWO JIMA
LORAN C
MARCUS ISLAND
MARIANA
ISLANDS
THAILAND
SOUTH CHINA SEA
JAVA SEA
Djakarta
Northern Dancer collision and sinking, 27 lost 12/24/70
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
LORAN A
GUAM 1
LORAN A
I SAIPAN FV Matseui Maru afire, crew rescued
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ENIWETOK
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YAP f
MV Solar Trader wrecked 12/71
NEW GUINEA
ARAFURA SEA
CAROLINE ISLANDS
TIMOR SEA
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of the United States to be covered by the U. S.-Japanese agreement.
Over 200 Korean and Chinese vessels are now fishing out of Samoa on contract for two Samoan canneries. The Governor wants none of this fishing conducted inside the 12-mile limit around the seven islands of American Samoa, and has requested Coast Guard assistance to save this area for the use of the developing indigenous local day fishery.
Time rarely hangs heavy, however, in Alaskan waters, as the new 378-foot cutter Jarvis, on her first Alaskan fisheries patrol, found out in November 1972. She struck a reef near Dutch Harbor, sustaining considerable underwater damage. After making temporary repairs she headed for Honolulu. Her voyage had barely begun when her engine room flooded, requiring the assistance of the Japanese fishing vessel Koyo Maru # 3, which towed her back to Dutch Harbor. The Jarvis later safely made the trip to Honolulu for permanent repairs.
In the future, Honolulu-based cutters will continue to patrol the 6,500-mile Alaskan coastline and the Bering Sea. In the Bering Sea, America shares with the Soviets one of the largest of continental shelves. Competing with foreign fishermen in these waters, some of Alaska’s 15,000 full-time and 3,800 part-time fishermen caught 500 million pounds of fish. However, in that same year, and in these same waters, Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets took a combined total of three billion pounds of fish.
More than 1,200 individual foreign fishing vessels regularly operate in Alaskan waters and, at any one time, there will be from 100 to 600 of them. In July 1971, there were 574 Japanese vessels in the patrol area. At that time, only 23 Soviet vessels were present. However, in February 1972, in this same Alaskan patrol area, the number of Soviet fishing vessels peaked at 171, and Japanese vessels numbered 86. These vessels range in size from 85-foot catcher boats to 20,000-ton factory ships.
It is obvious that the waters need to be patrolled if U. S. fishermen’s rights are to be protected. The Coast Guard’s Alaskan Fisheries Patrol does just that. In 1971, 550 ship days were devoted to the Alaskan Patrol. Current indications are that this number will increase steadily. The patrol area, covering 1.6 million square miles, includes the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering Sea.
High endurance cutters from the entire Pacific area have been and will continue to be assigned to this patrol.
Before the arrival of the new 378-foot cutters, the principal Coast Guard vessels used were the medium icebreaker Storis (WAGB-38) and one of our new 210-foot medium endurance cutters, the Confidence
(WMEC-619). The eight 180-foot buoy tenders assigned to the Seventeenth District were—and are—also used.
Two HU-16 Albatross aircraft out of Coast Guard Air Station Annette patrol the Gulf of Alaska as far as Kodiak. Kodiak Air Station’s three C-130S patrol both sides of the Alaska Peninsula and the Bering Sea. To improve the value of surface vessels, the Coast Guard is testing the use of on-board helicopters. It is obvious that the helicopter-ship team can give better patrol area coverage than either alone—provided helicopters can be operated from the decks of our small ships in the heavy seas and high winds that prevail much of the year.
The 378-foot cutter Mellon, operating out of Honolulu, evaluated the use of an on-board helicopter during her first fisheries patrol in the late winter and early spring of 1972. Her commanding officer, Captain Don Riley, reported that the assignment of an HH-52 helicopter to the Mellon for the Alaskan Patrol led to more and better fishing intelligence gathered more quickly, more economically, and with less disruption to legid" mate fishing operations than when the ship was operating alone. Even though the helo-ship system is weather limited, Riley found that for 70% of the time in the Bering Sea he experienced favorable weather for helicopter launch, flight, and recovery.
In practice, the cutter steams over the fishing grounds at an economical speed until fishing vessel contact is made. When there is light and the weather is favorable, the helicopter is launched and the ship takes a position outside of the fishing vessel concentration. From that position she controls the helicopter with air search radar in the IFF mode. This gives, the aircraft a reference point for position-keeping. In two hours the helicopter can investigate and identify all fishing vessels in the area.
Ronald Naab, the fisheries management supervisor of the National Marine Fisheries Service, in Juneau, Alaska, made ten helicopter fisheries patrol flights while assigned to the Mellon last spring. He considers that the helicopter-ship combination provides an increased clement of surprise, expands the area of coverage, and reduces the hazard of maneuvering the ship among many fishing vessels. The helicopter allows detailed observation and documentation of activities on board vessels. When the helicopter hovers, the observer can document items critical to policing or evaluating 3 foreign or domestic fishery—for example, fishing ge3f in use and on board, including presence of unlawful fishing gear, processing methods of species taken, siz£ of catches, and vessel identification characters. Th£ observer gains a detailed view of the fishing vessel* deck area regardless of her size—a feat which is oft£n not possible from any other ship.
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 277
The future will bring the Sikorsky HH-3F helicopter into Alaska patrol missions. This aircraft offers significant over-the-horizon capability in three areas important to law enforcement missions—radar, twin-turbine safety and reliability, and range.
During the last two years, 15 foreign fishing vessels have been seized by the Coast Guard in Alaskan waters for violations of U. S. laws concerning territorial and contiguous fishing zones. Penalties totalling $818,000 were paid to the U. S. government for these violations. The most celebrated seizure occurred early in 1972 when the Storis seized two Soviet vessels near St. Matthew Island in the Bering Sea.
The Storis was assigned to Alaska fisheries patrol for the period 8 to 28 January 1972. Her specific assignment was to patrol the Soviet and Japanese herring fleets operating in the central Bering Sea. The patrol had been routine until the afternoon of the 17th. Then, while approaching St. Matthew Island in the midmorning, a radar contact was plotted 11 miles east of St. Matthew inside the contiguous fishing zone (CFZ) and not in one of the authorized St. Matthew Island loading zones. The Storis closed, plowing through six to twelve inches of ice, and identifying other contacts in the area. Upon arrival at the suspected contact, it was identified as two Russian ships, the base factory ship Lamut and the refrigerated stern trawler Kolyvan. The two vessels were moored together and drifting 9.6 miles off Cape Upright. Several men on board the Storis observed cargo being moved between the two ships. Since such cargo transfer is illegal, the Storis moored alongside the Lamut and placed a boarding party on her. The Coast Guard party was met by a well dressed English-speaking man who identified himself as Igor hovtun, master of the Lamut. Bovtun was informed 'hat the party was on board to investigate the ship’s activities inside the CFZ and desired to inspect his log books, charts, and No. 3 hold. The party was escorted 'o the master’s cabin where they were introduced to 'he fleet commander, V. Artimov. Shortly thereafter the patty went to the bridge where the Lamut's charts were examined. These charts showed the ship in a position 9-6 miles from Cape Upright—the Lamut's radar indicated 9.47 miles. Photos of the ship’s log and charts Were taken and this information passed to Commander Terry Allen, the commanding officer of the Storis. ^hile this was going on, other members of the board- lng party visited the Kolyvan. In the Lamut's cabin, ffle master admitted to the National Marine fisheries Setvice agent, W. Lewis, that a cargo transfer had taken place. When this information was relayed to Commander Allen, he directed that the two vessels be seized and this was done. The word was passed to the master one ship by translation cards and to the other
through a Russian interpreter. The five-man custody crew on board the Kolyvan was headed by Lieutenant John Erikson, who alone was armed with a .45 pistol. About an hour after her seizure, the Kolyvan got underway, en route to Adak, with her radios secured. Seven hours later, the ship’s master stopped and stated he would not proceed to Adak as the Lamut was not proceeding. Two-and-one-half hours later, the cutter’s executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Garry Hall, on board the Lamut directed the Kolyvan to return to the Storis' and Lamut's position. This the Kolyvan did, but she would not moor alongside. Instead, she hove to.
The events on board the Lamut were much different. The custody crew was headed by Lieutenant Commander Hall, who, like Erikson, was armed with a .45 pistol. First the Lamut refused to proceed. Then she came about, apparently fleeing towards her mother ship,
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1973
with the Storis in pursuit. The cutter veered in front of the Lamut several times, dropping mooring lines with floats in an unsuccessful attempt to foul the Lamut's propellers. Three red flares were fired across the Lamut's bow. General quarters was sounded and the ship’s 3-inch gun and a .50-caliber machine gun were manned. A second attempt to foul the fleeing vessel’s propellers failed. The Storis now took position 150 to 200 yards off the Lamut'% port bow and passed word through the custody crew to stop or the Storis would open fire. The Lamut slowed but did not stop and the order was repeated. Allen had directed a star shell be fired first and then an anti-aircraft shell. The star shell fuses were set but the Lamut stopped before the shell was fired. As the Lamut hove to, the Storis came alongside and ten men armed with M-i6s were placed aboard. Fleet Commander Artimov was identified as the prime instigator of the short-lived attempt to flee and Allen ordered his arrest and transfer to the Storis. Sufficient control was maintained by the enlarged boarding party to keep the Lamut from running, but not enough to control her external communications. Within about 12 hours of the order to seize the vessels, a stalemate had developed when the Soviet expedition leader came aboard the Lamut from the Soviet vessel leronim Uborevich. He began negotiations in the Lamut's master’s cabin with Lieutenant Commander Hall. The Soviets maintained that the Storis had no jurisdiction over them, that the situation was an international one, and that it should be handled as such. They demanded that the Fleet Commander, Artimov, be returned to the Lamut so they could talk to him and review the charge. Hall indicated that this was not suitable and that the Fleet Commander would remain on board the Storis and, if they wished, the Soviets could talk to him there. Commander Allen and Mr. Lewis came aboard the Lamut and, after meeting with Hall, advised the Soviets they could proceed peacefully to Adak or be towed there. The Soviets said they needed to call Kamchatka for a decision and needed time. They all became aware at this point that Washington and Moscow were making the decisions and both sides needed time to get answers back. A short while later the Lamut's master was taken to the Storis. Sometime during the ensuing stalemate a Soviet officer put the rudder hard over and the engines ahead. Before the motion was noted and the engines stopped, a line parted—it thus became apparent that, because of the tensions developed among the participants, towing had become impractical. During this period, Coast Guard and Navy aircraft from Kodiak and Adak were on scene. After considerable delay—some 40 hours after the seizure—the Storis reported that the Soviet ships were ready to proceed. Both ships requested and were
allowed to visit other Soviet vessels to take on water and transfer excess personnel, but no cargo transfers were allowed. Without further event, save that the Kolyvan became beset in the ice and had to be broken out by the Storis, the Lamut and the Kolyvan proceeded to Adak where they were held until the court proceedings took place in Anchorage. The court in Anchorage found the three Soviet captains guilty and penalized them a record quarter of a million dollars for conducting fishery support activities within the U. S. contiguous fisheries zone.
More recently, the American Embassy in Tokyo has advised the Coast Guard that the Japanese government has punished several fishing vessels the Coast Guard took into custody in July of 1972 for violation of the provisions of the international convention for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. After their return to Japan, three of the four vessels were ordered to remain in port for 100 days commencing 30 Apfd 1973. At this writing, the penalty of the fourth lS pending. These penalties are extremely severe; for the)' effectively eliminate the use of the vessels during the 1973 salmon fishing season.
Search and Rescue
Though the Coast Guard’s own resources for the search and rescue of distressed marines and aviators arc small, its SAR role is many times more that of a coordinator of resources belonging to others—i.e., A'r Force, Navy, and merchant vessels. It coordinates; and it controls, communicates and, when need is indicated' it transmits medical advice prescribed by Public Health Service doctors. Its two high endurance cutters and fout buoy tenders are also used frequently in SAR mission* Obviously, these resources are inadequate to cover tbc far reaches of the Central Pacific Ocean, and the need to use other resources becomes apparent.
Most search and rescue efforts are local cases, su^ as overdue aircraft or stranded hikers. Few seem imp°r' tant, but each one involves people and property in some degree of distress. And, then, occasionally, a real dram* unfolds. Such was the case with the 45-foot ya", Galilee, which sailed with a crew of three from Tah>[l on 17 June 1970, bound for Honolulu, with a stop at Bora Bora, about 150 miles west of Tahiti. |
The Galilee was seen at Bora Bora, but for seven* weeks thereafter, there was no word from her. Thc district SAR officer, Captain A1 Tatman, himself accomplished yachtsman, began communication harbor checks throughout the Central Pacific and Son1 Pacific SAR sub-regions. An all-ships message to keef an eye out for the Galilee was broadcast. Still no conmij was made with the yacht. Meanwhile, Coast Gusf aircraft searched Hawaiian waters.
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 279
What had happened was that at the end of July, Julian Ritter, 61, who was sailing with Wilfred Heiring- kofF, 28, and Lauren Kokx, 22, had run out of provisions, fuel, and wind south of the Island of Hawaii. Ritter had only a fair idea of where he was, for he had damaged his sextant, and was steering a generally northwesterly course, hoping either to intercept the shipping lanes or to sight the island of Oahu. For 48 days after their cupboard went bare, they lived on philodendron and elephant ear plants plus a concoction of algae scraped from the boat’s hull, boiled with nutmeg, cloves, cinnamon, and thyme. By mid- September, they were close to perishing, if not from extreme exposure, then from dehydration. FJuding the searching aircraft, the yacht had now drifted 250 miles heyond the Hawaiian Islands and into the North Pacific. It was there, at Latitude 24° 45' North, Longitude 164° 44' West, that the morning watch of the USS Niagara Falls (AFS-3) noted the sail hoisted upside down, and closed to investigate. When rescued, Ritter’s weight had dropped from 150 pounds to 112, Heiring- koff, from 162 to 114, and Miss Kokx, from 120 to 86.
Hopefully, a recently awarded Coast Guard contract [o develop experimental Distress Alerting and Locating System (DALS) equipment will make available to people attempting such a voyage a reliable means of taking their position known to searching vessels and aircraft.
If DALS works, position information will be obtained by using the signals of established electronic aids to navigation. The vessel in distress will retransmit the standard signal together with an identifying code. The distress signal will be picked up by airborne equipment 0r directly by a base station and then electronically converted to the identification code and latitude and kngitude of the troubled vessel.
Another system, the Global Rescue Alarm New (GRAN), which will use satellite communications, will eventually more fully fill the need for a voyage like (ue Galilee's. The Coast Guard is working with other Services in developing GRAN.
Perhaps the Coast Guard’s most cost-effective effort ls the Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue system or AMVER, which teams the Coast Guard with Merchant ships at sea. When a ship or airplane is in distress, through the use of AMVER’s computer which ^eps track of participating ship’s positions, the Coast Guard can send the nearest ship (or ships) to help those ln trouble and permit more distant vessels to continue their voyages uninterrupted. The primary AMVER center ls on Governor’s Island in New York. There are submits in coastal continental districts, all of which can 'uterrogate the AMVER computer in Washington di- recdy. Curiously, only 40% of the 900 merchant vessels
normally plying the Pacific trade routes at any one time radio their positions daily to this computer. The Service is trying to improve this participation rate; however, the decision lies, not with the Coast Guard, but with the owners.
An unusual AMVER call occurred about two years ago. The SS Omega opened a seam in her hull when she was in as remote a place in the Pacific as it is possible to be—2,000 miles southeast of Honolulu, 1,700 miles from San Diego, and 1,800 miles from Tahiti. Through AMVER, the Coast Guard Commander Pacific Area requested the SS Ikada Maru, 390 miles away, to assist. The Ikada Maru contacted three other vessels which also proceeded to the scene. In the meantime, the Omega's crew of 29 had abandoned ship in two life rafts. In short order the Ikada Maru rescued all 29 in good condition and proceeded on her voyage to Chile.
One of the best recent AMVER cases in the Pacific was that of the Heering Kirse. "POSIT 30-14N 173-46W LEAVING SHIP NOW” was heard by radio operators at Naval Station Midway Island and on board the SS Pluton. This report, relayed to the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in Honolulu set the rescue in motion. A Barbers Point C-130 was launched. The AMVER computer showed several merchant vessels in the area. Radio contact was then made with the SS Montana, MV Dalmatia, SS Japan Carryall, and MV Puna. Though the visibility was low and the seas high, these ships began an extensive search effort. They were joined by other merchant ships, by Coast Guard cutters, and by aircraft from the Coast Guard, Air Force, and Navy. The hazards of controlling several search aircraft were emphasized when a Coast Guard C-130 collided with a Navy P-3. Although both aircraft experienced extensive damage, they both landed safely at Midway.
At 1510 on 10 December 1971, the second day of the search, a Navy P-3 aircraft sighted a life raft in position 29° 45' North, 173° 48' West. The Puna was vectored to the scene and picked up 12 survivors. Starting with this new datum, a more concentrated search was begun. A few hours later, the Montana sighted a flare which led her to a second raft, with 19 survivors. Now all but five of the sunken ship’s crew were safe. But after several days it became clear that those five did not survive the winds and seas, and the search was ended.
A great deal of our SAR communications is devoted to medical advice, for about 1,200 medical cases occur in the Western and Central Pacific each year. This advice, relayed from the U. S. Public Health Service, is provided several times daily to ships at sea by Coast Guard radio in Honolulu and San Francisco. When the Public Health Service doctor considers on-scene
assistance necessary, the SAR Mission Coordinator has two options—to use either AMVER or Paramedics. The former can provide a "DOCPIC”—a computer print-out of the position, course, and speed of those vessels carrying doctors. If one such ship is nearby, whe can be diverted and her doctor can handle the situation.
When the services of the Air Force’s para-rescue teams are indicated—the Coast Guard has no such teams—they are provided by the 76th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) from Hickam AFB in Honolulu. These Air Force medics, working in teams of two, parachute into the ocean wearing Scuba gear. Sometimes the paramedics find more patients than they expected. In July 1970, a team was parachuted aboard the motor vessel Aimee 685 miles northeast of Honolulu. A seaman had cut his leg through to the bone with a grinding wheel. Two days later, a Coast Guard helicopter evacuated the two medics and two patients— the second with an intestinal obstruction. A third case, for burns, was treated and left on board the ship.
In October 1970, a para-rescue team was dropped onto Fanning Island, a small atoll 1,000 miles south of Honolulu. An attempt to evacuate their patient in a 31-foot ketch to Christmas Island was defeated by heavy seas. The next day Lieutenant Commander Albert Allison landed one of the Coast Guard’s C-130S on the island’s 2,500-foot runway. But, at 30 feet, the runway was too narrow to turn the plane around for takeoff. So Allison backed the plane the length of the runway. Then, using a jet-assisted takeoff, the patient was flown to a Honolulu hospital.
Several times a year, injured seamen in foreign fishing vessels are evacuated from as far south as Samoa. Coast Guard C-130S fly into such places as Palmyra Island and Funafuti atoll, evacuating injured or critically ill fishermen to the hospital in Pago Pago on American Samoa. The Coast Guard 55-footer in Pago Pago, a crew boat design converted for Coast Guard use, chalks up several local SAR cases each year.
SAR cases are less frequent west of Honolulu than in the Hawaiian islands or to the south and northeast of Honolulu. When they do occur, great distances usually have to be spanned. With the Air Force’s 79th ARRS leaving Guam, and the Coast Guard having closed Ocean Station Victor, SAR resources for that area have become scarce. Fortunately, the Air Force took over when the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) reduced its operations on Wake and the Navy still has one HU-16 amphibian and three UH-34 helicopters operating out of Midway.
lished, there will be no more assistance to the mar11
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1073
When the 65-foot Japanese motor vessel Makua, en route Honolulu to Majuro with six persons on board, broadcast a "May Day” distress signal, a Coast Guard C-130 flew from Barbers Point to Wake. The Makua,
some 575 miles southeast of Wake Island, was taking on water and had no power. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Direction Finder Net, which includes the Coast Guard Loran station on EniwetoL the FA A Wake, and the Midway Naval Station, fixed the boat’s position. The FA A diverted incoming aircraft of the Military Airlift command to stay with the boa' for navigational purposes and a Coast Guard C-i3( dropped pumps, fuel, and pyrotechnics. The 180-foo1 buoy tender Mallow (WLB-396) was diverted from he[ aids to navigation work to tow the Makua to Majuro- a port in the Trust Territories of the Pacific. At the same time that the Makua was having difficulties, the 16-man crew of the fishing vessel Matsuei Maru, which was afire in the engine room, abandoned ship in position 14° 16' North, 166° 18' East, 500 miles from thc Makua's location. The raft, with all 16 on board, h^ an automatic transmitter, aiding this search, which involved the same C-130 that was assisting the Maku* The USNS Huntsville transiting the area, an Air Fotc£ C-130 from Guam, and the Japanese fishing vessel KotJ11 Maru #15—which eventually made the rescue were involved in the search.
In February 1970, another Japanese fishing vessel, thf Koryu Maru #25, drove hard aground on Laysan k land, 400 miles west of Honolulu. A Coast Guard C-h5 dropped provisions and a radio to those who had m^c it to the beach through the surf. Although other JaPJ' nese fishing vessels stood by, they had no boats or raft- with which to rescue the marooned men. The 1$ Monticello (LSD-35), diverted to the scene by RCC Hon0- lulu, found the 16- to 18-foot surf too much to with. The buoy tender Buttonwood (WLB-306), departi11? Honolulu late on the 9th, landed on the opposite si^ of the island on the 13th, and, under better surf cond1' tions, made the rescue.
Late that same month, the 450-foot Panamank11 freighter SS Grand Ocean sent out an SOS—she was aft^ in her No. 1 and No. 2 holds; the crew might hJ':' to abandon ship. The old 311-foot cutter Bering St (WHEC-382), then on one of her last patrols (on Ocfjf Station Victor, which also would soon be gone) ^ off station to help extinguish the fire. Coast Gujt aircraft from Honolulu and Air Force aircraft ft011' Guam and Japan dropped over 300 oxygen breath111? apparatus cannisters (OBA), as well as gasoline and 1,1 for the cutter’s firefighting teams. The large nurt1^' of OBA cannisters was required because of the he*'- smoke caused by the burning and smoldering of d1^ veneer lumber. After three days, the Coast Guards^1 extinguished the fire, and the merchantman was tl^ able to proceed directly to Los Angeles. With 0^ Station Victor between Midway and Japan disesk
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 281
in distress in this area by U. S. Coast Guard vessels.
During the Vietnamese War, the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service (recently renamed Military Sealift Command) chartered many merchant vessels for support of the Armed Forces in Vietnam, and these vessels sailed under classified routing. If a rescue case developed in the Central Pacific the Navy handled the distress. Recently, this has been changed so that in the future all search and rescue coordination will be handled by the Coast Guard in Honolulu.
There was a disastrous case, in December 1969, which cost a ship her cargo and the lives of most of her crew. The ship was the old Victory ship Badger State, taken out of the Maritime Administration’s reserve fleet to haul ammunition to Vietnam.
Upon entering the North Pacific, on 14 December, en route from Bangor, Washington, the Badger State encountered heavy weather. On the second day, some of the cargo shifted. It was time to turn back or seek shelter. The Naval Control of Shipping Organization, with advice from Fleet Weather Central, adjusted the routing but it was in vain. Conditions were bad everywhere in the North Pacific. The nasty weather— confused swells to 20 feet—caused the Badger State to labor heavily. On the 17th, some of the 500-pound bombs in the No. 3 lower ’tween deck shifted. Some dunnage splintered—one bomb was "steel on steel” with the ship’s hull. For a week, the situation went on, with the crew continually making repairs. But the cargo continued to shift. By the week’s end, the situation was far worse than at its beginning.
On Christmas Day a surprise storm struck, with winds of hurricane force. The Badger State took a 50° toll. Cargo was now loose in all holds. Gear, such as spare engineroom equipment, that had been in place for years, was cast adrift. The master requested an escort Jnd also more shoring material. The Badger State was directed to Midway and the SS Flying Dragon, en route from Sasebo, Japan, was directed to intercept her. Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, now assumed the r°le of SAR mission coordinator.
At 0200 local time on the 26th, another surprise storm attacked the Badger State. When hove-to, a •nountainou? sea hit her. She rolled 50° to starboard and immediately 52° to port. The No. 2 lifeboat was Wrecked. Worse, several 2,000-pound bombs in No. 5 uPper ’tween decks broke loose from their pallets, sparks flew in the darkness as the bombs struck each °ther and slid into the ship’s structure. Everyone not °n watch turned to in order to secure the bombs or, at least, to stop them from rolling and sliding. All l^nds donned life jackets or had them close at hand.
To
resecure the bombs, everything available- mattresses, mooring lines, hatch boards, spare life
jackets, chairs, linen, steward stores, fire hoses, even frozen meats—was thrown on top of them. The master loaded hatch pontoons on top of all this material. But by now some bombs had fallen into the hold below. The master broadcast his distress message at 1607Z. This message set off the auto alarm in the Khian Star, a Greek merchant ship only 40 miles to the west. The Khian Star radioed that she was coming to assist and four hours later she was on the scene. The Coast Guard radio at Honolulu and the cutter on Ocean Station Victor rebroadcast the distress at 2236Z. Meanwhile, at 1645Z an Air Force HC-130 departed Honolulu. The stricken ship’s master tried to keep his vessel hove to on the best heading, using 50-60 rpm. He intended to remove part of his crew to the Khian Star and use volunteers to get his ship to Midway. His entire crew volunteered. Number 1 lifeboat was readied for lowering.
When the master sighted the Khian Star visually he decided to come about on a course for Midway. All men were ordered off the weather decks. Full speed ahead was ordered. As the Badger State came around she rolled heavily. An explosion occurred in the No. 5 upper ’tween deck. It blew off the hatch pontoons and scattered pieces of burning mattress and linen about the deck. The master gave the order to abandon ship. The engineer closed the throttle and secured the boiler fires. The master lowered his lifeboat with 34 men aboard before the ship lost her momentum. As the boat became waterborne two or three large swells carried it back up to the boat deck before the falls could be released. The painter then parted or came loose and the boat drifted aft. When it was abeam of No. 5 hold, a 2,000-pound bomb came out through a hole in the side of the ship and landed in the lifeboat, capsizing it.
The master and five of the crew who had remained on board checked the ship once more to see if anyone else was aboard and then, with life rings and lifejackets, went over the side into the rough cold water.
The large waves crested and broke, driving the men deeply under the water. The wreck of the capsized boat was also submerged deeply by the waves, pulling those clinging to it down under the sea. The men found their life jackets were riding up under their arms, pushing their heads forward, into the water. Only 14 out of the 40 made it.
Captain Niros of the Khian Star ordered Jacob’s ladders rigged over the side and stationed most of his 19-man crew on the main deck with lifelines, life preservers, and life rings. The Khian Star had a freeboard of 11 feet and she was rolling 30 to 50 degrees, with large swells sweeping over her deck. She picked up five or six survivors on her first approach to the overturned
lifeboat. Two more passes were made near the overturned boat, rescuing two or three each time. Captain Niros then maneuvered to pick up individual survivors scattered in the area. The U. S. Air Force C-130, now on scene, dropped several life raft kits in the vicinity of the survivors. The rafts would be lifted to the crest of the swells and then be flipped over and over by the 30 to 40-knot winds. A line from one of these air-dropped life rafts fell into the hands of a man in the water near the overturned life boat. He and five others boarded the raft, which was filled with water. One of the men aboard was too weak to hold his head up. Another clung to the side too weak to board. When the Khian Star approached, the life raft was almost washed aboard her by the heavy seas. Three of the men were hauled to safety.
Some of the survivors were washed off the Khian Star’s Jacob’s ladders by the seas sweeping the deck, and the rescue ship’s crew members were waist deep in water. Our survivor was hauled aboard upside down by a lifeline. Another was tangled in a cargo net, but lived.
Seven ships participated in the search for the other men for a total of 140 ship hours on scene. Air Force and Coast Guard aircraft searched 8,000 square miles in five sorties, totalling 34 aircraft hours on scene. But after the first few hours, no one was recovered.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1973
The Coast Guard role in the tragedy involved two mission areas. Search and rescue in support of the Navy was one. More important was the Merchant Marine safety mission. The Badger State had been given her "mid-period” inspection in Seattle and at Bangor. After her loss a Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation studied the disaster. The board recommended research to develop better blocking and bracing of explosives stowed on board ship to prevent shifting cargo on vessels rolling to 52°, improvement of life jackets, and better rigging of inflatable life rafts.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Chester Bender, noted that the 2,000-pound bomb
About the only difference between sea duty and shore duty at the French Frigate Shoal loran station is that the shoal, 500 miles west of Honolulu, doesn't move. But it does ship seas from time to time and, in November 1969, the 14-man crew had to be evacuated by a passing New Zealand frigate after the station was swept by 50-foot waves. The Coast Guard had the station back in operation only three days later. The Service mans a large number of similar small, isolated loran stations scattered about the vast Pacific.
pallets in No. 5 upper ’tween deck were stowed so that the noses of bombs on one pallet were bearing against the noses of those on the adjacent pallet. In rough weather when the cargo shifted it would be possibk for the bomb noses on adjacent pallets to override each other and eventually wedge apart the bombs, breaking the steel bands securing them to their pallets.
The National Transportation Safety Board com' mented on the fact that Fleet Weather Central did no( forecast the two intense storms of 25 and 26 December the failure of air-dropped life rafts to remain in the vicinity of survivors, and the lack of better technique* to detect and retrieve a person in stormy seas. The Board also criticized the life jackets, which tended to drown exhausted or unconscious survivors.
Clearly, the Coast Guard has its work cut out foe it if similar tragedies are to be averted. An enlarge^ potential military readiness role for the Coast Gua^ is involved here. In future wars or "half-wars,”
the
Coast Guard can materially assist the national effort by greater participation in the preparation, loading, rout' ing, and general control of merchant shipping boun^ for the war zone. Contingency plans should call f°( early involvement of Coast Guard forces in control ot wartime merchant shipping.
To cope more successfully with disasters at sea,3 week-long Pacific SAR Seminar was held in Decembtf
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 283
1972 in San Francisco. Working groups, composed of experts from government, industry, and various associations covered such subjects as fishing vessel safety, bomb threats against ships at sea, vessel traffic systems, medical kits for vessels not carrying doctors, and voyage planning.
Planning and equipment are inadequate for private and business airplanes, especially the many small aircraft ferried by lone pilots, who make long over-ocean flights. In like manner, pre-sail planning and equipment for yachtsmen and other nonregulated mariners making trans-Pacific voyages often are inadequate. In some cases, equipment doesn’t exist and planning simply doesn’t happen. These voyages include those by yachts, such as the Galilee, that depart with inadequate crew and insufficient provisions. Also there are those who want to "row” or sail various small boats and other craft—including, in one recent instance, a bathtub— across the ocean. New regulations and other changes that might be needed to cope with these potential SAR cases were discussed and studied at length. (One such change already in effect is that the Commandant now has authority to prevent such voyages which he considers to be hazardous.) Briefings on new safety, emergency, and survival equipment were made. Improvements on equipment and techniques and training for safety and survival were evaluated. The results of this seminar will strengthen and improve Coast Guard SAR operations and will make the Pacific Ocean a safer place for those who use it.
Marine Safety
The Badger State disaster is a good example of what We are trying to forestall through the Coast Guard Merchant Marine Safety program.
Greater safety of people’s lives and their property at sea are this program’s aims, which the Coast Guard seeks by working closely with shipbuilders and mer- chant ship owners and operators to make certain both ^at the vessels are safely constructed and operated and diat merchant mariners are properly trained and li- Censed. To these ends, it has become necessary to main- hin in certain shipping ports of the world small staffs °f Coast Guardsmen known as Coast Guard Merchant Marine Details (MMDs). These consist of one or two °fficers and a chief yeoman who is normally a qualified Ct>Urt reporter.'
^ In the Western Pacific, the marine safety staff in the . lstr'ct office in Honolulu is augmented by a marine 'nspection office on Guam and by merchant marine
a*Is at Yokohama, Singapore, Saigon, and Manila.
Members of an MMD are selected for their special 'mining and their knowledge of the U. S. merchant ^hne. They must be familiar with the overall func
tions of the merchant marine safety program, and the need to investigate casualties makes it essential that officers assigned to these details be expert investigators. They work closely with other U. S. government officials, especially those in the Foreign Service and the naval and military services. They advise on merchant marine matters pertaining to shipping in general, to security clearances, to employment certificates, and to removal of seamen from vessels for cause. They are responsible for boarding merchant vessels to investigate marine casualties and to inquire into complaints of misconduct, incompetence, negligence, the endanger- ment of life or the willful violation of law.
In July 1968, the Merchant Marine Detail started in Saigon. Before that it had been a "Shipping Advisory Staff” attached to Commander Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East. In that first month, out of 103 ships arriving in Saigon, 72 were boarded. The cases investigated included two murders, a shooting incident, and one of opium addiction by a pair of teenage seamen. Because Subic Bay and Manila were used as holding ports for Vietnam, MMD Saigon also handled the U. S. shipping build-up in the Philippines. In 1968, over 1,200 U. S. flag vessels called on Philippine ports. In July 1969, MMD Manila was commissioned.
MMD Singapore
Singapore is the fourth-largest port in the world and the build-up of U.S. flag shipping there in the last few years has been dramatic. The closing of the Suez Canal and the Vietnam effort brought the first increase. Then came the huge rush, led by American oil interests, to tap the undersea oil resources in that area.
Forecasts indicate that next few years will see continued increase in offshore drilling operations in Southeast Asian and Australian waters, including those bordering the Indonesian archipelago. Shipping statistics show that U. S. flag vessels of over 75 net registered tons which entered Singapore jumped from 302 in 1965 to 560 in 1969 and over 760 in 1970. There are over 60 U. S. flag "special purpose” vessels working in and around Singapore in the offshore oil exploration industry. The "special purpose” category includes drilling vessels, drilling barges, seismographic vessels, jack-up rigs, rig tenders, and crew and supply boats. Their number is increasing.
Singapore is also a major ship repair center, with U. S. vessels coming there for voyage repairs from as far away as Iran and Australia. There is also a growing construction program of American drilling apparatus and support vessels in Singapore. The construction and equipment of each vessel that intends to fly the U. S. flag must be in harmony with U. S. laws and regula-
dons. Most of the Military Sealift Command’s chartered tankers call at Singapore while passing to and from the Persian Gulf. Routine, periodic, and special material inspections of these vessels are carried out in Singapore and other Far East repair ports in preference to requiring the vessels to make the long dead-head voyages to U. S. ports for these inspections.
The Singapore MMD area of operation extends from Australia through the Java Sea to Malaysia. It does not include Thailand, which comes under Saigon, because normal marine traffic in that area flows from Vietnam to Thailand and most of this traffic is engaged in support of military operations in that region.
Problems of the early Vietnam sealift involving replacement crews, citizenship requirements of seamen, and discipline have largely disappeared. The new problems involve standardizing operations of the U. S. offshore drilling vessels, and these are centered in Singapore and Djakarta. In this offshore problem, we note a lack of sufficient U. S. seamen or citizens with proper experience and documents to man the vessels. One of the reasons MMD Singapore was established was to bring U. S. flag vessels engaged in the oil exploration fleet back under U. S. Coast Guard inspection and to ensure compliance with pertinent Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and U. S. laws and regulations. As might be expected, the majority of vessels in this fleet remain away from the United States for extended periods of time, and, in fact, may never reach a U. S. port. Innumerable problems have developed because of the definitive language in which the various statutes are written. The maritime laws of the United States were written around a transportation and trading marine industry and their application to the non-transportation function of oil exploration and oil exploitation creates new problems daily.
These laws may have been violated about six months before the Singapore MMD opened when the crew boat Northern Dancer and the supply boat Aqueduct collided shortly after midnight on 24 December 1970, 30 miles east of Djakarta, Indonesia, in the Java Sea. The vessels had just completed transferring materials while proceeding alongside each other at a speed estimated at between 6 and 9 knots. Both then increased speed. The Northern Dancer opened about 50 feet, surged ahead, and then veered to port across the Aqueduct's bow. She was overrun and capsized immediately. She floated bottom up for about a half hour. Several persons trapped inside were able to reach safety before she sank in 50 feet of water, but 27 lives were lost. Although the records in this case have not been closed, actions have been taken to assure that U. S. flag vessels operating in the oil exploration and oil exploitation industry comply with U. S. laws.
Trust Territories
The Trust Territories of the Pacific cover a multitude of small islands scattered about 100,000 square miles of the Western Pacific. They are in a fast-moving stage of political development. Though what the Coast Guard does now is useful, if given proper authority and resources, more could be done for the people of these islands. Mainly, the Coast Guard provides aids to navigation in the way of buoyed channels and loran. Coast Guard loran stations are located on Saipan, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Yap, and Palau. They are charged j with the prevention of oil pollution and have assisted | High Commissioner Edward E. Johnston with a field j survey of Trust Territory vessel safety problems. Courtesy inspections of these vessels are conducted to assist in the development of a local safety program.
The stranding of the Liberian ship Solar Trader highlights the problems involved in handling oil pollution cases in this area. This 470-foot motor vessel went aground on West Fayn Atoll, about 350 miles southeast of Guam, on 20 December 1971. Inside the vessel were 213,000 gallons (5,000 barrels) of fuel oil. Some salvage was conducted but the vessel was written off. On 1 June, when reports indicated that nearly half the fuel j remained on board and was seeping out and threatening turtle breeding grounds, the case was reopened. The owners failed to take action so the Coast Guard assumed control of clean-up operations. Fuel oil salvage was complicated by weather, but the contractor successfully completed operations on 23 July. A total of 1,100 barrels of fuel and oil was removed from the hull. All tanks including double-bottom tanks were opened, stripped, and washed down with sea water. All other compartments and the main engine crank case were inspected and cleaned of oil. Damage to the green turtle breeding grounds was avoided by the use of booms. The vessel’s owners will be billed for the cost of these defueling operations.
A new political relationship for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is currently being negotiated. Hopefully, this future political status will involve a j continuing relationship with the United States. Some consideration is being given to a Coast Guard role in this future relationship. This role could include aerial and surface patrols throughout Micronesia for the protection of Micronesian territorial integrity and its marine environment against oil spillage and the discharge of other pollutants by ocean commerce.
Loran
Modern loran is competing with Omega, Decca, and Satellite Navigation Systems. Omega, a Navy experimental system will go operational in a few years. Eight stations, two now operated by the Coast Guard,
285
Left: The 311-foot high endurance cutter Half Moon’s 5-inch gun fires on a Viet Cong target ashore during a tour on Market Time in 1967. Notice the antisubmarine Hedgehog launcher and the pair of naval-mounted 81-mm. mortars on the 01 level. Below: The 82-foot cutter Point Arden on inshore patrol during her Market Time operations. The crew’s clothes are hanging out to dry aft, and she is flying both the U. S. and South Vietnamese national ensigns. The 82-footers are particularly good sea boats.
will provide worldwide coverage. Stations in Hawaii, Japan, Trinidad, and Norway are now operating in an experimental mode. The station in North Dakota has been completed, with standard equipment, and is operational. Other stations are planned for Australia, Argentina, and the French island of La Reunion near Madagascar. When fully operational, Omega will provide accuracy comparable to that of Loran-A —that is, two to four nautical miles. Although Loran-C can provide far greater accuracy, a worldwide system would require more than 100 stations, and no such system
planned.
The Service’s program for the future include expanded Loran-C coverage. For the Pacific, the plan calls for improving equipment at our central Pacific Loran-C stations and extending the coverage over the ap
proaches to the West Coast of the United States. If the plan is approved, the new coverage—to be provided by a four-station complex—could be ready within a couple of years.
Decca, a short-range navigational system, is used extensively in Europe. Because it lacks range it is not competitive as an ocean navigation system; however, satellite navigation can become a real competitor to loran. The Navy’s Transit System is well advanced, sophisticated, but expensive, and probably is only an interim satellite system. There appears little doubt that eventually—in 20 years or so—a maritime satellite system will become the primary navigation system. But for now, only Omega and Loran-C can be used by a fully submerged submarine—a key factor that will keep these two systems in business for a long time.
There are 16 Loran-C and 41 Loran-A (24 U. S., 10 Japanese, five Philippine, two Canadian) stations in operation in the greater Pacific area. A loran chain consists of a master station paired with two or more secondary stations. The timer equipment at the secondary station locks onto the master station’s signal. After a delay, the timer triggers the secondary station’s transmitter, producing a new signal. The loran receiver in an interested ship or airplane measures the time difference of arrival of the signals from the master station and each of the secondary stations. The time difference associated with signals from each master/secondary station pair define a line of position for the receiver. Two such lines fix the receiver’s position. Although an accuracy of 25 yards on 90% of all Loran-C fixes is possible, the Coast Guard claims only % mile or better accuracy for Loran-C fixes, and for Loran-A an average 2-to-4-mile accuracy. Some Loran-C stations provide precise time. This is made possible by the use of cesium beam standards. Loran-C also can provide a reliable communication system.
The Coast Guard hopes that Loran-C usage will increase considerably now that the $2,000 to $4,000 low-cost receiver is a reality. With the advent of this low-cost receiver, it is intended that Loran-A will eventually be phased out and be replaced by a combination of Loran-C and Omega navigation systems.
The Vietnamese War
Market Time
The surveillance of the South Vietnamese coast to prevent the entry by sea of arms and ammunition for the Viet Cong began in 1965 under the code name "Market Time.” The effort was begun by escort ships, destroyers, and minesweepers. But these ships, none of them considered big by the Navy, were still much too large for the surveillance of the inshore waters where so much of South Vietnam’s traffic passes. Unfortunately, the Navy had almost nothing smaller.
Hence, from the beginning, the Coast Guard was involved in Market Time, for the Coast Guard was well supplied with vessels suitable for shallow-water warfare. From 27 May 1965 to 21 December 1971, when Coast Guard participation in Market Time ended, over 8,000 Coast Guardsmen served in the Market Time patrols.
Not only was the Coast Guard well supplied with the right kind of vessel, but also the Service’s experience could be brought to bear directly on this peculiar kind of coastal and inshore warfare. The Coast Guard spends a lot of time in small vessels along our own coasts and during one of our peculiar wars against ourselves, Prohibition, the Coast Guard was charged
\
with preventing the infiltration by sea of liquor for thirsty Americans.
So, even though the war in Vietnam is one which, for the Coast Guard, at least, has largely faded into history, it is one worth examining, because of the reasons given, and also because it took place under the administrative control of the Fourteenth Coast Guard District in Honolulu.
The early stages of Market Time and, in particular, the Coast Guard’s participation in it, have been well described by our first commander over there, Captain Jim Hodgman, and I won’t retell his story.1
In May 1965, the Coast Guard deployed seventeen 82-foot patrol boats, each armed with an 81-mm. mortar and five .50-caliber machine guns. They were organized as Coast Guard Squadron One, with nine cutters going to An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand and the other eight to DaNang in the northern part of South Vietnam. Nine more 82-footers followed a few months later, and they operated out of Vung Tau (Cat Lo), near the Rung Sat Special Zone and the river entrances to Saigon.
Nine patrol areas, each extending offshore and along the coast, covered the entire South Vietnamese coast line. The 82-foot WPBs and the Navy’s 54-foot "Swift” boats, which soon afterward began to enter the combat zone in considerable numbers, provided shallow water coastal surveillance. For offshore surveillance, the radar picket destroyer escorts, minesweepers, and landing ships already at work were quite suitable, though they were short on numbers. Later they were joined by some of the Navy’s fast new 165-foot gunboats. In 1967, Coast Guard high endurance cutters were added. Beyond the outer barrier a few P-2 Neptune and P-3 Orion patrol planes provided early warning patrols for detection of suspicious vessels approaching South Vietnam. The Gulf of Thailand Surveillance Group (CTG 115.4) was commanded by a Coast Guard commander. The latter also served as the senior naval advisor in the Fourth Coastal Zone, heading up a 40-man Navy team.
Coast Guard Squadron Three was commissioned in 1967 to administer the five high endurance cutters assigned at any one time to Market Time operations. Thirty-three high endurance cutters2 rotated on 10-month deployments with Squadron Three. On 4 May 1967, this newly established squadron reported to Commander Seventh Fleet for operational control as Task Unit 70.8.6, joining forces with Navy Escort Squadrons Five and Seven. That October the Navy and
lSee J. A. Hodgman, "Market Time in the Gulf of Thailand,” NaW Review 1968, pp. 36-67.
2Thirty-six of these cutters were in commission when the Vietnam War opened in 1965. Since then, 12 new ohes have joined the Service and 18 old ones have been decomissioned, leaving a total of 30.
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The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific
Coast Guard were integrated into a single task unit, designated TU 70.8.5. Captain John Day, Commander Coast Guard Squadron Three, was designated the task unit commander, with headquarters at the Subic Bay Naval Station. As CTU 70.8.5, Captain Day performed the normal functions of a squadron commander, with emphasis on a high state of readiness and the coordination of logistic and personnel support. He was also designated Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Seventh Fleet Representative Subic Bay. In this capacity, he represented an average of 65 cruiser and destroyer type ships for matters concerning personnel, material, repair, and readiness.
During their six years in Vietnam, the Coast Guard cutters, large and small, cruised 5.3 million miles, participated in more than 6,000 naval gunfire missions, and boarded or inspected approximately 510,000 junks or sampans, checking for enemy personnel and contraband. They were underway more than 70% of the time. Usually they were operating in shoal waters and frequently they were under fire, but none were lost. In the main, it was a tedious business. Toward the end, Coast Guardsmen trained Vietnamese Navy personnel in 82-footer and 311-foot cutter operations. The latter then took over all twenty-six 82-footers and four of the 311-foot high endurance cutters.
The Market Time forces worked with Vietnamese Navy junk divisions along the coast at night. The junks were vectored to contacts in extremely shallow waters, where much of the boarding and search work took place. The major movement of contraband was by junks laden with cargo. Most junks were harmless, but some were well armed and determined to fight. Let me give you an example, from near Saigon early in 1966.
Before the River Patrol Force (TF 116) obtained its 31-foot PBRs, Market Time’s forces had to help out in the rivers of the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zune (RSSZ). Their job was to stop Viet Cong movements and supply redistribution across the rivers. Coast Guard WPBs from Cat Lo worked with Navy PCFs (Swifts) in these operations. On Tuesday, 8 March 1966, two WPBs were in the Soi Rap River on such an operation. The Soi Rap marks the western boundary of the Rung Sat Special Zone south of Saigon and separates this mangrove swamp from the rich delta area. The vc had ammunition factories and training camps in continuous operation in the swamp. All their food md water was brought in by boat from the rich rice fields across the river. Both the rice fields and the RSSZ were VC-controlled, and all attempts to dislodge the Viet Cong had failed. The WPBs, each with a pair of Vietnamese junks, were to patrol the lower 12 miles °f the Soi Rap. One boat, the Point White, patrolled
at the Mouth of the Song Vam Sat, a smaller stream leading from the Soi Rap into the swamp. This was known to be a VC crossing point.
For two days the patrol withdrew at dusk to the mouth of the Soi Rap. At dark on the third day, the Point White came about and slowly made her way upriver. At 2100 rifle shots were heard from the beach. The Point White, now 700 yards offshore, ignored the firing so as not to reveal her position, identity, or fire power. At 2215, when the patrol boat was two miles south of the Van Sat, the radar watch saw something move out of the mouth of that stream, heading westward across the Soi Rap. The Point White closed the intruder at full speed, sounding her siren. At about 200 yards, the target was made out as a small junk. The cutter’s Vietnamese liaison officer hailed the junk on the loud hailer and ordered her to stop—the orders, repeated, were ignored. At about 150 yards the Point White illuminated with the searchlight.
Instantly the junk poured intense fire at the Point White, from an automatic weapon and eight to ten rifles. The cutter returned the fire with her .50-caliber machine guns and M-16 rifles. A fire flashed in the junk’s after cabin. The range closed and the junk’s gunfire continued. The patrol boat rammed the junk and the firing ceased. Some of the men in the junk jumped overboard. Two stood in the stern sheets with their hands raised. The two Vietnamese junks arrived to assist in mopping up. Lieutenant Hickey, the cutter’s commanding officer, personally recovered a wounded and badly burned Viet Cong from the water by going down the scramble net. This prisoner turned out to be a Viet Cong leader in the RSSZ. The large number of people on board the junk and their attempt to shoot it out with the patrol boat indicated the importance of this man.
Off and on, the river work continued. But intercepting the large trawler-like cargo ships coming in from the sea was the prime purpose of Market Time. One such intercept occurred on 10 May 1966 when the 82-foot Point Grey met a 125-foot "trawler” attempting to bring a large cargo of arms, ammunition, and supplies to the Viet Cong on the eastern side of the Ca Mau peninsula at the southwestern tip of Vietnam. This was the largest attempt detected since February 1965 when a cache of arms was discovered at Vung Ro Bay, leading to the creation of Market Time.
About 2200 on 9 May, the Point Grey, Lieutenant (j.g.) Charles B. Mosher commanding, was on patrol under the operational control of the USS Brister (DER-327). Two large bonfires were sighted on the beach. Aware that the Viet Cong used such signals to guide trawlers, Mosher decided to stay in that area for a few hours. Just after midnight on 10 May, his radar
detected a target at a range of seven miles, heading toward the beach. Mosher maneuvered to intercept and when within visual range, he challenged the target then five miles offshore. No reply was received from the blacked-out vessel; the Point Grey closed and illuminated with a searchlight. The target was then identified for what she was. No one was visible on board.
The trawler changed course about 120 degrees to the right, to a northerly heading, but still in toward
the trawler crew, who had the advantage of higher positions on their deck. By 0700, the trawler was grounded 500 yards offshore, but was being driven farther in by the flooding tide. Lieutenant Mosher decided it was time to board. The patrol boat took heavy automatic weapons fire from the mangrove- covered beach and was forced to withdraw, which she did while spraying the shoreline with .50-caliber and mortar fire. During the next five minutes the Point Gttf was hit about ten times, and the Brister ordered her out of range. For the next five hours, the Point (>reJ
the beach. The Point Grey stayed with her. Shoals in this area extend out for miles and are continually shifting. At 0200, the trawler appeared to heave to about one mile to seaward of the bonfires. At 0330, the patrol boat began to fire 81-mm. illumination to discourage any attempts by the VC ashore to board the trawler Her own boarding attempts were put off until first light, partly because of 6-foot seas breaking on the shoal and partly because of the danger of ambush by
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 289
held the line, moving in with gunfire to forestall any attempts by the Viet Cong to board the trawler and off-load her cargo. In the meantime, help was coming. The Point Cypress was on her way, along with two minesweepers, a destroyer, and several Vietnamese naval vessels. All the while the tide and wind were driving the trawler closer to the shore. At 1400, the trawler was within 100 yards of the shore and though no help had arrived, the Point Grey was ordered to board her to recover documents and cargo. When within 400 yards of the beach, the Point Grey opened fire. The enemy was quiet until the cutter closed to 200 yards. Then the beach erupted with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Within 20 seconds, three of the four men on the forward mount were hit. The cutter turned in order to bring her after .50-caliber guns to bear, taking another 15 or 20 hits as she did so.
Eventually the enemy’s guns were silenced by air strikes and mortar fire from the Point Grey and Point Cypress and gunfire from the Brister and other vessels newly arrived on the scene, but by then darkness had set in and prevented another attempt to board the trawler. Because the Viet Cong, under cover of night and with an ebbing tide, might be able to off-load the stranded trawler, CTF 115 ordered the vessel destroyed. This was done, and an estimated 50 tons of ammunition, arms, and supplies were destroyed when the vessel Mew up and broke in two. Fifteen additional tons of ammunition, plus weapons and other equipment, were salvaged. Mosher was awarded the Silver Star for his performance as commanding officer of the Point Grey.
For the most part, the work of the larger vessels in Market Time was similar to that of the small ones, but encounters with hostile vessels were rare. Let me describe briefly two of those rare encounters in which high endurance cutters of Squadron Three were involved. The first one happened during the Tet Offensive at the end of February 1968 and the second one occurred in November of 1970.
For several days prior to 29 February, Market Time forces had been aware of suspicious trawler activities along the coast of Vietnam. Barrier vessels were ordered to shadow the trawlers and take position abeam the trawler and at 6.5 miles from the beach, commence challenge procedures, and be ready for surface action.
On 29 February, four cargo trawlers attempted to land supplies each at a separate location. Trawler 28-Fl (target designation by CTF 115), headed for the Ca Mau Peninsula, was detected by Market Time aircraft on the 28th and on the 29th turned over to the 255-foot cutter Winona (WHEC-65), commanded by Captain Herb Lynch, for covert surveillance. A blocking force of three 82-footers and two 54-foot Swift boats was set up opposite the entrance to the Bo De river. At 0200,
when eight miles offshore, the Winona closed the trawler, challenged, and fired warning shots. The trawler headed for the beach, jettisoned her cargo, and opened fire on the Winona. Twenty minutes later a shell from the Winona'% 5-inch gun sank the trawler.
The second trawler, 29-F3, was picked up by aircraft at 1853 on the 29th. No outer barrier ships were available so the patrol plane held the contact until she was intercepted off Nha Trang by the coastal blocking force—two Vietnamese Navy junks, a 185-foot Vietnamese Navy PCE, and five U. S. Navy Swift boats. At 0038, as the trawler headed for the beach she was taken under fire by the PCE. The trawler and Viet Cong beach parties engaged the blocking force in a running battle until the trawler was severely damaged by a hit from one of the Swifts, and beached.
While trawler 29-Fl, shadowed by the 255-foot Minnetonka (WHEC-67), aborted her attempt some miles northeast of Qui Nhon and cleared the coast to Hainan Island, a few miles farther north trawler 29-F2 was putting up quite a fight. Another 255-footer, the Androscoggin (WHEC-68), under Commander Bill Stewart, working with a blocking force of two WPBs, the Point Welcome and Point Grey, and two Swifts, the PCF-18 and PCF-20, intercepted 29-F2. When the Androscoggin opened fire 6% miles from the beach the trawler headed for the cutter under cover of smoke. A helicopter flareship provided illumination as the blocking force, aided by two helicopter gun ships, joined the attack. At 0128, the Androscoggin's 5-inch gun scored a direct hit and the trawler went aground near the mouth of the Tha Cau river. She blew up a few minutes later.
These simultaneous actions were described at the time by CTF 115 as the "most significant naval victory of the Vietnam campaign.”
The November 1970 trawler incident is especially interesting because of its prolonged "tailing” phase. Market Time aircraft noted this trawler’s suspicious movements 75 miles off the southern coast early on the 17th. The airplane noted four crew members and a deck cargo covered with fishing nets, but also saw that no flag was flown. Commander Task Force 115 alerted his surface forces and directed the USCGC Rush (WHEC-723) and the USS Tacoma (PG-92) to commence surveillance. Both ships were new, the Rush being a 29-knot 378-footer, the Tacoma a 37-knot 165-footer. The Rush’s commanding officer, Captain Bob Durfey, was the on-scene commander. The Tacoma and the aircraft, which were in visual contact with the suspicious vessel, broke off and departed the area as the Rush took position astern of the trawler.
For the next 3j/2 days the Rush tracked the trawler, apparently undetected.
When it became apparent that the trawler would make her attempt to go in, CTF m cleared the USCGC Sherman (WHEC-720), the USS Endurance (MSO-435), and the USS Tacoma from the area to allow the trawler to enter the 12-mile contiguous waters of the Republic of Vietnam without apparent opposition. The Rush was now certain the trawler’s destination was near the entrance to the Co Chien, one of the several mouths of the Mekong. The Rush CO, as on-scene commander, maneuvered the Endurance, the Sherman, and the Tacoma into position for the impending engagement. At 2225, as the trawler entered South Vietnam’s contiguous waters, the Rush directed the minesweeper to challenge. The Endurance closed and challenged at 2247. In response the trawler turned on her running lights—nothing more. Upon illumination by the Endurance's searchlights the trawler turned to seaward. At 2256, the minesweeper fired a warning shot across the trawler’s bow. Then, at 2302, after receiving permission from the Rush, the Endurance opened fire, followed shortly by the Tacoma. The trawler turned, attempted to ram the Endurance, and then took both that ship and the Tacoma under fire from 75-mm. recoilless rifles, B-4o rocket launchers, machine guns, and AK-47S. The Tacoma, with a material casualty, retired, as the Sherman and the Rush moved in to support the Endurance, which now was blocking an attempt by the trawler to escape into a nearby cluster of fishing vessels. The Rush and the Sherman took the trawler under fire and the target vessel sank at 0018 in position 90° 47' 6" North, 106° 42' 3" East.
How effective was Market Time? General Westmoreland said that "Market Time Forces are a major element of any overall strategy, without which we could not succeed. Market Time forces successfully blocked entrance by sea, forcing the enemy to use the long, tortuous Ho Chi Minh trail, thus affecting significantly his ability to properly sustain his forces in the south.”
Command Change
By October 1966, it had become obvious that the simple Squadron One organization needed a change to reflect the additional and varied Coast Guard forces that had been brought into Vietnam. The squadron organization was no longer consistent with either the Coast Guard’s assigned tasks or its operational command relationships with other Services. Upon deployment in 1965, the Squadron was tasked with Market Time patrols under Commander Coastal Surveillance Force (CTF 115) and advisory functions for Coast Guard- related matters directly under Chief Naval Advisory Group. But new tasks were added: explosive loading safety and port security advisory functions, under the
Commanding General, U. S. Army, Vietnam; coordination of U. S. military requirements for aids to navigation under Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, (the new title for the old Chief Naval Advisor)’ Group); and a Merchant Marine Detail. The diversity of these activities went beyond the concept of the Squadron organization, which was geared to a seagoing force with a specific mission. These added activities were shoreside and completely unrelated to Market Time.
The solution was a Coast Guard administrative command echelon higher and broader in scope than Coast Guard Squadron One. To satisfy this need, Coast Guard Activities Vietnam was established on 3 February 1967 to encompass all "in-country” Coast Guard activities except the Loran construction project. Commander, Coast Guard Activities Vietnam reported to Commander, Western Area, though later this was shifted to Commander, Fourteenth Coast Guard District, Honolulu. Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One reported administratively to Commander, Coast Guard Activities Vietnam and operationally to Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam. The Officer-in-Charge, Ports and Waterways Detail, reported administratively to Commander, Coast Guard Activities Vietnam and operationally to the Commanding General, First Logistics Command, U. S. Army, Vietnam. Squadron One components were chopped to tactical commands, such as CTF 115 and CTF 116, as directed by Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam. When not so chopped, components were under the operational command and control of Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One. As a matter of reasonable economy, Commander, Coast Guard Activities Vietnam also served as Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One.
Port Safety in Vietnam
Saigon Harbor was a potential disaster. Captain Rist° Mattila surveyed the port security situation in
1965,
made several recommendations for improvement of port security, and laid the ground work for a continu- ing port security effort involving U. S. Coast Guardsmen, though the latter never numbered more than 50-
Ten thousand persons entered and left the port every day—3,000 more than had legitimate business there, and there was no system for clearance or identificatio11 of any of them. Ships in the harbor were vulnerable to underwater swimmers and mines. The narrow road and warehouses with small doors and limited storage areas were not suited to handle the tremendous ton- nages of war material to be delivered into the Saig0*1 area.
A National Port Security Committee was established to deal directly with the situation and to cope wid1
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 197 3 291
the complex Vietnamese government organization. The security of the ships in Saigon became the responsibility of the port operator, the 1st Logistics Command, U. S. Army, and assigned in turn to the Vietnamese harbor police and U. S. Army military police. Progress was made here and river patrols began operating with some efficiency.
Most cargoes were handled by badly equipped and poorly trained Vietnamese longshoremen—and women. They had no hard hats, no safety-toe shoes, no protective glasses, no goggles—none of these. The idea of personal safety seems not to have occurred to them. It was commonplace to see them riding bombs being off-loaded from ships. Captain Mattila watched a truck driver empty his truck of projectiles. Defused and unarmed they were, but still dangerous. He dropped the tailgate, backed up fast, and jammed on his brakes: the projectiles tumbled out in a heap. Captain Mattila immediately recommended explosive loading teams be established, and they were shortly thereafter.
The first permanent Coast Guard Port Security Detachment, under Commander Ray Hertica, was assigned to the U. S. Army First Logistics Command in August 1966. This detachment consisted of two explosive loading teams. Two more followed. Hertica and his staff traveled extensively to all port areas, inspecting security of ports and anti-swimmer and sapper defenses of ammunition-handling operations and facilities. Better handling and stowage of explosives resulted and port perimeter security and waterside security improved. It took a while, but the ammunition ship anchorage at Nha Be, adjacent to the only petroleum depot in South Vietnam, was moved some miles, to Cat Lai.
To protect the ammunition vessels against enemy swimmers carrying explosives, hand grenades were dropped frequently alongside the offloading vessels, and any unidentified objects in the water were fired into.
Each explosive loading detail (ELD) was staffed by a lieutenant or lieutenant junior grade, a chief petty officer, and five to eight petty officers first class. Their ratings included boatswain’s mate, gunner’s mate, damage controlman, and engineman. Before reporting to Vietnam, they all attended the 3-week explosive loading supervisory school at the Coast Guard port security station in Concord, California. This was followed by one week of on-the-job training on board ships being loaded for Vietnam at the cargo-handling school at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California.
Annually the explosive loading details handled more than 500 ships carrying over four million tons of explosives. The ELD’s job began with the arrival of an ammunition ship in the Vietnamese area of responsibility. Prior to moving any cargo the ship was boarded. The Master, chief mate, and chief engineer
were indoctrinated on safety requirements of the specific port. Requirements concerning fire hoses, waterside surveillance, lighting, readiness to get underway, and smoking areas were specified. Cargo and handling equipment were carefully inspected, and gear not up to standards was repaired or replaced immediately. Vessels with storm damage were meticulously supervised in special isolated locations. Off-loading operations went on around the clock, seven days a week. Coast Guard supervisors worked on 12-hour shifts. It was not uncommon to go for 30 days without a day off. When such a day arrived these Coast Guardsmen were usually sent to inspect an explosive loading activity in another port or to some place like Pleiku where retrograde ammunition was inspected for return to the United States.
Shipping Advisor-MMD-Vietnam
The role of shipping advisor to the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) office in Saigon was established late in 1966. With 300 ships in the supply line and 75 others at anchor in various Vietnamese ports, personnel problems had become serious. Increasingly, these crew problems were causing new delays to already delayed ship movements. The merchant vessels used in the Vietnam logistic support operation were primarily of World War II vintage, and their great age did not help the merchant seamen’s situation. That situation was bad. Ships were lying at anchor for up to two months in the oppressive heat while waiting to be off-loaded, and there was no dependable way for their men to get ashore or back again. Nor was there any law enforcement on board them. The U. S. military lacked jurisdiction and the Vietnamese authorities were incapable of acting. The ships’ masters were without recourse to any law enforcement agency of any kind.
Commander Edward F. Oliver,3 who, as a captain, is now in Singapore, was assigned to Saigon as our first Shipping Advisor on the staff of Commander MSTS Far East, Rear Admiral Lucien B. McDonald, U. S. Navy.
In addition to Saigon, Oliver’s area of operation extended to Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and DaNang and to major seaports elsewhere in Southeast Asia including Singapore and Manila. In the first year, he and his two assistants ranged the entire coast of Vietnam, boarded over 500 ships, and investigated 263 serious cases involving sabotage, assaults with deadly weapons, narcotics addiction, and other serious offenses. Obstreperous seamen were removed from vessels and escorted back to Saigon. Sixteen licenses and documents were surrendered in lieu
3See E. F. Oliver, "The Largest Maritime Police Beat in the World,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1970, pp. 120-122.
of hearings, 17 documents were deposited pending seamen hearings in the United States. Oliver, working with the U. S. Consul in Saigon, reduced cases of seamen missing ship from 20 a week to five a month. Some shipping agents in collusion with hotel managers were putting seamen in hotels to await transportation home, allowing them to charge "anything” to room service and sign the name of the ship to the bill. This practice was stopped. Working with U. S. Army provost marshal, Oliver also arranged an Embassy decree putting merchant seamen under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. By 1 May 1968, there had been three general courts martial of merchant seamen, two for murder, and one for assault with a deadly weapon.
Surface Aids to Navigation
Aids to navigation, or more accurately, their absence, were another serious problem in Vietnam. The amount of shipping passing in and out of Vietnam was enormous; the aids needed for safe navigation were not in existence, and no in-country capability to create and maintain them ever developed. The 180-foot Coast Guard buoy tender Blackhaw (WLB-390) was moved to Sangley Point to provide this service in 1967. Since then, she has made 15 three-month deployments, servicing aids along the entire coast and in Thailand. In Saigon, we added a five-man team to assist the Vietnamese, and they travelled throughout Vietnam’s navigable waterways in all imaginable ways to service the fixed and floating aids.
To Vietnamize this effort, in 1969, our team in Saigon developed a program to minimize floating aids and depend instead on fixed shore structures. Concrete structures were cast in Honolulu and, with all the related signal equipment, were shipped to Vietnam in 1970. By contract the shore aids were set and a Vietnamese team was developed and trained to service and maintain this system.
Lor an in Vietnam
As the Vietnam war closed, Coast Guardsmen were replaced at both Con Son and Tan My Loran-C stations in the Republic of Vietnam. Con Son Island lies 45 miles southeast of the Mekong Delta. On the island are a village, a penal establishment, some Vietnamese
That there were any aids to navigation at all in South Vietnamese waters was largely the result of the work of the 180-foot buoy tender Blackhaw and her company of about 50 officers and men. Notice the pair of .50-caliber machine guns mounted on the forecastle. This 1,025-ton ship is not confined to service in tropical waters, for her hull is reinforced for the breaking of light ice.
troops, a Vietnamese radar site, and a small U. S. Array signal station. Con Son Loran station was commissioned on 2 September 1966—ten months after DoD tasked the Coast Guard to install a Loran-C chain in Southeast Asia, and its Loran-C signal is paired with that from our station at Sattahip, Thailand. The Coast Guard’s current Vice Commandant, Vice Admiral T. R. Sargent, III, then a captain, conducted the survey and selected the site on Con Son. He also chose sites at Lampang, Udorn, and Sattahip, Thailand, for the chain.
After three years, the Tan My station, six miles northeast of Hue and 42 miles south of the demilitarized zone, was added to give better coverage and flexibility. It consists entirely of prepackaged, prefabricated units, our Air Transportable Loran Station (ATLS), which was flown into Da Nang by the U. S. Air Force in June 1969. Three weeks later "on air” testing commenced with full operations available on 15 August. Prefabricated trailers form living, messing, office, recreation, sick bay, reefer, shop, and storage spaces. Fuel is stored in rubber bladder tanks.
Coast Guard Aviators in Vietnam
Finally, Coast Guard participation in Vietnam included a few aviators on a pilot exchange program with the Air Force. Although the number of Coast Guardsmen involved was very small, 11 to date, the contribution is noteworthy, the potential for the future significant. Ever since 1967, two or three of the 40 officers assigned at any one time to the U. S. Air Force’s 37th
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron have been Coast Guard aviators.
Perhaps typical of the many rescue missions flown by these officers was the rescue of Lieutenant Colonel Jack Modica, U. S. Air Force, on 2 July 1968. Modica’s F-105 had been shot down two days before in North Vietnam, 17 miles northwest of Dong Ha, which is located in South Vietnam, near the DMZ, and he was wounded. Four rescue attempts had been driven off by intense groundfire. An escort gunship was shot down with the loss of its pilot. The next attempt was assigned to Lieutenant Lance Eagan, U. S. Coast Guard, Rescue Crew Commander of Jolly Green 21. Eagan’s co-pilot was Major Robert Booth, U. S. Air Force, his flight engineer Sergeant Herbert Honor, U. S. Air Force, and his rescue specialist Airman First Class Joel Talley, U. S. Air Force. Ai-E Skyraiders flew escort. After several fire suppression strikes, Eagan commenced the recovery attempt. On the way into the recovery area the Jolly Green had been taken under accurate and intense AAA fire, with the bursts shaking the aircraft. A smoke signal guided the aircraft near a large tree extending 100 feet above the thick jungle canopy, but Modica could not be seen. Knowing the risks, Airman Talley volunteered to go down the hoist. There was no ground fire at this time. Arriving on the ground, Talley established communications and searched for and found Modica, He then vectored Eagan into position and strapped the injured Modica and himself to the rescue hoist. By this time, Talley had been on the ground 16 minutes. As
Coast Guard aviators flew rescue missions in Vietnam with the Air Force's 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron. Here, one of that squadron’s HH-3E rescue helicopters is refueled in flight by an Air Force C-130. A majority of the Coast Guard's 133 aircraft are helicopters, either HH-3F or HH-52A.
the hoist began, the North Vietnamese sprang their trap. Intense automatic weapon and small arms fire raked the aircraft, striking from directly below and from all sides. Four of the five main rotor blades were hit. Nine hits were taken in the fuel tanks. Eagan held the hover until the hoist cleared the top of the jungle canopy, and then moved off with Talley and Modica swinging 50 feet below the aircraft. As Eagan cleared the site to safety, a Skyraider swept under the hoist, silencing the ground fire. Talley was awarded the Air Force Cross for this mission. Eagan received the Silver Star, and Booth and Honor the Distinguished Flying Cross.
Three weeks earlier, in a similar mission near the A Shau Valley, South Vietnam, Lieutenant Jack Rit- tichier, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve, was lost. Rittichier
must be maintained and supported. There are far too many persons who want to convert the Coast Guard into a non-military force. To do so would deprive our nation of a valuable defense force—an armed force that has distinguished itself throughout America’s proud history.
was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for this mission, as well as the Distinguished Flying Cross with a first and second oak leaf cluster and the Air Medal, with first, second, and third oak leaf clusters for missions flown in the preceding two months.
In one of these missions, Rittichier twice entered an extremely hostile area to rescue four survivors of a downed Army helicopter and five seriously wounded men. The survivors were located in an extremely small landing zone, surrounded by tall trees, on the side of a steep mountain slope. Rittichier executed the second approach and departure at night by flarelight even though the distress site was obscured by smoke and clouds.
Now that the Vietnam war has ended, two observations might be made. First, the Coast Guard role, although small in terms of men and units committed, has been significant. My second observation is that the Coast Guard has many special capabilities that should be employed fully from the beginning of any future conflict. The Coast Guard military readiness posture
The Future
Like that of many agencies, the future of the Coast Guard can never be fully assured. These are changing times and the next few years undoubtedly will see several major shifts in Coast Guard roles and missions. The proposed reorganization of the federal government, • combining departments and agencies into large, super departments will have an impact on the Coast Guard. No matter what changes occur, field operations should not be drastically altered. Each year we will continue to handle more than 45,000 SAR cases in both oceans, and save about 4,000 lives. We will monitor 10,000 oil spill cases, issue 45,000 commercial vessel licenses and documents, maintain 49,000 aids to navigation, carry out 63,000 boating safety patrols, conduct 140,000 port safety inspections of waterfront facilities and vessels, provide 24,000,000 square miles of Loran coverage, discharge and sign on 450,000 merchant seamen, and monitor the operations of 7,000 foreign fishing vessels off our coast. Except for loran coverage, less than 5% of this work will be accomplished in the Central and Western Pacific. At least 25% of Coast Guard loran operations, however, will continue in the Fourteenth Coast Guard District.
The thrust of Coast Guard operations will shift
The Coast Guard in the Central and Western Pacific 293
towards regulatory work and law enforcement, as required by recent legislation such as the Port and Waterway Safety Act. This act, which provides significant new tasks, grants the Coast Guard, through the Secretary of Transportation, authority and responsibility for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of vessel traffic systems in congested ports and waterways in the United States. Last August, the San Francisco vessel traffic system assumed operational status. The system includes advisory radar, voluntary traffic separation, and communications with commercial traffic moving to and from the Bay area. A different system has been commissioned in Puget Sound. The major components are the traffic separation scheme, a VHF-FM communications net, and some radar surveillance where navigation hazards are the greatest.
A system will be installed in Valdez, Alaska, to handle the tanker traffic serving the Alaska oil pipeline. In the foreseeable future, neither Honolulu nor Guam will require a more extensive traffic system than the simple harbor entrance control signal now in use.
Maritime traffic in the Fourteenth Coast Guard District, however, will be involved in Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act which amended the Tank Vessel Act. This title calls for a major improvement in the design, construction, maintenance, and operational standards of vessels carrying hazardous substances. As a result of this act, an estimated 500 additional U. S. vessels could be brought under inspection by Coast Guard marine inspectors.
Another law passed in 1972 that has already had impact on all commercial and naval vessels in the bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act, which became effective 1 January 1973. Through required bridge-to- bridge communications, it is expected that there will be a reduction in such casualties as occurred when the Oregon Standard and the Arizona Standard collided in San Francisco Bay in January 1971. More than 800,000 gallons of oil spilled into the Bay and out through the Golden Gate as a result of this collision. An exchange of communications between the two vessels’ masters could have prevented the damage to the two ships and the pollution of the Bay waters.
To make Coast Guard services more available for marine safety, some organizational changes have been made in the. districts. Each Coast Guard district office now has a marine safety division that handles all functions of vessel safety, port safety, and environmental protection. The aim is to integrate to the highest degree possible these three related programs to provide for more effective direction, coordination, and manpower utilization at Coast Guard operating units in port areas.
The Ocean Station program will terminate by 30
June 1974. Except for Ocean Station November, located halfway between San Francisco and Honolulu, the ocean stations affected are in the Atlantic. Data buoys and satellites will gather much of the meteorological data now obtained by Coast Guard cutters while occupying ocean stations. A shift away from ocean station patrols will make seagoing resources available for other ocean programs. The most likely candidate to receive more emphasis is the role of fisheries law enforcement. Such a shift could involve several more Coast Guard high endurance cutters operating in the North Pacific. It is likely that additional high endurance cutter time will be devoted to military readiness exercises and operations with Fleet units of the Navy.
An indication of the new 378-foot cutter’s ASW capabilities is found in a recent letter to the Commander Fourteenth Coast Guard District: "The performance of Mellon while serving with the Navy as a destroyer type unit during ASWEX RIMPAC 72 was outstanding. I observed with pride her enthusiastic and professional performance in the fast-pace multi-threat and multinational environment. The Mellon's tenacity, aggressiveness, and resourcefulness in heavy ASW combat situations throughout the exercise was an important contribution to the success of Blue forces.”
There is some concern within the Service that future Coast Guard roles and missions may not involve or employ an adequate seagoing force to give the Service a proper balance. This balance becomes critical as the ratio of shore to sea billets increases, for the nature of our work ashore requires administrators with extensive experience afloat. A spirited, effective Coast Guard requires an adequate fleet of vessels with solid seagoing missions manned by competent professionals. Our history, our tradition, has been that of a far-ranging blue water Service capable of enforcing U. S. laws and capable of serving as an arm of the Navy, not only in the Pacific, but anywhere in the world.