The Origin of Navy Day
Mrs. Mary Paolozzi—The idea of a special day to honor the Navy and naval personnel was conceived by Mrs. William H. Hamilton of New York City, in 1922.
In 1917, Mrs. Hamilton had founded the National Navy Club of New York for enlisted men of the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It functioned for 17 years as a home away from home for thousands of enlisted men. Its president was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who maintained his interest in the club after he became governor of New York, and even after he became President of the United States. His mother, Sara Delano Roosevelt, was chairman of the Women’s Committee, and his wife, Eleanor, gave much assistance to projects sponsored on behalf of the National Navy Club.
The year 1922 was one of uncertainty for the Navy, and there were those who felt it was a mistake and a waste of taxpayers’ money to maintain what they termed a “large” Navy during peacetime. The uniform, which during war years was a badge of honor, became a symbol in some civilian minds of a professional ne’er-do-well.
Mrs. Hamilton conceived the idea of a nationwide celebration of Navy Day, which would bring a knowledge of the Navy into every part of the country, bring greater respect for the men who wore its uniform, and give the civilian population an opportunity to visit ships, meet the men, find out how, in fact, each ship was a school, and learn the importance of our “first line of defense,” as the Navy was referred to in those days.
Accordingly, Mrs. Hamilton went to Washington to place her idea before the Secretary of the Navy. He was on a tour, and so she had a conference with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. He was very enthusiastic, and called in several high-ranking officers and asked their opinion. They thought it an excellent idea. The question of an appropriate date was then considered. Many were suggested, and it was finally decided to choose 27 October, the birthday of President Theodore Roosevelt, a great friend of the Navy.
Within a month of the 1922 observance, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt wrote Mrs. Hamilton the following:
I wish to thank you personally for having suggested the idea of a Navy Day. It was your original idea. It worked out excellently, and, I believe, gave a real momentum to a correct understanding of what the Navy means to our country.
In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to a daughter of Mrs. Hamilton:
Thank you very much for your letter by which you remind me of the part your mother and mine played in the founding of the National Navy Club of New York. I also remember well your mother’s part in the establishment of Navy Day, and I note with pleasure that a proper tribute has been paid by Secretary Knox in his speech on 27 October 1942.
In subsequent years, the Navy League of the United States has carried on in a magnificent manner the observance of Navy Day. Were it not for their sponsorship, it is conceivable that this special day might have lost its significance and eventually been forgotten. The consolidation of the Services seemed to doom the observance of Navy Day, and for a few years the date was all but ignored. Gradually, certain organizations, proud of their Navy heritage and tradition, commenced with small ceremonies to commemorate Navy Day on 27 October. As the years went on, more and more special programs were promoted to remind us of what we owe to the U. S. Navy, past and present. For this we can thank the late Mrs. William H. Hamilton, the originator of Navy Day.
“Vital Interests and Volunteer Forces”
(See L. P. Brooks, pp. 18-23, January 1971 Proceedings)
Commander H. E. Smetheram, U. S. Navy—When Lieutenant Brooks mentioned the conflict over the declaration of war powers between the President and the Congress, he introduced an element into his article which should be carefully analyzed. His recommendation to limit Presidential power in this field must not go unchallenged.
It is important that the President have the capability to respond immediately to a war threat. Congress is not equipped to do this. Senator Gale W. McGee (Dem., Wyo.), stated, “On more than one occasion the time allotted by crisis incidents to those who must make decisions has been less than the time it would take to assemble a quorum of the Congress.” Through the concept of legislative oversight, Congress can restrain the President, as it is doing today. This can take the form of committee investigations, withholding of funds, and passage of restrictive legislation.
Judicially, past decisions indicate that the courts are not going to check the President in his warmaking power. The courts have affirmed the Presidential viewpoint as to the extent of executive power in the field of foreign relations.
The President determines our national interest and is sworn, by implication in his oath of office, to protect the national interest. Specific defense of the nation is certainly not questioned as basic to our national interest. Since the problem of immediate defense is not questioned, it is the point at which foreign action becomes a danger to the nation that is the crux of the problem. Here, Congress, by lack of action, has granted the President a monopoly over foreign relations and the security of the national interest. The executive branch can and does initiate war in the protection of the national interest and Congress has only acknowledged the existence of a war.
The President, as commander-in-chief, has full power to direct the Armed Forces in the protection of the nation. He must be fully capable of moving forces to any area from which a threat to the national interest may emanate. The complex technology of modern weapons and rapid communications make it imperative that the President have unrestricted power to preserve the national security. The protection of American lives and property may require combat on foreign soil and the President should not be limited in carrying out this responsibility. Immediate action in response to a critical situation is preferable to no action, which would result from long debates in Congress.
Congress still has the obligation to advise the President, and it is entirely appropriate that the President give weight to this advice since it is a part of the total process by which the President establishes foreign policy. Congress, as a collective body, cannot bear final responsibility for a decision on war. The President bears that responsibility and eventually will answer for it to the Congress, the Court, and the electorate.
“The Silent Vote”
(See F. G. Dengler, pp. 34-37, February: pp. 98-99, June; and pp. 93-95, July 1971 Proceedings)
John A. Lorelli—Lieutenant (j.g.) F. G. Dengler has raised several interesting questions. I would like to comment on two in particular. He writes, in his comments on the single-screw ocean escorts, “The junior officer is left asking, ‘At what point does economy yield to effectiveness?’” Many white-hats ask the same question. I am a “plank-owner” and served through the first Western Pacific deployment of a new ocean escort, a vessel of the Brooke-class ocean escorts. As a youngster, I read avidly of the “can-do” exploits of the Navy’s destroyer force, both in fiction and official naval histories. During 15 months of almost continuous underway activity, from the commissioning through five months of deployment, I saw a great deal of the “tin-can” and very little of the “can-do.”
The ship has a helicopter hangar, originally intended for Dash, but we carried no Dash. Although I realize that Dash was phased out soon afterward, the point is that the ship had a capability that was never used. As Lieutenant Dengler points out, the single 5-inch, 38-caliber gun is next to useless for attacking jet aircraft. Furthermore, once on Yankee Station, the ship was not allowed to participate in shore- bombardment missions because of the severely-limited magazine capacity and lack of engineering redundancy in the event of battle damage. The air-search radar, although vitally necessary to the missile system, and although billed as reliable, was very often down, thereby almost eliminating the ship’s function in the AAW screen, a function, I might add, that could only be limited, considering the small missile capacity of the Brooke class. Finally, machinery failure in the single power plant left us wallowing far behind the task group on more than one occasion.
The various machinery and systems limitations and failures had, to my mind, a two-fold effect. First of all, it obviously limited the effectiveness of the ship as an integral unit of any task group. Secondly, there was, and is, the idea of purpose. We trained in all the standard destroyer assignments, but were quite obviously incapable or capable only on t a limited basis, of performing most of the jobs. It is more than frustrating to spend long hours underway, at general quarters or involved in evolutions that will not and cannot be performed with the equipment at hand.
I am not competent enough to suggest a technical answer. It would appear to me though, that those who are competent and responsible should take a solid look at the destroyers they are sending to the Fleet and remember the old phrase, “can-do.”
My other comments are on the problem of officer training. Lieutenant Dengler’s suggestion is, to this writer, excellent. From the vantage point of having been a radioman who had an English major ensign for a division officer, I can attest from personal experience that Lieutenant Dengler’s idea has some merit. I mean no personal reflection on the officer involved, but his knowledge of the communications job was terrible. Consequently, he would often make demands on the radio gang that we could not fulfill. This led to friction between him and the troops, and to a consequent loss of confidence in him as the division officer. Only the efforts of one of those superb chief petty officers, with which the Navy is fortunately blessed, turned a bad situation into an efficiently functioning communications crew, division officer included. Had the division officer had a more thorough grounding in the tasks which his enlisted men had to perform, there would have been far less friction. As Lieutenant Dengler points out, that basic training is available in the enlisted schools and would undoubtably [sic] benefit the Navy to no small degree.
As a one-time sailor, and now a concerned civilian, who has had a lifelong interest in the fortunes and well-being of the U. S. Navy, I heartily agree with Lieutenant Dengler’s final statement that it is time for the Navy to “. . . promulgate its overall goals and the methods . . . it will use to attain them.”
“A United States Navy for the Future”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-25, March; pp. 81-90, June; pp. 89-93, July; pp. 93-96, August; and pp. 93-95, September 1971 Proceedings)
Master Chief Sonar Technician James Bussert, U. S. Navy—The USS Hepburn (DE-1055) was deployed on a WesPac [sic] cruise, and our wives sent newspaper clippings concerning the Prize Essay headlined, “Officer Criticizes New Navy Ships,” and “Navy Ships A Mistake?” I was prepared to write a defending case for my ship, and I was going to say that the Navy got a single-gun, single-screw ASW escort, which is what it contracted for. Contractors must be blamed for the lack of our variable depth sonar (VDS), Point Defense AAW, and MK-25 tubes aft. The latter was due to cancellation of wire-guided MK-48 torpedoes, spelled cost over-run. Rather than negative effect articles on “in-being” ships, emphasis should be on unbuilt ships, such as the Spruance (DD-963) class for positive results.
After reading Captain Smith’s fine essay, I see the whole thrust of it was missed and misrepresented by the press, making him an unwitting ally of the “. . . irresponsive criticism of news media . . .” he mentions in his last sentence. I have to agree with most of his logic and points.
As a senior sonarman, I would defend the ASW capabilities of the antisubmarine rocket (AsRoc) and SQS-26CX sonar as the most effective to date on a surface ship hull. To close the ASW gap, he says that we must use more power, lower frequency, digital signal processing, and modes other than surface duct, all of which the simpler and less costly sonars do not have. I believe Captain Smith’s point should be that the Navy should not have bought the SQS-26 program until after the five evolutionary models had come up with the final CX version.
From his pointed complaints of the DE-1052 class design, I think the DD-963, with the addition of a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) would meet his criteria to defend herself and others. For the same money cost of 46 DEs, we would get about 13 DDGs that could match the newest Soviet ships.
As a former career counsellor, I was somewhat disturbed by Captain Smith’s anti-habitability comments. I would hate to see us regress in our standards at a time when an all-volunteer Service is coming. There is plenty of room on newer class ships for weapons for parity with Soviet warships. It is merely the lack of developed, Fleet-ready systems or the total lack of a designed Styx/Shaddock capability that is our ton-for-ton problem.
I have the feeling Captain Smith feels that surface ships will never be ASW capable against the latest submarines, and he wants a hundred nuclear ASW submarines, although he does not say so. He speaks vaguely of “reordering priorities.”
Inadvertently or not, I think the Proceedings put my captain, Commander Landersman, in an unfair position with the untimely publishing of his article on the DE-1055 in the Professional Notes section of the same issue. Forewarned, he would have emphasized differently in another context. As it is, one newspaper said, “Landersman’s article was published as a kind of opposing opinion to Smith’s, but instead it tended to bear out the captain’s criticism.” I am sure this was not your intent, as Commander Landersman’s article was a purely objective description of the ship and not controversial. Knowing him as I do, I can assure you that he thinks most highly of his ship and her capabilities.
Finally, I hope Captain Smith’s optimism in truth over politics is proven by the American people and results in a strong, vital Navy led by apolitical, honest officers.
Midshipman First Class Anthony Bollen, U. S. Naval Reserve, Stanford University—In response to the challenging Prize Essay, Stanford NROTC instructor Lieutenant Commander Chris Clark, U. S. Navy, asked his 19 operations analysis students to write down their thoughts regarding some of the controversial points raised by Captain Smith. We were pleased enough with the essays to want to share parts of them with Proceedings readers.
All of these Stanford students will be on active duty within a year. What kinds of ideas will these new junior officers bring to the Fleet? Here are a few samples:
On the Navy—“In contrast to common romantic images, modern sailors wield slide rules and torque wrenches against unseen enemies. History has demanded these contrasts as the nature of war has changed. But our physically changing Navy, while changing its ships, is not changing in many of its ways.”
“The Navy is still wallowing in its past triumphs. This resting on laurels produces the kind of traditions which clutch ideas and procedures long after their usefulness, or even applicability, have virtually vanished. Naval complacency was easy to build as long as the United States was in complete control of the seas and could effectively control those who wished to gain access to seaways. However, complacency today has solidified into one of the most disgusting monuments ever seen.”
“With the trend of national and international attitudes today, the U. S. Navy no longer holds its position of supremacy, and, instead, finds itself in a tenuous position concerning national support and, and at the same time, must strive to keep pace with Soviet gains. Now more than ever the Navy needs an infusion of new, creative, and non-traditional ideas.”
“Our years of experience are important in teaching us what may be wrong, but they alone have not the power to redefine the direction we must take for the future. It would seem that new and improved studies and analyses are of utmost importance in helping the Navy meet the challenges of the future.”
“A Navy in which men can take pride because of its accomplishments and humanity becomes more professional than a force which binds itself in tradition and loses its spirit of service in petty gripes.”
“Central to a new and exciting and efficient Navy is the role of the junior officers in the Fleet, responding to new programs critically and proposing new ideas themselves. In other words, the junior officer should not be seen as a dormant, order-following buck-passer who may react to a situation in the manner of Lieutenant Calley. As a thinking human being, a junior officer can contribute much to overall efficiency and future growth.”
“Greatness is not achieved and then forever retained. To be great and to be the best requires the ability to meet all challenges with an open and confident mind. Mediocrity is not the answer to the Soviet naval challenge. We must look inward objectively at our shortcomings, have the courage to correct them, and to rightfully retain the pride in being best.”
On Vietnam—“Divisiveness plagues even the Pentagon, and public opinion polls reflect war-weariness such as this nation has seldom known. Is it any wonder that warnings about the Red Fleet’s growth and power ring hollow? And is it any surprise that no one believes the military when war is fought nightly during the dinner hour on the TV networks and the papers carry banner headlines screaming ‘My Lai’?”
“I think the Vietnamese War has swept away much of the naive camouflage under which an archaic military structure hid. We see the atrocities of the war and wish to evolve from military mediocrity into a new singleness of purpose. . . . We must react to our challenge with a new wave of professionalism and selfpride that will transform us into a thing of the present, not a thing of the past.”
“The largest, single obstacle blocking the recovery of military credibility—the war in Vietnam—must somehow be eliminated. The sooner this is done, the sooner the public will believe the facts about Soviet seapower; the sooner Congress will provide funding for worthwhile projects; and the sooner the lost American faith and patriotism will be recovered. There is hardly another course of action.”
On the Balance of Power—“In the rapidly developing and changing world of today, almost nothing, and certainly not the strategic situation of a country, can be seen as so completely and rigidly established that it is not subject to change.”
“Captain Smith claims that ‘. . . the maritime supremacy of the Western powers . . . has bound all strategies of this century into a common unity.’ It is clear that, if this supremacy is lost, the Soviet Navy will assume command of the seas; it is not clear, however, that this supremacy is the sole factor upon which all Western strategies hinge.”
“The day may not be far off when the concept of a Navy second to none is a thing of the past; when the more narrowly-structured Soviet Navy, designed specifically to exploit our vulnerabilities, might wrest from our grasp that most cherished concept of control of the seas.”
“How credible can our claims of peace and equality and self-determination be if we continue dogmatically to demand total control of the seas? How seriously can our overtures of peace be taken when we seemingly reserve the right to ‘blow the hell’ out of anyone who disagrees with us? Certainly there are hostile forces in the world which we must be prepared to reckon with; the Soviet threat is by no means to be taken lightly. But a balance of power does not mean a preponderance of U. S. naval force. The only way to decelerate this insane struggle to be the best is to take the first step. This is our prerogative. It is very paradoxical that the super-powers seem compelled to prepare for a war that neither of them wants, neither of them can win, and for which there is no defense.”
“Image of Command”
(See S. H. Edwards, pp. 36-39, February; pp. 102-104, July; and p. 98, September 1970; p. 88, January; and p. 84, February 1971 Proceedings)
Commander Michael A. McBride, U. S. Navy—Command of a ship should not be considered the ultimate goal or pinnacle of a naval career, despite the personal satisfaction it may evoke or the fond recollections of a retired admiral. Like it or not, command at sea should be a stepping stone to a different form of responsibility, which is most likely disguised in a staff billet. As junior officer experience afloat prepares one for command at sea, command should prepare one for high level productive staff work. This progression should close the loop and provide the feedback that can alleviate much of the burdensome paperwork and administrative requirements that belabor the afloat skippers to which Lieutenant Commander Edwards refers. He states that “. . . today’s commanding officers have less and less authority.” I take exception to this statement. The authority is there, but it has been made more difficult to exercise, and the allowable margin of error has been reduced. The CO’s job is therefore bigger than before, and he needs more management ability and, if he is lucky, greater charisma to get him over the rough spots while maintaining the motivation of his junior officers. The numerous thorns in the side of the CO (and in many instances, even more in the side of his executive officer) that evolve around troublesome and inadequately understood administrative procedures should be handled without overemphasizing their significance to the junior officer (JO). But these thorns should not be forgotten. The ex-CO should charge ahead in his career with the firm resolve to rectify the legitimate problems he noted at sea, when he is in a shore or staff position where he can exercise his influence.
What about the “image of command” and the junior officer? Is it necessary or reasonable that every JO at sea should automatically aspire to command? Is it not just as worthwhile (and immediately more significant) to aspire to outstanding performance in his current billet, with his goal set at his immediate superior’s billet? The course of his career will then lead to aspiration for command naturally. In the meantime, he can strive for a goal both more attainable and understandable. Few, if any, junior officers know what the CO’s job really is. The “image of command” to the JO is primarily what his commanding officer magnifies through his words or actions.
That may be discontent over redundant reports and unreasonable administrative requirements, or it may be outstanding shiphandling ability, or other things.
Whatever it is, however, it cannot be created by the Shore Establishment or co-operative staffs. The man in the job creates the “image of command.”
“The Career Officer as Existential Hero”
(See D. G. Deininger, pp. 18-21, November 1970; p. 91, April; pp. 93-94, June; p. 98, July; and pp. 96-97, September 1971 Proceedings)
Commander Robert C. Steensma, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Deininger’s article indicates that it is perhaps time for the Proceedings to take stock of its present editorial policies and to strike out in new directions. The motto of the Naval Institute reads, “For the advancement of the professional, literary, and scientific knowledge of the Navy.” Professional? Scientific? Certainly. In an age of technological explosion and expanding professional horizons the Proceedings serves a vital function. But a glimpse of the indices of the journal over the years indicates that the literary aspect has been ignored (except for Louis Bolander’s article on James Fenimore Cooper in 1940), not so much from editorial bias as from authorial neglect or disinterest. But the publication of Lieutenant Deininger’s article leads me (and perhaps others) to hope that the magazine will seek and encourage naval writers to deal with literary matters which are pertinent to the Navy.
Lieutenant Commander Frederick T. Daly, U. S. Navy—There is little evidence in the modern Navy of senior officers trying to “influence” anyone into accepting their own motivations. Rather, most officers would be immediately suspect of anyone who borrowed someone else’s reasons for making the Navy a career.
The Navy needs officers who believe in the Navy for their own reasons, be they existential, patriotic, or pragmatic.
I submit that an unspoken, but very strong motivation for naval officers is the sea, with all its romance, uncertainty, treachery, serenity, turmoil, and unmatched beauty.
“Navy Medicine: A New Prescription”
(See P. A. Flynn, pp. 42-47, February; p. 98, June; and p. 95, August 1971 Proceedings)
Orville C. Barr—Commander Flynn advocates a retreat (with the other Services and perhaps the Public Health Service) to an isolated Federal Medical School (FMS), staffed with career military doctors.
This could build a wall between the medical officer and his civilian counterpart. The present medical officer is accredited by his civilian counterparts as their equal. Isolation can destroy that position; making it difficult for the dissatisfied or misfit medical officer to leave the Service. That does as much harm as the grumbling conscript does today.
The present equality in each other’s eyes leads to a two-way flow of information and ideas. The Navy derives far more than it contributes. Isolation implies increasing self-sufficiency and it is highly doubtful the proposed FMS could originate any significant percentage of the new ideas that now flow into the Medical Corps from all the nation’s medical schools via the new doctors arriving each year. The naval medical service would lag behind as its contact with the outside was reduced to reading published journals. In such a position it could not continue to make original contributions to the advancement of medicine, reducing its attractiveness further.
There is no question that there is a national doctor shortage. The dollars spent on an FMS could better be used to train an approximately equal number of additional doctors in expanded civilian medical schools. That would upgrade the nation’s standard of health without arousing the ire of civilian doctors. In the meantime, the future of civilian U. S. medical services will be decided (without the Navy taking a public position subject to debate and criticism); perhaps in favor of socialized medicine as Commander Flynn hopes; perhaps not.
Senior medical officers should be made available as instructors in the civilian medical schools. By such a step, the Navy could put its best foot forward in front of impressionable medical students; it could contribute to the training of needed new doctors, and it could help its internal morale problem. The medical student could then consider and debate the merits of naval service in an open forum. If the Navy cannot win there, it deserves to lose.
“For the Reserves; A Workable System”
(See H. C. Boschen, Jr., p. 93, April; and p. 86, November 1970 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Philip M. Spina, U, S. Naval Reserve-R—Commander Boshen’s [sic] comments are pertinent but much too narrow. As training officer of Naval Reserve Surface Division 3-32 located on Long Island, I would give my left arm to have any type of naval vessel affiliated with our unit. The Navy is just “not doing its thing” by keeping Reserve units cooped up in a classroom environment.
Being an old “Gator,” I would be overjoyed to have the Commander’s suggestion taken to heart and instituted where practical. But I am not fussy. Heck, I would even take a destroyer.
“The Soviet Union’s Far-Flung Nets”
(See R. Oetting, pp. 48-57, November 1970 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Ralph M. French, U. S. Navy (Retired)—This situation might interest the Secretary of the Navy in appointing a study panel. A favorable report from such a panel, together with a favorable reception from our fishing industry, could lead to a request to Congress for appropriations to organize and maintain a “fishing support flotilla,” which could increase annual production by improving the efficiency of our fishing fleet.
Such a flotilla, comprised of ships from types available in the Navy’s Reserve Fleet, could: (1) assist all commercial fishermen, but primarily those of U. S. registry, by reconnaissance, reporting schools of fish, using sonar, aerial survey, and any other means available; (2) using shipboard communications on “availability basis,” relay messages between vessels and mainland offices; (3) mediate disputes in cases involving fishing in international waters where violation of jurisdiction claimed; (4) provide search and rescue within limits of operational capacity. Render medical treatment where required in emergency cases; and (5) gather and disseminate meteorological information.
If favorably received by the fishing industry and initiated, this service would be purely voluntary, and owners of vessels requesting such, would provide the commander of the flotilla with identification data and pertinent operational information.
This plan, if adopted, would also provide a valuable source of peacetime training for officers and men of the Navy. It would also add operational ships in case of national emergency. The program could develop into an essential facet of the national economy and, additionally, enhance the prestige of the Navy from the public viewpoint.
Matthew Henson: A Personal Memoir
David Whittet-Thompson—So much misinformation concerning Matthew Henson has appeared in otherwise accurate and authoritative publications, that I think it time that one who was acquainted with Matt should endeavor to set the record straight.
Matthew Henson has been described as illiterate or semi-literate, as a surveyor, as the co-leader of the Peary expedition to the North Pole, as the first Negro officer in the U. S. Navy; and, in an exhibition honoring the achievements of American Negroes, as an admiral.
Matt was an admirable man, but he was never an officer in the U. S. Navy.
As to being a surveyer [sic], he said:
If a man who carries a theodolite and a tripod on his back and sets it up where somebody tells him to—well, yes, I’m a surveyor.
He has also been described as Admiral Peary’s “body servant.” Matt retorted:
Body servant? I don’t know what that means. Maybe Uncle Remus does, but I don’t. The admiral hired me as a general handyman, a helper. I was an ignorant young man with no education to speak of. But in the course of time, I educated myself. When they write about me as the Admiral’s servant, I can’t really fault them on that. I started out as a servant, but with the help of the Admiral—he trusted me and had confidence in me—I became something more. I would describe myself as the Admiral’s assistant.
What kind of a man was Matthew Henson? He was a big man, well over six feet, with broad shoulders, long arms, and large, capable hands. He was dark brown in complexion, with very white teeth, a flashing smile, a booming laugh, and a low, soft, baritone voice. He was a Negro who accepted philosophically the role of a Negro in a predominantly white man’s world. He was, however, no yassuh-massah Uncle Tom. He was simply a man who happened to be black.
The charge has been made that Admiral Peary selected Matt to go with him to the Pole so that he would not have to share the glory with a white man. Matt Henson speaking:
When the time came to pick the man who would go to the Pole with him, the Admiral picked me. Captain Bob Bartlett had expected to be picked. When he wasn’t, he turned beet red and was so mad he couldn’t speak. After we made the dash and got back to the ship, Captain Bob took me aside and said: ‘Peary made the right decision. You are the best man with the dogs, the best man with the Eskimos, the best sledge driver in the expedition.’ Well, I’m not being boastful when I say I knew the Eskimos better than anyone else and got along with them better. Most white men regard the Eskimos as inferior people. As a Negro, well, let’s not talk about that. Anyway, I lived with the Eskimos, I learned their language, I worked with them as an equal, not as a master. I practically became an Eskimo.
Incidentally, the sledge used to make the dash to the Pole was designed and constructed by Matt Henson. When you look at it in the American Museum of Natural History, you need not be an expert to know that it is the work of a master craftsman.
Matthew Henson speaking again:
The first man to set foot on the North Pole? Santa Claus, and that’s all you’re going to get out of me. Some people say I was. Maybe I was if I happened to be breaking the trail for the dogs. But if I was, it was purely by accident. I didn't discover the Pole, the Admiral did. He organized the expedition, he led it. When we made the dash to the Pole, he made the navigational calculations, I didn’t. What does it matter who put the first foot on the North Pole? Admiral Peary discovered it . . . No, after we got back to the ship, he never spoke to me again. I knew why and I understood. The admiral was a very proud, sensitive man, a complicated man.
To show you what kind of man he was: when he froze his feet, all he had to do was tell me and I would have pulled up my parka and put his feet on my belly and warmed them up. But no. He was too proud to ask for help. No, he just suffered in silence, got gangrene and lost his toes. Foolish pride? No, stiff-necked, unbendable pride. The pride a man needs to do great things.
The Admiral had an ambition and a determination to discover the Pole. To do this he needed money for his expeditions. He went around the country with his hat in his hand, talking to rich men and begging—yes, begging for money. I know how this went against his grain. And by accident he—No, let’s not talk about that anymore. You know my answer. Santa Claus was the first man to set foot on the North Pole. Some people give me too little credit for my part in the expeditions and some people give me too much. I helped, that’s all. I just helped.
When the Admiral lay dying, he sent for me, and I sat beside his bed and held his hand and we talked about old times . . . So they call me the Admiral’s ‘body servant.’ Well, if that’s all I could have been, I would have been proud to be only that. But I was more than that, a hell of a lot more than that.
And he was.