There are those who feel that the Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System SABMIS and Nike-X are complementary, not competitive; and that a ballistic missile defense (BMD) composed of SABMIS, Nike-X, and perhaps an airborne missile intercept system would be much more effective than a BMD consisting of only a single system.
A mixed BMD is indeed attractive from the viewpoint of the defense planner. In addition to any quantitative advantages, a mixed BMD system would also provide significant qualitative advantages:
► It would complicate the planning and execution of an enemy attack.
► It would deepen the battle space available to the defense.
► It would decrease the effectiveness of the enemy’s offensive penetration aids (penaids) since a technique effective against one system is often ineffective against another.
► It would enhance our deterrent posture by increasing the enemy’s uncertainties and decreasing his probability of success.
The principal technical problem of a mixed defense, however—dynamic real time battle management—raises several as-yet-unanswered questions. First, could these systems really be integrated effectively? If they could, what would be required? How could it be accomplished? Unfortunately, these questions are being neglected by the Department of Defense and are being carefully ignored by the military services.
The term “battle management” as it is generally used today is somewhat ambiguous. To some it means nothing more than effective command and control. For the purpose of this discussion, however, dynamic real time battle management is much more than just command and control. It is the total process of trans-attack mission evaluation and effort redirection. It must include the ability to:
► Perceive the course of an engagement as it develops by observing and evaluating events as they occur;
► Assess the impact of these events on the future course of the battle;
► Adjust actions that have not yet been taken based on this assessment rather than continue following a predetermined plan based entirely on a priori planning factors;
► Implement the resulting dynamic battle plan;
► Do all of these things rapidly enough to affect, favorably, the outcome of the engagement.
Dynamic real time battle management thus presumes effective command and control. The terms, however, are not synonymous, since it is possible to have effective command and control without any meaningful dynamic battle management capability. Command and control is subsumed in battle management.
Turning first to defensive battle management, let us look at some of the problems of integrating the mixed ABM defense. In the simpler days of air defense, an aircraft that had been killed well forward by a manned interceptor would fall out of the sky, and thus never appear in Nike Hercules battle space. In an ABM defense composed of forward-based SABMIS and terminal Nike-X, however, a re-entry vehicle (RV) that had been subjected to a lethal dose of radiation by a SABMIS warhead would (unless vaporized by the fireball) continue on trajectory and enter the battle space of the Nike-X system deployed behind it. The dead RV, continuing to “fall” along its ballistic trajectory, would appear as a threatening object to the Nike-X radars.
To prevent Nike-X from having to engage every RV, whether killed by SABMIS or not, it would be necessary to assess the results of the SABMIS engagement at a very great distance, as with an intercept in exo-atmospheric space, and then communicate this assessment, together with positive trajectory identification, to the underlying Nike-X system. Figuratively speaking, it would be necessary for SABMIS to mark each dead RV with a big red “X” that Nike-X could easily recognize.
In an ABM defense containing several different systems, real time battle management could be thought of as being made up of four essential elements. These elements are:
The assignment of incoming ballistic missiles and RVs to the systems of a mixed defense; the allocation of ABM interceptor missiles against these targets; the timely assessment of the results of an ABM engagement, even at a great distance; and the exchange of engagement information, among the systems of the mixed defense, as the battle develops.
The need for real time battle management is not limited to the strategic defense. It would do no more good to shoot one of our ICBMs at an already empty silo than it would to fire an ABM interceptor missile at an RV that had already been killed.
In planning a nuclear attack, the strategic planner demands an extremely high assurance of success, say 95%. In order to achieve this goal, he must first estimate planning factors, such as the reliability of his own ICBM system, the effectiveness of the anticipated enemy defense, the effects of ballistic dispersion, and the vulnerability of the target. Using these factors, he must next calculate mathematically the probability of success with a single shot (the single-shot probability, SSP). He must then plan to fire enough rounds to raise the assurance of success (the damage expectancy, DE) to the desired figure—here assumed to be 95%.
If, for example, the planner concluded that his SSP was 50%, he would have to plan to fire a total of five missiles to achieve a DE of 95%. (If he would be satisfied with a DE of 93.75% he could get by with only four ICBMs.)
Were these missiles actually fired, however, and if all of the planning factors were correct, half of the time the last four missiles would be wasted, since the first one would have already destroyed the target. (The much-publicized “overkill” really results from the requirement to achieve a high assurance of success in a nuclear attack rather than from a desire to smash the rubble into successively smaller pieces.) The capability for dynamic real time battle management could relieve the attacker from firing unnecessary missiles when the target either had moved (an empty silo) or had already been destroyed.
Dynamic real time battle management will require not a single system, but rather the integration of many systems and capabilities, at least some of which may already exist. To begin with, sensors will be required that will be able to observe results and conditions as they occur. Second, there must be adequate communications (data links) to relay these observed data to a combat operations center for processing. This center must then evaluate, correlate, and assess the information collected by the sensors; accomplish the required dynamic reallocation of weapons and other assets; and exercise the authority to implement the changes to the battle plan required by the events as observed. Next, there be adequate communication links between the command and control center and the weapons systems to transmit orders to the weapons as necessary. Last, the weapons themselves must be capable of rapid response.
A fixed battle plan is one that is completely preplanned and that, once put into motion, must be carried out without any change or interruption. Once the word to execute it has gone out, it must be followed without regard to the situation that actually develops. The fact that a fixed plan offers a small number of variations or options would not alter its essential characteristic as a fixed plan if, once an option had been selected and its execution begun, it was no longer possible to react to events as they actually took place.
Such a plan would be acceptable under only two conditions. First, a fixed plan would be desirable if it were so effective that there was never any need for change. Second, one would be necessary if it were impossible to make a change, no matter how desirable, once the engagement was under way.
Dynamic reallocation, on the other hand, could be accomplished in two ways, either of which should be superior to a fixed plan that, like the Law of the Medes and the Persians, altereth not. First, a very large number of contingency plans could be generated ahead of time and, as the battle developed, one course of action could be terminated and another substituted when the perceived situation indicated that such a change was desirable. Second, a dynamic plan could be achieved through the capability to generate a completely new plan in real time as the battle situation unfolded.
Although the extensive use of computers would probably be necessary in either case, it is the human mind that excels in making changes in contemplated actions to meet the unexpected. Computers can help the commander to react in a timely fashion to the observed results, and they can rapidly organize data to make interpretation easier. Significant real time battle management, however, must vest the final decision-making authority in an appropriate commander.
Ultimately, one can visualize a complex and highly-sophisticated battle management system that would include such exotic elements as space-based sensors to observe and evaluate events on the other side of the world; a high-capacity worldwide satellite communications and data transmission system; a national command center where, with the aid of computer-organized data, national command authorities could revise and update battle plans (or even create new ones) on a timely basis; and weapons systems that were infinitely and immediately retargetable. Such a system, while it might be extremely effective, is obviously a long way off. It would certainly be subject to many technological delays and limitations.
The trouble with most such complex systems is that they always seem to present a multitude of problems. Further, until all of these problems are solved so that the systems can work in their entirety, they often will not work at all. The reluctance to undertake the development of such a difficult system would be understandable.
Battle management, however, does not work that way. It can be implemented on an incremental or piecemeal basis with significant benefits accruing as each new capability is added. In some cases, all that is required may be the capability to interpret data or to react to information that is already being generated for some other purpose.
A logical first step, then, would be to improve our estimate of the probability of success or failure of our efforts (the planning factors) by observing and evaluating those events that are readily accessible. If we could learn something by watching these happenings as they occur and then react to the refined planning factors that could be derived from this partial knowledge, we could increase our effectiveness even though we could not determine absolutely the outcome of any particular event. The resulting reduction in uncertainty as to the outcome could produce desirable results.
Let us consider a hypothetical example. Most missile failures occur at or shortly after launch, and mechanical failure becomes very unlikely once powered flight is over. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in an address to the Aviation and Space Writers Association on 12 May 1969, said that the United States “has designed, but not deployed, a system which allows a missile to signal to the launch-control point if it has launched its re-entry vehicle properly.” Such a system could obviate the requirement to fire redundant ICBMs as a hedge against missile failure. An additional missile would be required when, but only when, an actual failure had been reported.
With this in mind, let us return to our earlier example in which an ICBM with an assumed SSP of 50% was being fired and a damage expectancy of 95% was required. Also, recall that this required five missiles per target, or 1,000 missiles to attack 200 targets.
Suppose that the planning factors for missile reliability indicated that these missiles were 75% reliable. If this figure is stripped out of the SSP, the SSP for a reliable missile is raised to 66.7%. A DE of 95% now would require only three missiles (as a hedge against failures that could not be observed). However, one missile in every four would be an observed failure and would have to be replaced. On the basis of the same 200 targets, the number of missiles required would be reduced, through the use of this technique, from 1,000 to 800 with no loss of effectiveness. And this from only a single, incremental improvement.
Real time battle management will result in a more efficient use of resources. This, in turn, can be used either to produce a greater result (more damage from the same number of weapons) or to permit a lesser expenditure of resources (the same damage from fewer weapons). Until now, strategic planners have had a plenitude of weapons, so that the inefficient use of weapons could be tolerated. Using “overkill” to assure a high damage expectancy has been easier, more practical, and possibly more economical than making “overkill” needless by providing a battle management capability. This situation, however, may now be changing under the combined impact of economic and political pressures.
An arms control agreement, for example, to limit strategic weapons is a distinct possibility. Such an agreement could reduce the number of ICBMs available. Under such an arms control ceiling, battle management might be the only means available to assure a high damage expectancy. Thus, an era of arms control might make real time battle management essential to the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent and hence a stable international environment. By reducing the uncertainties associated with nuclear attack, battle management could provide some of the safeguards that are essential to enforceable arms limitation agreements. It could provide an attractive alternative to escalation in the arms race.
Why is it that the concept of dynamic real time battle management, the necessity for which is accepted without question in conventional warfare, has been systematically avoided in strategic nuclear war? No tactical battlefield commander would consider blindly adhering to an attack plan after it became clear that it was no longer appropriate, or that the situation confronting him was not that envisioned when the plan was adopted. Yet, this sort of unthinking adherence is precisely what is often advocated in strategic war. The view is widely held that, once SAC gets the word to “go,” it has no further need for communications with the outside world. Whereas flexibility in strategic planning is the watchword today, the execution of those strategic plans appears to be totally inflexible since no capability for real time battle management exists at the strategic level. In the rush to develop systems to do almost everything, this one area has been systematically and shockingly neglected.
At least one reason for this neglect is not hard to find. At its heart lies the sacred cow of “roles and missions,” and a recognition of the fact that strategy battle management will necessarily involve the weapons of all services. Each of the services, therefore, has a vested interest in avoiding the development of a battle management capability that would make it possible for some other service to control their weapons. If this capability could be prevented, this particular threat to service roles and missions could be avoided.
The Sage-Missile Master controversy of a decade ago was ostensibly over the technical compatibility of these systems. The real issue, however, was the determination of the Air Force to gain control of the Army’s Nike missile system and the equal resolve of the Army to deny the Air Force the capability of exercising such control. One need only look at the jealousy with which the Navy guards its SPACEUR system from complete integration into CinCNORADs Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADETS) to appreciate the titanic struggle that would ensue should someone seriously attempt to develop a system that would give CinCSAC a real capability to control the Polaris fleet.
Unfortunately, the military are not the only ones who wish to prevent real time battle management in an attempt to control “roles and missions.” In the name of “civilian control,” many people in all branches of the government are determined to prevent the development of any system that would give any military commander a significant real time capability to influence the use of strategic nuclear weapons.
There is nothing as important to the defense of the United States today as dynamic real time battle management. Despite the technical difficulties and the human problems that will be encountered, the development of such a capability must be undertaken by someone at once.
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A graduate of Colorado State University in 1940, Colonel Giddings also holds an M.S. from Utah State University and an M.A. from The George Washington University. Service schools attended include the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College. During World War II, he served with the 7th Infantry Division in the Pacific Theater. Subsequent assignments include: Instructor, Army Air Defense School (1951-53); Missile Officer, 31st AAA Brigade (1954-56); Staff Officer, Department of the Army General Staff (1956-59); Senior Advisor, Royal Saudi Arabian Artillery School (1959-60); Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion (NIKE HERCULES), 6lst Artillery (1961-63); Staff Officer, NORD [sic] (1964-66); and Commanding Officer, 50th Artillery Group (1966-67). Prior to his retirement 30 April 1970, he assigned to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Articles by Colonel Giddings have also appeared in the Air University Review and the Military Review.