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Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, builders of the Flagstaff (PGH-1) and the Boeing Company, builders of the Tucumcari (PGH-2), had a lot riding on the foils of their respective gunboats as they underwent side-by-side tests in San Diego during the first seven months of 1969. In the authors view, both vessels are winne<i and, if we do not stop hydrofoiling around, looking for perfection, the Navy itself will be the loser.
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aots, swooping through banked turns (much ^ aircraft), and effortlessly passing through pxcar-high waves with little or no apparent 111 effects.
esidents of the San Diego, California, ^ area may well have noticed, in recent lri°nths, two small, unconventional naval Craft “flying” in and out of the harbor at high sPeed and operating offshore in a rather sPectacular fashion. Giving all the appear- arices of super-sized water birds, these boats VVere> in fact, built to “fly” and have, over the Past several months, been demonstrating their ^-'narkablc capabilities to the Navy, kicking aP sheets of spray at speeds in excess of 40
Casual observers and VIPs alike have been Uniformly impressed by these new Navy Vdrofoil gunboats, the Flagstaff (PGH-l) and ae Tucumcari (PGH-2). Since their delivery and arrival in San Diego this past year, these °ats have been competing in a side-by-side °Perational evaluation to compare their Performance and mission capabilities. Al- n°ugh a written report of the results of nese trials—concluded in July of this year— as riot yet been published, there is no doubt t)at these two boats represent revolutionary CaPabilities that may place severe demands on a Navy primarily accustomed to evolutionary Ganges. Consider the following:
* The capabilities of this type of vessel, in sPeed, maneuverability, and seakeeping, far Ppcpass those of any other the Navy now has in .feet service. They can operate at high speed *n sea conditions that render most ships inCapable of speeds in excess of a few knots.
* To counter the severe and pressing threats Posed by enemy surface units, our Navy requires capabilities of this sort.
* There are perhaps two dozen known mission applications for which hydrofoils of this nature can be considered.
• The construction contractors, Grumman Aircraft Corporation and the Boeing Company, could commence delivery of their gunboats to the Fleet in approximately 18 months time.
• The Flagstaff and the Tucumcari have both proved to be more reliable than any vessels of their size to join the Fleet, to date.
• In all probability, as things presently stand, there will never be another hydrofoil craft such as the Flagstaff or the Tucumcari built for the Navy.
The reason for this apparent paradox is that, so far, Navy planners are unable to fit this vessel and her capabilities into their “requirements.” The Flagstaff and the Tucumcari were built as prototypes for testing different propulsion, control, strut configuration, and other developmental concepts in hydrofoils, but were tailored within packages requiring certain size, displacement, and performance characteristics. The intended purpose (as stated in the construction contracts) was an evaluation and comparison of the two craft, with a clear implication that multiple procurement of the superior craft, or one very similar, would result.
Several years have elapsed since these decisions were made, however. Final contracts were not executed between the Navy and Grumman and Boeing until January and February of 1966, respectively. Many potential mission “suites,” which were considered for the hydrofoil gunboats during the concept formulation have grown to the point where they no longer easily fit into the space provided. The transportation of Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) and “Beachjumper”
62 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1969
units are examples. Hence, the proposed solution, by planners seeking to fulfill these missions, is to build considerably larger hydrofoils and requiring another cycle of prototype design, construction, and testing. However, those who reason that design and construction of yet another prototype hydrofoil is the answer to “requirement obsolescence” of our 75-foot hydrofoil gunboats fail to consider the following:
• It will take at least four years to deliver such a prototype to the Fleet and at least two more years before the results of multiple procurement would be realized by the Fleet.
• There is no assurance that the same type of requirements change (or growth) will not render this next platform “unsuitable” as it purportedly has the PGHs.
• The Navy’s R&D program in hydrofoils remains tenuous, at best. Only the two major contractors mentioned above are still maintaining any hydrofoil R&D effort, and there is a question as to how much longer the Navy can afford to continue to produce prototypes. Failure to produce useful hardware, the best of reasons notwithstanding, makes it difficult for any program to justify its existence, particularly in private industry, where profit is an ultimate objective.
What, then, is the answer to this dilemma? Does anyone really believe that craft such as the Flagstaff and the Tucumcari cannot be employed usefully in the Navy to fulfill present mission requirements? What are the obstacles to such introduction and employment?
The primary requirement for effective introduction of any radically new system into the military establishment is recognition that mutual constraints must exist between the system and its intended service environment. Rigid adherence to postulated requirements (mission, administrative, manning, operational, etc.), by those seeking to improve capability, dooms them from the start, by eliminating the vast majority of systems that could serve effectively under different circumstances.
It is probable, in fact, that by failing to be realistic about what we can expect from such high performance vehicles as the hydrofoil gunboats, we will have either low cost-effectiveness or Fleet commanders without suitable
A graduate of Massachuse* Institute of Technology 1957, Lieutenant Comnrat1 er Duff was commission ' through the OCS progranl and served in the USS Br0p (DD-546) from 1958 to l^V He then returned to Md; for graduate studies, receiv'11? j his M.S. degree in Nav | Architecture and Marine f’1 gineering in 1964, and a Doctor of Science degree 'n Mechanical Engineering in 1966. From 1966 to 19o“> he was Hydrofoil Project Officer for the construction of the Plainvicw (AGEH-1) and the Tucumcari (PGq 2). Since 1967, he has been in charge of the Hydrofo1 Special Trials Unit at Bremerton, Washington.
ships. The former would certainly be the case if we assigned expensive, high-perfornianCe hydrofoil craft to such missions as the inter' ception and search of sampans, or for rh'er i patrol. The latter would be the result of a “II0 | procurement” decision based on, for example the inability of the hydrofoils to carry 311 existing missile system, existing UDT uints or to replace all the functions of a screening destroyer-type vessel.
It should be apparent, however, that by tailoring (using the same examples) a missile system, a UDT unit, or several specific de- | stroyer roles, such as plane guard, search and rescue, high-speed surface craft interdiction! 1 high-speed reconnaissance, or ECM that the hydrofoil gunboat probably could acconi' plish these missions better than we are doing them now. We should, therefore, be willing t° tailor our requirements to take advantage of the additional speed, maneuverability, and seakeeping qualities these craft offer. To do this, we must apply some pragmatic, “bird' in-the-hand” philosophy when considering what we have versus what we desire.
Adherence to preconceived ideas in many requirements besides mission definition can drastically affect the vessel’s ultimate per- > formance and usefulness. In many cases, these requirements have little or nothing to do with the military use of the vessel.
Administration, maintenance, and routine operation can take up the vast majority of the I manning effort, and unrealistic requirements ^ in these areas can undermine a vessel’s effectiveness just as well as can unrealistic mission
Two Birds in the Hand 63
Maintain regular communication guards, '§S! and files;
Handle her own supply and commissary fictions;
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reciuirements. For instance, is it reasonable to exPect a naval vessel with one officer and 12 men to:
* Conduct her own maintenance program deluding preparation for all availabilities and
°verhauls;
* Maintain her own administrative records;
* Fight and operate the ship, and
* Maintain a 24-hour watch both underway I in port?
pertainly there is not an aircraft crew in lls country’s naval and military establishment that is similarly burdened. Yet, that Is Precisely what is being imposed upon the b'drofoil gunboats. Or at least, it appears fiat is what is projected for the “require- nients” they are expected to fulfill if they are to he useful. It should be apparent that these rcquirements are as incompatible with military effectiveness as would be requirements hat naval aircraft (or the Air Force, for that fi'atter) be required to operate without the ''ast support establishments they now have. ,*• is certain, in any event, that all these func- !lQfis will be undertaken by the present crews In the absence of a higher command decision t(J assign a portion of these responsibilities to °ther activities or forces afloat just as we do "fith our aircraft.
Hence, it is necessary that the concepts of sfipport necessary to free operating crews for fidr primary objective be recognized and de- vHoped now in order to optimize operating effectiveness when these advanced surface Craft,are put into service. Some level of sup- P°rt similar to that provided for aircraft will °e necessary, employing afloat refueling, fi'aintenance, administration, and supply. ^erhaps this support would best be provided p a tender or shore facility until modifica- h°n and reactivation of a seaplane tender or aPpropriate conversion of an LSD could be ficcomplished.
It is important to recognize here that hydrofoils of the PGH type and size are not the °fily ones which could be built for the Navy. Flans are being considered for a 120-to-150- l°n class hydrofoil with the same features of performance and high reliability as our existing hydrofoils have. Such a vessel could be built and delivered to the Navy, based on reasonable engineering development of present knowledge and experience. However, this involves the process of prototype procurement all over again. Unless Navy planners are willing to commit to multiple prototype procurement, the earliest arrival of operating units to the Fleet will be at least five or six years hence. The PGH-class hydrofoil can be procured and delivered now, within the next two years.
It has been over 15 years since the Navy’s “Sea Legs” hydrofoil program commenced and almost ten years since appropriations were made for construction of the Navy hydrofoil High Point (PCH-l), still operating in the hydrofoil R&D program. In the Flagstaff and the Tucumcari, we now have operating craft that far surpass in sophistication, speed, and operating capability, anything our potential enemies can expect to have developed within the next several years. By then, we should properly be in a phase of development that includes experience and improvements based on active fleet hydrofoils, ensuring developmental superiority for some years to come.
With the announcement of the results of the operational evaluation of the hydrofoil gunboats at San Diego, we should at once order a good many such craft, identical to, or similar to the superior vessel of the two. In the interim, pending their purchase and delivery, we should commence assigning priorities to our hydrofoil mission requirements; we should do the additional work necessary to tailor and improve the related equipment. We need now, to make preparations for appropriate administrative, maintenance, and logistics support. Unless we start now, it is certain that the factors necessary for the successful introduction of hydrofoils to the Fleet will be missing when needed. By making these procurement and planning decisions now, we will make the best use of our resources and products of research and development, and greatly improve our chances of achieving what we are all seeking—efficient, effective use of our operating capabilities to extend our control of the sea.