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Professionalism and Writing
Lieutenant Dennis W. Brezina, U. S. Naval Reserve—On 15 February 1968, Captain Paul Schratz, U. S. Navy, recipient of the Prize Essay Award, spoke at the annual meeting of the U. S. Naval Institute. Instead of the traditional synopsis that a winning essayist gives, Schratz implored the naval profession to expand its number of imaginative thinkers and creative writers. In his remarks, published in the Proceedings, he asserted: We have a great need for creative writing— and thinking—in the professional military. Virtually every civilian scholar in the field of military strategy today—the Schellings, Kissingers, Brodies, Kahns, and Strausz- Hupes—to a man have lamented the lack of imaginative thinking by the military and the need for academicians to fill the unnatural void.
In the past years great strategists were military or military trained. The Naval Institute itself is a monument to one of the greatest military scholars, Admiral Stephen B. Luce.
“But,” he elaborated, “times have changed and the military has slid from its former position of primacy.”
No one can honestly dispute that the Naval Institute has done an admirable job in continuing to encourage the submission of high quality articles—on strategic and tactical issues—and has served as a forum for a viable, stimulating and on-going debate about policies and priorities. There are Schratz, Amine, and Hayes, to name a few, who understand the doctrinal interplay of Mahan, Clausewitz, and Douhet on the theoretical level, and are sophisticated in interpreting how these arguments are manifested in the political military arena which encompasses both sides of the Potomac. But, if these naval professionals are scarce, as Schratz implies in no selfserving way, what can be said about the degree of participation of junior officers?
I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1959 just before the long-awaited era of curriculum modernization began. One could refer to ours as the last of the pre-Renaissance classes. Indeed, one might expect, with r sharp focus on individual development with' a context of sound naval traditions arid ph1 ciples, that more graduates of the last dec2‘‘ than ever before would be speaking out on ^ continuing strategic debate over mihtaf roles and missions, which frequently read15 the flashpoint in the kitchen of hotly c°' tested views—Washington, D. C.
At the last three annual meetings of $ Naval Institute, officers of my class, and sequent classes, were conspicuous by tltff nearly total absence. The adage, “Wal until you get your scrambled eggs before V0' start to talk about strategy,” still seems to p,f vail. Another conspicuous fact relates to 1 survey I conducted on the authorship 1 articles in the Proceedings. From Januah 1965 until July 1969, almost 400 military a”1 civilian authors and co-authors have co*1' tributed major articles on both strategy tactics. Of this number, 19 are active duty officers who have graduated since 1959. that number, eight are Academy graduate5’ Four of the 19 articles written by this group were on subjects of strategic significance a11" only one was prepared by an Academy man" that being an essay on the Anti-Ballistic MlS' sile System. Therefore, over a four-and-one' half-year period, four officers receiving the1' commissions since 1959 have spoken out 011 strategic issues.
I am compelled to ask the obvious ques" tions. Are these statistics unsettling or placating? What are they indicative of? What is the policy of the Navy to encourage junior office1’3 to express themselves creatively and in 311 articulate manner?
Also, I am compelled to state the obvious- Currently underway in the U. S. CongresSi across the nation and, for that matteG throughout the world, is a searching, scorching debate on the role of the U. S. military 111 the 1970s. Not in 25 years has Congress beeu so critical of military programs. But there is 3 discernible trend that should be appreciated for its implications. Congress is not play>n£ its typical role of saying “no” and simply cutting back programs with impunity. Sen3'
th * with11
pM
fecal on
ilitaf; ;achf co|f
of tl>( suh"
/^rs and Representatives are asking questions Th0ut strategy, doctrine, roles, and missions.
t\Vl
aou
1S time to discuss the influence of oceanic
the' Wa'1 c y<A prc to * ip (l! niab /
cofl-
anti
duo;
I. Of
iates- roup . an<f
an''
Mis'
one' their t of
ueS'
cat'
the
r-ers
an
ms-
;SSj
er, di' in
en
s a
ed
ng
iy
a-
°tver on world affairs and to emphasize the Cial role Qf tjje ]\javy Jn maintaining our lQnal security in the challenging years
ahead.
^'ill a few more junior Mahans please step
forward?
lhe NROTC Crisis
Lieutenant (junior grade) Daniel R. Muc- |‘a> hJ. s. Naval Reserve—In recent months e Reserve Officers Training Corps has come nder continual attack by many in the college "'Uiunity. These attacks, stemming pri- amy from the colleges of Letters and Sci- r'1C(: or Liberal Arts, are based on a dispute •p Cr the granting of credit for ROTC classes. ae majority of these attacks seem to be dieted at driving the ROTC from the cam- Ses of our finer universities, with denial of ■ redit intended to be the first step in achieves that goal.
The reasons given by those who advocate e denial of credit or the expulsion of the are varied. Some express an opinion j at the caliber of ROTC classes is not equal 0 that of others on the university level. Others fegard the mission of the ROTC to be one °re associated with a trade school, and asSert that university credit should not be ^ranted for classes of that nature. Still other Smtjpg are either opposed to the Vietnam ar> or—even more extreme—believe no Credit should be granted for the study of war- rfdated subjects.
As a graduate of the NROTC at the Univer- Slty of California at Los Angeles, with a long ' xposure to the problem, I should like to ex- arr>ine each of these criticisms and offer a eRnse of the ROTC program.
The primary target of the opposition groups
e ABM debate, having gone on for almost .0 Years on Capitol Hill, is a perfect model "'hat is likely to come. Inevitably, out of th n ^e^ate on military strategy will arise e Question of alternatives. This is a propi-
appears to be the Army ROTC program. The Navy and the Air Force seem to have inherited the problem on the campuses which they populate. Hence, in this discussion—the term, ROTC is used to embrace the programs of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.
The criticism most frequently heard is that the ROTC classes are not of the same caliber as the others at the university. This claim, by the faculties of these institutions, does not do justice to the facts of the situation. The NROTC curriculum covers many subjects, and, for example, the history of sea power is certainly comparable to other survey courses found in most history departments. Again, navigation and engineering are on a par with many other courses found at our best universities. While these critics are quick to accuse these courses of being unworthy or non-academic, they ignore situations of greater magnitude within their own colleges. The most determined attacks on the grounds of equality of content appear to be leveled by those in the colleges of Letters and Science. Readers will recall, however, that, even at our greatest institutions, classes known as “Mickey Mouse” or “Pushover” have traditionally been sought out, and found, by freshmen and seniors alike. That these courses exist must be known by the faculties of these universities. Why then are these courses ignored, while those of the ROTC come under attack? The failure of these faculties to put their own house in order, while being so concerned over the granting of credit for the ROTC courses would seem to stem from motivations other than academic equity.
The second objection to granting credit to ROTC courses is that they are trade courses— that is they are “How-to-do-it” courses and do not belong behind those ivy covered walls. Applying this same logic, those enrolled in pre-Medicine, pre-Law, or for that matter, most of the courses in the schools of Business Administration, Engineering, and all but the ancient disciplines would likely be denied credit. The argument offered that colleges and universities do not have the time to show how, but rather must concentrate on theory, in the hope that the students will be able to put it into practice themselves, is not realistic. Theory is important, as much to the naval officer as to the philosopher. However, naval officers and plumbers are not the only professions that require technical skill and ability.
A third group of opponents to the ROTC program is composed of those who are either opposed to the Vietnam War, or who feel that war-related subjects should not be taught and if taught, should not receive credit. The second proposition does not bear examination if one considers that the study of war is just as vital to world peace as is the relaxation of international tensions. Just as men of science study cancer to find a cure, politicians and military men, historians and statesmen must understand the nature of modern warfare if they are to avoid it intelligently and, when required, to fight it effectively. It follows too, that denial of credit to war-related subjects would not only destroy ROTC courses, it would also devastate the history departments and do great damage to the efforts of hard science researchers.
The fourth objection is the least heard but is the most basic one. It goes without saying that the Vietnam War is unpopular with many on our college campuses. Much of the criticism of the ROTC which masquerades as a movement inspired by academic motives is, in fact, a reaction to the Vietnam War. It is tragic that the ROTC has become a political tool used by those opposed to the policies of the government. Those who disagree with the involvement of the United States in Vietnam have found the ROTC to be a most vulnerable extension of the military organization they wish to attack.
The denial to the military of well-educated leadership will not further the cause of world peace. This concerted effort to deprive the nation of a large percentage of its military leadership can in no way aid the cause of those who attack the ROTC on the grounds of academic equity. In fact, the opposite would seem to be more the case.
The NROTC serves the Navy in ways so obvious that a detailed description is not necessary. The large influx of well-educated and well-trained officers each year is a marked contribution to the Navy. This observer views the NROTC as a unique training ground for the naval officer. At the U. S. Naval NaL emy and at OCS, the atmosphere is entire) different from that to be found at an NRO° unit. While the faculty of the Naval AcaC emy is not significantly different from thal at other universities, the Midshipman ** not likely to be exposed to the same kind 0 academic feelings as is the NROTC midship man. At OCS the Officer Candidate is con1 pletely involved in his military indoctrina tion and his exposure to the more radi°a points of view while undergoing mili^51' training is extremely limited. Too, while a1 OCS, his time is so occupied with rnilic1' training that he probably has little time t0 seriously consider non-military matters. Od) the NROTC Midshipman is faced with a dad) confrontation of the issues at the time he lS undergoing his military training. There" fore, while his views in relation to the mil1' tary are being formed, he is observing den1' onstrations and countering criticism dad)’ and, in the process, is increasing his aware' ness while he is forming his basic belief' The NROTC Midshipman majoring in Pol'1' ical Science, English, History, or Phil°s' ophy may sit in the class of an anti-war pr°' fessor and weigh the respective views pre” sented. Such experiences will undoubtedly serve to temper his attitudes and strengthen his final point of view in relation to military and political thinking.
This exposure will enable the future naval officer to understand better the position °1 those whose ideas are different from or more extreme than his own, and to defend better those ideas in which he believes.
Denial of credit, then, appears to be the first step in attempting to destroy the ROfC program. The arguments on the grounds of
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions ofl any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceed' ings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate °^ $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
V Jampoler, pp. 141-144, July 1969
edings)
asdy, in applying for graduate school, competitive are the records of our men? o 24 credits of Naval Science courses, can Midshipmen compete equally with their
°Ur
UHCi
ses? We should consider this point; the
pmen do, whether they intend to make
grad
1[1]Ley might be?
quality of content, and of non-university the Courses are weak at best. Opposition to ^OTc as a form of protest to the Vietnam J. rather than on academic grounds is the errlssue- The academic community would t]. Sreatly should it deprive the military of ls source of leadership.
(‘Spg
P*0cE]
^Lieutenant Colonel Conway J. Smith, U. S. j, arine Corps—Lieutenant Jampoler’s sug- sub*011 t^at t^le curiaculum Le modified, to , ..stltute appropriate university courses for $h ltaT ones, has considerable merit. Officer 0rtages in technical skills, and in increasing ^ ’'bers of subspecialties, are critical. It is, clijireL)re, a modern necessity that every tra- l0r>al school of military education be re- ^Xamined. The NROTC curriculum is well rth reviewing, because it harbors unsus- offitC<^ Poss*Lilities toward helping to alleviate ^er shortages in technical skills, languages ^ other critical areas.
^ Ahis recommendation is not intended to Srade “military” subjects. Such courses are thwhile and necessary, but they should be §ht in an appropriate environment during ^ "nier cruises. Our universities should not r expected to train midshipmen for their deck watch.
how
°mmitted counterparts on campus, who
aye a full bag of accredited university c°Ur< y
"hdshi
Service a career or not. Too, we will want Send many of them, as career officers, to as rate scLools. Are they prepared as well
means of bringing about its downfall.” He considers this “a logical consequence of the Navy’s policy of staffing its college units with regular active duty personnel.” At least at Harvard this argument does not seem to square with certain facts.
No one who has followed closely the controversy at Cambridge believes that quality of curriculum or instruction are the reasons for ROTC receiving its sailing orders. There are a number of college courses offered for credit which are less demanding. There are a number of instructors at Harvard less well- qualified than our Navy instructors. To cite only a few: Social Relations 148 and 149 (Social Change in America and Radical Perspectives on Social Change) were, in 1969, taught by instructors (section men) not in the Social Relations Department, some of whom were not college graduates, and whose qualifications included a commitment to a radical philosophy.
Contrast this with the young officers assigned as NROTC instructors. At Harvard, these are highly qualified professional officers. They have generally served as heads of department on board ship, most are graduates of advanced professional schools (e.g., Destroyer School) and they work full-time in instructional and counseling capacities.
While the foregoing may be adequate to discount Commander Alden’s less-than-ffat- tering allegations, perhaps a word should be added to explain why the Harvard faculty has acted to terminate the ROTC programs. If course content and instructional quality were not the reasons, what were?
At various times, various reasons were given: “outside” control of curriculum—as though the study of Navigation or Marine Engineering were susceptible to political manipulation; the lack of academic freedom on the part of instructors, by which was clearly meant that the navigation instructor was not free to disagree with American foreign policy.
In fact, Harvard’s Committee on Education Policy, the senior authority on such matters, approved a revised NROTC curriculum in May 1968. This curriculum did not include a course in naval history, an area that the Navy believed could be better taught by civilian professors. Nevertheless, by January 1969, a spokesman for this same Committee was proposing re-examination of curriculum, and saying, with Orwellian logic, that “their (ROTC) courses would be subject to extra careful scrutiny.” Under what circumstances this change of attitude took place, I leave it to the casual reader of the nation’s press to decide. Certainly, it was not based upon examination of our performance, because not once during the controversy did any Harvard authority visit the NROTC Unit to examine our performance.
Even this argument, however, was not sweeping enough to carry the day. The faculty voted, among other things, in February, to “cease the free allocation of space in University buildings,” and, in April, after passing an even more sweeping resolution, its author gave this interpretation: “I would also urge that the provision of Shannon Hall (the ROTC facility) by the University even for a generous rent would be inconsistent with the principle.”
These faculty resolutions, and their interpretation by the author of the most recent and operative faculty action, state the faculty intention. It is quite clearly not to improve instruction, not to “reform” curriculum, but to remove ROTC from the Harvard campus.
Commander Alden, and all the Proceedings’ readers, should know that the Navy’s ROTC curriculum was a flexible one. It was under continuing revision in response to changing needs. Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Personnel had delegated to each NROTC Commanding Officer authority to adjust his program to the conditions existing on the campus on which he served. Whether or not this commanding officer used that authority wisely is subject to dispute, but the reasons for the actions of the Harvard faculty certainly are not explained by Commander Alden’s letter, nor would adoption of his proposal prove likely to change the situation at this institution.
The Professional Note by Lieutenant Jampoler is much more thought-provoking. However, it seems to me that some of his premises may be faulty. Specifically, much of the opposition to NROTC is provoked not by a desire to “return the University to its idealistically conceived role as a detached observer and critic of society,” but by a desire on the part of a large number of students an faculty to desert the ivory tower for cours^ with “relevance,” and for involvement 'V1 the great moral issues of war and Peaf[ poverty amidst affluence, and racism- 1 least these seem to be a concern at Harva1 and I had understood they also fueled d'e conflict at Columbia.
Furthermore, it seems to me that d'e courses proposed by Lieutenant Jamp01 are very similar to those explicitly required authorized as options in the recently PllJ fished NROTC revised curriculum. Presi'1” ably, the Navy professional courses such aS Navigation, Weapons Systems, and the 1'^’ would, under Lieutenant Jainpoler’s propos3 > be relegated to “labs” and summer cruise5j I am still convinced of the need for profession3 training, but skeptical of our ability to d° lt effectively in the manner Lieutenant Jan’" poler suggests.
Still, Lieutenant Jampoler’s paper is a very useful one and, as he says, “it is not posed a* the definite statement of either the proble1'1 or the solution.” It is my suspicion that, juSl as the problem at Harvard and Columbi3 may differ from the situation at other uni' versities, so may the management of tbe problem differ.
In any event, I would suggest that it is no1 the particular program that is important, bn1 the product of that program. It is useful to the nation and to the Navy that the graduates 0 our civilian institutions continue to be repre' sen ted in the officer corps, though the means by which they are recruited, educated, and trained may differ from one area to another and era to era.
It is indeed time, and it is always time, t0 examine critically the NROTC program. Ou* goal should be the effective training and edU' cation of midshipmen, a goal that will not be achieved through “quickie” simplistic sug' gestions.
★ ★ ★
Captain Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy (Re' tired)—I agree thoroughly with Commander Alden with one exception—-the suggestion that colleges have academic control over the curriculum.
The Navy Department has prepared an adequate program and has sufficient nun1'
tool
Permit each educational institution con-
•f°gram
es*ted by any college should be referred to e Navy Department.
§ ^aving participated in the “Honor Naval jy 0o”’ program for ten years as Director of jJ.i4Val Science at Admiral Farragut Academy, ltle Beach, New Jersey, and being a current ^server of the new “Junior Naval ROTC” gram, I know from experience that Com- Oder Alden’s idea is a sound one and will la l t0 advantage of the Navy, particu- Qj. y lhat part about using our large reservoir retired personnel; especially those with graduate backgrounds, or who plan to
that in determining countries will receive U. S.
'jPulation remaining neutral. Our only mis- We are told, was in supporting a leader t, 0 later turned out to be unfriendly to the
^‘ted States. Whether the Cubans would
b,
lr*s the ability to make adequate use of its
ers °f experienced civilian personnel to make pessary changes in the NROTC program.
Q IlPrrvi 1 + i_ _ i ___
over its own program would result in too nY variations and, in the end, make the difficult to administer. Changes
Jrther their educational capabilities.
J^Bitary Aid and Comfort to
Ictatorships”
l]^h. H. Victor, Jr., pp. 42-47, March; and pp. 113’ September 1969 Proceedings)
q, ^0lnmander W. H. Savage, Jr., Supply
I 0rPs, U. S. Navy—Colonel Victor’s article ‘eaves tk ■ 1 ■
, the impression
'ch foreign itary aid we give very little consideration 0 People.
might surmise from the article that ' h- policy is to grant military aid to any '^rnment that appears to be friendly to us r,endliness, not from the people neces- r‘‘y but from the individuals in power. Cuba el°r to Castro (the article explains) had an number of both pro-Batista and proastro supporters, with the majority of the
e better off under one or the other leaders Pparently is not a matter of vital concern „ d does not enter into our decision-making
Pr°cess.
j fact, one might get the impression that, ^ tT|any ways, we might prefer dealing with dictatorship-type government since such l'L?0Vernrnent, according to the article, is not (g.ely to be overthrown as long as it main-
SURFBOATS AND HORSE MARINES
U. S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846-48
K. JACK BAUER
This definitive study of American naval operations during the Mexican War of 1846-48 is the first book devoted exclusively to the subject. Based upon official records, private papers, and published sources, it chronicles the actions of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Mexico, off California, and along Mexico’s west coast. The book describes in detail such events as the landing of General Winfield Scott’s army at Veracruz in America’s first large-scale amphibious operation, the conquest of California, and the little- known operations in the Gulf of California along the coast of Baja California. Essential reading for anyone interested in this formative period in American history. Index. Appendixes. 304 pages. 61 illustrations.
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A New
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,ersf Slnce
or branch of our society including the gov'd1 j^riIlc ment. We have recourse through the co^
we so coldly and calculatingly give mil'12’ aid to? They not only have to worry ab°’: larii
torials questioning and often criticizing 0,1 Ua^
if . Li
of our foreign policy. Fair enough—but, 1 >, ■ ' ‘
S
pendently and as outlined I believe our pol'd \^ava
needs a critical re-evaluation.
May; pp. 114-115, September 1967; and pp.
h,
to 'vas
ec
/td'j 4at.
(nv<
miral Langeraar’s article, I endeavored
equidistance with the “sector” principle su
:cb blet(
which also suggests that a compromise ougb1 'M‘f'
military and police powers. If such a government avows a friendship for the United States, then we really have it made. This policy, we are told, has been our guiding light since 1947—unchanged despite the radical changes that have occurred in the world in the past 20 some years. Apparently, the policy-makers believe that this policy is, and has been, the best approach.
Could our policy lead us to behave toward Czechoslvakia in a manner similar to the recent Russian actions? I wonder if their policy tenets differ much from ours.
The five questions that are asked in order to establish whether or not U. S. military aid will be forthcoming do not consider or allude to the people who live in the recipient country, except to ask if they can be effectively controlled. Amazingly enough, no question asks what effect will occur, or how other U. S. programs will be affected, if we decide to give or withhold military aid.
Is it conceivable that we might send Peace Corps teams or approve AID assistance—supposedly to train and win the hearts of people to an appreciation of freedom—while at the same time we support an unpopular, tyrannical, and ruthless dictator in power? Do we refuse aid to dictators who claim to and apparently have some consideration for the welfare of their people in mind? A dictator’s statements along these lines are just as apt to be as truthful as any other statement he makes, including utterances of friendship for the United States or any other country. As noted, the article states that as long as a government can control its military and police power it is not likely to be overthrown. Is this not saying that the more military aid we give a country the more powerful the government in power—good or bad—will become?
I have always believed our primary aim was to ensure freedom of choice to the people of the world in the tradition of the history of the United States. I thought we gave away billions of dollars of foreign aid to feed the starving, to educate and train the less fortunate people of the world, in order to enable them to pursue a peaceful life of freedom. The article implies that we are out to buy allies.
We in the United States have many built- in protections to guarantee our freedom. Our system of checks and balances helps to ensure that we are not exploited by any p1
to the ultimate opinion of the Supreme Ctff of the United States. What similar protect'® 'at do the people have in some of the count111 1)r>s dominance within their own country, e s' they may have to face the fact that the ricbe' °ast, most powerful country in the world is h$ ' ing to keep the status quo—good or ba st Over the years, I have read numerous d foreign policy. Unfortunately, Colonel ^ ‘c dS‘n tor’s article seems to give credence to mal’; of the allegations made in these unfavor:1'1 Pict<.
:VleWS- .(t ben
Perhaps one might say this is only a pa
policy in this vital area is pursued idd‘ y-’ *ar(|
’t'ost
"The North Sea” j ot th
(iSee W. Langeraar, pp. 20-32, January; pp. 121-4', ‘Li
January 1968 Proceedings)
Dr. F. K. DeVos—In my comments on
show that he appeared to take a fairly e>’ treme stand against the claims made by tL 'JtlCl German government to a larger share of tbl an continental shelf than would normally accfllt nc° to her under strict application of the eq1'1' j,rri' distance principle. I ventured to offer a cod1' *ve promise principle which would comb'd® es<
as it is sometimes applied to the Arctic p°- CPb sessions of Greenland, Canada, and the Sov’ift V Union. ^af
Readers will no doubt be interested to note at that the International Court at, of all place* c
the Hague, recently rendered a judgmed* a4 to be reached in negotiations between the c favored nations—Denmark and The Nethed °r lands on the one hand and Germany on tbf 1 0 other. The Court has ruled that, since Gey '' many did not ratify the 1958 Convention o'1 the Continental Shelf, which generally favor5 0r> countries whose coasts are convex as again51 ' ,J those with concave coasts, and secondly’ I
)e|j pf5e such equidistance principle is not a IV . k, ClPle of international law, she is not ; ^ -p u °Y that convention in any way.
' v tk e Court recommends to the contestants J (jQ^ aey resume their interrupted negotia- n , cls' The Court also denied the Germans’ {ft1 ^uterclaim, which had asked for equal u, tt.arinS the shelf, and it reaffirmed that
pti sh lr ’ *i
l e to *e ouSht to be shared on the basis that |stal countries’ rights extend under the 1 ■ g^ers bordering their shores. I would sug- *hat my proposals may well turn out to be C tUai°nIy guidelines that might lead to even. agreement on an equitable basis as well 111 accordance with international law.
oii(
Vic
iai>’
ibl(
par;
|t, “
t#
,lid
Uk
it'
Ad-!
lct°rial—"The Mobile Riverine Force”
(c-
e h- Dodd, pp. 80-95, June 1969 Proceedings) lieutenant (j.g.) Melville L. Stephens, y' T Navy, Riverine Warfare Instructor, MUal Inshore Operations Training Center, ^are Island—Chief Dodd’s pictorial was 0f interesting, and his sequence of shots uie assault support patrol boats (ASPB) ang was particularly exciting. Though
s'nki
Ob'
viously written within the past 18 months, dat e,Ver’ che article seemed painfully out-
ed. The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF)
eS' the thf rue iui- iifl- inf id1
os-
ic'
;s,
n1
M
ie
r
if
r- I
n
■s
it
4a new concept two-and-a-half years ago, c experience has taught it much. Tactics, ^ CePts, and, particularly, boat design have anged radically to meet new objectives and tUrCo,npass technological advance. With the j^. Uover to the South Vietnamese Navy of er Assault Squadrons Nine and Eleven, k|C'Sc original units have now been com- rr,,:'eIy removed from the U. S. arsenal and Placed by the “Program Five” units.
M
ost obvious of the changes to the Flotilla
!!aft has
Mated
helicopter landing platforms on all of
fit
each
d^htg a flight deck for the “dustoffs” and y e aH-important command and communica- pfas (C&C) helicopters. Other major im- Y°vements to the armored troop carrier
armored troop carriers. This enables to double as a medical-aid boat, pro
tfaft
C) include addition of two 20-mm. air-
cannon and the MK-19 high velocity,
'a*g-range, 40-mm. grenade launcher in the
aft,
j'r gun tubs.
Replacing the 40-mm. cannon on the mon-
itors is the M49 105-mm. howitzer turret adapted from the U. S. Marine Corps LVTH-6. Thus equipped to fire nine different types of rounds, the monitor increases dramatically the fire power of the task element, and adds an indirect fire-support capability never before envisioned. The gunboats also have two 20-mm. aircraft cannon in the MK.-48 mount.
The command and communications boat (CCB) evolved from primitive origins into a highly mobile, sophisticated, versatile, and comfortable tactical operations center. Airconditioning, coding devices, intricate navigational equipment, and greatly increased radio capability, including UHF, SSB, and FM equipment, are only a few of the improvements which have increased their usefulness.
In-country experience demonstrated the need for a weapon effective against an enemy who most often has the advantage of surprise. This enemy has sophisticated weapons, which include recoilless rifles, rocket grenades, and heavy automatic weapons, and he frequently fights from bunkers and spider holes along the banks of the narrow waterways. Tactical use of the flame thrower emerged. The new “Flame Monitor” incorporates a unit capable of firing more than 1,000 gallons of napalm at ranges over 490 feet. The craft also has two of the 20-mm. cannon in the MK-48 mount. Christened the “Zippo,” it has become a valuable part of every MRF strike force.
Many other developments, including antiballistic flak curtains, more seaworthy ASPBs, infrared and “starlight” sniper teams, have made for a continuously improving Mobile Riverine Force. This constant change is evidence of a research and development program capable and eager to respond to immediate operational needs. I trust, too, that what is current now, will be “painfully outdated” by tomorrow’s tactics and equipment.
★ ★ ★
Commander C. L. Horowitz, U. S. Navy— Perhaps one day some intrepid soul or souls will wade through the after-action reports, operations orders, and eye-witness interviews, and write a definitive history of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF),* perhaps now, in view of its apparent reduction of scope in Vietnam.
* See W. C. Wells, “The Riverine Force in Action, 1966-1967,” Naval Review 1969, pp. 46-83.
My own relationship with the MRF be$3 on 3 October 1966, when I reported ComPhibTraPac, Coronado, California) ‘ prospective Commanding Officer of P-jf Assault Squadron Nine (RASNine). ' various elements of River Assault Flotilla 6' including the Flotilla staff, Squadrons b11 and Eleven staffs, and the squadrons’ b°‘ crews, gathered for the counter-insurgS survival, and Vietnamese language train11 r at Coronado, and then, boat, operations, 311 weapon training at the Naval Inshore Oper' ting Training Center at Vallejo, Califom1'. RASNine was officially commissioned oi1
November 1966, the first of its kind in
U. S. Navy since the Civil War. I took co*1
mand on 16 December 1966, when
squadron staff and River Assault Division
(RivDiv 9l) completed training and repode‘
to ComRivFlot One for duty. On 4 JanS 1967, my staff, RivDiv 91, and an element the RivFlot One staff departed for Vietnam-
We arrived at Tan San Nhut airport ■ 0200 on 7 January, and later that day el1' barked in the USS Whitfield County (LST-U6' our mother ship, in which I broke my peI\ nant. An advance contingent of the RivfP One staff, in-country since October lSj provided our liaison with ComNavForV a11 USMACV. They provided us with three cO11 verted LCM-6S, borrowed from the Vietn3 mese Navy, and we outfitted these with bo3' kits provided by the flotilla staff. We thf': proceeded with the LST and the three bo3' to Vung Tau. We worked feverishly for week, double and triple crewing our thref boats to enable the crews to get as much bo3' handling and firing training as possible befoft the first of the Army’s Ninth Infantry Divisi0'1 arrived for operational training, which beg311 on 18 January. As the boat crews became more adept at beaching and retracting, pr° viding covering fire, and boat handling a11® night navigation in the swamps of the RmV Sat Special Zone, so, too, did the Ninth 9Y vision troops learn how to move in mud bN quicksand. The Whitfield County progressed in troop handling from over-the-side we1 nets to using alongside Ammi pontoons f°r mooring boats and staging troops.
Gradually, the number of boats borrow^1 from the Vietnamese Navy grew to seve1' armored troop carriers (ATCs), one monitoh
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^ 11 mid-February, Viet Cong (VC) units e attacking shipping on the Long Tau the main shipping channel from the th t ^B*na bea to Saigon. My boats, and e Third Battalion, 47th Infantry Battalion, e co-located at a base camp on the Long . J> about midway to Saigon. We engaged
drying out on board the LST, we had a (Jir 3r round trip shuttle added to our other j les- Our combined efforts were successful 4 Preventing further attacks on shipping, pj we also salvaged some useful intelligence tUrrients from sampans beached by river |r°l boat (PBR) interdiction patrol, j,. n late February, the remainder of the ,, V'rd°t One staff, RivDiv 92, and part of jj ^ Eleven arrived in Vietnam. The USS fieenrico (APA-45) arrived to relieve the Whit- bounty as mother ship and to provide the rosary extra berthing and staff spaces cfiiired. Once again the boats were double- tra triple-crewed to provide operational Ining for the newly arrived crews. In , arch, the first three of our newly converted Ejs arrived in-country, and were a welcome mtion to our tired and overworked Viet- amese boats.
thBV 10 April, RAS Nine had turned over all Vietnamese boats to RAS Eleven except •j,(; monitor, and I took RAS Nine to Dong am for employment in the Delta, while RAS £ ven took over duties in the Rung Sat ^ Pecial Zone, operating from the USS Mon- (APA-212) in Vung Tau Harbor. In Dong am we lived on board the APL-26 and the j,K>JV-i7 provided our maintenance support. °m were moored in Dong Tam Basin.
On 15 May, a combined force of RAS Nine nb RAS Eleven boats supported two infantry
and one artillery battalion on an assault on the Cam Son area, the first major action of the MRF in the Delta. We suffered our first sizeable personnel and material casualties, but all hands performed admirably. For the first time, battalion medical aid teams were embarked on selected ATCs, and they proved invaluable in the early treatment of the wounded. A repair boat was also employed in the operating area to repair battle damage sufficiently to allow the damaged boats to transit to Dong Tam.
The first week in June, the entire Mobile Riverine Force anchored in the Mytho River off Dong Tam. Apart from the APL-26 and YRBM-17, which remained in Dong Tam basin, the force consisted of the USS Benewah (APB-35), the force flagship; the USS Colleton (APB-36); the USS Askari (ARL-30); and the USS Vernon County (LST-1161), temporarily attached. Embarked were two infantry battalions, the Second Brigade staff, River Assault Squadrons Nine and Eleven, and the RivFlot One/RivSupRon Seven staff.
On 18 June, the MRF was anchored in the Soi Rap River, preparatory to the first operation in Long An Province, and a day later began the second major battle of the MRF. On 21 June that battle ended, with a cost to the VC of over 200 dead by body count, thereby rendering ineffective the VC presence in Long An Province for a year. It also demonstrated the effectiveness of the organic weapons of the boats against an enemy in ambush positions. RivDiv 92 saved an ambushed infantry company from annihilation, and my CCB’s 40mm. gun knocked out a VC .50-caliber machine gun position by having its fire spotted by a battalion commander circling overhead in his helicopter. This same .50-caliber had previously knocked out two UH-1B choppers and one a medevac helo. ComRivRon Eleven arrived on the scene with a monitor and resupply of 40-mm. ammunition, and proceeded up a shallow stream to knock out another .50- caliber position with his monitor’s 40-mm. gun. Of course, artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gun ships contributed the major share of the body count, but the boats had kept the VC entrapped until they could be hit by the heavy stuff. The embarked battalion aid teams once again proved their worth; I was one of their patients during this battle.
The MRF continued campaigning throughout the Delta, from Ben Tre to Sa Dec, projecting itself into former VC sanctuaries, and dishing it out ten-to-one in kill ratio. Innovations such as a flight deck attached to an ATC to make it a floating helo pad, ATCs equipped with a flame-throwing Armored Personnel Carrier, and the arrival of the Assault Support patrol boat (ASPB) added to the MRF’s effectiveness. The ASPB boat crews, who arrived in-country well before their boats, received good operational training by filling in for wounded members of other boat crews. As a matter of fact, I don’t know how we could have kept all our boats operational without this pool of available personnel. We also had joint operations with the Seventh Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARNV) and temporarily incorporated the Fifth Vietnamese Marine Battalion into the MRF. The Marines’ leadership and performance were outstanding.
I was relieved on 29 December, arrived in Saigon on New Year’s eve for processing, and arrived at McGuire Air Force Base on 3 January 1968, completing to a day my year’s odyssey in Vietnam. The success of the Mobile Riverine Force, conceived, trained, and committed to combat in a relatively short time, is a tribute to the officers who led it and to the combat sailors who manned it.
"SABMIS and the Future of Strategic Warfare”
(See M. B. Schneider, pp. 26-34 July 1969 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral F. Withington, U. S. Navy (Retired)—If, as the author suggest, “this single electronically steered radar could sweep the sky in micro-seconds,” and “the attacker is now faced with possible interception at any altitude from perhaps 5,000 feet and five miles down range to 100 miles altitude and 400 or 500 miles from his intended target,” why are we wasting billions to develop improved Minuteman and Poseidon?
There are other assumptions and statements that are equally dubious, if not fallacious. Perhaps the most glaring of these appears toward the end, “the Nike-X deployments would cost only one to two billion dollars a year. SABMIS expenditures would come after the Nike-X was largely completed and would be substantially less.”
The Nike-X figure is probably low b) ' factor of about ten. The SABMIS estimatec worse, since the system prices would inch1 ^ not only the cost of developing and product"- radars, computers, missiles, and spare paI but also of the design and building of ^ single-purpose ships to carry them.
Here are some of the questions which "ll not raised, or answered:
• Is the Navy willing to undertake, at d expense of the already strained gene"3’ purpose ship forces available, another sin?*1, purpose ship-weapon system like Pola"15' If so, what general-purpose ships should "e sacrified?
• What assurance is there that a SAB1''1 system, if developed, would work? We a‘‘ forbidden by treaty to undertake nude"r atmospheric tests, and the proposed syst"1" without nuclear warheads would be wo"s£ than useless.
• Who would have operational control 1,1 the SABMIS system? Rationally, it would the Continental Air Defense Command’ Would this command arrangement be sat!i factory to the Navy?
• In the event of a saturation attack hi ICBM on the United States, how many nead) simultaneous incoming missiles should b" assumed? How many ABM shore-based de‘ fensive missiles and SABMIS sea-based m>5' siles, in how many ships, should be deploy^ to counter such an attack effectively, aid with what assumptions of system and rnissw reliability?
• Continuous deployment of SABMIS ship5 would be mandatory, so that the Blue aid Gold crew system of Polaris would be nece"' sary. What would this requirement do 10 Navy personnel ceilings, and to the morale °* SABMIS crews?
• Would there be any assurance that a p0' tential enemy could be prevented from keep' ing track of deployed SABMIS ships by satel' lite photography?
• Would it not be cheaper to defend the United States by maintaining an assured superiority in offensive ICBM systems, rathe" than by producing at great expense, two de' fensive systems of dubious value, the Nike-^ and the SABMIS?
It appears to me that in this age, with m"'
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★ ★ ★
Lowdl Ponte, Department of International stations, University of Southern California ""^r. Schneider’s thoughtful article on the
'Posed sea- based missile intercept system fen ted a good case for the system’s theoret-
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|Cal usefulness. However, he brushed aside '"'^deration of its practical application in Crtl« of deployment, control, and use. Some consideration is essential to any strategic
filiation.
Lnvisioning a Poseidon-armed surface fleet f anning Arctic waters and skies with on- °ard phased-array radars, Schneider sug- \ests neither the number nor configuration ol V required to alter the present strategic Nations of ICBM exchange between U. S. 4rid Soviet forces. He suggests, without being C!(Plicit, that the Poseidons will be armed
with nuclear warheads, much like the area- coverage Spartan missile in the Safegua System. If they are not so armed, then their accuracy must be very high, sl“e warheads—even when used agains phase” enemy missiles-will explode at alt - tudes at which thin air minimizes the effects of conventional explosives. Under sue circumstances a very large number of such missiles would be needed to blunt the impact of a massive Soviet attack. If, on the other hand, the modified Poseidons are nuclear-armed, then control and use considerations become central to strategic evaluations. ,
Uss
New Jersey BB-62
Back to sea and to her thud war m 25 years goes the USS New Jersey. This full color prmt of Mr. C. G Evers’ painting shows the 45,000-ton, 887-foot behemoth, the only active battlewagon of the era, on her way to duty in Vietnam.
The print size is 29 x 22 inches and is especially handsome when framed.
List Price $5.00; Member's Price, $4.00
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Since the early days of President Kennedy s administration, American nuclear weapons have been under the restriction of the Positive Arming Link (PAL) system, through which, by holding codes necessary to the “unlocking of each nuclear weapon, the President has exercised direct control over all use of our atomic arsenal. Release procedures for such weapons are, to say the least, time-consuming Thus, imagine the admiral of a SABMIS fleet, who is faced with a probable Soviet attack,
described by Bethe and Garwin in the Ma" 1968 Scientific American as a possible wad3' device.
Soviet leaders, in their pessimism, sudckj1, • ■ ' - :eo®
as he tries to secure release for his missiles’ warheads. Realize, too, that even if the President could be located instantly, and even if the necessary codes could be transmitted in time, would the Commander-in-Chief want to make a decision to use a nuclear weapons system in the few moments between attack perception and the escape of enemy ICBMs from effective SABMIS range of use? Recall— one major advantage of the use of site-hardening and hard-point ABM defense of our deterrent is that it permits the President time to evaluate, to respond from unpanicked analysis of the quality and quantity of the presumed attack. This improvement over the highly vulnerable, hair-trigger situation of the 1950s has increased stability between U. S. and Soviet strategic forces. As Mr. Schneider pictures it, however, SABMIS might be seen by some as either ineffective or as a return to those quick-reaction days of yesteryear, and hence as destabilizing.
More effective from a use standpoint—to set aside momentarily the issue of stability—• the President might permanently release PAL codes to SABMIS commanders to make possible a use of the system in the short time available. Under such circumstances, the SABMIS commander would be put largely in charge of deciding whether a seeming attack warranted nuclear response. Assuming a lack of consultation between the SABMIS commander and the President, what standards and guidelines can be laid down in advance to minimize the possibility of waltzing across the firebreak and into nuclear war? Or should we assume that any use of SABMIS will, indeed, be a trigger for all-out conflict? These are questions worthy of expert consideration.
A scenario: One tense evening, ablaze with Arctic aurora, the SABMIS radars perceive ten images—apparently missiles—streaking northwards from the Soviet Union. The SABMIS Commander, cautious lest he mistakenly explode nuclear weapons over Soviet territory, orders his Poseidons set to intercept the blips 300 miles out to sea at a 43-mile altitude. The SABMIS system works perfectly, killing the accidentally launched cluster of Soviet missiles. In exploding, however, the SABMIS blast-pattern combines with the aurora to cause an extensive radar blackout across the northern Soviet periphery, this of the type
infer that this blackout—capable of sere' a full American retaliatory blow—was ^ true purpose of SABMIS: they react accof ingly, however that may be.
Our lack of in-the-air testing has lin^ our knowledge of medium and high-altd113 nuclear blast effects. Admittedly, the rad'" jumble used by the Soviets along their n°r ern frontier—made up as it is of new, W0fl. and ancient equipment scanning nunier° frequencies—is capable of producing unp1 dictable perceptions. If the Soviets assu1 U. S. doctrine to be counterforce, dam3^ limitation strategy, and if they accept as 6- ‘ dogma the “firebreak” view of McNafl1^ and Enthoven—the doctrine that any use 1 nuclear weapons outside our own terrb°: (excepting perhaps the exploding of ^ Safeguard System’s Spartan missiles °ve Canada) would constitute the crossing °* major boundary into nuclear war—the1' SABMIS use might, in time of accident, g1' the Soviet leadership a cause to panic. Sat1
Schneider’s article should serve as a jump!*1*’ off point for a thorough strategic consider3' don of SABMIS.
Pictorial—"Soviet Surface Combatants”
{See R. D. Wells, pp. 87-102, July 1969 Proceedin'3*
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. ^ Navy—Robert Well’s fine pictorial of Sovie surface combatants is a welcome suppleine*1 to the more stereotyped presentations food in naval annuals. The following commeU concerning his effort are offered as addend3
A closer look at the launchers and rad3’ antennas on Moskva will reveal that none a1'1 the same as those found in the Kashin-daS frigates, indicating that the surface-to-a1’ missiles carried are not the Goa-type tn1 something totally new. This being the caSe one would expect them to have a greats range capability—at least the equal of Guideline on the Dzerzhinski, if not ever longer.
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Comment and Discussion 121
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ps more surprising than the con- existence of the Kirov-cXass cruisers is [, n°te the capability of the 7.1-inch main ery. These guns are said to have a maxi- ^1111 range of some 39,300 yards. That makes ^ arn°ng the longest-range guns afloat 3q Our Salem-class cruisers can range but q’ JO yards with their 8-inch main batteries. jv 7 tPle USS New Jersey's 16-inch guns are 3 nr a^e to t0P the Soviet rifles—and by just Y° Yards.
n his discussion of the Sverdlov-class cruis-
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—“Varangian” or “Viking,” in Eng- Y ~~~is a traditional name in the Russian avY- Perhaps it is an indication of the im- rtance that the Soviets placed on the class c, eri the ships were built that the Kynda l ..Ss should be so named. An element confuting to this importance is the fact that
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_?e of 400 miles (not the 200 mentioned). J he helicopter hangar on the Krestas is the frst instance of one to be included in a Soviet Uiser/destroyer design.
Phe Kashin-class DLGs, to give them their e> are the world’s largest warships powered eV by gas turbines—the first among major I aibatant types. They can attain speeds of at >t 35 knots. Although a unit of the class is ^tlQWn to have been named Skoryy (“Quick”), , Soviet dissertation on the subject of native
de.
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stroyer development refers to the design as '. e Smelyy (“Daring”) class. The paper also jSted the Kotlins as the Plamennyy (“Ar- L nt”) class. At least two of these ships have . Ccn converted to DDGs with the Goa missile lr*stallation aft.
With regard to the Petya-class PCEs, the 68-69 Jane's reports they also were built in ^ahningrad (once Koenigsberg) on the Baltic. . °nstruction also is said to have taken place lri the Soviet Far East. Another report says
that there are about 30 of them.
The Cba-class PTFGs reportedly employ a new diesel engine said to be among the most highly developed in the world. Among its attributes is the lightest specific weight (pounds per horsepower produced) of any known diesel.
Finally, the Egyptian sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath took place off Port Said, not Alexandria.
Watching the evolution of Soviet warships over the years—from Kildin through Krupnyy and Kynda to Kresta, from Skoryy to Kotlin (and Kashin), from Komar to Osa—one can conclude only that the Soviets are following lines uniquely their own. The designs show imagination and high skill, and when we in the West pause to consider what the next steps in Soviet warship evolution will bring, the conclusion must include the thought that this is not a time for us to rest on our laurels.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Roy G. Metzgar, U. S. Naval Reserve (R)—This pictorial stirred memories of my two summers of extensive operations on board an oceanographic survey ship, USS Rehoboth (AGS-50), in the northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea off the Kamchatka Peninsula. The operations afforded abundant opportunities to observe closely many units and components of the Soviet Union’s naval forces.
One of the lasting impressions of my Siberian coast experiences (at times mildly traumatic) suggested that it is essential to become familiar with and possess the ability to recognize quickly a potential adversary’s combatant vessels. How obvious to a combat veteran! However, I doubt if many of my fellow junior officers even give this facet of naval professionalism a passing nod. Since my at-sea service experience was exclusively in non-combatant ships, perhaps this sidetracked me past that particular phase of naval officer training and professional development. Regardless, the usual shipboard source of information on foreign combatants is the registered publications locker. Much of its contents are not, however, readily or conveniently accessible for familiarization or for training purposes.
Besides, as I recall, classified material is
I find it difficult to consider the Ky11'
122 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
usually issued on a “need to know basis.” Therefore, while the pictorial performs com- mendably as is for the casual and professional reader alike, it doesn’t fill the described gap in a junior officer’s professional background. Perhaps this pictorial, bolstered by recent Soviet naval forces activity off our shores, will stir responsible command sectors, in the Fleet and ashore, to the needs suggested here with consequent remedial courses of action.
In a lighter vein, the same pictorial has already served another and unexpected purpose-checking or verifying a photo caption in the same issue of the Proceedings. I noted with especial interest the Kresta-class destroyer caption for the middle photo on page 58 in Mr. Wettern’s “NATO’s Northern flank.” Whereas quick reference back to page 94 in the pictorial section indicates that the combatant vessel pictured (in the middle photo on page 58) is actually a Kresta-class guided missile cruiser. Sorry about that!
★ ★ ★
William Weathered—Since the Soviet Navy sent a force to visit Cuba, the pictorial was both timely and interesting. I would like to see in future issues of Proceedings a series of such pictorials on other navies, maintaining the format of high-quality photographs, silhouettes, and data. Eventually, the articles could be bound in book form and published by the Institute. Such a book would augment Fahey’s Ships and Aircraft and Weyer’s Warships.
The type-designations employed in the article, however, are confusing. The Kynda and Kresta classes are described as cruisers, and the Kashin-class vessels are called frig-
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ates. At the same time, on page 58 of ^ same issue, there is a photo captioned KteS^ class destroyer. My Weyer’s Warships (w lists Kynda, Kashin, and Kresta classes destroyers.
and Kresta-class vessels as cruisers—altho11- they do not fit my concept of destroyer eithe^ The frigate category is more acceptable my thought pattern, perhaps because 1 term “frigate” to me is so confused that 4 ' synonymous with “miscellaneous.” Just vd> is a frigate anyway?
This business recalls to my mind some frl= ates I saw during the Korean War. were the PFs of World War II vintage wb>f were copies of British River-class frigatf’ were named after minor American cities (al1' thus “city”-class), and somehow were gi’f a Maritime Commission Type designat'01' (S2-S2-AQ1).
The particular PFs I saw were being *L turned by the Soviet Union and were arriv"’ at Yokosuka Naval Base, in 1951, in g°°\ condition and were being turned over to South Korean Navy. (I note Weyer's l';'1 four such PFs still in South Korean serv>fl and 18 more are serving in South America11 and Asiatic fleets.)
I have always wondered what induced ^ Soviet Union to deliver those ships to us 1,1 that time and place. Certainly they were nsc' ful to us, and I assume from the Russian p0*’1' of view, that the return of these ships co>’ stituted giving aid and comfort to the enetw
"A New Approach to Navy Ship Procurement”
{See N. Sonenshein, pp. 135-140, January; and P' 110, June 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. NaV' -—Lieutenant Gray’s fears need to be air swered, although I have some difficult identifying the little guy he is worrying aboU In the original article, Admiral Sonenshei” identified the main losers—the three ship' yards that bid unsuccessfully. Their ma'r years of engineering, marketing, and mal1' agement effort were a dead loss. The three shipyards winning CD contracts split nearly S30-million.
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Points. Admiral Sonenshein stressed one:
j -Urn, dated 13 November 1967, Finn J. ars°n, Deputy Director Defense Research i Engineering and Thomas D. Morris, (In- *ution and Logistics) reemphasized DOD jjky on Cost-Sharing and Contract Def- 1^ ion Funding. One paragraph in particu-
With respect to the funding of subcon- tr3ctors, the determination as to whether or n°t a prime contractor reimburses a subcon- lfactor for contract definition effort continues Appropriately to be a matter for negotiation etween the prime contractor and subcontractors.
rrying about does have legal rights, such 1 the Proprietary Notice:
The data, furnished in this proposal, shall not be disclosed outside the Government and sEall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed in ''’hole or in part for any purpose other than l° evaluate this proposal; provided that if a c°ntract is awarded to this offerer as a result of 0r in connection with the submission of this data, the Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose the data to the ex- 'ent provided in the contract. This restriction not limit the Government’s right to use '^formation contained in the data if it is ob- ta*ned from another source without restric- U°n. The individual pages containing the Proprietary data are appropriately marked. . . .
The second point, “It is the intention of the that each contractor will be fully compen- . ted under the terms of his contract for his jr°Posed work during Contract Definition.” T the spirit of the Memo, the Government l^umiral Sonenshein’s people) were required 0 hold discussions with the selected conte contractors efforts to: be consistent with e objectives of the program; be limited to effort which is necessary to provide the thnitive contract proposal for the develop- I'T'Ot of package procurement; and provide back-up information for the definitive Tntract proposal for Government evaluation. The DX is to be a non-nuclear ASW vessel. 'vill have guns for shore bombardment and Sdrface defense. It will have self air defense capabilities. Starting from this point, the contract definition phase calls for detailed studies of automation, systems integration, and integrated logistic support. One new, practically unbelievable item, is the requirement for ease of modernization.
Which prime contractor’s version will be accepted, or selected remains to be seen. How many subsystems will be transposed into the DX mule also remains conjecture. However, the Navy’s and DOD’s policy should reassure Lieutenant Gray: pay it all, own it all.
"Callaghan Upstages C-5A Plane”
{See Notebook, pp. 154-155, May 1969 Proceedings)
Stan Logan, Editor, Lockheed-Georgia Quarterly—Neither McNamara or his DOD subordinates have ever said, “the cost of airlift is more economical and efficient than that of sealift.” They have always recognized the lower cost of sealift if time is available to use it. In fact, the transportation force recommended by McNamara is a mix of airlift and also sealift.
Such a mix is essential if we are to achieve the nation’s military goal of maintaining a posture of rapid deployment as a keystone of our military strategy. In other words, aircraft and ships in this context, are complementary and not competing modes.
Initially, the C-5 concept included not only the aircraft, but also the Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (FDLS). Without the FDLS, the quantity of C-5 aircraft planned for procurement has actually decreased. For without the complementary sealift capability, the military planners have determined that our nation cannot have a rapid deployment strategy. Rapid deployment, of course, involves consideration of such factors as efficiency, effectiveness, time, transportation interfaces, and many other factors.
There is a definite distinction between efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency, in the minds of many, is simply the cost to move personnel and material. Effectiveness, on the other hand, relates to the ability to accomplish a given mission on a “least cost” basis. It would be possible, therefore, for a military operation to be very efficient but extremely ineffective. The common factor here would be time.
While a ship has massive ton-mile produe-
tivity, the time involved in transit from port to port in the initial stages of a military operation is extremely critical. Accepting the statement that the Callaghan could make the trip from the West Coast to Southeast Asia in 14 days, it must be recognized that before the trip can begin, the ship must sail to a seaport with suitable dock facilities and the men and equipment to be loaded must move overland to the seaport. At the completion of the cruise, the Callaghan must unload at a dock equipped for the purpose or take the additional time to unload her cargo by more conventional means. Once unloaded, the men and equipment must once again move overland to the area of employment.
Air cargo, on the other hand, can usually be loaded near the base location of the men and material to be deployed, flown directly to support area airfields near the military objective area, and rapidly unloaded. In 1967, during operation “Eagle Thrust,” two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division were airlifted from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Vietnam. This force included 10,024 troops and 5,357 tons of cargo. Using a mix of C-5s and C-14s, the total time required for this operation would take 2.7 days, or approximately 11 days less than the port-to-port sailing of the Callaghan.
If the C-5 were given the task of lifting 8,000 tons of cargo, comprising an infantry- type force, it would complete delivery from a home base to a forward area in 10.8 days, with arrival of troops and equipment occurring within two days. Furthermore, the C-5 would not require fuel in the forward area to support it. The C-5 would refuel at a rate of 1.82 tons of fuel per ton of cargo in areas such as Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines.
The comparison of the Callaghan and the C-5 with an 8,000 ton total payload is entirely unrealistic. Rated at 7,000 tons capacity, the Callaghan does not have space for an 8,000-ton infantry force. She could carry about 5,000 tons of equipment, but could not carry all the personnel. The Callaghan would consume 1/3 of the fuel required for the C-5 and would have to refuel at her destination port. For such an infantry-type force payload and with no backhaul, the annual productivity of each C-5 is 84-million-ton miles, including the troops. For this same cargo, the
productivity of the Callaghan is about million-ton-miles, but the troops of the fo1 would have to be transported by some 0$ means, probably by airlift.
The Military Airlift Command stated, without boasting, that it prodi'fl about 5.5-billion-short-ton-miles in 1967. This is no measure of what MAC able to produce at that time, or of what it be able to produce with the C-5 in its in'r£|1 tory of aircraft.
To reiterate: airlift and sealift are 111 competing modes in the role of fast depl°' ment of military troops and equipment. P'\ are entirely complementary and, in mil'll operations, are not substitutable, one for other. Data developed by Lockheed, toge1^ with other manufacturers, tend to indie3’ that the same is true in the commercial car- market. All modes of transportation—l3”1 sea, and air, are essential to the security 3”‘ future of our nation, both economically a<1 from a military standpoint.
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Lieutenant J. B. LaPlante, U. S. Navy' The Navy is not alone in its shortage of yo"1;; leaders—the “people market” has been 1 existence for some time, and competition 1 becoming more keen each year.
Why are business and industry enjoy'11' reasonable success, while the Navy contin"p to be plagued with a critical inability to prove junior officer retention? The ansfo1 lies in the attitude of personnel department In successful firms, dual responsibility tween home office and field personnel >s ‘ matter of fact in all personnel matters. lege graduates are eagerly sought after 0,1 campuses by personnel managers, directo'v and even vice presidents, in addition to fiel
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of; made to feel that he is needed—and ll works. Statistics show, for example, that m°s graduates do not accept the highest sal31' ■ offered.
Today’s young reserve officer-on-the-brh1^ remembers this treatment—in most cases I still carries a civilian frame of reference 3 , regards job hunting and selection. When l1' approaches the personnel department 0" detailer) with a hesitant offer to extend, tl'/ response is likely to be a laconic request 1
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J3r ‘weapons of massive destruction’ from
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eralities. He is disappointed and reacts • '''hat he feels to be indifference by accept- i,3 position in business or industry, here can be no substitute for an intelli- 1 h vigorous retention effort by each com- js ^rhng officer. In normal circumstances it Coefficient—at present, however, the situa- c11 's critical and getting worse. The old . ltlrnanding officer approach just isn’t suffi- BuPers must accept responsibility Ojj°''~to establish direct contact with young ,j Cers; to court them if necessary. This ac- lv,n must come from BuPers, because this is frere the young officer expects it to come vvhich makes it the only source from •ch it will be effective.
''mat is suggested is the application of a different from that applied to career(jjtf
|, ,erence. Any number of methods will do. erhaps another desk—for junior officer revntl°n. Then any indication of interest (con- Ration on field trips, letters, and phone . s) can be passed on by the already over- °rked junior officer detailers and given a (°nCentrated follow-up. This, in addition to ■ 'sting provisions for commanding officers to . * “hot prospects” to the Bureau’s attention, °uld bring definite results.
^he Paper Torpedo”
q" K. J. Hanks, pp. 26-34, May; and pp. 114-115, ctober 1969 Proceedings)
etired)—Presumably after Captain Hanks
'r°te his penetrating article about the So-
„et s bottom-of-the-sea machinations, a bit Of K *
tnstory quite inconsistent with his thinking recorded. The U. N. Disarmament Com- 'Bttee in Geneva, on 16 July 1968, received '"essage from the head of the U. S. Govern- ^'ent. Read by William C. Foster, then chief • S. delegate and co-chairman of the 18 J'3bon conference, the message urged “the . Hey to come up with a ‘workable’ plan to
Apparently, this placed our nation at least lreast of the Indian delegation’s draft of a Solution for the U. N. Ad Hoc (Peaceful
Sea-bed) Committee. It will be recalled that the resolution proposed that the sea-bed, ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof “. . . be used exclusively for peaceful purposes . . . .”
As a corollary to the long-view meaning of U. S. support at Geneva for an ocean-floor ban against what amounts to modern weaponry, does this not lend cogency to Captain Hanks’ statement that “. . . the present danger from international pressures is compounded by forces at work within our own government?”
Can there be substantial doubt that the U. S. pronouncement of July 1968 in Geneva had received earlier, bureaucratic pushes in Washington? Understandably, such actions could have been stimulated by the belief that this was in harmony with what certain individuals had been naively evaluating as signs of detente toward the Cold War in Moscow. But the U. S. “sea-bed” exhortation was ironically timed.
Following by a month, the Russian, Stalin- style armed invasion of Czechoslovakia came along and dealt a lethal blow to all “detente” images.
This leads to another question: Where do we go from here? Can the drift toward an eventual and serious devitalizing of our sea power, as outlined by Captain Hanks, be countered? Time and credibility seemingly are the determinants. Fortunately, time does not press. The inherent bovinity and meandering indirection which characterize so many of the clusters of international delegates indicate that seldom do they feel that “time is of the essence.” Credibility is the tough one. It is indeed a sky-high hurdle. Could even a major effort succeed?
Certainly there is no encouragement to be garnered from the recent ‘ ‘ advise-and-consen t’ ’ approval of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Here is a document calling for coordinate, sovereign conduct. But individual violation is virtually undetectable. At least, unless such action should reach toward the scale of Hitler’s brazen breach of the Versailles Treaty in rearming Germany.
Furthermore, the nuclear nonproliferation agreement’s dual-super-power gestation irritated and accordingly tended to weaken the desire to adhere to NATO by the lesser powers; manifestly, not bad news in the Kremlin.
126 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
However, these negative features never got through to the consciousness of the American rank and file. Consequently, no telling anti-treaty impact ever was felt within the legislative halls on Capitol Hill.
Years before the present era of civil disorders within our borders, a great liberal, Walter Lippmann, wrote in his “The Public Philosophy” that:
When distant and unfamiliar and complex things are communicated to great masses of people . . . The complex is made over into the simple, the hypothetical into the dogmatic and the relative into the absolute . . . There is an inherent tendency in opinion to feed upon rumors excited by our own wishes and fears.
When it comes to “wishes and fears,” there lies deep within the grain of American character an abiding love of peace. Nearly anything labelled “peace-promoting” goes, regardless of merit. What a mighty effort must be made, if the odds can be bettered for a miraculous transformation of the “paper torpedo” into a “paper tiger.”
"Moonlighting Toward a Master’s,
A Do-It-Yourself PG Program”
(iSee T. W. Goad, pp. 59-65, August; p. 113, November 1968; pp. 102-103, January; p. 109, March; and pp. 113-114, June 1969 Proceedings)
Commander Robert W. Johnson, U. S. Navy—Having just graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and being currently involved in the final throes of the summer session of the ICAF-George Washington University co-operative degree program; and being within sight of a “bona
fide” Masters (in Business Administrati0^ and having during past Washington tours P ticipated in off-duty courses with the An1 University (at the graduate level); I u11^ difficult to believe that one who claims to a “bona fide master” can seriously level su a charge. ^
In the course of my several experie11 ^ with the academic community, I have c° to understand better what appears to be least a part of the problem between
younger generation and that academic
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munity. Commander Johe’s remarks seem exemplify the unfortunate attitude, 0 shown by the academic community “I’ve got mine, how are you doing?” A y°l1!' black militant student at Howard Univefs" expressed this sentiment recently at co1" mencement exercises, to the effect that, ) (the faculty) look down at us (the stude*1 and seem to say I’ve got my degree, you 3 here to get yours. The intimation is cle you must suffer—as I had to.
The establishment of degree programs the various service colleges, as well as at ‘ ^ National War College and the Industry College of the Armed Forces, in co-operat> with well known and respected universd1' is hardly a hoax on anyone. The progra,1J are generally compatible, and if anythin the academic requirements of the universd1' tend to dominate. (
The establishment of off-campus courses the Pentagon,, at military installations, al* at various governmental centers in the Was ington, D. C., area, is hardly to be d|S couraged. The benefits to this country, , alone the people involved, would be ve'; difficult to calculate, but must be considef able. Courses I took while assigned to d" Pentagon proved of considerable value in » performance of my duties.
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The opportunity, as well as the ability.
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“concurrently pursue a degree and P1 . severe through the Naval War College 1° any other service and joint colleges) or sh°'f duty in the Washington, D. C., area,” or am
other area, is to be applauded, not decftel There is nothing easy about such a cou>5lj of action, but the reward is satisfying a*1
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worthwhile, personally as well as prol
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sionally. I would bet that the academic cd1’ munity would agree.
'v'ould hope that not only the Navy Decent, but also the Department of Defense all government departments would con, **e to encourage and support participation , 'l|ch programs, for the betterment of the ,°Ple involved and the government itself. I ^ hope that those who cannot avail themes of the opportunity for further study will f he discriminated against in the promotion
^•eutenant R. M. Hixson, U. S. Navy— etal observations were made which to me >ear to be based on the a priori assumption ?*• part-time graduate study is inherently erior in quality to that pursued by full-time aents. International Relations was singled 1 as an example of an academic disciple . °Se standards have been significantly °tled by the impact of part-time graduate Rents’ curriculum.
jj have attended the School of International Nice at American University under the
Navy’s post graduate program, the International Relations curriculum. My knowledge of scholarship standards for this discipline are therefore restricted to the universities located in the Washington, D. C., area, and in particular to American University. In these schools (and I would anticipate in most major urban universities), most advanced theoretical courses, as well as a number of “area-studies” courses, are offered in the evening. I noted no difference in the criteria for satisfactory academic work between the day and evening courses. To question the merit of an individual’s scholarship because it is pursued on a part-time basis smacks of an elitist attitude totally unwarranted in a non-professional scholar. I trust that the various deans throughout the country have enough professional pride and talent to establish and maintain the quality of their schools’ graduate degree programs.
Lieutenant Goad performed a useful service in proposing an alternative to full-time graduate study in achieving a Master’s degree. In
-Our:
acquire technical knowledge beyond the scope of military
how many more electronics specialists can you use in your command?
"Ilce what I have" is the typical answer. But you're not going to get them until somebody comes up with a solution for today's severe shortage of military electronics men. Meanwhile, what can you do? You’ll get some help from a continuing effort to increase the technical qualifications of the men you have. CREI can help you in this task as it has helped officers since 1927. ^El Home Study Programs offer your men an opportunity to ra(j”drses. They cover every phase of modern electronics—from ar to missile and spacecraft guidance—even the increasingly .. important field of nuclear instrumentation and control. SritjH® man who enrolls in a CREI Program studies on his own time Pays his own tuition. The cost to the Armed Forces is nothing. CRin °^'cers n°t only encourage CREI students but also suggest tl study to particularly ambitious men. And they welcome the ''REI Field Service Representative who visits their command.
If you are not familiar with CREI Programs, we’ll be glad to send you complete information as well as typical lesson material for your evaluation.
Home Study Division, McGraw-Hill Book Company
3224 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20010
ft
article. In addition, there are some
that the needs of the service preclude wider participation in the full-time post graduate school program, “Moonlighting Towards a Master’s ...” was addressed to the majority of officers. Casting aspersions on the quality of and motivation for part-time graduate study contributes little to the development of a more competent officer corps in the Navy. Greater encouragement should be given to part-time studies rather than discouraging this effort.
"Land Bridge: From Sea to Shining Sea”
{See G. D. Saunders, pp. 44-51, July 1969 Proceedings)
Captain E. B. Perry, U. S. Navy (Retired)
It is to be doubted if there would be any overall savings in the movement of containerized cargo from Yokohama to Southampton, England, via Land Bridge; probably quite the contrary. Considering ships of 20 knots speed, making good some 480 miles per day, and hoping that our railroads could move containerized cargo in special equipment at a steady speed of at least 35 miles per hour, we come out with something like this:
Land Bridge Movement, Containerized Days Cargo Only
Sea miles, 7,768 17
Port time, two transfers of containers 4
Rail time, first out to last in 4
Least time required 25
All Sea Route, via Panama; Containers and Break Bulk
Sea miles, 12,302, and including Canal transit, not over 27
Therefore, if we give Land Bridge the benefit of all doubts, there is a possible but improbable saving of two days in time. What do we pay for this questionable saving? All of the cargo must be containerized; rather wishful thinking at this time. Containers have not lived up to the hopes of their promoters. The cargo must be handled twice en route, and that is costly. The predicted economy of containerization was based upon fewer cargo handlings. Extensive areas of high-cost land must be made available on each coast for the receipt and dispatch of containers, together
with expensive handling equipment. ^ longshoremen hate containers as the de' hates holy water, and they take their p°' of flesh at each operation. The rail transp0' tion of a container from coast to coast is inexpensive, as is shown by the table io
charges which somebody must absorb. £v time that there is a change in the flow of ca unpredictable costs tend to make themsej known; strikes, boycotts, increased la demands, pilferage, damage to the contain and contained goods, questions as to the w sponsibility and increased insurance cost to name only a few.
If you consider that the estimated days a containership transit is too long, watch 1 arrival and departure dates of such ship® our various ports. If you feel that the t*1’1 allowed for the transcontinental movenie11 of many unit trains is too long, remember1 last time that you went west by rail eV. though you paid premium rates for expe< tious travel. As a matter of fact, one for61' steamship line, transporting containers fr°, Europe to our west coast, relies upon sh1 transportation only, by-passing the end ment of any rail transportation from o1’ U. S. coast to the other.
It is probable that Land Bridge would d1 increase the cost of cargo movement. It doC!, have one unique advantage; great sums 0 money would be spent on cargo moverne*1' within our own land and those dollars wo11*1 become naturalized.
X'
Pictorial—"The NC-4: History Preserve*1
{See J. Johnston, pp. 94-105, May; and pp. 106-4^' September 1969 Proceedings)
Commander M. J. Baber, U. S. Nav^ Reserve (Retired)—In the picture of ^; NC-4 on page 94 of the Pictorial, the lid tenant standing in front of the propeller recognize as C. N. Liquid, Construed0” Corps, U. S. Navy. He was, at that time, £r spector of Naval Aircraft at the Curtiss pi3*1' at Garden City. I hope the Naval Institd” will go even further in presenting the N<7' history and also the odyssey of the NC-3 whde so many of the participants are still alive‘
★
[1] ★ ★
(•S’
J- D- Alden, pp. 106-107, July 1969 0ckedings)
q, Captain Thomas J. Moriarty, U. S. Navy, ^°Mmanding Officer, NROTC Unit, Harvard Mversity—Commander Alden takes the pos .l0n that the critics of Naval ROTC “have 2ed on weak points in the program as a