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/Ari enduring hope of the Western world is f ^ that one day the Russian Bear and the t^lriese Dragon will violently set upon each ‘j. er in the vast spaces of Central Asia. In ^ recent past, however, each new wound ^*cted on either by the other has been j^'ckly healed by the patented Marxist- ^ ^nist elixir that both brutes find so sooth- And, in the end, Westerners have con- ,^ed that a fight to the finish between the I('' seemed to be about as unlikely as a re- i/ tcn between the American Eagle and the Lion.
V • •
et, war between Russia and China has
^c°tne a very real possibility in the wake of
recent outbreak of armed conflict along
^ Ussuri River, which constitutes a portion
Sino-Soviet frontier.
Peiping, territorial expansion may be ^ Way of parading the power of the Chinese | before its own people in order to remind ..y1'1 of that Army’s loyalty to the central j vernment and its consequent reliability for , ernal security missions. Or, Peiping may ^•tnate that territorial aggrandizement to north will have both a compensatory and , ^'lizing effect upon dissident elements , llQng its populace. Many mainland Chinese • Ust be disenchanted with Mao’s apparent lj fiility to control or even capitalize upon j’^oi’s program of planned violence. Or,
. tlfight even be that the Chinese Commu-
desperately need to turn their people’s away from that hated war that is being
lost despite the fact that it is being waged according to Mao’s lexicon—if not with his legions. .
If this last observation is valid, it is then fair to say that American resolve in South Vietnam has helped to thwart Peiping’s expansionist policy in Southeast Asia and forced it to probe elsewhere. We may, then, unwittingly be witnessing the justification of the U. S. policy of containment. The much- maligned containment policy estimates that totalitarian regimes, such as Communist China and the Soviet Union, can suppress internal resistance to their rule and gain unswerving loyalty for their programs only if they justify their policies with more successes than failures in both internal and external affairs.
Still, whatever the inscrutable dragon sees as his reward, Chinese expansion in the Ussuri River Region carries great risk and may prove foolhardy, if not fatal. For, paralleling the Ussuri River is a major spur of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, constructed by the Tsars. This ribbon of iron is Moscow’s major land link with its Pacific Maritime Provinces and its important port of Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. Certainly it can be anticipated that the Bear will resort to whatever savagery is necessary to protect its interests in this strategically vital region.
The Communist Chinese, as the Mandarins and Warlords before them, may be seeking to extend China’s political borders to the natural geographical frontier. This goal has been
mountain backbone, and Moscow with much-prized river valley to serve as the ri? of-way for the Trans-Siberian Railroad
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possessions and a sizable portion of her
the Ryukyus, the Pescadores, and Port
largely achieved by absorbing Tibet, where the towering Himalayas now seal off Communist China from India to the south. But, east of Lake Baikal, Communist China’s natural border is the general west-to-east trace of the interconnecting Yablonovy, Stanovoy, and Ozhughgheer Mountains. All of this region is contained within the Soviet Union. Thus, in this area, the Argun, Amur, and Ussuri Rivers serve to demarcate the Sino- Soviet frontier, leaving Peiping with a meandering river line, instead of a more desirable
In December 1939, Mao spoke very p° edly of the present boundaries of China- mentioned that the imperialist powers, a inflicting military defeats on China, fore* took from her a large number of her for1” territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Tai"‘”
Bhutaf
thur; England acquired Burma,
'Pal and Hong Kong; Portugal seized ^ao; and France received Annam. In the Une statement Mao spoke of the “unequal ties” to which China had been subjected, ltlaout mentioning the territory which Rus? had appropriated in the treaties of 1858, \ and 1881.
the Yalta Conference, Premier Josef , an struck a secret bargain with President |9nklin D. Roosevelt by which the Soviet 7lon received back from Japan the southern aa of Sakhalin Island, the Kurile Islands, Port Arthur. To his people and to the yrld Stalin depicted Russia’s part in World II against Japan, and Russia’s actions 1 Valta, as Moscow’s revenge for its defeat 7he Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. After aha, Stalin appeared on the Pacific coast, as n nad a few months earlier on the Baltic, as Unifier of former Russian possessions and p inheritor of Tsarist patrimony.
' Until quite recently, Communist China . Gained from making an official claim to pditional Chinese territory held by the °viet Union. But, now that Peiping has
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°Voked a bloody clash with the Soviets and ’hnonstrated its willingness to fight to regain ** lost territories, it is important that the °rld understand how the Soviet Union , Juired the region and why it, in turn, will 'Sht to keep it.
j. The first noteworthy contact between ^ssian and Chinese forces in the Amur iver region of Siberia occurred in 1687 when Chinese force of 8,000 men and 40 guns appeared outside the Russian settlement of loasin. This force immediately took the Russian setdement under fire. The Russians V.naged to repulse all the attacks, although 'P the end, their garrison was reduced from combatants to 66. To put an end to what becoming a war of annihilation, Russia aPd China agreed to negotiate a treaty that . as concluded at Nerchinsk on 7 September 689. This treaty focused the attention of the 'Ussian government upon the Amur region a valuable link between the Pacific Coast 'hd the more populous west.
It was agreed at Nerchinsk that Russia Pould retain the area west of the Argun jlver and all Russian settlers should withdraw from the east bank. The basin of the
Amur River proper was to remain with China, and a left hand tributary of the Amur, the Gorbitsa, was fixed as the western frontier between China and Russia. The northern frontier was described as the watershed between the Lena and Amur Rivers, running eastward to the Pacific along the Stanovoy ridge.
News of Nerchinsk stunned the Russian people. Regarding the Lena Valley as being deep within Russian territory, they were not prepared to relinquish it. Tsar Peter, however, calculated that advantages resulting from trade with China would outweigh territorial losses. Consequently, after occupying roughly five million square miles of new territory in the previous century, Russia lost one- and-one-half million square miles of Siberia in one conference.
After Nerchinsk, the area of the Amur continued to remain as unknown to the Chinese as it did to the Russians, and territorial advantages gained along the Lena River line by the Chinese were never exploited. Military occupation of the area by Chinese troops did not take place, as China decided not to scatter its army in so vast and remote a territory. Rather, the Chinese attempted to intimidate the Russians into respect for the border.
Thus, for about 160 years, the exact trace of the frontier determined at Nerchinsk remained obscure and a precise line of demarcation was never drawn. After 1800, Russian explorers travelled throughout Northern and Central Asia, and other European maritime nations began to take an interest in Asia’s northeast coast. Cook’s voyage to the Bering Sea in 1778 and La Perouse’s expedition to Sakhalin in 1787 reflected this new and growing interest.
Attempting to counter the growing influence of Britain and France in the Bering Sea, Gregory Ivanovich Shelikov, founder and part owner of the Russian North-Eastern American Company, in 1790 recommended that Russia construct a harbor on the Sea of Okhotsk. Besides its strategic implications, Shelikov’s recommendation was based on logic that concluded that a waterway must exist somewhere along the eastern base of the Stanovoy ridge. Once located, such a river might provide an easy route for Russian political and economic penetration of the
region and serve as an overland link between the Ural Mountains and the Pacific. Also, Shelikov reasoned, a suitable harbor might be found near the mouth of the Amur River which would serve as a base for exploring parties bent on determining if this river provided access to the interior of the continent. Shelikov’s presentation made good sense to the Russians and they came to realize that only extensive colonization of the Amur region could solidify their holdings in Asia.
In the early 19th century, communication and transportation links between European and Asiatic Russian settlements were arduous and primitive. Only two major routes of contact had been established. One route went overland from the vicinity of present-day
Sverdlovsk to Nerchinsk on the Amur, 'v^e'| settlers then boarded rafts for journeys to the east. The other link was the long route from Baltic and Black sea ports 1,1 the Atlantic, around Africa, and thro11-" Asiatic waters to the mouth of the A11)1 River. Although the sea route then can11 much of Russia’s commerce to Siberia, Tsars regarded the establishment of a praC| cal overland alternative as being vital Russia’s national interest. The sea voVa- was over 20,000 miles long, and the ment of Russian naval forces and commerc'• vessels along the route could be easily track by agents assigned to coastwatching activitlP by an unfriendly power.
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Amur Gulf to the Sea of Japan in the at season. Also, Nevelsko mentioned that Cssels with a draught of under 15 feet could nRr the mouth of Amur, jj Recognizing the importance of Nevelsko’s ndings, the St. Petersburg government ad' cated increased colonization of Siberia . sought ways to obtain trade connections lm the Chinese similar to those already ablished by British, French, and American -j/'cehants. Muravyev prevailed upon the yar to exploit the provisions of the Treaty of j, erchinsk relative to colonization and to 0t% the Amur Region while China was staggering from its defeat by Britain in e Opium War of 1842.
. After receiving the Tsar’s approval, on 14 aY 1854, Muravyev launched an expedi- l°a eastward down the Shilka River from mta jn Russia to the Amur River. Following
the R ■
la | Ussians about the need for a dependable q . r°ute vanished after the invasion of the l|.riI"ea by England and France in 1854 and c°nclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. s merchant fleet was left virtually of ?ls<^ess as a consequence of the provision Un £ ^aias Treaty which placed limitations || u Russian warship construction. The ^Ussians knew that they must quickly open s °Verland link; otherwise, their Asian (i Cn'ents would be absorbed by others. fe°nsecluently, Russian explorers focused l risnly on the Amur region where Shelikov ^ndicated that a practical route might be
re^rev'ous exploration parties in this region lj P°rted that the Amur River ended in a f^an the former estuary of a river cut off j °ni the sea by sedimentary deposits, except- lat ^°r a narrow outlet, to form an inland ^ e' However, Gennadii Nevelsko, a Russian jj ar*ne officer, refused to accept these reports.
could not understand how the enormous ^Ot.Ur, the world’s eighth largest river, could va>0 mto a liman. Receiving the support of J °Ri Muravyev, Governor of East Siberia, ' evelsko led an expedition to Siberia and jj^'le discoveries that startled St. Petersburg. (■e reported that Amur did not end in a \'n.an' but, rather, that Sakhalin, instead of eing part of the mainland, was an island. It ^Separated from the coast by the Tatar t^ra,t through which vessels could pass from
'"arm the Amur through Chinese territory, he reached Nikolayevsk without incident and then fortified the place with troops and cannons that he had transported overland from the Urals. The Muravyev expedition proved that the overland route was practical, reliable, and secure; China did nothing either to harass traffic or to discourage colonizers. Thus, in 1857, Russian troops and settlers poured into the Amur region, establishing a line of fortified settlements at strategic points along the river.
Seeking to legitimatize its territorial acquisitions in the vicinity of the Amur, Russia concluded with China the Treaty of Arigun in May 1858. This treaty recognized the Russian claim to the left bank of the Amur River from its mouth to its confluence with the Argun and stipulated that all lands east of the Ussuri River were the common propery of both countries. The Russians were not satisfied, however, as they wanted to annex all of the eastern Ussuri region. With the mouth of the Amur frozen for six months of every year, they planned to develop a port just south of the Ussuri watershed in a large bay on the Sea of Japan. Only total sovereignty in this region could satisfy the Russians. Thus, in 1860, Peiping concluded another treaty with St. Petersburg that recognized the Russian claims in the Ussuri region. Almost immediately Russia began to build its port, which it called Vladivostok, on the Sea of Japan.
Another stimulus for Russian expansion was the extension of the railroad network on the North American continent. Muravyev concluded that while Russia lacked an east- west railroad, it would be foolish to hold its American possessions. Unable to exploit its wealth, Russia proceeded to sell Alaska to the United States in 1867.
Once the Union Pacific Railroad was completed in 1862 and after service began on the Canadian Pacific Railroad in 1886, Russia realized that it also must build a transcontinental railroad if it intended to remain economically and politically competitive in the northern Pacific region. Consequently, the capitals of the world were not surprised when in 1891 the Russian Tsar proclaimed his intention to have a railway constructed from the Urals to Vladivostok. He calculated
sia were asked to consider allowing R ussia 1 build an extension of the Trans-Siber*3
Railroad through Manchuria. China, regar<
at
grateful for Russian diplomatic support afl‘ Shimonoseki, concluded a treaty with Russians on 3 June 1896, which provided the railroad extension as requested, a™ treaty allowed Russian railroad builders
that such a venture was the key to Russia’s national interests, as it would unite its eastern and western territories and protect it from the Asiatic races which were being “awakened from their slumber by other hands than ours.” Furthermore, the Tsar indicated that in the future Asians would constitute more of a threat to Russia’s security than any possible combination of Western powers. Consequently “Manifest Destiny,” Russian style, was demonstrated as the first “sleeper” of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was laid at Vladivostok on 29 March 1891.
In 1892, Sergei Witte began his ten-year assignment as Russia’s minister of communications and finance. Also convinced that the Trans-Siberian line was vital to Russia’s interests, Witte knew further that it would create new markets and routes for world trade, lead to closer relations with the United States and facilitate the Tsarist policy of “dominating the East.” What Witte did not realize was that the extension of the railroad would infuriate the Japanese.
Japan calculated that when the Russian railroad reached the Amur, it would then turn south and eventually bring Korea into Russia’s sphere of influence. Prior to 1894, Korea was not controlled by Japan; nevertheless, Tokyo was determined not to allow it to slip into Russia’s hands. Thus, in 1894, Japan exploited an opportunity to move into Korea under the guise of protecting its interests from Chinese troops who had entered the country at the request of the Koreans to suppress a rebellion in Seoul. After forcing the Chinese units out of Korea, Japanese troops crossed the Yalu River and occupied most of the Liaotung Peninsula upon which Port Arthur is situated.
By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China ceded the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan and recognized Japanese interests in Korea. But Russia objected to the terms of the treaty and with the support of France and Germany, forced Japan to return all of the Liaotung Peninsula to China. Japan acquiesced, but regarded the enforced major power settlement as naked coercion, particularly after Tokyo had already celebrated a great national victory.
Astute Russian diplomacy again paid dividends. In 1894, Chinese officials attending the coronation of Nicholas II as Tsar of Rus-
Quantico and elsewhere '' units of the 1st and 3rd . rine Divisions. He receive3 Ph.D. in 1968 from the School of International . ^ vice of the American University. He now specie1! • in political ideology, and is a professor of p°lltlC' science with the State University of New York.
■cling Russia less dangerous than Japan a"‘
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bypass the great loop of the Amur River afl construct a direct link across Manchuria V1 Harbin to Vladivostok. The original r°Ul within Russia and along the Amur River Khabarovsk was not abandoned. ConSe" quently, today the Soviet Union has within1 borders a railroad connecting its eastern aa western extremities whereas Russian tran1 on the spur across Manchuria is subject to d’1 whim of the Communist Chinese and may 1,1 the future be blocked entirely. ,
In the last years of the 19th century, Rnss'3 waited for an opportunity to extend its ral' road south from Harbin to the Yellow Sea,10 end its 200-year search for a completely icC free Asian port. In 1897, the chance arrived- Acting as the “protectors of China,” Russ'j countered the German occupation of Tsingta<^ with its own seizure of Port Arthur and th*- Liaotung Peninsula. In 1898, they conclude another treaty with China by which the) obtained a lease on Port Arthur and gair>cC an exclusive right to extend their railroad t0 the Yellow Sea.
By 1900, Russia’s Asia railroad buildi11^ program was proceeding at a rapid pace’ Extensive progress was being made, along N Ussuri River and on spurs moving east, west, and south from Harbin. After the Boxer Re'
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Sl°n of the Russian railroads and eager . exploit the timber resources of theYalu , Ker Basin controlled by Russia. It deeded that Russia relinquish its control i er northern Korea and limit its railroad ^ests in Manchuria. When Russia failed ^teed the Japanese demands, Tokyo
0j. l°n> resulting in the granting by China extensive trading concessions to the coun- . °f Western Europe and the United [0es> Russia recognized that it could no CornPete economically and politically 0t^er countries along the Chinese coast. q, . s> it concluded still another treaty with j „lria which established a Russian sphere of S(, Uence in Northern China, effectively lng off the region to all other states.
‘ teanwhile, both Russia and Japan re- j. ltlcd within their respective spheres in 1<°rca; the Japanese held the south while U.Ss*an troops occupied the north.
Japan was anxious to prevent further ex-
to
launched the attack on Port Arthur that triggered the Russo-Japanese War.
The war was a catastrophe for Russia. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed by Russia on 5 September 1905, all of Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the southern half of Sakhalin Island became part of Japan. Thus, after Portsmouth, Russian influence in Asia diminished but did not disappear; for in 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Stalin recouped all that Nicholas II had lost to Japan.
Today, as Communist China seeks to regain territories, now held by the Soviets, it seems that a conflict of interests between Moscow and Peiping has developed along lines similar to those which led to the Russo- Japanese War. If the Soviet Union refuses to yield its territory to China and if the Chinese continue to press to regain their lost lands, the world may yet look on in awe as the Dragon and the Bear rend each other in the vastness of Central Asia.
★
Shipboard Solomon
For many years, British troopships not only transported soldiers assigned to distant stations, but also their wives and children. In 1879, a troopship sailed from England for the Mediterranean, with the usual contingent of soldiery and their families. With fresh water rationed and primitive bathing facilities available, a raucous dispute soon broke out among the wives as to who would bathe first. This apparently insoluble problem was cleverly resolved by the naval commander of the troopship. He merely ordered the oldest woman to bathe first, followed in turn by those next oldest in age.
------------------------------------ Contributed by Captain Edgar K. Thompson, U. S. Isavy (Ret.)
Situation Hopeless
Before leaving the Naval Academy for President Nixon’s inauguration, there was a meeting of the six companies of Midshipmen designated to march in the Inaugural
Parade. . . ...
There was some apprehension about the peace demonstrations expected in Washington that weekend, and the meeting was called, not only to describe our plan of march, but also to give us special instructions in case there was trouble with the demonstrators.
Our Brigade commander started the meeting by saying, West Point will be marching in front of us and Air Force will be marching behind us, leaving us defenseless on all sides. ...”
------------------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Midshipman Steven J. Bannat
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)