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Aden, to embark the 600 men of 45 Co"1 mando, Royal Marines and proceed with 1 2,300-ton destroyer Cambrian to Zanzib"r The men, their stores, equipment, vehideS' and aircraft had to be embarked at the rllS' without previous preparation and with 110 alongside berth available. The time takej^ from the order to embark being given ulltl the Centaur sailed from Aden at midnight 01 20-21 January 1964 was 13J hours.
A small carrier, with her full complei"'
en1
de-
be
-a'1
ship’s aircraft, mostly Sea Vixens, had parked on the flight deck amidships-
SUDAN
UGANDA \
HMS Centaur lay 30 miles east of Zanzibar. On her flight deck was a conglomeration of aircraft, stores, Landrovers and armored cars, Sea Vixens and twin-rotor Belvederes, pyramids of wooden cases and, to the horror of all right-minded carrier men, 150 jerricans of vehicle gasoline.
The date was 24 January 1964. Two months earlier, in November 1963, both Zanzibar and the former British colony of Kenya had been granted independence. Tanganyika had been independent since 1961. Although in some instances the road to independence had been accompanied by blood and strife—such as the 1953 Mau-Mau terrorism in Kenya—when the moment came to move forward from colonial rule, it seemed that peace, justice, and moderation would prevail in East Africa, and that the democratically elected leaders would maintain firm and progressive government. This halcyon hope was short-lived.
On 12 January 1964, news had reached the outside world of an uprising in the island state of Zanzibar and the overthrow of the Sultan. The African population had risen against the Arabs and Asians who had for years held most of the power and wealth of this prosperous island some 20 miles off the African mainland. At first, the revolt appeared to be an internal racial disturbance— but it would prove to be far from bloodless. It is still not possible to estimate the extent of the massacre of Arabs and Asians which followed the declaration of the new regime, but some reports equated it, in proportion to the population, with the bloodletting that followed the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo.
On receiving news of the Zanzibar revolution, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Harington, ordered preparations to protect British lives and property on the island. The Naval Survey Ship Owen was first on the scene and established contact with the British High Commissioner, a prisoner in his house and deprived of cipher facilities for transmitting to London. The frigate Rhyl raced from Aden to assist the Owen, while Rear Admiral John Scotland (Flag Officer Middle East) ordered the 28,000-ton Centaur, then working-up off
of aircraft and air group personnel, is not signed to carry a Marine Commando unit) - Landrovers, 70 tons of stores and addition3 ammunition, five Ferret armored cars of1 16/5th Lancers, hundreds of cans of vein fuel and two twin-rotor Belvederes of No- . Squadron R.A.F. The Commando persoiiIlf had to be accommodated on the quarterde and in the after hangar, where camp be were so tightly packed that it was almost i'11 possible to get from one end of the hangar the other. The men had to sleep there, af> j indeed, had to live there except for meals a11 exercise.
With the after hangar full of men, half t^ to
Map of East Africa
Mombasa
• Tabora
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
Nctchmgwea* | A |
----- * | \ |
X
anathema to the Fleet Air Arm because of a‘rcraft maintenance problems. Because there |yas no room for Commando stores below, ^aey had to be sorted in dumps on the star- °ard side of the flight deck and forward of ne island. The vehicles and stores had to be Parked along the starboard side of the flight ec*h and the Belvederes at the after end. judicious juggling, it was possible to spot
/
lree of the Centaur's six Wessex helicopters °tvvard and still keep enough deck space in lV^ich the Marines could exercise.
An ingenious plan known as “Sardine Sta- °hs” was devised for the operation of fixed- ^ng aircraft. The Marines and their port- stores moved down below by one elevator ^ile aircraft were spotted on deck on the °ther. Shortly before launch and recovery, all
helicopters took off and hovered nearby until the operation was complete, when they returned to cover the flight deck like a swarm of locusts—a plan which could have been thrown into confusion by an emergency landing.
General Harington’s decision to move the Commandos closer to the scene of possible further trouble was a sound one, even though the naval forces available were very small. In the newly independent African states, revolt was in the air. On the day that 45 Commando was embarking in Aden, men of the Tanganyikan Rifles had mutinied in Dar es- Salaam and roamed the streets, pillaging and terrorizing the local population. After a night of carousing, the soldiers had drifted back to their barracks where, in their stupified condition, they had been brought more or less under control. On 23 January, African troops had mutinied in Uganda and British troops had been flown in at the request of the Ugandan government. In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta, sensing the growing current of militant subversion, had asked the British government for the support of British Army units remaining in Kenya after the Declaration of Independence, and these units had been used to quell a mutiny of the 11th Battalion of the Kenyan Army on 24 January. The vast, vulnerable countries of East Africa, taking their first hesitant steps along the road of complete autonomy, were easy prey in the jungle of world power politics.
HMS Centaur's commanding officer, Captain O. H. M. St. J. Steiner Royal Navy, set about organizing his overloaded ark. The Centaur was newly commissioned and not yet fully worked-up in her prime role of an attack carrier, let alone being trained in the amphibious role of putting men ashore in a combat situation. Forty-five Commando Royal Marines (Lieutenant Colonel T. M. P. Stevens, MC, Royal Marines had been operating in a purely military role in the Aden Protectorate in Dhalla and the Radfan. Although they had received amphibious training, they had had little or no recent opportunity to exercise with amphibious units of the Royal Navy.
Captain Steiner and Colonel Stevens set up three joint planning teams—Intelligence, Assault (with a Logistics cell) and Communications.
The Assault Planning team was concern^ with the organization procedure and drills f°r getting the Commando into the helicopteP and ashore. It was not concerned with tactical plan—there could be no such pla” at the stage because so little was known of tl*e state of affairs in Zanzibar, nor what action if any, the British government could take it wished. Several procedures had evolve0’ based on those for a Commando Ship (Lf^ with modifications to meet the limitations 0 an attack carrier, not the least of which vV°s her small complement of helicopters. various procedures catered first for landing unit into a single landing site remote fr011' opposition; second, for landing at more tha11 one site; and third for landing close to opP° sition or where tactical operations are re quired immediately on landing. The pr° cedures required careful planning and train ing, and had to be flexible enough for l^e unit to arrive in the correct sequence at the right time. ,
The Communications planning team ha to provide systems for controlling helicoptel| in flight, for controlling the initial stages 0 the shore battle from the ship and subse^ quently for the commander ashore to contr° the build-up of land forces and the use 0 helicopters for tactical operations.
The Intelligence Planning team’s task W°s
d
>r
■s
Royal Marines embark in an R.A.F. Belvedere helicopter on the flight deck of HMS Centaur and, later, three were among those defending the airport to the west of Dar es Salaam.
‘GOD LONDON.” Later, it would be lea1"”1
help'
messages might mean. The VIPs were ^
sta'
:d of
vtfi1
As soon as Brigadier Douglas arrive1- board, Captain Steiner called a meeting
looting, and killing. Most of the mutifle'
:eP
a few miles north of Dar es Salaam. Briga1
di£f
Douglas thought they would be caught
o"
difficult as it was not known what, if anything, the force would be required to do—or where. Their main work was therefore devoted to studying suitable helicopter landing sites close to places of tactical importance along the coast of East Africa.
All this may sound elementary to Marines and sailors serving in amphibious forces where ships, equipment, aircraft, and training are designed solely for the purpose of putting fighting men ashore, but to the hastily formed and as yet amorphous group in a small carrier, it presented prickly problems, all of which had to be overcome in a matter of a day or two, while the Centaur steamed southward at maximum speed toward the island of Zanzibar.
On arrival, the Centaur lay out of sight of land to the eastward of Zanzibar, while the Cambrian patrolled the 30 miles of water between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, making hourly radio checks with the British High Commissioners in both capitals, and reporting on the situations ashore to London, Aden, and the Centaur. The British High Commissioner in Zanzibar had been lent a small communications team with portable VHF radio sets by the Rhyl. The Cambrian never closed to less than five miles from either port, as it was felt that any show of British Military force at this stage might possibly aggravate the delicate situations ashore.
At approximately 2300 on Friday, 24 January, the Cambrian, off Zanzibar, received a message from the British High Commissioner at Dar es Salaam asking him to close the capital as soon as possible and transfer VIPs secretly to the Centaur. The VIPs, the message continued, would be on a certain beach at midnight and would flash a light to seaward. At the same time, the Centaur received an uncrypted message from shore saying that “countryman wishes to get closer to Westminster and will be at the ferry landing at midnight.” All this James Bond activity was followed by the Centaur receiving instructions from General Harington through Admiral Scotland to go into Tanganyika and disarm Colito Barracks. Then came a followup signal from the Ministry of Defense, London, the gist of which was: “Disarm Tanganyikan Army Colito Barracks soonest.” The signal address was received fr°'.
that President Julius K. Nyerere had a: the U. K. government for immediate
The Centaur and the Cambrian, both oa
’ t tltf
ened, arrived off Dar es Salaam at almos' same moment. The Centaur’’s executive on1 took in a boat with men armed to the lc ^ since no one could be sure what the cryP
collected at their clandestine rendezvous were taken to the Centaur. They were dier P. Sholto Douglas, Commander of 1 „ Tanganyikan Rifles, and one of his officers.
his escort and the Colonel of the Coming to devise a plan to disarm the muting, “soonest.” Swift action was essential with lives of European, American, and other ia11 cent citizens in Dar es Salaam in real dare now that the government had lost control- Brigadier Douglas reported that the Battalion Tanganyikan Rifles had mutn’1 for the second time and had been riot*1 *
were still living in their barracks at Co^l°
nap
ping by a landing at first light—it was a1
recommended a direct assault. He stress ^ that casualties to the mutineers must be kfP to a minimum, and warned that many of 1
mutineers’ families were living in the barraf*
Douglas and Colonel Stevens, Captain all the means at his disposal—and with0' incurring delays by referring back to Lond for approval of his plan. General Haring'0^ had given Captain Steiner full authority act as the man-on-the-spot, but, of coi>rS<:'
interv-e11
the fir
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irmed
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0100 and dawn would break at 0605-
With the joint agreement of Briga
di£r
ner decided to take Colito Barracks by us*
,0*
retained ultimate authority to should the political situation change.
In addition to the 1st Battalion at Col'1 Barracks, the 2nd Battalion Tanganyika1' Rifles stationed at Tabora, 340 miles inlaf ’ had also mutined and had thrown out l1’.
*ay
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rst
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officers. At the same time a Company ^ Rifles at Natchingwea 220 miles south 0 Dar es Salaam had joined the revolt.
550
’Peed
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e essence of Captain Steiner’s plan was surprise, and an overwhelming display °rce. In addition to the main effort of a
copter assault and the Cambrian’s guns,
ptif
col-
afl-
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tl?
field alongside the southern edge of oarracks. This second site was risky be- Se the football field was only 50 yards
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'uevitable bloodshed. It was decided to a landing close to the barracks. The
>ion was a bold one since the landing site
w '
Hi
neither accurate intelligence nor heavy
support.
|j 0 divert the mutineers’ attention front the ^nding zone, the Cambrian was to lay down a Hionary bombardment of 4.5 inch high Plosive airburst over an uninhabited space ground a half-mile to the north of the bar- '**• Provision was made, too, for the bom- .Hment to be swiftly diverted to direct ac- f 11 against the mutineers should they inter- Vvith the helicopter landing. s a gunnery problem, the task was formid- ^ e- It involved the Cambrian firing under-
Hall-
y and condemnation of the British ac-
e Ht task was to disarm the 1st Battalion 'Bering approximately
!H anc* trained,
t hi
heli,
itrjl _ _
e aircraft could also be brought into play, here were only two really suitable heli- C Cr ^anding sites—one a mile or two to t south of the barracks, the other on the Hall
-------------------- ----- "-------- /---
rjfn the nearest living quarters and a few ^ erniined mutineers armed with automatic 5H°ns would make life unpleasant for the
r,<^ There were not enough helicopters to e tnany risks. Still, a landing too far to the
H,
L ~ tuside the range of their mortars and we
llfe
l0l'i I and iudiract at a range of six miles over 'nhabited island; there was no local infor- . bon on tidal streams, no Forward Ob- fj er; no ranging shots were possible and the ,|rst broadsides would have to be rapid, ^^rriatic, and accurate to keep the mutineers’ CQeads down and thus safeguard the first heli- ^Pter landing. Unintentional direct hits on re barracks itself might have caused civilian Halties, with the inevitable and unfortu- ■ te repercussions on the political situation
°U internationally.
^here was no time for the detailed planning
"An’, after, I met ’im all over the world, a-doin’ all kinds of things,
Like landin’ ’isself with a Gatlin’ gun to talk to them ’eathen kings;”
with the first wave. We had achieved completf
surprise.
On arrival ashore, Colonel Stevens that “Z” Company had almost secured J. landing site. Against the din of the Cambrll>r‘
r oc>c
Tactical control ashore was transferret
operations. Roads and exits were closed
helicopters sent out on reconnaissance.
window.
While the final remnants of the 1st
vederes brought the Commandos’ Landro'1
and briefing needed for fancy tactics ashore. After only four days’ preparation for landing procedures, it would have been unwise to impose a complex plan. The whole unit would have to be landed on the football field with the greatest possible speed, and improvise from there.
Final briefings were held at 0330 on the morning of Saturday, 25 January, the rest of the night was spent in completing preparations. From start to finish, in both ships, there was only one written order issued—the helicopter flight plan, a previously prepared contingency plan. All other orders, briefings and instructions were oral—a pleasant change from the massive written orders which accompany even the most minor peacetime exercise.
At 0515, the Centaur moved slowly into Msasani Bay and anchored less than one mile offshore in very shallow water and three miles from Colito Barracks. At 0610, first light—about seven hours after President Nyerere’s call for aid, the first wave of helicopters moved towards the shore. Captain Steiner ordered the Cambrian to open fire.
The first wave contained “Z” Company which was to secure the landing site. Tactical headquarters would follow in the next wave. Colonel Stevens, on the bridge of the Centaur, watched “Z” Company disappear in the silver grey dawn, and later wrote his impressions in his journal:
This was the worst moment of all. There were too many unknown factors. We knew little about what the other side were doing: we did not know what, if anything, they knew about us—whether they knew we were there, and had somehow been warned that we were about to land somewhere, whether they had even seen the dark outline of HMS Centaur as she steamed right into Msasani Bay, and were standing to, ready to receive us. In an attempt to finish the mutiny in a single blow we had staked everything on the assumption that we would take them by surprise.
Our imaginations pictured armed men tumbling out of the barrack blocks as they heard the approaching helicopters. We could see the helicopters against the grey sky as they gained height crossing the coast so as to spot their landing site. They crossed well to the south of Colito and turned north to run in upwind, then dipped out of our sight against the black background of hills. We watched anx
iously for the glare of burning helicopters.
The “landing reports” came in by radio 1,1 quick succession from the helicopters, fr0111 ‘Z” Company and from the Control Tea'11
bombardment and “Z” Company’s
launchers, the main noise of small arms
came from the barracks entrance and gu3
• a tnl
room. Brigadier Douglas accompaniea Commando ashore in order to use his 1° , ence as a mediator to prevent the Tang311- kan Rifles from fighting. Under covering 3 he approached the guardroom, and oW1 “handhailer” called on the mutineers ^ Swahili to lay down their arms. When 1 • answered him by opening fire, a roc launcher bomb was put through the roo ^ the guardroom. Firing ceased, the mutine began to surrender and “Z” Company tered the camp. The time was just be 0700—45 minutes after the first landing- All three companies had been put afis in 70 minutes—a remarkable perforin311 with only six Wessex-1 antisubmarine 11 copters operating from a fixed-wing carrier-
Colonel Stevens, who ordered rounding"1 Jj
’ • -tlO
Man)
mutineers had run out into the bush at noise of the initial bombardment and the ^ rival of the helicopters, and one group shepherded in by a hovering helicopter, naval pilot brandishing his pistol out ot
vvmic me nnai remnanis oi me ,
talion were being brought in, the R.A-F- .
ashore. With these and the helicopters,
mafic and European residential area, to c r ture the armory, and to patrol the strc.jl(,
'U
Co.*' >1
mandos were rapidly deployed to take Dar es Salaam airport, to seal off the dip
where they quickly rounded up remain’^
small groups of armed men. At 11(,,4 Centaur closed Dar es Salaam harbor, c° mandeered a tug and lighters to land her o ^ Royal Marine detachment, backed UP ' four platoons of armed sailors and the Fel
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A '-oursc, Greenwich in 1962. He was promoted Ij, /Hander in 1962 and appointed to command Qi ” Cambrian, a modernized Fleet Destroyer of the f*mi he commanded Cambrian for two years in tig ifr ®ast and Middle East during the confronta-
troubles, described in this article. After two- years serving in the Ministry of Defence with
Nl
rait painter.
j 0red cars. This force secured the port ea and was then deployed to assist the
Commander Hankinson, entered the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth as a cadet in 1942 at the age of 13, and first went to sea in 1945. He then served almost continuously in Fleet Destroyers in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, including the campaigns in Cyprus 1955 to 1958, Suez x 1956 and the “Fish War” off
i.ut1^59. He qualified as a Gunnery Specialist at ^Excellent in 1954 and passed the Royal Naval
^ Pa ___________________ o _____
%i ^etween Malaysia and Indonesia, and the East
"’“-half
'lrectorate of Naval Plans, he terminated his ; p “1 career in order to pursue his lifelong interest as
Captain Steiner relieved the tension at Dar es Salaam with a mixture of peaceable friendliness and a show of force. Prominent locals were given a day at sea in the Centaur, and her Royal Marine Band, in full ceremonial uniform with white pith helmets, played in the main square of Dar es Salaam to a delighted crowd of thousands. An air display was staged and key positions were kept under guard, while Ferret armored cars, sailors and Marines patrolled the streets. In the evening, the captain of the Centaur went ashore to a diplomatic reception. By happy coincidence, 25 January was Australia Day, and the Australian High Commissioner held the first official reception for many days. At the party a respected local inhabitant related that, while talking with an Eastern European diplomat late the previous evening at the height of the riots, his host eyed his barred and shuttered windows and commented wryly: “Thirty years ago the British would have sent a battleship and quelled this rabble. But now . . . ?” Even as he spoke the Centaur and the Cambrian had been moving in.
Within 36 hours of President Nyerere’s call to the British Government for assistance, the mutiny had been quelled, order had been restored and the authority of his government re-established throughout the vast country. All was accomplished with the loss of only two lives, when two mutineers were killed in the guardroom at Colito Barracks.
The swift and immensely successful intervention in Tanganyika was carried out by minimum force. It was not an aggressive operation, nor a punitive expedition, nor a relic of the British empirical “gunboat policy,” although it was suspected that the revolution was engineered by a foreign power. It was a phenomenon that has emerged in the world of international politics in the last ten to 15 years—an armed police intervention at the request of a recognized government.
The prolonged and costly full-scale military campaigns of recent years have shown — in Korea, Cyprus, Suez, Malaysia, and Vietnam—that outright military force, however massive, can no longer solve political problems. At best, they hold the problems at bay while a solution is negotiated; at worst, they aggravate the situation to an inflammatory
degree. The military powers of the world are becoming increasingly loath to involve themselves in aggressive military ventures on a vast scale, whether unilaterally or with allies. Swift and effective armed support, such as at Dar es Salaam; may well evolve as a prime role of military forces for the future; it will certainly become an increasingly important one.
It may seem impudent to attempt to draw conclusions from an operation so insignificant in military terms when compared with the war in Vietnam today, but there can be no doubt of the political efficacy of the Centaur’s action. Without the swift and purposeful intervention of British forces at Dar es Salaam which stifled what could have grown to a serious uprising, it is possible that the whole of East Africa would now be involved in a conflagration similar to that of the Congo.
What lessons, if any, should military men and politicians draw from this event?
First, military intervention must always be swift and purposeful. The man-on-the-spot— assuming that he is worthy of his rank and authority and is properly briefed—must make the operational decisions. Reference to, or interference by, a higher and distant authority can only cause delays, create confusion, vacillation, or, worst of all, masterly inactivity. This does not mean that the commander in the field can expect, nor indeed would he welcome, complete autonomy. On the contrary, in these days of complex international power politics, most right-minded military commanders prefer clear-cut objectives. These General Harington gave while he was in immediate and continuous contact with his staffs in Aden and Nairobi, and with the British Colonial Secretary and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Chief of Defence Staff, in London. Having been given the objective, it then was up to Captain Steiner to get on with the job.
Highly trained forces, well led, can always turn the odds against superior forces if they
strike before the opposition has had tinlf prepare and deploy. Conversely, hesit^ engendered by indecision or the desire military buildup not only increases the # of the battle once it is jointed, but also
opportunity for world political opi1'11’
malevolent or well-intentioned, to bring P1*' sure to stop the operations
_ „ -as was sig0^.
illustrated by the Anglo-French misadved
at Suez in 1956.
|¥
Second, if military intervention is t0 .
V
---------- '•*-*•* / iiivw YOUUU11
swift, the forces must be on the spot. The11,
- ----- 7 -------- »> W'- '
not enough space here to examine all arguments for and against amphibious f°rf; versus air transported troops, but there is 1 doubt that the British could not have achieV success at Dar es Salaam without the Centlt\ even while they held Aden, a base which1,1 longer exists.
Thirdly, if the Western Powers are to
a world-"''
ability to help friendly but weaker gov'e,‘
tain, without overseas bases,
ments, their forces must always be fle*1 and often seaborne. It is recognized that1
problems of supply and operating cyde
ieOs'v.
achieve such a maritime policy are expe in men and money. However, the Dar . Salaam incident illustrated how extreH1.. versatile and effective a small carrier and 1
support group can be.
The protagonists of large all-singing f|ltf dancing aircraft operating from “float1'1' cities” may put forward cogent arguments their policies in general war, but it can |K
argued that the prime role of military forC^
today is to maintain stability, thus enabl'11!
■ -1\0
i t
an3
emerging countries to develop in peace, - to prevent minor local conflicts escalating1IlU general war.
One of the ways this can best be done is ^ nipping in the bud potential sources of c01’ flict, and this requires the worldwide depl°' j ment of small highly trained task units arme with simple but effective weapons, capdL of swift and determined action, anywhe,t and any time—and the nucleus of such foi'cC5 is surely the small, versatile carrier.
★
[I]» January 1964, with revolt in the air throughout the newly independent East African states, a single, small earner steamed southward at ^
^ed toward Zanzibar. No one had expected to see tins that
carrier serve as a glorified troop transport; but, then no one had expected t »*e British trained-and-led Tanganyikan Rifles would mutiny either.
Orhrnandos. The Commandos and sailors ^rc greeted enthusiastically by the popula- ,^9 of Dar es Salaam. All races welcomed ^ restoration of law and the overthrow of e mutineers.
|, ^he next task was to deal with the 2nd gallon at Tabora, 340 miles up-country. Lionel Stevens immediately commandeered *1 aircraft belonging to a mining company ^ flew up with one company. A second . r,1Pany followed. No opposition was en- JUntered at the airfield at Tabora; and just er midnight the Commando surrounded ipfl disarmed the 2nd Battalion Tanganyikan , ' *es. At the same time, other British mili- rV units were flown in from Kenya. To f,'Pport this operation from interference, the
[3]entaur operated in her prime role as an at- carrier and launched her Sea Vixens to ,°ver the Tabora assault. By dummy ground ^ tacks and low flying, these aircraft must 'tvc done much to deter any opposition.
The mutineers at Natchingwea, realizing /*at the uprisings in Dar es Salaam and Ta- °ra had failed, laid down their arms, and a °mpany of Marines flew down to take charge 'Td arrest the ringleaders. In the meantime,