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hroughout modern history the com- •*- manding officer of a ship has borne the . “ responsibility for his ship and all its ac- °ns, and he has had authority commensurate this responsibility. Today, however, a Sl§nifiCant portion of this authority, which is ?° necessary to meet the ultimate responsibil- of command, has been usurped—not by re§ulations or laws, but by the complexity of ^°dem weapons systems and the failure of ^avV ship control systems to keep pace with c changing world of naval warfare. It is my detention that the commanding officer of a stroyer no longer has the power of final deci- j n 3t that very moment when his judgment jj °*t urgently needed: during battle action. ..e 4oes not have the power of ultimate de- a a°n because events are moving so rapidly 0j. his communication with the remainder
tirii *S so inarS'na* that much of the
e he must use all his professional knowl- just to keep track of what is going on. /T^Ust rely on officers far junior to himself dc .\ln experiencc and maturity to make the m?°ns that should be his. fr hat destroyer CO has not experienced the thr rat*on °f strugghng to get a message si^ uSh to his CIC officer regarding a tactical dps ^r> what CO has not experienced the a,r of a missed firing run because the sgg^rcu't was occupied with a routine mes- brjpj what skipper has not stood on the aljj^ entering port in a heavy fog, feeling HilSt as though he were but another lookout, Young, desperately sincere but inexofficers in CIC guided his ship through restricted waters? Or watched his ship fall back helplessly out of a fast-moving formation, while engineers, working frantically against time to prevent a major casualty, were too busy even to tell him what had happened? Or in the thick of a fast moving anti-air exercise, has been able to determine what he was shooting at only by observing the guns, because if he stopped the GLO long enough to get the desired information a target would be missed?
Most, if not all, of these experiences are common to all destroyer captains to some degree. Some can be minimized by extensive training; others can be avoided by the use of makeshift gimmicks. But, for the most part, they are inherent in the makeup of the modern destroyer. And in every case they throw the need for key decisions on the shoulders of someone other than the commanding officer. Worse, they take from that commanding officer the capability of supervising or monitoring the decision.
How has this condition come about?
It is simply that the quarterdeck is no longer the single nerve center of all activity, nor is the captain on the bridge the focal point of all activity. A modern destroyer now has a half dozen nerve centers—main engine control, Combat Information Center, Gun Control, Sonar, and, oh yes, the bridge. Information cannot be passed to the CO rapidly enough—or, in some cases, slowly enough—for his mind to grasp completely what is happening. Nor are there adequate display facilities on the bridge to record and
retain this information. Hooded radar repeaters that can be seen by one person at a time and then only after eyes have become adapted to the darkness, plastic boards with grease pencils, three or four loud speakers blaring tactical instructions and signals at the same time, and sundry compass repeaters are the equipment given the commanding officer. This situation is further complicated by the presence of half a dozen or more enlisted men, including the helmsman, lee helmsman, phone talkers, quartermaster, signalman, and boatswain’s mate, to be kept organized and busy at the proper tasks; a problem frequently further complicated not only by foul weather and foul tempers, but also by the impossibility of seeing on both sides of the ship without sprinting 15 feet or more from one side to the other; and by the necessity for wending one’s way through all of this in utter darkness much of the time.
The problem is serious, but not, of course, insoluable. Any destroyerman worthy of command can, by exercising leadership, absorb all of the aforementioned penalties
and, like a good quarterback, keep his team moving through every crisis, large and small, toward the goal with no outward sign of strain. But must we impose such an initial burden on this man merely because he seems to be capable of contending with it? Is it not common sense to free him from this archaic arrangement and permit him to devote him* self to the operational problems which com front his command?
These are the problems to which he has devoted 15 or 20 years of his career. And, having found his solutions, he must noW stand virtually mute and rely on youngsters with less than one-fourth of his experience and scarcely more than half his maturity. ^ the concept of absolute responsibility is to be retained, and with it the concept of commem surate authority, we must put back into the hands of the captain of the ship his capability for ultimate decision.
Ultimate decision must not, however, be construed to mean “all decisions.” It is noj suggested that the skipper should be called upon to make all decisions. But he should bc able to keep himself aware of the decisi°llS which are being made for him; he should bc’ provided with the essential information up0” which such decisions are based; he should be provided with this information in such 3 manner that he can personally evaluate l(- in time to over-ride when necessary decision that could place his ship or his i'ie” in jeopardy.
What, specifically, handicaps the c01" manding officer in the execution of his fu”C_ tion of ultimate decision? First, we must c°” sider the fact that a man can do only 0 thing at a time. He can think about, assu •. late, or act on only one fact at a time. 1 , process may take a split second or sevc minutes. But, until the mind has digested^, been cleared of one item it is not ready the next.
In this context, what handicaps the c manding officer? ^
• Information comes to him slowly sound-powered phones. Each message mus* repeated twice at minimum—once by^^ transmitting station, and once by th to the captain. Moreover, his sound- phone information is doubly subject —once in transmitting, once in
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A graduate of Duke University in 1947, Commander Scott commanded the USS Lorikeet (AMS-49) in 19521953, and served on the staff of Commander Mine Force, Atlantic Fleet, from 1953 to 1956. He was assigned to the USS John Hood (DD-655) in 1956-1957 before serving on the staff of the Naval War College from 1958 to 1960. He was Executive Officer the USS Massey (DD-778) from 1960 to 1962 be- 0re being assigned to the Staff, USCINCEUR from '62 to 1965. Prior to his present assignment as a student at the National War College, he commanded ‘he USS Richard E. Kraus (DD-849).
Modern Destroyer Bridge Design 47
These, then, are some of the shortcomings of the destroyer bridge. Doubtless, efforts have been, and are now, underway to rectify many of these flaws. But, as yet, the operators in the Fleet have seen no tangible evidence of the imagination, or the tremendous mechanical and electronic skills which are available. We have remained tradition-bound to the large, awkward and semi-manageable wheel- house-open bridge concept for ship control, while most other portions of the ship have kept pace with the times.
The Destroyer Force in particular, and the Navy in general must accept the challenge of modern technology and its applications to ship control. The CO must be given the tools to fully use his technical skill, experience and judgment. It is time to depart from tradition and to design and construct a new, efficient bridge. One possible version of such a DD bridge is depicted in Figure 1. The objectives, of the redesign are to:
• Minimize distractions, inconveniences and inefficiencies.
• Remove as many personnel from the bridge as possible.
• Eliminate the sound-powered phone talker on the bridge, substituting electrical, electronic, and data processed presentations.
• Ensure that all information forwarded to the bridge is presented, as nearly as possible, in the form in which it will be used.
• Make maximum allowance for the CO or conning officer to select the information he desires—and have it instantly available.
• Provide ship control with an instantaneous means of overriding key decisions made at other stations, while providing for uninterrupted execution of those decisions when they are acceptable to ship control.
• Provide the conning officer with a station from which he has maximum visibility with minimum movement.
• Provide ship control with a dry, temperature-controlled working environment which makes minimum demands on physical endurance and provides protection from fallout in case of a nuclear attack.
New designs, necessitated by the advent of nuclear propulsion, guided missiles, and new radar arrays, make this an ideal time to
CPA and Maneuvering Board, (7).
By pairing own ship and a contac ^ pressing the button, the computer w® ^ for and show on the ARO the course, SP^() range, bearing, time and altitude (for a®
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incorporate bridge redesign. It is proposed that this design provide for a tapered superstructure, at the top of which is located the conning station, designated “Ship Control.”
Directly behind Ship Control, and a halflevel lower is located the Combat Information Center. Direct access from Ship Control to CIG is provided by a short ladder, allowing easy consultation between Control and CIC officers and providing the commanding officer with convenient access to Combat.
Directly below Ship Control is the pilot house. This level contains all the present bridge equipment, including the wheel, chart desk, and other elements now found on the conventional bridge. This level can be used for conning in the event a casualty places Ship Control out of commission.
Ship Control itself consists of two seats, an instrument panel, a walkway behind the seats, and doors on either side leading out to swept wings. The absence of stacks in nuclear- powered ships, and the advent of MACKS (combined mast and stack) in conventionally powered new construction all contribute to make visibility on all sides excellent. The ship control station is illustrated in Figure 2.
During normal steaming, the two seats in Ship Control are for the officer of the deck and junior officer of the deck. The captain has room in the walkway to see clearly what
is taking place. He has easy access to Combat and would spend much of his time there. When the tempo of operations increases and the captain desires to move to the bridge* the JOOD would take station in the pilot house and the captain would assume the second seat at the control panel. For close operations, such as refueling or replenishing* the conning officer would occupy the seat on the “engaged” side.
Instrumentation of the control panel of course, the key to the bridge design. 1° the configuration presented in this paper, ® is a basic assumption that new construction DD types will incorporate the present or a modified version of the present NTDS syste®’
The control panel of Ship Control is shown in Figure 2. The suggested instrumentation* it will be noted, is similar on both sides of the bridge. Most of the proposed equipment 1,1 Figure 2 needs no elaboration. But, the R^ar Scope (77), for example, does.
By means of the selector switch the co®' manding officer or OOD has a variety of Pr° grammed presentations available. The basjc surface and air pictures would be availau without the computer energized. The con®0 is under the scope. With the computer enet gized, the bridge can duplicate the ar®) programmed in Combat. These include all a targets, friend and foe, showing electronic0 ' on the ARO the track number designa®0'1^ course, speed, and altitude, and for CAP* ^ bogie to which they have been assiglie ^ Similar automatic filtering for the sun3 picture is programmed. These various preS, tations give the commanding officer, d®" AAW, ASW or normal steaming, the coinple^t picture of what is being done in CIC, with0 the necessity for personal involvement ® *
This console would have the add®10f feature of a Command Alert Button, s®** . to, but of different symbology, than the A Button now used by the Ship’s Weapons ordinator. This symbol would constitute^, absolute command to designate a we°P system to a specified threat. ^
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Radio speaker-amplifiers. Selector switches permit patching of all voice circuits to the control panel. Four circuits, two on each side, can be guarded if necessary.
Radio handset. The Selector switches permit transmitting on any voice circuit patched to the control panel.
Intercom combination transmitter-receiver. This unit connects with all key stations and is similar to the current 21MC.
Dual ASW presentation. Miniaturized versions of the presentation now available on the MK-78 Position Indicator.
Tape printer. Complex tactical instructions and signals should be sent via a system similar to HI-CAP
COMM which was evaluated by COMOPTEVFOR in 1962/3. This provides an immediate readout, and
permanent record of all tactical signals and instructions.
Pitlog. Direct reading permits faster scanning and is less apt to be misread than the conventional pointer dial.
Automatic steering/station keeping. The automatic steering device and engine revolution indicator could be controlled by computer to maintain the ship at a constant range and bearing from the guide, i.e., automatic station keeping.
Radar scope. The variations and sophistications of the radar presentation are the core of the console.
This scope is a duplication of the NTDS Data Utilization Console as used by the CIC Evaluator.
Automatic CPA and Maneuvering Board. During tactical situations the computer memory and tracking systems can be used to quickly give the conning officer vital maneuvering information.
Gyro repeater. A standard gyro repeater showing ship’s head. It can be provided with indicators showing relative heading of any equipment.
Automatic sinuous and zigzag steering device. Zigzag plans and sinuous course patterns lend themselves . easily to programming into the automatic steering device (G above).
Closed circuit TV. The conning officer or Captain can select cameras which will give him a view of the ASW DRT, the geographic plot and radar navigation table, the navigator's chart table, or the Summary
Plot.
Weapons and equipment panel. This panel shows weapons and equipment status, and weapons assignment, and permits the CO to override decisions made elsewhere.
Intercom to Pilot house. This is an always open two-way intercom to the helmsman, lee helmsman and navigator. It could easily be backed up by a voice tube for emergencies.
direct reading clock. A standard direct reading clock.
^■ps control repeaters. Indicators showing rudder angle, engine order and answer, and shaft revolutions rung up.
of CPA, and the designation and track number of the contact. This information will continue to be displayed constantly correcting, until CPA is past or until the computer is sequenced to another track. This data is already available in the NTDS system.
In addition, maneuvering solutions to station have been incorporated in the present NTDS and would be available on the bridge presentation. Readouts would provide course, speed and time to station as displayed on the automatic readout.
Perhaps, too, a word of explanation is necessary as to why a Closed Circuit TV (L) is recommended.
During times of active maneuvering (i.e. multiship ASW), limited visibility or operating in confined waters, few commanding officers are willing to leave the bridge where they may be needed in an emergency. On the other hand the plots and information which are of the most use are seldom available on the bridge. This problem can largely be solved by closed circuit TV.
And, finally, the Weapons and Equipment Panel (A/), demands more discussion. The right hand portion of this panel has a series of red and green lights. Each pair of lights represents a vital piece of machinery or equipment. A green light indicates a properly operating unit. When a unit malfunctions its light shows red giving instant notice of source of trouble.
The left hand portion of the panel displays information on each ship’s gun or torpedo (Note: these systems are not presently
incorporated in the NTDS system). As the GLO assigns a target to one of these systems, the target designation appears in the small dial window for that weapon. Under the window are four lights indicating when the weapons system is manned and ready, has acquired its target, has an open fire order, and has fired and is reloading. If a weapons system malfunctions its red light will appear on the right side of the panel. The commanding officer can see to which target a weapon is assigned. If he does not desire to fire at that target he can instantly refuse permission and negate the assignment by throwing the toggle switch beneath the four indicator lights. If he desires to direct the weapon to a different target (or to a target, if the weapon is unassigned) he may indicate the desired target by dialing the designation himself, using the knob to the right of the window. This is indicated to the evaluator and GLO, and constitutes an overriding command to use that weapon on the target indicated.
It is not suggested that the bridge described above is the ultimate. The ideas presented here were developed while the author was serving in FRAM I and II destroyers, and they reflect primarily the needs of those classes- Adaptability to other classes than destroyers would require considerable further Study- Much additional work should be done in devising instrumentation that would provide the best information in the fastest manner possible, and would provide an overriding command decision capability. Instruments* tion would vary among ship class, dependent upon primary mission and armament. Practi' cal considerations of size and weight migb1 impose some limits.
Neither is it suggested that such a radic3 departure from the traditional bridge can be made in a single step. A great deal more re* search, development, and evaluation will be required. The transition will have to be made over a period of years and through sever3 classes of ships.
It is suggested, however, that we muf move in this direction. Such a bridge practical. Virtually every device mentione is already available as a component of soine item of existing equipment. The problen involved in assembling them into a sing control panel are relatively minor. In c°nl parison with other control panels in const^e use, this one is not complex. Technically! are ready for this step. g
The Destroyer Force, indeed the U- Navy, is faced with a vital challenge- we manage, and use to their utmost etI ^ tiveness, the increasingly complex we3P^fe systems given us by modern technology- ( must, if we are to survive. We can do it,1 exercise imagination and initiative in ship sign. The concept of a “Ship Control” aS 0 lined above is offered as one possible step the right direction.
, • The mental process of information as- s‘ttiilation is slowed by the frequent need to dualize. Contacts and targets given in ranges and bearings must be converted to a 'hental image of geographic position and Native movement.
• Too much is left to the memory of the ^‘dge officer. There are, even in the newest . Ps, limited facilities for recording informa- °n> Too frequently, when information is rec°rded, it is in tabular form, again requires the time-consuming process of visuali- a‘ion and analysis.
e instrumentation is
th 1C an^ aw^war<^- I'1 my ship, for example, ere were nine different gyro repeaters serv- b various functions—duplication which is re‘y unnecessary.
fr * * Visibility is poor, requiring movement °ue wing to the other and back again. tai/S’ ‘n turn, means sound-powered phone crs trotting back and forth causing dis- action.
in * are many people on the bridge,
Itl0 Veci in ship control but not in ship com- Cent •'v^° detract the captain from coning on the problems at hand. cje • . ae facilities for transmitting command s0ll *°ns are for the most part limited to cea .’Powered phone, with occasional ex- aSSQ1?ns such as the MK11 l/l 14 system and its ^c*ated MK78 Position Indicator. beain and cold weather, while they may tbeje ‘faditional lot of the seafarer, are never- eff1(,7s significant factors in reducing human