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"Some Aspects of ASW in the Royal Navy”
(See pages 152-156, October 1966 Proceedings)
Captain R. A. Bowling, U. S. Navy[*]—A significant difference in ASW as practiced by the Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy is embodied in the first part of Captain Treacher’s article, wherein he describes the training and qualifications of the ASW officer as a career specialist in the Royal Navy, f
As an example, the U. S. Navy equivalent of the torpedo antisubmarine (TAS) officer, the ASW officer in most U. S. destroyer-type ships, is usually an ensign with no previous sea experience or a lieutenant (j.g.) with a maximum of 4| years’ total service. However, some of the larger destroyer-type ships may have a junior lieutenant with between five and six years’ service. The ASW officer may or may not be a qualified officer of the deck, depending upon his rank and length of service, and is preferably a graduate of the eight- week ASW officers course at one of the fleet ASW schools. But often he is a graduate only of the three-week ASW deck officers’ course.
There is no U. S. equivalent of the Royal Navy’s helicopter control officer or the gunner- TAS insofar as experience is concerned, although some U. S. ships do have, apparently more by chance than by design, LDOs who have equivalent experience. There is no real effort in the U. S. Navy to develop ASW officers as career specialists; in fact, the opposite is true in that the U. S. Navy continues to stress the development of well- rounded, unrestricted line officers while seeking solutions to problems generated by a burgeoning technology in reorganizations and new technical management concepts.
In this latter regard, the Secretary of the Navy in 1964 established the Office of the Director, ASW Programs (Op95) under CNO, and the Office of the Manager, ASW Systems Projects under the Chief of Naval Material. Further, in May of 1966, the Chief of Naval Material was placed directly under CNO, for the first time giving CNO direct control of the material as well as operational aspects of ASW. These organizational changes were long overdue.
These changes have resulted in substantial improvements in the development of consolidated requirements by the Director of ASW Programs, the development, production, installation, and support of ASW systems in response to these requirements by the Manager, ASW Systems Projects, and the appearance of appreciable improvements in ASW sensors and weapons systems in the Fleet.
However, a comparable improvement in ASW operations at sea is not readily evident. There will be little or no appreciable improvement in such operations until such time as substantial, even revolutionary, changes are - made in personnel management policies and concepts on a scale comparable to those recently made in over-all Navy organization and technical management concepts. Extraordinary efforts must be taken to identify and evaluate actions which can be taken, both short and long term, to improve the proficiency of personnel engaged in ASW opera-
tions. New and imaginative approaches may be necessary with respect to accepted unrestricted line officer career patterns and personnel rotation policies. Equally imaginative innovations may be necessary in Fleet organization and operating policies.
Assuming that the ASW breakthrough, so eagerly sought in the technological area, is of vital national importance and probably lies in the personnel management field, the question then becomes a matter of developing and implementing a plan, initially on a limited but statistically valid base. Such a plan is well within reason. First, CNO should reaffirm the fact that ASW is a very crucial problem and assign to it an appropriate priority. Next, changes would be directed in the areas of:
Personnel and Training:
1.Establish ASW personnel billets both ashore and afloat.
2.Establish ASW as a career subspecialty, similar to the programs for aviators and submariners, for both officers and enlisted personnel.
3.Establish officer and enlisted qualifications for these ASW billets (similar to those for Polaris submarines).
4. Stabilize ASW personnel in ASW billets.
5.Maximize the use of officers with enlisted ASW experience in ASW officer billets (this would include warrant officers in destroyer-type ships and aircraft squadrons).
6.Revise and expand the curricula of ASW schools to meet established personnel qualification standards.
Organization:
1.Place the fleet ASW schools at San Diego and Norfolk under the command of the respective fleet ASW commanders with support by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (similar to the Naval Submarine School at New London, Connecticut).
2.Establish one ASW force in the Atlantic consisting of an ASW carrier with embarked air group and a permanent land-based air contingent of eight destroyers and two submarines as a base for implementing the plan.
Admittedly, these are rather drastic changes, but history alone should vindicate the need. Both the U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy learned early in World War II that normal naval training was not enough to qualify personnel for the highly complex but often boring task of antisubmarine warfare; special training was required in tactics, sensors, and weapons. As a result, special ASW schools and training units were established, strongly supported at a high level. This early appreciation that the Battle of the Atlantic, above all else, was a battle fought by men could conceivably have been that single crucial factor in a seesaw struggle which spelled ultimate victory for the Allies and doom for the Third Reich. For it was the ASW specialists in specially formed ASW forces who turned the tide of battle in May 1943, when Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, after losing 31 U-boats in 22 days, withdrew his submarines from the convoy lanes in the North Atlantic. Admiral Donitz later wrote in his memoirs, “We had lost the Battle of the Atlantic.”
It is evident from Captain Treacher’s article that the Royal Navy has applied the lesson so grimly relearned in World War II: it is men who win victories in war. It appears that the U. S. Navy has not similarly applied the study of military history to the development of a comparable, specially trained ASW force in the postwar era. This failure could conceivably be that single crucial factor which might spell ultimate victory for the submarine if again we are faced with its depredations against merchant convoys or its aggressive use against our naval forces.
"Sovereignty and the SLBM”
(See pages 34-41, September 1966,
and pages 130-132, December 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Larry G. Parks, U. S. Navy[2] —Captain Sweitzer develops a flaw in his thesis when he reaches the old “saw” SUBDIZ (or SEADIZ as it has been called). His flaws are at least threefold.
First, he relies on that concept of international law that I call the “white hat concept”: it is legal for us to do it because we are the good guys and all wear white hats; it would be illegal for the Soviets to do the same thing because they are the bad guys.
Secondly, Commander Sweitzer’s analogy of the ADIZ is faulty. The legal basis for exercising control over foreign aircraft in international air space in an ADIZ is not self-defense. U. S. ADIZ regulations are simply reasonable regulations imposed as a condition of entry into U. S. airspace. Foreign aircraft operating in a coastal ADIZ are required to comply with U. S. regulations only if they are entering the United States. A foreign aircraft, for example, en route from Canada to Cuba could fly through the Atlantic ADIZ and not be subject to any U. S. restrictions. Is this what the author desires in his SUBDIZ? If so, I perceive a rather ineffective maritime control measure.
Thirdly, Captain Sweitzer misconstrues the law of self-defense. It is evident that there is confusion between “self preservation,” “selfdefense,” and “national security.” To meet the test of legality under the principle of selfdefense the threat must be so overwhelming as to necessitate immediate and unilateral action to protect the nation from an imminent attack; then we may use force or the threat of force to counter the threat. I question that the factual situation postulated shows a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” That, of course, has been the law of self-defense since the Caroline case in 1837. f Further, if one has a case for the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense, it is not necessary to draw lines on charts to exercise that right, because the right of self-defense may be exercised wherever the necessity presents itself.
There are legitimate rights and interests of other nations that would be violated by such a SUBDIZ. We are deluding ourselves if we think that there will be no commercial exploitation of the undersea areas in the not too distant future. It takes very little foresight to recognize the imminence of sub-surface transit, exploration, and exploitation of the oceans by non-military submersibles.
I can also see a very real problem of enforcement: How would one discriminate between friend and foe if our friends decide not to “knuckle under?” How would one discriminate between military and non-military undersea vehicles?
"This Way to the Egress”
(See pages 92-97, September 1966,
and page 132, December 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) John V. Kjellman, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Commander Wood’s view from the other side of the fence should certainly be useful to junior officers confronting the decision of whether or not to remain in the Navy. He aptly points out some of the realities of civilian life. Flowever, I take exception to some of his implications.
It is common for nearly every industrial firm to interview many times the number of college graduates that it intends to hire. This
f See Bruce Harlow, “The Legal Use of Force . . . Short of War,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1966, pp. 88-98.
is necessary, because many students find the demand for their skills such that they can be as selective about their future employer as the employers can be about their future employees. Thus, the one-hire-to-12-interviews ratio given by Lieutenant Commander Wood is meaningless in the context of his discussion.
He also states that success is not particularly common in the civilian sector—“a final third reach varying degrees of success.” This can not be refuted because the author does not define what he means by success. Correspondingly, neither can his implication that success is highly likely in the Navy be debated. I do not think that the civilian sector is as bleak in this respect as he would have us believe.
Although I do not dispute his comparison between civilian and military pay, I feel that more information on this question would be useful. The following tables provide a comparison between officer’s pay and the pay for certain professional and administrative occupations in the civilian sector.
The military pay is considerably understated for those who receive a special compensation such as flight pay. In addition, no attempt has been made to include the financial worth of fringe benefits for either the military or civilian sectors. In this regard, civilian
MILITARY
CIVILIAN SALARIES1
Occupation |
| Per cent in occupation averaging |
| Mean | $9,800 |
| Salary | or more |
Accountants | $ 8,676 | — |
Auditors | 8,856 | — |
Job Analysts | 9,072 | — |
Managers, Office services | 9,732 | 0.1 |
Chemists | 11,028 | 2.1 |
Engineers | 11,580 | 1.7 |
Directors of Personnel | 12,252 | 4.4 |
Chief Accountants | 13,320 | 1.9 |
1 National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical, and Clerical Pay, February-March 1965 (Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1469, 1965).
fringe benefits should not be underestimated.
On the civilian side, the occupations listed obviously do not include all careers in the civilian sector, but only those occupations not generally requiring advanced degrees and which are found in significant numbers in industrial corporations (in all major fields) which lend themselves to classification. Neither do they include upper echelon managers such as company presidents and vice
SALARIES[3]
| Per cent[4] |
Grade | in grade |
Ensign | 18.8 |
Lieutenant (j.g.) | 24.1 |
Lieutenant | 24.4 |
Lieutenant Commander | 17.1 |
Commander | 10.3 |
Captain | 4.8 |
Rear Admiral (lower) |
|
Rear Admiral (upper) | 0.5 |
Vice Admiral |
|
Admiral |
|
Weighted mean for ensign through captain.
100.0
Approx, years for | Mean adjusted[5] |
pay purposes | salary |
under 2 | $ 5,478. |
over 3 | 8,290. |
over 6 | 9,680. |
over 10 | 10,920. |
over 16 | 13,274. |
over 22 | 16,305. |
over 22 | 19,985. |
over 18 | 22,441. |
over 26 | 25,216. |
over 26 | 30,540. |
| $ 9,467. |
presidents. Thus, the comparison is not particularly pertinent for flag officers.
There is much to be said for Lieutenant Commander Wood’s statement on the serving of one’s country by serving in the Navy. But, is it less honorable to work to build the American society than it is to work in the defense of it? He also states that in a corporation “Assignment after assignment consists of overcoming problems, increasing efficiency and all in the service of . . . profits.” Any officer who follows the doctrines of Secretary McNamara is doing the same thing, except costs are minimized instead of profits maximized. In addition, the civilian can clearly and unmistakenly judge the worth of his final product.
I fail to see any basis for Lieutenant Commander Wood’s implication in his concluding paragraph that further education is not likely for the junior officer who returns to civilian life. Any civilian with the necessary ability and initiative can earn a Ph.D. The Navy makes this possible for a select few.
I agree that civilian life is not all peaches and cream, but the opportunities are present. Success is a function of the individual and is not dependent on whether or not he wears a Navy uniform.
Lieutenant (j.g.) George D. Van Arsdale, U. S. Naval Reserve—As one who has recently “egressed,” I certainly agree with Lieutenant Commander Wood’s proposition that the grass is not always greener on the other side. I have found that the misconceptions of civilian life in the wardroom are matched by the misconceptions of wardroom life among civilians, but the people and problems on both sides of the fence are essentially the same.
There are two differences between a naval career and a career in the civilian world which were decisive in my case. Some individuals find the structured life, the pomp and ceremony, and the regimentation, which are more pronounced in the military, very satisfying; others do not.
More important is the slight additional freedom of action in civilian life. While it may cause economic hardship, a civilian always has the possibility of an “out,” a change, when confronted by an intolerable superior or an unpalatable assignment; he can move or stay put—stay on the same job for 40 years or change every two, as he chooses. This freedom of action is not as apparent in the military, at least not from the vantage point of a lieutenant “jaygee.”
Again, what is important to one person may not seem important to another.
“Naval Gunfire Today and Tomorrow”
(See pages 52-59, September 1966,
and pages 132-133, December 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Dwight Wadsworth, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Keppler, DD-765)—Lieutenant Colonel Soper has lifted a veil of misunderstanding from my eyes which has caused me to ridicule proposals to recommission battleships. As a fledgling missileer with some knowledge of the research and development of new weapons, I always believed that the terminal guidance problems inherent in the shore bombardment missile area would be overcome. I still believe this.
But what about right now? What sort of a reaction would the Viet Cong have if they looked out to sea one morning and saw nine 16-inch rifles pointed in their direction? After one broadside on their position the survivors would scramble to get back on the farm.
Is it really inconceivable that one or two of the mothballed battleships could be placed back in commission as gun platforms only? Manned with about 600 men, operating on one-half of their engineering plant, these mighty queens of the sea could range the coast of Vietnam, putting more shot on more area than is now possible.
Use of the battleships in the way proposed would require a bit of humility on both the anti-battleship and pro-battleship factions: one for saying “no” all these years and the other to refrain from attempts to exalt the battleship’s status from that of a gun platform. In the interests of economy, there would be no
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
real reason to install new communications and radar equipment: an SPS-10 radar and the basic radio equipment required for communications with the gunfire spotters would suffice.
"Surface Effect Ships”
(See pages 34-48, November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Navy—The ability to carry heavy loads rapidly across the water may be only a minor property of the full spectrum of surface effect ships.
Ground effect barges, consisting essentially of the new standard sea-air-land shipping containers supported by an air cushion, could revolutionize transportation. An SES “canal” could be a simple hardened surface.
Two recent Proceedings articles illustrate that fitting an air cushion skirt to an existing LST would provide a solution to many operational problems. [6] The air cushion configuration would permit firm, stable beaching and would simplify unbeaching as well as other shallow-water operations. The air cushion effect could also act as the support for the LST’s ramp and a personnel causeway.
The hump phenomenon is only noticeable over a yielding surface; a surface effect ship plying the Great Lakes should operate more efficiently over the winter ice than over open water during the normal shipping season. The amount of hump is dependent on the vehicle’s footprint, the pressure shape exerted by the surface effect ship. There are several methods of reducing this effect: an articulated hull should decrease lifting requirements as well as simplifying frame loading; a rolling leading edge, providing both lift and cushion seal, should virtually eliminate the hump. As a last resort, hydrofoils or skis could supply the necessary lift at a much lower power penalty than the current brute force method. In order to develop the competitive position of the surface effect ships it will be necessary to:
• Develop valving systems to permit operation from external air sources.
• Develop coupling systems to permit several surface effects ships to function as a unit for safe and efficient open-sea operation.
• Develop means of rapidly connecting air cushion skirts to existing vessels to improve stability and to decrease draft.
• Develop a more efficient high-speed propulsion system, preferably large driving wheels to provide cushion seal, lift, and directional control as well as propulsion.
• Adapt the techniques used in building air-inflated structures as well as lighter-than- air ships in designing the next generation of surface effects ships.
"Not Too Near—Not Too Far”
(See pages 157—159, November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. W. Roop, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Taivasa, ATF-92)— Lieutenant Commander Curl’s argument proposes placing one’s ship at a desired distance off the track prior to coming alongside. What we must be concerned with is obtaining that distance after we are there. Whether using the radian rule, the author’s determination of the side opposite a vaguely determined angle, or plain eyeball, it should be readily evident that we begin the maneuver by being “on the quarter” of the soon-to-be engaged side. I submit that this is sufficient, for our primary interest at this point should be the distance or range to the transfer station. Until that time when the receiving ship’s bow is abreast of the delivery ship’s stern, lateral offset can only come under one of two headings: enough to clear or too close.
Secondly, suppose that we have established a predetermined distance of lateral offset and elect to maintain this distance. It does not follow that a comparison of the ordered course and our heading to maintain track separation will provide the course to be steered in making the approach or in maintaining station alongside. We may determine an aggregate gyro error; knowing one’s own, we can even call over and tell him what his is. But strange things happen to lateral offset when coming alongside: the other ship’s wake, bow wave, the cushioning induced, and other variables that are in turn compounded or mitigated by such known factors as dissimilar ships, their drafts, the ordered speed, and location of transfer stations wreak havoc with
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the best approximations of distance and the courses to be steered to maintain that distance during such maneuvers.
Thirdly, the derived approximation hinges upon a somewhat nebulous point: the placement of a fender that may be suspended below the bridge, or some other point directly across from one’s own ship when alongside. In view of the great variety of “delivery” ships and the fact that the fender may not always be suspended below the bridge, I would prefer to know the location of the transfer station and how far it is from me horizontally. The entire side of the other ship is going to be directly across from me once I get there.
Finally, the inclusion of an additional chore to be performed by the watch, or by assigning it to an extra man on the replenishment detail for no other reason than to calculate approximate distance with a slide rule, stretches the gentle art of going alongside to an absurd degree. For here, if in no other instance, are we truly dependent upon the oft-maligned skill we know as seaman’s eye. I agree wholeheartedly that every tool should be used to get to waiting station, or any other station whether going alongside or not. But once ROMEO is closed-up, it is experience and a fine sense of timing and distance that dictates how closely we go alongside, when to reduce speed, when to steer one or two degrees off course, and when to add or subtract turns. It is not the novice shiphandler who does this; rather, he should be standing closely by observing how his ship, destroyer, cruiser, or fleet tug, is handled when making an approach on the delivery ship . . . whether she be an oiler, carrier, another ship of the same class, or even a submarine running on the surface.
The task is not that difficult. To follow the proposal of the author may or may not prove helpful, but it does complicate unnecessarily a beautiful evolution that is a routine matter on the majority of the ships in our Navy.
Commander John L. Wash, U. S. Navy— I, too, have used an adaptation of the principle which Lieutenant Commander Curl describes. I modestly called it the “Washboard.” A plexiglass sheet with rangelines and distance lines overdrawn with angular measurements shown in Lieutenant Com-
mander Curl’s illustration proved quite helpful in obtaining an early and accurate concept of the approaching ship’s lateral position during a replenishment. A range scale covering the approach path from 1,800 yards to 300 yards will allow the plotting of about six to ten minutes of information, enough to allow the conning officer time to correct his lateral displacement with ease, arriving on the “cut” mark with the desired distance already achieved.
However, I was dismayed at Lieutenant Commander Curl’s interpretation of the rule of radian. He treats it as if it is only valid at the 600- or 300-yard mark. The rule is not that inflexible. It can be used at any range and with accuracy which is quite acceptable to the conning officer. More than that, it can be used for formation station-keeping, piloting, and formation maneuvering.
The rule of the radian is, briefly, that, since an angle of about 57.3 degrees (a radian) at the center of a circle intercepts an arc of that circle equal in length to a radius length of the same circle, a smaller angle will inter-
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cept an arc nearly proportional. That is, an angle of 5.73 degrees will intercept an arc about one-tenth as long as the radius. We make the approximation even more fuzzy by using the angles of 60 degrees and six degrees, respectively. When we do this we transform our three-sided figure from two lines and an arc to one of three lines. In the former the angle between the two straight lines was 57.3 degrees and in the latter the three angles were all 60 degrees; i.e., an equilateral triangle. Thus, the rule of the radian should more properly be called the rule of the equilateral triangle.
As Lieutenant Commander Curl says, at a range of 300 yards (the radius) a six-degree angle will indicate that the lateral offset (intercepted chord) will be 90 feet or 30 yards which is one-tenth of 300 yards. The factor of one tenth comes, obviously, from the ratio 6°/60°. If we use an angle of two degrees at a range of, say, 1,200 yards, our lateral offset would be 2/60 times 1,200 or 40 yards—120 feet. I am certain that the mathematicians are shuddering at such heresy, but with the other approximations we have been making in solving our approach problem, e.g., stadim- eter or radar range, delivering ship’s course and speed, receiving ship’s course and speed, set and drift, and the like, the errors incurred by using the rule of the equilateral triangle will be of little consequence.
I am pleased that Lieutenant Commander Curl placed these thoughts on the pages of the Proceedings, for a well executed replenishment approach not only reflects more favorably on our level of nautical competence, but gives the deck crews a better chance of getting their bolos to the other ship at the earliest possible moment plus reducing the number of replenishment collisions. Our need for all three of these factors cannot be denied.
"The Legal Use of Force . . . Short of War”
(See pages 88-98, November 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy—The subhead of Lieutenant Commander Harlow’s article states, in part, that “a group of Canadian militiamen entered U. S. territory and destroyed the USS Caroline, which was being used to transport rebels into Canada.”
Later, the author refers to the Caroline simply as “an American steamship.”
Within the scope of his article, I was surprised that an American man-of-war receive such cavalier handling and such short shrift.
Editor’s note : The only Caroline to serve in the U. S. Navy was a 42j-foot motor boat of the same name leased free to the Navy on 17 March 1917. She performed harbor patrol duties at San Diego throughout the war and was returned to her owner on 23 December 1918. We regret the erroneous subhead.
"The Last Battle Cruiser”
(See pages 134-135, November 1966 Proceedings)
R. D. Layman—Consul Collins’ remarks on Turkish battle cruiser Tavuz constitute a well-deserved tribute to this remarkable ship, which changed the course of world history.
From the viewpoint of purely naval history, the Tavuz (ex-Goeben), whose fate is still unknown at the time of this writing, established several other “firsts” and “lasts” which render her truly unique among warships of the 20th century:
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• She is the last of the battle cruisers and the last of the pre-World War I dreadnought- type construction programs, the last survivor of the ships built for the German High Seas Fleet, and probably the last dreadnought to remain in active commission in any navy.
• As the Goeben, she was the first dreadnought to fire her guns in anger, when, accompanied by the German Navy cruiser Breslau, she bombarded Bone and Philippe- ville, Algeria, on 4 August 1914. These were also, as far as I can ascertain, the first shots of World War I to be fired by a warship of any nationality.
• The Tavuz was the first dreadnought to be the target for a planned air attack. This occurred on 9 July 1917, when the battle cruiser, anchored in Stenia Bay, was bombed by a British Handley Page bomber which had made a 2,000-mile flight, unprecedented for the time, from Britain to the Aegean island of Lemnos. The aircraft aimed eight 112-pound bombs at the Tavuz, but apparently little or no damage was inflicted.
• While grounded after her 1918 sortie, the Tavuz was the target of World War I’s greatest sustained air attack upon a warship. As she lay immobile, the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service sent every aircraft within range against her. Altogether, approximately 15 tons of bombs were aimed at the Tavuz—a massive weight for the time. But her stout Krupp armor shrugged off the 65- and 112-pound missiles, and damage from the air was minor. The Tavuz on this occasion might also have been the first capital ship to feel the sting of an aerial torpedo attack. The seaplane carriers Ark Royal and Manxman both attempted to fly torpedo-carrying seaplanes against her, but bad weather and what one official history calls “unaccountable delay” aborted their takeoffs. The Manxman!s part in this effort is described in “The Birth of the Flat-Top” by Ernest Watson in the Proceedings for May 1956.
• Exchanging gunfire with warships and shore batteries, stalked by submarines, bombed from the air, and pounded by mines, the Tavuz racked up what well may be a record number of hours in combat by a capital ship in World War I. In doing so, she displayed an ability to absorb underwater punishment that seems unrivaled even by her compatriots in the North Sea. She was mined no fewer than five times and survived.
It is greatly to be hoped that this distinctive ship may be preserved as a memorial to the dreadnought era.
"Printing in the U. S. Navy”
(See pages 154-157, November 1966 Proceedings)
Edwin H. Carpenter*—I was surprised by Chief Vogler’s statement that no mention of printing on board ships is found for the period between 1775 and 1866. Confining myself to naval vessels, I find in my notes:
1776, HMS Phoenix at New York had a press which was used to counterfeit Continental currency. Kenneth Scott, “A British Counterfeiting Press in New York Harbor, 1776,” New York Historical Society Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1955), pp. 117-120.
1778-1782, the French Fleet operating in American waters had presses on at least three ships; books and a newspaper, the Gazette Francoise, are known from the Languedoc, 1778, the Neptune, 1780, and the Triomphant, 1782. There is a facsimile of the newspaper file (New York, 1926) and several references to this printing, e.g., Howard M. Chapin, Early Sea Presses (New York, 1925).
1782, HMS Formidable in the Caribbean had a press—perhaps one of the above French presses which had been captured—and at least one book was printed on board. Howard M. Chapin, “More about Sea Presses,” American Collector, Vol. 3 (1926), pp. 86-88.
1793, there was a press on board the French Republican navy’s ship Montague and in the same period on board its Sans Culotte (ex-Royal Louis) and Guillaume Tell. Roger Vaultier, “Les imprimeries particuliere” France Graphique, No. 97 (1955), pp. 22-25.
1812, Admiral Pellew had a press on board HMS Caledonia blockading Toulouse, on which at least two books were printed in 1812 and 1813. G. F. Barwick, “Books Printed at Sea,” The Library, Ser. 2, Vol. 1 (1900), pp. 163-166.
1819-1820, HMS Hecla in Arctic waters had a press, on which a weekly newspaper was printed, according to Barwick, loc. citbut the Library of Congress card for a reprint
* Mr. Carpenter is Western Americana Bibliographer of the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, San Marino, California.
says that the original was a manuscript paper.
1849, a pamphlet was printed on board the USS Pensacola. A copy was offered to the New York Public Library by a bookseller in 1956.
1850-1851, HMS Resolute, wintering in the Arctic while searching for Sir John Franklin, had a press on which were printed programs, trifles, and a newspaper. There is a facsimile of the paper (London, 1852); Barwick, loc. cit.
1854, a press was sent out to Admiral Perry in Japanese waters, and documents, programs, and reports were printed on board the Powhatan and the Mississippi. R. W. Lovett, “The Japan Expedition Press,” Harvard Library Bulletin, Vol. 12 (1958), pp. 242-252.
1854, a Polar Almanack was printed on board HMS Enterprise in Camden Bay. Walter H. Blumenthal, Bookmen's Bedlam (New Brunswick, N. J., 1955), p. 56.
1864, Admiral Farragut issued printed orders on the USS Hartford off Mobile, though I do not know for sure if they were printed on board. Copies are in the New York Public Library.
Chief Vogler might be interested in the reminiscences of Chief Printer Steve L. Watts at the Newport Naval Training Station in 1917-1918. They are in the periodical The Pastime Printer (Front Royal, Virginia), No. 2 (September, 1956). Watts, a major in World War II, may be the only other Navy printer to have written on the subject.
"The Lawful Order”
(See pages 82-90, July 1966, and pages 124-126, November 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Marvin L. Duke, U. S. Navy -—The “official” U. S. position, as stated by Lieutenant Commander Sutphen, “that the prisoners held by North Vietnam are not war criminals and that they cannot be held personally responsible for their acts because they were obeying orders” does not refute my article “The Lawful Order.”
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which North Vietnam acceded on 28 June 1957, yielded rules, both fundamental and detailed, for the protection of prisoners of war throughout the period of their capture. These rules apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict. Under international law, there is no possible doubt that the execution of POWs without lawful cause is punishable itself as a war crime. The “lawful cause” may only be an offense committed during captivity or a war crime perpetrated prior to the capture of the POW. In either case, the POW is entitled to a fair judicial trial. The United States has maintained that the POWs were following legal orders, which led to their eventual capture. The world outcry against the North Vietnamese proposal to conduct war crime trials and the great difficulty in their substantiating these allegations in open court led them to drop the issue.
Concerning a declaration of war, the existence or absence of a formal declaration of war is not a factor in determining whether an international use of force is lawful as a matter of international law. The United Nations Charter places restrictions on the manner and purpose of the use of force and not on any formalities of announcement.
The International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg was set up only for the trial of members of the German government by an international agreement between the leading victor states and later adhered to by 19 states. The tribunal was international in that it was established by an international aggregate and in that it applied (and made) international law. In the absence of an international criminal court, it would have perhaps been wiser to create an ad hoc tribunal composed of neutral judges and even representatives from the conquered nations, but that this was not done does not necessarily suggest that justice was not carried out. The current significance of the trials is that because of U.N. approval the results of the trials have taken on true international flavor.
Messrs. McDougal and Feliciano in Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961) summarize the results of the war crimes trials as:
Examination of the decisions of the war crimes tribunals indicates that by and large the plea of superior orders was assessed in the light of familiar criminal law principles relating to mens rea (culpable perspectives) as a basic condition of penal responsibility. Thus where the court was satisfied that the accused did not in fact know of the illegal quality of the order he executed, he was not held accountable. However, knowledge or lack of knowledge might be inferred from the character or the orders contents. Where the order was illegal in its face “or obviously unlawful,” the accused, upon the assumption that although unlearned in the law of war he partook of a common humanity was held liable. Illustrations of orders so characterized by the war crimes tribunals include orders for the killing or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, the massacre of survivors of sunken ships, and the mass extermination, torture, and mutilation of the civil population in occupied countries. The extent to which knowledge may be imputed to the defendant may of course be affected- by the rank he occupied. It would seem but rarely reasonable to ascribe the same degree of knowledge of the law of war to an ordinary enlisted man and, say, to an army commander; an order “obviously illegal” to the latter may frequently not be so to the former.” Where the accused’s knowledge of the unlawful nature of the order he carried out was sustained by varying processes of proof, he was not permitted escape from liability by merely pleading superior orders.
Certainly an analysis of this kind concerning the legality of a superior order does not contribute to a serious breaking down of the effectiveness of the military service. Nor does it lend itself to breeding a generation of “sea lawyers” in the Navy.
In the more difficult grey area, when determining the legality of orders, the action for the military man to take, is clear. If in doubt about the legality of the order, so express the doubt to the superior issuing said order, and then carry out the order as given. In this manner, both conscience and duty are obeyed. In the Peleus trial, the engineering officer of the U-852 was the only officer who was not sentenced to death by firing squad because he had protested the order to fire upon the survivors in the water before doing so.
Military necessity also enters the picture and can be used as a defense plea against charges in some cases.
Can the plea of superior orders be offered as an excuse in following commands clearly against the national interest, even if the superior so issuing the order is acting in what he assumes to be a patriotic manner? The Air Force general in the movie, “Dr. Strangelove,” thought he was acting in a rational manner and for the good of the country when he launched bombers against Soviet Russia. The question is, should his subordinates have carried out these orders, knowing they were based only on personal convictions, without protesting? I think not.
We in the United States can be reasonably assured that trust may be placed in orders emanating from those in command. The exception will be an order which is a violation of the laws of humanity. It can happen, through war hysteria or misguided patriotism, but the American military man has the ability to deem what is right and what is wrong and should and will protest flagrant violations of international law.
"The Howell Automobile Torpedo”
(See pages 174-176, October 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Rene Podhorsky, Royal Yugoslav Navy (Retired)—It is true that the Howell torpedo had the advantage of being- trackless, but the writer omitted to mention its major drawback: The turbine that spun the gyro gave off such a banshee-shriek that the torpedo could be heard for miles.
"Let’s Show the Grape With the Flag”
(See pages 123-124, August 1966 Proceedings)
Captain Allan P. Slaff, U. S. Navy—I am in full support of Captain Komorowski’s very important statement on the desirability of serving wines on board U. S. Navy ships for representation purposes.
Lapel Button
To Members only: one dollar
Write:
Secretary-Treasurer U. S. Naval Institute (Twice actual size) Annapolis, Maryland
It is inadmissible that grown men who have the authority and judgment to command ships worth hundreds of millions of dollars cannot be officially relied upon to exercise judgment in dispensing spirits on board.
Having served on distant stations on numerous occasions, I, too, have recognized this need. It has been a constant source of embarrassment to me during the years I served in the Fleet that we are not permitted to offer alcoholic beverages during representation functions. We are completely out of step with the rest of the world, and I think it is time that we set the matter straight. I am certain that Secretary Daniels was a splendid person with the highest possible motives. However, the concept is out of date. It is time to remedy the situation.
"Ship manning:
How far should we go in cutting?”
Captain E. B. Perry, U. S. Navy (Retired) —A good indication of the difference between realism and wishful thinking on the subject of merchant ship manning appears under the above title in the November 1966 issue of Marine Engineering/Log.
The article is written by Professor Harry Benford of the University of Michigan and is based on a presentation made to a shipboard automation seminar in Elsinore, Denmark.
Professor Benford discusses the annual savings attainable through various degrees of “work rationalization” (non-featherbedding) and automation. He accepts the non-automated, over-manned, Mariner-type ship as a basis for comparison and then delves into savings which might result from automation and new methods of operation.
The non-automated Mariner is union-required to sign on a total complement of 54. Under “work rationalization” or even under sensible manning, that same ship could be crewed by 36 men. Such a manning scale would meet all safety requirements and comply with U. S. Coast Guard certification as well as the rules of the underwriters. The total annual savings under this “rationalized” manning would be about $44,000 which would make U. S. ships more competitive.
The only fly in the ointment is that the unions do not look with favor upon the reduction of manning scales, with or without automation, until there are more American- flag ships to provide more job opportunities. Ships cannot go to sea without personnel and
the manning scales are union dictated.
The article suggests that the manning scale of a ship should be based upon a watch-and- watch system; four hours on and four hours off for each man on board, and indicates the savings which might result under such a program. This is completely unrealistic. Any man who has ever been required to stand such watches under emergency conditions will agree that after 48 hours of such watch standing efficiency is low and the ability to react properly under exacting circumstances is poor. The U. S. Government, its agencies, and the underwriters do not want exhausted seamen operating our ships.
The article next discusses the savings which could come about under various degrees of automation, both for the three-watch and the watch-and-watch systems. The conclusion reached through “educated guessing” and certain “ceiling-gazing” indicates that, considering the capital investments involved, the optimum saving would result with ships equipped with automated boilers, mechanized mooring, no shipboard maintenance requirements, and a manning scale of 23 men on a three-watch basis. The annual saving under this unrealistic thinking is in the nature of $445,000 over a 54-man Mariner ship. The article also considers the manning of an automated Mariner with a crew of only eight men working under a watch-and-watch system.
U. S. merchant manning and costs can be reduced to reasonable levels, but that requires that we have enough ships to provide reasonable job opportunities for those men who elect to make seafaring their career. Reasonable automation would then be acceptable as a means of reducing sweat and toil and increasing efficiency with a reasonable number of men on the ship’s articles.
Except for the comparison between an over-manned Mariner, as is now required, and a similar, reasonably manned ship, automated or not, the article has little to offer to the experienced seaman.*
* Similar criticism of Professor Benford’s article, by Captain Perry and another writer, together with Professor Benford’s rebuttals, appeared in the January issue of Marine Engineering/Log. The editor stated that he would welcome fuller discussion.
[*] Captain Bowling is a submariner and has served on the staff of Commander, Carrier Division 17, and as ASW Undersea Warfare Officer on the staff of Commander, First Fleet.
t See also Charles F. Flaherty, Jr., “ASW—Are We Missing the Boat?” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1966, pp. 112—113, and the following Comment and Discussions: April 1966, p. 133; June 1966, p. 118; December 1966, pp. 135-136.
[2] Commander Parks is a special duty officer (law).
[3] Pay and allowances in effect on 1 January 1966.
[4] Unrestricted line officers only (47,366). Distribution from Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, (NAVPERS 15018), 1 January 1966.
[5] Income subject to income tax which would provide the after tax equivalent of military salaries after taxes plus BAQ, BAS, and personal pay. Three dependents were assumed at every grade except that zero and one dependent, respectively, were assumed for ensign, and lieutenant (j-g.). A standard ten per cent deduction was used with 1965 tax schedules. Additional income was assumed to be zero.
[6] See J. H. Demyttenaere, “The 20-Knot LST,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1966, pp. 170-172; and B. F. O’Rourke, “The LST in Vietnam,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1966, pp. 148-152.