In the ancient time of absolute kings, the Siamese military was a single service which included a naval component. Naval archives record many campaigns in which land forces were supported by muscle-and-sail-powered boats in battles fought along the rivers, canals, and coastal regions. Boat armament usually consisted of single cannon mounted to fire a few rounds of cannister or grape through a bow port.
The advent of far-ranging merchantmen in the sailing ship and early steamboat days required Siamese policy-makers to consider their sea lanes in the Gulf and develop a navy to protect them. Such was done but in the typical Siamese fashion of building their navy from a collection of canoes to a collection of warships, populating these with a mixture of army technicians, and exercising the highly developed Siamese capacity for effective politicking. Siam remained free; the sea lanes remained open; and the Siamese were practically oblivious of the colonialist expansion of France and England.
However, the Siamese Navy’s aggregate of small ships purchased abroad or built at home was no match for the new sun that would scorch all Asia in the early 1940s—Imperialist Japan. After the war, the English name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand, meaning “free nation.” In May 1949, a strong effort was begun to reorganize and update fleet units. Since 1951, the Royal Thai Navy has shown steady progress toward becoming once again a force in the Gulf of Siam.
The contemporary Thai Navy is not well known except by its own personnel and the handful of U. S. naval officers who have been assigned as advisors under terms of the Military Assistance Program. And, because the scope of its sea operations is generally limited to Gulf waters, very little is known of the RTN combat capability. Scarcely noticed in the Chao Phraya River, sea lane terminus and major transportation artery of the country, are the clean hard lines of a small but effective group of warships which form the operating navy. Counting the rarely steamed older ships, the Thai sea service has over 70 vessels, but of these, only 30 form the muscle and tendon of its sea power.
The life lines of Thailand and its burgeoning economy lie in the one sea lane found in the shallow but vast Gulf of Siam leading to the delta of the Chao Phraya River. This swiftly flowing body of water drains the central rice-growing alluvial plain of Thailand, and serves as the central trunk of the nation’s water communication system. Thai riverboatmen say a man can paddle without portage to the heartland of China over these muddy waters. Days and nights spent afloat on this river and canal system (the famous Khlongs) have shown an endless stream of water-borne traffic. All sorts of craft from 400-ton freight barges to peddlers’ canoes ply the waterways which cover the entire alluvial plain from east to west and northward from the river delta almost to the nation’s border. Although a sophisticated road network is under development, these waterways and the railroads are the primary transportation systems.
The twin cities of Bangkok and Dhonburi lie astride the river 28 kilometers from the Gulf, with the former serving as the only heavy cargo seaport in Thailand. A single sea lane through the Gulf to this port exposes a jugular vein. One concerted thrust by submarines or mines would bring paralysis, as happened in World War II when the Japanese were practically sealed off from the sea by U. S. submarines. Amphibious logistics support operations over the beaches to the single all-weather roads leading north on both sides of the Gulf would be the best alternative. Nearly 1,500 miles of sandy shoreline offer innumerable landing sites for guerrilla forces, and stand as ready highways for transfer of insurgents inland. Yet, these same beaches would also allow sea-land power of the compact and ready Royal Thai Marine Corps to move ashore from Thai amphibious shipping. Thus, although vulnerable to infiltration, the beaches are a two-edged sword. A potential enemy may use them or may find them used against him. This factor would be of major importance in the event overland transportation for garrisoned army troops were disrupted as in Vietnam. A ready battalion afloat just over the horizon is far less expensive and perhaps more effective than a helicopter-borne flight of land-based combat troops or a relief company stalled on the roads by land mines and ambush.
This Bangkok sea lane, these beaches, and the calm Gulf waters are patrolled by the five combat squadrons of the Royal Thai Navy, the only naval force in this remote but strategic area possessing an operating fleet ready for sea. Perhaps the simmering Asian rice pot that is Thailand will boil over soon. If it does, there may be U. S. sailors sweeping mines or standing patrol duty with Thai Navy men in the Gulf of Siam. Let us examine the Royal Thai Navy, its ships, and its position as a power in Southeast Asia.
The ASW Squadron. Effective operating units of the squadron include the U. S.-loaned destroyer escort Pin Klao, the ex-U. S. 1,430- ton patrol frigates Tahchin and Prasae, seven PCs, two SCs, and two CGCs. Shipboard armament is conventional and includes scanning sonar and homing torpedoes. Regularly each quarter the ships of the ASW squadron conduct single- and dual-ship practice “attacks” on a U. S. fleet submarine, used for similar exercises by several allied nations under the Military Assistance Program. All available units of the squadron participate together with selected amphibious ships serving as main body units during combat screening exercises. Operations range the Gulf. The destroyer and escort types also serve as boundary patrol ships, frequently exercising in shore bombardment and anti-air defense.
The Mine Squadron. Although mine warfare stands as a serious threat to the single sea- lane to Bangkok, operational effectiveness of the mine squadron is restricted by lack of ships suitable for extended sweep operations. Eight existing motor launch minesweepers are capable of making a good effort toward clearing the Chao Phraya and its approaches of hostile influence or contact mines, but sufficient ships for a vigorous mine countermeasures offensive extending to the South China Sea are not in Thailand. Under MAP, four 297-class coastal minesweepers (MSC) are eventually scheduled for delivery to the Thai Navy, with two of them presently with the squadron. These vessels will provide clearing power and will be able to augment patrol forces. The mine squadron practices almost continuously to improve its effectiveness. Thai forces presently include the MSC Ladya and MSC Bankeo (U. S. 297-class), and the MSF Phosampton, ex-HMS Ministrel.
The Patrol Squadron. The mission of the patrol squadron is the surveillance of the extensive Gulf coast and numerous islands. There are not sufficient ships and base support, however, for patrol of the Kra Peninsula’s western coast. These vessels are largely non-MAP supported and operated on a regular basis, but their frequency of sea exercises is limited by funding restrictions. The Force includes seven torpedo boats and assorted patrol craft.
The Service Squadron. These vessels provide amphibious lift for the well-trained and U. S.-equipped Royal Thai Marine Corps. The mission of the amphibious group is to support troop landings anywhere on the Gulf littoral. The squadron operates regularly, and recent exercises have proven its capability. LST/LSM launched LVTs provide assault capability for the Marines. The UDT and RTMC reconnaissance units are trained in Commando tactics. Remaining ships of the squadron provide sea training, island base replenishment and miscellaneous services for the fleet. Squadron units include two LSTs; three LSMs, three LSILs, six LCUs, and two YOs. The LST Chang, LSM Kram, LSILs Satakut and Prab and fleet oiler Ko Samui make up the amphibious group of the service squadron and provide amphibious lift capability for the Royal Thai Marine Corps.
In addition, the Navy has an 870-ton surveying vessel, the Chanthara.
The Air Squadron. The Grumman Albatross amphibian of the Air Squadron provides a nucleus for development of an airborne Gulf patrol. Aircraft are assigned to patrol the Gulf as required by the Fleet covering both water areas and coastal regions.
Present Royal Thai Navy personnel strength is sufficient to support the operating forces and shore establishments, but deficiencies exist in the critical rate areas. In all, there are some 2,000 officers and 16,000 enlisted men in the Navy, and 130 officers and 3,200 enlisted men in the Marine Corps. Although a system of in-country schools staffed largely by graduates of USMAP training courses provides a regular input of technically trained men, personnel trained in the operation and maintenance of modern equipment found in certain of the fleet units must be developed via MAP training. Since inception of the Military Assistance Training Program, nearly 1,500 RTN personnel have received training abroad. The Navy’s use of school graduates has become more efficient in recent years to the point where improvements in fleet maintenance and quality of instruction at training centers is noticeable.
Officer Training. Eight kilometers from the Chao Phraya River’s bar stands the imposing classroom/administration building complex of the Royal Thai Naval Academy. The structures are new, having been dedicated in October 1964, and are a monument to the Thai sea service’s perseverance in building a navy. Until 1962, the final site of the academy was undetermined with strong pressures being exerted from some quarters to have the yard reestablished at Kled Kev, nearly 100 miles to the South on the Eastern shore of the Gulf. Under the leadership of RTN Commander-in-Chief Admiral Swasdi Bhutrianon and Captain (now Rear Admiral) Phandhum Thavivongs, a final decision was made in 1962 to erect modern buildings and overhaul the curriculum both to reflect that of the U. S. Naval Academy and to support the growing influx of U. S. equipment. Antiquated structures were razed and replaced by a million dollar complex complete with dormitory, classrooms, laboratories, and administrative offices. Older plant units such as the cadet club, swimming pool, observatory, and maintenance shops were retained.
Present brigade strength is 150 cadets, separated into five classes of 30 each, with completion of the curriculum requiring five years. First-year men are selected from the graduating class of the Thai Military Preparatory School in Bangkok where they spend two years preparing for the academy entrance examinations. The first four years of education include both naval science subjects and the classical disciplines of mathematics, general science, history, Thai, English, and engineering. The fifth year is devoted to specialization and practical application of studies, and further training at functional schools at the Sattahip-based fleet training center. The academy’s teaching methods include self- study, class recitation, periodic testing, and semester comprehensive examinations. As a holdover from the British system in vogue when the academy was established in the early 1900s, a clear split exists between line and engineering officers. The designation is made in the third year during which time the cadet choosing engineering begins to follow a course designed to prepare him for primary engineering billets.
The naval academy leadership is particularly zealous in developing the young cadets ability to apply his class study. One of the more effective methods practiced is the cruise system whereby prospective ensigns spend considerable time at sea manning the fleet’s warships. Sea periods are split into two cruises, one of 15-day duration with the ship remaining in the Gulf and the other lasting two months. During the latter cruise, cadets voyage to more distant shores, with recent cruises including the Philippines, Taiwan, and Burma.
Upon graduation, the Royal Thai Navy ensign has received five years of rather intensive training in gunnery, seamanship, navigation, marine engineering, together with mathematics, chemistry, physics, mechanical engineering, and the humanities. The next few years after graduation are spent afloat, with those designated as engineers serving in associated billets. A small percentage of officers are transferred to the Royal Thai Marine Corps for service with the regiment. Continued postgraduate education is afforded through the naval officer colleges which include the general line course, command and staff college, engineering college and senior officers college. Functional training in tactics, gunnery, engineering, and damage control is afforded at the naval dockyard in Dhonburi, the ordnance depot at Bangna, and the fleet training center, Sattahip.
Enlisted. Personnel voluntarily enlisting in the ratings are sent directly to the naval ratings school at Kled Kev on grounds adjacent to the recruit training center. A two-year curriculum is followed embracing both subjects relative to the rate concerned and general items designed to raise the educational level of the enlistee to the point where he may assimilate technical information.
Upon graduation the man becomes a career petty officer. Periods of obligated duty are flexible, however, and a man may retire with as little as ten years’ service. The two most outstanding graduates of each class are given the opportunity to enter the military preparatory school. Draftees train for approximately 12 weeks at the recruit training center. This complex was constructed with MAP funds and is staffed by officers trained in U. S. recruit indoctrination procedures. The curriculum follows that of U. S. Navy’s recruit training centers. These men serve for a minimum of two years.
The fleet training center is part of the rapidly developing Sattahip Naval District. Facilities are not at present fully developed but do include classrooms and some equipment for teaching ASW, tactics, gunnery, basic damage control, and machinery repair. The fleet uses Sattahip for underway training, and the operating fleet depends upon the port facilities as a base. Facilities include a pier, an LST ramp and staging area, fuel depot, and water supply. The ship Repair Facility, Sattahip, has a capability very similar to that of a U. S. repair ship.
Vessels of the Royal Thai Navy’s operating fleet are required to be ready for sea on four hours notice and maintenance standards are improving. Although present regulations do not allow all ships to carry their ammunition allowance on board, certain ready duty units are fully armed and combat readiness is approaching acceptable standards. Although the Thai Navy has received considerable support through the Military Assistance Program, present advances have resulted primarily from the dynamic efforts of recent Thai naval leadership. The United States has grafted some bone and muscle into the Thai Navy through MAP; but what happens to this hardware in terms of proper usage to the end of combat preparedness is determined almost entirely by Thai naval leaders. Through vigorous leadership and close liaison with JUSMAG Navy Section personnel, know-how in operations and maintenance, techniques of modern management, and a limited input of modern equipment have been made a part of the Royal Thai Navy. The fleet’s present capability includes being able to clear the approaches to the Chao Phraya, patrol Gulf islands and the remote Gulf coastline, and provide sea lift for the marines. Amphibious shipping can transport an assault battalion to any part of the Gulf. If war should come, outside support would be required, but forces in being could stand and deliver and give a good account while awaiting help from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
The Royal Thai government has embraced SEATO and remains fully committed to the terms of its charter. Army field forces have regularly participated in combined exercises, but scarcity of operating funds has precluded any large naval involvement. U. S./Thai bilateral Operations Jungle Drums I, II, and III involving elements of the Seventh Fleet amphibious force, the Royal Thai Navy, and Marine Corps have been held, with the last exercise being completed in the Narathiwat/Pattani area of the Kra Peninsula during March 1965.
The threat of sea lane interdiction, whether by massive attack or guerrilla raid, continues to confront the Thai Navy; for the now peaceful beaches and sheltered islands of the Kra shoreline could one day become natural routes to Thailand’s hinterland.
Until recently, there were no vessels of the Royal Thai Navy involved in the conflict in Vietnam. But, on 5 May 1966, the Thai government announced that it was responding to a request from the government of South Vietnam, and that Thai naval vessels, initially an LST and a coastal patrol boat, were being sent to Vietnamese waters.
Another decade of war in Southeast Asia may find Royal Thai Navy warships steaming with our formations.