“Armed with powerful weapons and recent technology, the Navy of the U.S.S.R. has become a completely modern navy. It is capable of solving any problem put to it and can operate far from its shores and deliver decisive blows against important objectives deep in the territory of the enemy.”
This statement by Admiral Golovkov, First Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy would seem paradoxical in view of Khrushchev’s derogatory statements concerning navies. As early as 1956, during his trip to Britain with Bulganin, he remarked that cruisers were useful only for naval visits. Again during the Lebanon crisis in July 1958, he made veiled threats to reduce our carriers to steel coffins at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. A short while later, in a letter to President Eisenhower on the Far East situation, Khrushchev pointed out that “The heyday of surface navy power is over. In the age of nuclear and rocket weapons . . . these once formidable warships . . . can serve as targets for the right types of rockets.” During his visit to the United States in September 1959, he once again went out of his way to comment on the obsoleteness of cruisers.
This verbal smoke screen, like the Soviet interpretation of Marxist ideology, is designed to deceive. When Khrushchev’s statements are considered alongside Soviet naval developments, it becomes apparent that he has something else in mind when belittling our fleet and his cruisers. He was evidently irritated with the effective deployment of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets during periods of Communist-inspired crises. Behind Khrushchev’s facade of anti-naval remarks there is an impressive picture of a rapidly expanding Soviet naval force composed of modern aircraft and submarines designed to carry out the objectives of Communism.
Since Russia already possesses a large air force within her army, the question arises, why does a great land power with no overseas commitments, no essential foreign trade, and no aircraft carriers consider it essential to maintain in peacetime an operational land-based naval air arm of some 3,000 aircraft, second only to U. S. naval aviation?
This is indeed a pertinent question especially in view of the publicity in both the United States and the Soviet Union concerning nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation. Also, we have Khrushchev’s boast, while talking of disarmament, “We have stockpiled such a quantity of rockets . . .250 from one factory alone . . . and so many atomic and hydrogen warheads that if attacked we shall be able to raze to the ground all our potential enemies. ...” A month later this threat was substantiated by the announcement of the reduction of armed forces and the placement of primary reliance on a superior missile capability.
Against this background, a build-up of Soviet naval aviation might well be considered perplexing and unwarranted. There are logical reasons, however, for believing that the U.S.S.R. has a definite need for a strong naval air arm. Contrary to Khrushchev’s boasts, the Soviets realize that their land-launched missiles cannot prevent an attack from the sea. For example U. S. nuclear-powered, missile-launching submarines and carrier strike forces present elusive targets capable of inflicting crippling retaliatory blows on the U.S.S.R. There are good indications that Soviet naval forces—including long-range naval aircraft—would attempt to seek out and destroy such targets.
Trends and Developments
Soviet naval aviation’s position in the military defense structure has not always been a favorable one. In fact, its development during the past 45 years has been rather tortuous. As early as 1912, the Imperial Russian Navy, like other navies, began to show a practical interest in aviation. Progress was slow, however, and there was little real appreciation of the future strategic and tactical possibilities of the aircraft. By August 1914, the air component of the Russian Navy consisted of some 50 Curtiss seaplanes from the United States. During World War I, this small contingent was used mainly to back up the Russian Army Air Force, and some of the Navy pilots flew advanced 4-engined bombers designed by Igor Sikorsky. The defeat in World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the establishment of Communist power in Russia left the Russian Navy at a very low ebb, its ships antiquated and only a few aircraft in flyable condition.
From the outbreak of the Revolution until about 1921, naval aviation almost ceased to exist. After the Revolution' and until 1925, it was gradually built up to a maximum of approximately 400 seaplanes. It was the Soviets’ intention before World War II to re-equip with ship-borne aircraft and seaplanes. This modernization plan was part of their endeavor to become a major maritime power, but it did not materialize, and 1941 found the Soviets without suitable naval aircraft. At the time of the German attack, the Soviet Navy had mainly land-based aircraft of the same type as those used by the tactical air force.
Soviet World War II operations were marked by a failure to make even mediocre use of available naval forces. Naval aviation expended most of its efforts in joint operations with the Army Air Force in tactical engagements against the German Army and the German Air Force. A few naval fighter units were used for the defense of ports and shore installations and later gave much-needed air support to the Allied convoys as they neared Murmansk and Archangel with supplies vital to the Soviet war effort.
At the war’s end, Soviet naval aviation had a sizeable force-in-being with approximately 2,500 aircraft. All these were piston types and, with the exception of a few hundred seaplanes, were the same World War II variety of aircraft as used in support of Soviet Army operations.
In rebuilding their Navy the Soviets were faced with the serious question of the direction which their postwar naval policy should take. Notwithstanding the advent of the nuclear bomb, it was concluded that staying power in a war of attrition was responsible for securing Soviet victory against Germany and would continue to be fundamental in any future war.
The Soviet postwar building program emphasized the construction of submarines, cruisers, and destroyers. Aircraft carriers were rejected as being too vulnerable. Their lack was compensated for by the implication that in the Black and Baltic Seas and Pacific coastal areas, naval air cover could be provided by shore-based aircraft, thus assuring Soviet naval forces superiority in these areas. Admiral Alafuzov’s writings in 1946 recognized the importance of local naval air superiority and the mistakes the Germans had made in not providing a strong naval air arm in support of naval operations. Soviet thinking at that time could be summed up as centering on a navy large enough to dominate, under land-based naval air cover, the sea approaches to the Soviet Union.
The immediate postwar period, however, was slow in bringing forth any improvement in naval aviation. In fact, a setback was experienced as a result of the incorporation of the Navy, including naval aviation, and the Army into a single Ministry of Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. During the era of a single Ministry of Armed Forces, 1946 to 1950, the Soviets attached primary importance to the Army. As a result, naval aviation, which remained under naval control both administratively and operationally, did little more than mark time.
In 1947, naval aviation consisted of approximately 2,000 aircraft, a slight decrease in its immediate postwar strength. And by late 1949, while the strength of naval aviation had grown by some 1,000 aircraft, the force was still not modernized.
In 1950, however, there came a radical change when the three branches of the Soviet armed forces received their own ministries. Naval aviation was placed under the direct control of the Naval Staff, partly because of the influence of Admiral Kuznetsov, toward whom Stalin was then very well disposed. It was during this period that the Western powers began to realize that the Soviet Navy as a whole was being expanded. Confirmation that naval aviation was to be modernized with jet aircraft was first provided at the July 1951 Soviet Air Day Show, when the Soviets displayed some of the Navy’s modern air equipment. During the display, two types of naval jet aircraft were presented. These were the twin-jet Bosun (TU-14) bomber, and the swept-wing Fagot (MIG-15) jet fighter. A twin-engined flying boat, Madge (BE-6), was also seen at that time.
By the end of 1951, nearly half the fighter strength of Soviet naval aviation consisted of jet types, and conversion was continuing at an accelerated rate. Conversion to twin-jet Bosuns and Beagles (IL-28) among the naval light bomber and mine/torpedo units followed closely fighter modernization. Jet conversion in naval air reconnaissance units was also initiated with some reconnaissance regiments continuing to utilize seaplanes and other smaller piston-engine aircraft. Fighter and light bomber units continued to re-equip, and by the mid-Fifties, both fighter and light bomber units had completed conversion to jet aircraft.
In March 1953, the Navy was once more merged with the other services into a single ministry, the Ministry of Defense, headed by Marshal Bulganin. The Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces was Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. As such, he was one of the three First Deputies directly subordinate to Defense Minister Bulganin. Following this reorganization, naval forces in the Far East were again placed under one command as they were prior to 1947.
The year 1953 was also important in other significant respects. Not only was the Navy reorganized, but also important trends became apparent following Stalin’s death in 1953. Admiral Alafuzov’s strategy, backed by Stalin, was brought under scrutiny and dissenters began to be heard. During Malenkov’s reign (March 1953 to February 1954), doctrinal debates concerning the influence of nuclear warfare on military science raged in the Soviet press. Khrushchev apparently settled the matter, because a new line began to appear in the Soviet military press. Captain Shavtsov and Admiral Vladmirsky were among the first to promulgate the new policy. Vladmirsky concluded in Komsomol Pravda that the U.S.S.R. needed a “defense which prepares itself to be master over all types of weapons, all media of warfare and all methods of warfare which exist or can be used by the enemy.” The only element of Alafuzov’s policy that was retained was the axiom that air supremacy is essential to command of the sea. Cruisers were no longer considered primary, and new construction was halted; smaller ships armed with missiles were to be emphasized, and the submarine continued to be the prime naval weapon.
Since naval aviation’s role was still highly regarded in the new policy, modernization continued unabated. New jet aircraft including Farmer (MIG-19) day fighters and Flashlight (YAK-25) all-weather fighters were introduced into naval aviation units. Also, the replacement of Fagots by Frescos (MIG-17) and the limited, all-weather fighter, Fresco-D, continued.
The Soviet Navy has been pictured with Badger (TU-16) twin-jet bombers in the press, so that it is assumed that these are specially adapted to naval work, such as long-range reconnaissance, anti-shipping tasks with homing missiles, and co-operation with distant submarines. In this connection, Komet air-to-ground guided missiles have been mentioned with a range of about 50 miles. The assignment of medium bombers to Soviet naval aviation extends maritime strike and reconnaissance capabilities and provides a suitable carrier for air-to-surface missiles.
The Soviets have also given publicity to an ASW innovation. It consists of a small Hen (KA-15) helicopter to be operated from the fantail of a Kotlin-class destroyer. Pictures in Soviet newspapers show a special platform from which the helicopter operates. Statements indicate that they are to be used in hunting and destroying submarines.
Concept and Philosophy
From the foregoing it is apparent that naval aviation in the U.S.S.R. has not developed along the same lines as U. S. naval aviation. In contrast to the U. S. Navy’s carrier-based forces, Soviet naval aviation is a land-based force with emphasis on fighter defense and long-range jet reconnaissance bombers to extend the air coverage for its growing, far-ranging submarine forces.
Naval aviation is organized as an integral element of the Soviet Navy, independent from the other components of military aviation. In the Soviet Navy, over-all technical and administrative control is vested in the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Aviation, General Colonel Preobrazhenskiy. He is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, who in turn is responsible to the Minister of Defense.
Principal subdivisions in the organization of naval aviation are fleet air forces, air divisions, and air regiments. Fleet air forces are attached to each of the four major surface fleets: the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Sea Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Pacific Fleet.
The role of naval aviation with respect to sea power in present Soviet strategy should be of more than passing concern to U. S. Navy planners. Soviet writings in naval and aviation publications have provided some indication of current naval thinking on this subject. In addition, the equipment itself and its capabilities gives an insight into the role it is to play. Of significance is the fact that naval aircraft have not been designed for specific naval requirements; instead Air Force equipment is used.
Although the Soviets continue to be essentially a land power, they have gradually come to recognize the importance of enemy sea communications and the importance of attacking these communications in case of war. Thus a change in concept of naval strategy was assured when Air Marshal Vershinin, in a 1957 Pravda article, conveyed the official propaganda line. “The Soviet Navy is equipped with all modern weapons and is capable not only of defending the sea frontiers of the state but also of destroying the naval forces of the enemy on seas and oceans and striking powerful blows at targets situated in other continents.” This view left no doubt that the Navy’s role had been widened to include deployment against enemy fleets and home targets. More specifically, Admiral Gorshkov pointed out the importance of naval aviation in the new concept when he remarked that “World War II proved that navies need integral aviation. The U. S. Navy is the leader in this respect, but the Soviet Navy is working hard to develop naval aviation.”
An article by Colonel Lapenin in Soviet Aviation, June 1958, throws some light on recent Soviet thoughts on the continued importance of aviation despite the advent of missiles. The article stated that “Soviet military theory holds that a modern war is won by the combined effort of all arms and services, none of which replace or preclude the other, but are instead considered complementary.” In emphasizing the importance of a mix of flexible weapons and the continuing vital role of conventional aviation, Colonel Lapenin went on to criticize U. S. planners for “their emphasis on strategic air power and long-range rocket weapons as the most decisive weapons of modern warfare.” He concluded by saying that “aviation continues to change qualitatively and in modern war it will play a highly important role.”
Against this background, the Soviets’ philosophy of naval warfare has broadened from the World War II role of operations supporting ground forces and protecting naval shore installations. Sea operations are now characterized by the conduct of combat operations over great distances with selected targets and, especially important, with the mass participation of underwater forces and naval aviation. These operations seek to undermine the military and military-economic power of the enemy, which determines their importance in the armed conflict. Today, submarine and aviation forces are the main elements useful for such operations in the Soviet Navy. In consonance with the Soviet Navy’s over-all strategy for warfare, it is apparent from the foregoing that naval aviation will have an important role in any future limited or all-out conflict.
Training
Although naval aviation training is realistic, there is much emphasis on tradition and veneration for the naval “heroes of the Soviet Union.” Pilots and crew members are continually harangued by newspaper and magazine articles exhorting them to improve their skills and give their all in strengthening the defense capability of the motherland.
We are told that the sea is considered the basic field of battle for all flyers of Soviet naval aviation; therefore, flight training for the most part is scheduled over water. In the operational training period the greatest importance is attached to flying in bad weather and at night. This forces the flying personnel to perfect their navigation and naval knowledge. Recognition is also stressed, and pilots are taught to identify classes and types of ships and to be prepared to employ the correct tactic in striking targets at sea.
The latest jet aircraft and equipment are used in torpedo and mining exercises conducted against target buoys towed by minesweepers. Exercises have been described consisting of drops while flying at great altitudes and speeds. Co-ordination with torpedo boats is also effected as described in a 1959 Soviet Fleet article, which stated, “Reconnaissance aircraft sighted an ‘enemy’ ship and radioed the latter’s position. A subsection of torpedo boats was ordered to intercept the ship. . . . The boats outmaneuvered the ‘enemy’ ship and successfully torpedoed it.”
Soviet naval pilots are exhorted to act in combat with boldness, determination, and initiative. Their instructions read, “Before nearing enemy ships torpedo-carrying aircraft must be ready to repel attacks of enemy fighters, and in the target area they must break through the enemy’s barrage of antiaircraft fire. Moreover, they must carry out the combat assignment and destroy the target in spite of all difficulties.” The necessity of striving to deliver a first destructive blow to the enemy and thus paralyze his resistance is stressed to Soviet pilots.
Aerial minelaying by night is another aspect included in the training of the naval aviator, and the use of radar is indicated. “Over the target a wide-view receiver permits a clear image of the ground surface. It is necessary to find the target and drop a mine on the first run. With the target appearing as a bright spot on the radar scope, the release button is pressed and the mine falls to the surface of the water,” say the instructions. Other simulated exercises include reconnaissance in support of submarines conducting torpedo attacks against surface targets.
High speed aerial tow-targets are used in the training of naval fighter pilots. These targets make possible high speed gunnery exercises by simulating conditions which would be encountered in aerial combat. The Soviets’ interest in all-weather fighter interception is evidenced by statements to the effect that “interception at night is possible under any condition, provided ground control interception is accurate and well coordinated, and the pilot is well schooled in such operations.”
Over-water flying in the Soviet Navy is given considerable attention. When a long-range flight is being carried out on the high seas and at high altitude, pilots are taught celestial navigation. In perfecting their submarine reconnaissance role, exercises are carried out far over the sea in search of ‘enemy’ forces. A statement on one such exercise said, “The reconnaissance plane was carrying out orders to find a detachment of ‘enemy’ ships headed toward the coast, to determine the nature of the ships’ movements, and to transmit this information immediately by radio. The navigator, watched his radar screen for any sign of the ‘enemy.’ Finally, blips of the ships appeared on the radar. When necessary calculations had been made and the finished information transmitted, submarines were directed to the area and successfully attacked the detachment of ‘enemy’ ships.” These exercises are but a small indication of the increased emphasis that is being placed on the introduction of long-range aircraft into naval aviation units.
In view of the threat to the U.S.S.R. of nuclear-powered, missile-launching submarines, increased interest in new ASW weapons and tactics has been apparent in the press. A recent article in Soviet Fleet revealed the new job that helicopters are now performing from destroyers. “Helicopters have for some time been used in the Navy to deliver mail, accomplish communications, and reconnaissance between ships and shore. But today, the helicopter personnel of sub-unit ‘N’ have another task. They fly on bombing missions. The pilots have been taught to adapt skillfully the low-speed machine for flights along difficult routes in search and pursuit of underwater ‘enemy’ submarines, for bombing of underway naval targets, and accomplishment of reliable shore communications with the sea. Helicopters take off and set courses toward the sea. There they deliver a bombing blow on the ships of the ‘enemy.’ ”
Capabilities
The ability of Soviet naval aviation to carry out long-range, antishipping operations and attacks against enemy surface and subsurface forces is limited only by the type and number of long-range jet aircraft currently assigned. However, any of the Soviet Union’s vast fleet of aircraft assigned to other air forces, including long-range jet and turboprop aircraft, such as Bison and Bear, conceivably could be assigned to these operations by the high command, even as planes of the German Luftwaffe were ordered unexpectedly on antishipping missions in World War II. There are, however, certain drawbacks to this possibility as evidenced by the German Navy’s dissatisfaction with air arrangements in World War II. This may be the very reason the Soviets are assigning long-range aircraft to naval aviation.
The Soviets today possess air bases both in the U.S.S.R. and in the satellites, from which they could launch attacks by light jet bombers on shipping and naval forces in the English Channel, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and upon every port in northwestern Europe. Larger medium jet bombers could cover all of Europe and range out over the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean toward Iceland. It would be prudent to anticipate that in the opening phase of a war, some of these aircraft could be launched despite efforts to destroy them. Once airborne, they would be in a position to carry out extensive minelaying operations in the approaches to principal ports with a view to the wholesale dislocation of shipping. The exits from the Baltic and Black Seas will be focal points in the Soviet war plans, and Soviet naval aircraft will undoubtedly have a large share in the attempt to maintain control of these narrow waters.
Turning south to the Mediterranean area, it is only necessary to draw a circle of 700 miles radius from a point in southern Bulgaria to realize that light jet bombers Beagle and Bosun can reach most of Italy, and cover much of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas. Longer range Badger jets could extend this coverage. The Persian Gulf and part of the Indian Ocean could be reached by mine-laying medium range jets. For the Soviet long-range bomber force, the scope of worthwhile targets in this area is enormously increased and covers the whole Persian Gulf, and, indeed, the Indian Ocean.
The situation in the Pacific with regard to the approaches to the South China Sea, East China Sea, Japanese Islands, Kurile Islands, and the Bering Sea indicates that the Communist air forces are well situated to make attacks on shipping in these areas. Soviet naval aviation, operating out of bases ranging from southern Chinese airfields northward to Arctic bases, has the capability of launching both light and long-range medium jet bomber attacks. In Japan alone, the entire island group could be reached by light jet bombers. So in general, providing the Soviets wish to commit sufficient air forces to harassment of shipping, the situation would parallel their capability of making the sea approaches to Europe a major battle area.
Soviet naval aviation is known to have an interest in the Arctic approaches to the U.S.S.R. and to have developed a capability for Arctic reconnaissance. Soviet naval units composed of both piston and jet aircraft have operated under severe Arctic all-weather conditions.
In Arctic areas, Soviet naval aircraft have been pictured operating from rolled snow runways. However, the operation of airfields in the Arctic is a complicated and costly matter. Snowstorms, fogs, and freezing weather make air operations difficult.
The present strike capability of Soviet naval aviation will improve with the continued growth of nuclear weapon stockpiles, increased transfers of large jet aircraft to naval aviation, and the availability of air-to-surface guided missiles for attacks against ships. It is likely that one of the main targets for Soviet naval long-range bomber attack in any future global conflict would be opposing nuclear-powered submarines firing intermediate range missiles armed with nuclear warheads such as the Polaris, and also aircraft carriers from which nuclear bombing strikes could be flown. These mobile ship targets cannot be dealt with by long-range missile attacks and will call for the development of bomber-reconnaissance techniques. For this reason, the Soviet Navy’s long-range jet bomber force presents a growing major threat to the U. S. Navy. More than ever the aircraft carrier and its high performance aircraft will be needed to protect the sea lanes of communication of the Western powers.
In view of the future threat to the U.S.S.R. of nuclear-powered, missile-launching sub marines, a build-up in the Soviets’ aerial ASW capability has already been evidenced. Their concern with this phase of naval warfare can be expected to increase rapidly as the threat becomes more serious to their security. Future Soviet ASW capabilities will be enhanced by the introduction of specialized aircraft and equipment, similar to the U. S. Navy’s P3V, and by the increased employment of helicopters, both piloted and remote controlled, in an ASW role.
The progress displayed by Soviet naval aviation during the recent decade indicates that the Soviets recognize air power as an integral and vital component of naval power. With the conversion to jet aircraft, Soviet naval aviation has greatly improved its capability for defense of seaward areas and shore installations against enemy naval, amphibious, or air strikes. Even more important is the fact that Soviet naval aviation is breaking with its traditional role as an extention of the Army’s flank and a sentinel for coastal areas and land-locked seas, and is striving to develop an offensive capability.
Mr. Barker served in aviation and intelligence billets while on active duty in the Navy from 1942 to 1946. He has attended the U. S. Naval War College. This is his fourth contribution to the Proceedings. Many of his articles on naval aviation have appeared in other publications and he has been a contributing editor for Naval Aviation News for the last ten years.
★
Forced Attrition
Between World Wars, a commission was sent to a European country to study the personnel practices that had produced such an outstanding Officer Corps.
When the study group reached the subject of officer classification and assignment, the record shows the following discussion:
Q. “Now how do you classify your officers?”
A. “A very simple system. We grade them in two major categories as being either Stupid or Brilliant and either Lazy or Energetic.”
Q. “And how do you use these classifications in developing career patterns for your officers?”
A. “Quite simple. The Brilliant-Energetic officers are channeled into Staff Duties. The Brilliant-Lazy officers are kept in Command billets to keep the Staff Officers from going too far and too fast. The Stupid-Lazy Officers we find make good troop leaders. They are closer to the men and don’t have the imagination and ambition to exceed the limits of their orders. It works quite well.”
Q. “But you have left out the Stupid-Energetic category.”
A. “Oh . . . We shoot them as soon as they are identified.”
——Contributed by Captain L. C. Savage, U. S. Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $5.00 for each anecdote accepted for publication in the Proceedings.)