This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Target Drones
(See pages 1093-1097, October, 1957 Proceedings)
Commander J. N. MacInnes, usnr.— Commander George Cornelius is to be congratulated on his article, “The Reconnaissance Drone.” He has stressed a tactical application of drones. There remains the story of the target drone, the aerial target which is the major item of instrumentation for defensive weapons systems. Obviously, the ultimate target for any weapon is the enemy. But, not knowing the enemy nor having access to his attack forms, pilotless aircraft, or drones, must substitute on the firing ranges. In the development of a weapons system, in its testing phase, in its evaluation phase, and later in the crew training and proficiency phases, drones are the target. Depending on the phase, drone requirements vary, small to large, slow to fast, low altitude to high. Even in drones, there is an ultimate; it is the target drone which perfectly simulates the enemy vehicle it represents.
With the advent of jet aircraft speeds following World War II, it soon became apparent that existing drones of that period were unrealistic targets for air defense weapons systems. Then current, but war-weary, aircraft were converted to drones. These were interim targets awaiting the development and testing of high-speed, high-altitude, jet drone target aircraft. These, and small piston-engine drones were used, and are still used, in those phases of weapons system phasing where their capabilities suffice. The F6F-5K (ex-Hellcat), the P4Y-2K (ex-Privateer), the QB-17 (ex- l ortress), have all sacrificed themselves in their old age as target drones.
While waiting for the proper target drone, some “guided missiles” such as Loon and Kegulus have served as targets. However, as targets, their cost is prohibitive and, except for rare requirements, their use as targets is little contemplated. A recent addition to the list of converted aircraft is the F9F-6K (exCougar) which, while giving faster and higher performance, will also have limited use because of cost and inherent operational dangers.
Jet speed has made the well-known “sleeve” obsolete and, though it is still used, its use is rapidly decreasing. A towed dart has been devised to allow towing at higher speeds, but lack of maneuverability and the fact that some missile might “home” on the towing plane has limited its use.
The proven weapons of fleet air defense, the anti-aircraft gun, the fighter aircraft, have now been joined by the missiles, both surface- to-air and air-to-air. Whatever the weapons system, the most essential and common element in development, training, and proficiency is the targetvehicle. With visual acquisition of the target a thing of the past, and because of the inherent limitations of positive identification by radar or other control systems, the practice target must be a drone. By aloneness, it provides identification. By speed- altitude capabilities and maneuverability, it provides realism.
The present answer is the jet target drone which has recently been made operational. The Ryan KDA-1 (Firebee) possesses substantially improved performance over previous target drones. It is a radio-controlled, jet- propelled, recoverable unmanned aircraft, which has a performance capability of 500 knots at 30,000 feet and an endurance of over 45 minutes. It is less than half the size of current fighter aircraft and is produced for about one-twentieth the cost. Ancillary devices are added to compensate for its diminutive size, providing needed visual, radar, or other acquisition needs. It is air-launched, recovered by a parachute system, and is reusable. It provides the freedom of movement and maneuverability that the towed target never could. It can simulate the enemy in many modes of offensive and defensive behavior. It has the speed and altitude capabilities currently needed, and the endurance on station over the gunnery range which allows a firing exercise to be completed.
The KDA-1 is now being flown by utility squadrons on both coasts servicing the Naval Air Forces and soon to service the surface forces. A KDA-2, of increased performance, is currently under test and evaluation; production plans are under development. The operations, gunnery and training officers who have long begged for realistic targets for weapons practice may now have the target they wanted.
One of the major headaches of anti-aircraft gunnery practice has been the ever-present apprehension that the towing or control aircraft might be mistaken for the target; and it has been done. An outstanding characteristic of the jet target drone is its independence, its freedom of movement, its aloneness, its positive identity. An airborne control system has been developed which releases the KDA-1 from the tether of visual control and allows a genuine out-of-sight radio control from fifty or sixty miles away. Thus, the old fear of hitting the wrong target is dissipated. This method involves the use of a P2V-5FD aircraft. Modified to launch the drone, control it by radio from plots obtained from the plane’s own radar, and assist the firing aircraft or surface ships in “locking-on” target, the P2V-5FD’s conduct the entire exercise except the drone retrieval.
The KDA-1 parachute recovery system allows the recovery of the drone even though it may be damaged by gunnery or missile firings. Thus, not only is reuse assured, but post-firing analysis is possible. If the drone retrieval HUS-1 helicopter is not available, retrieval by boats such as AVR’s or ATF’s is possible. Once retrieved, the drone is flushed with fresh water to “decontaminate” the salt water effects, disassembled for inspection, reassembled, ground-checked, and is then ready to fly again.
Most of our surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles have been designed with one enemy in mind, which means that their guidance or homing equipment is planned for a normal- size fighter or bomber. Being much smaller, the KDA-1 offers a real challenge to the weapons designers. Moreover, it provides an even more important function, a measurement of the combat readiness status and effectiveness of the weapons system. If the missile can hit the small, fast Firebee, then surely it can hit the bigger enemy fighter or bomber. However, in all fairness, this is not a legitimate test of the missile, hence ancillary devices are added to the KDA-1. The radar reflective area of the drone is increased by the addition of radar reflecting devices for those missiles which use radar for guidance or homing. Smoke generators or flashing lights are added for visual needs.
Missiles equipped with practice warheads have been known to hit and knock these devices from the wing-tips without serious damage to the drone. Ruggedly constructed, the KDA-1 has been known to survive actual fragmentation hits from a missile explosive charge, continuing on its flight to be recovered by its parachute and flown another day. In fact, it is reported that Firebee target drones have made as many as seventeen or eighteen exercise flights before becoming “target weary.”
Obviously, the use of jet drone targets will not guarantee a sure-fire air defense; the problem involves more than practice firing alone. They will, however, be invaluable in the extensive refinement of weapons use in fleet air defense and will fulfill the long-time need for a realistic target.
What of the future? The jet engine will be improved, speeds will increase; but the target drones will be up there ready for sacrifice so that fleet air defense may keep pace with the performances of the airborne vehicles they must combat.
An Engineer’s Candied Comment
(See pages 49-56, February, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain W. J. Buckley, usn.—Admiral McCandless’s article “The Battle of the Pips” brings to mind an incident that occurred in the Nevada during D-Day at Attu. Prior to going to General Quarters, all hands had been issued battle rations that included two bars of candy. While we were conducting the bombardment, the fathometer began indicating rapidly decreasing depths in an area charted with no obstructions. Suddenly an emergency back full was rung up in the engine rooms. Fortunately an obstruction was avoided and in a few minutes the delighted Captain announced over the 1 and 2 MC circuits, “Well done to the engineers for the quick response to that back bell.” A moment later, an unidentified voice from the port engine room came over the 21 MC saying, “Tell the old man we could really back down for two more bars of pogey bait.”
Scapa Flow
Captain Eric S. Brand, rn (ret.).—Mr. Wettern’s article was of particular interest to any one of the many who knew Scapa Flow ln either World War. There is, however, one slight correction which I beg leave to offer.
Mr. Wettern states that “forty-eight hours after war was declared in 1914, the Grand Fleet sailed for Scapa.” Actually the Home Fleet sailed from Portland Harbour in the English Channel on the morning of Wednesday, July 29, and first anchored in the northeast corner of the Flow off Scapa Pier on the evening of July 31. The butchers of the Fleet were landed that evening and a large number of Orkney sheep were purchased and slaughtered by them during the night to provide fresh meat for the Fleet next morning. The weekend was spent preparing the ships for war, hauling up their smaller boats on Scapa Beach, and mounting 12-pounders from the Fleet to defend the entrance to Hoxa Sound.
The Fleet put to sea on the morning of August 4, under the command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, whose appointment as Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet had just taken effect. When war was declared, the Fleet was making a sweep of the North Sea. The Fleet anchorage at the southwest corner of the Flow which provided a better lee was not used until three or four months after the outbreak of war.
With regard to the preparation of the base for the Second War, in January, 1938, I took over the appointment of Chief Staff Officer to the Rear Admiral Commanding Coast of Scotland. At that time Scapa was considered a secondary anchorage, Rosyth the main fleet base designate. The Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, however, considered that in view of the increasing danger of air attack his Fleet would be safer in Scapa farther away from German air bases. Consequently a defense scheme for Scapa as the main fleet base was drafted early in 1938, but little or nothing was done to implement it until after the Munich crisis during which the Commander-in-Chief took his fleet from Rosyth to Scapa. Rear Admiral Coast of Scotland was able to get communications both with and within the base improved and to make some renovation and additions to the old storehouses and accommodation at Ly- ness.
Mr. Wettern is right when he says that “When once more it (Scapa) was required for the fleet, it was obvious that there was much to be done before it could be regarded as a reasonably secure base.” This had certainly been obvious to the Coast of Scotland Command for some time, but in the scramble for priorities during the last year of peace many essential projects had to go short.
* * *
The St. Louis was one of three Allied cruisers damaged in the Battle of Kolombangara.
Japanese “Long Lance” Torpedoes
(See page 53, February, 1958 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral W. L. Ainsworth, usn (ret.).—Rear Admiral Bruce McCandless, in his “The Battle of the Pips,” makes the following statement. “Believing the enemy force consisted of vessels whose principal threat was the terribly destructive 24-inch ‘long lance’ torpedo, Admiral Giffen decided to fight initially at ranges in the vicinity of 20,000 yards; there his ships could make full use of their ability to fire in full radar control and largely if not entirely stay out of enemy torpedo range.” As a basis for this discussion, the date, July 26, 1943, is of great interest to me, since two and three weeks earlier the Task Group under my command twice had been damaged by “long lance” torpedo fire. In contrast to our torpedoes at this time, the Japanese “long lances” had about twice the explosive effect and at ranges of 20,000 yards had an advantage in knots of about 45 to 27.
McCandless’ article would lead one to believe that Admiral Giffen knew something about these Japanese torpedo characteristics in July, 1943. We in the Solomons did not and I do not think Giffen did either. The facts cited in this discussion will, I believe, support my assumption.
From the huge wounds in the Saratoga and other ships we had evidence of the terrific punch packed by the Japanese warhead, but, to the best of my knowledge, there were no intelligence reports extant in 1943 upon the superior range and speed characteristics of these torpedoes. In fact, I do not think we knew until after the end of the war that they had used oxygen instead of air in their torpedo flasks.
Although Intelligence was very much alive to the importance of information about these torpedoes, the first report to mention “unbelievable” speeds came as a result of the Kula Gulf action in which the Helena was hit by three Japanese torpedoes and sunk. A tissue over-lay plot of this action was sent to Cin- CPac by air with a personal report to amplify the dispatch and provide Intelligence information we thought they should have in advance of official reports. This plot was found to be remarkably accurate when confirmed by Japanese sources after the war. Actually, we underestimated their torpedo speeds as 40 knots, whereas they had run them at 45 to hit the Helena.
There was an exchange of dispatches subsequent to each of the Kula Gulf actions, between myself, as Task Force Commander, and CinCPac. Admiral Nimitz displayed a keen interest in all matters involving enemy capabilities and he insisted on co-ordination of his “team” in order that he might be kept fully informed. Later analysis of these actions confirmed these preliminary reports. However, as good as our Fleet Intelligence proved to be, I do not believe they were able to distribute any information on Japanese “long lance” characteristics in time to influence Admiral Giffen’s tactics in his Aleutian campaign.
Freeing a Stranded Ship
(See pages 987-989, September, 1957 Proceedings)
Teniente de Fragata Carlos E. Zart- mann, Argentine Navy.—Perhaps it will be interesting for Mr. O’Donnell to know that his method of freeing a stranded ship was used somewhere else. In July, 1951, the Argentine training vessel Pueyrredon, an old armored cruiser of the nineties, sailing with the midshipmen of my Naval Academy class from Stockholm to Copenhagen, ran aground in the Drogden Sound, off the latter port. The pulling efforts of three tugs and the ship’s engines couldn’t get the 6,000-ton veteran off the reef. After many hours of failure, the First Lieutenant conceived the idea of employing ship’s personnel to free the Pueyrredon. He called the entire complement forward, all men loaded with full equipment of hammocks and sea bags, then directed them to run from starboard to port and back, directing the maneuver by whistle calls from the bridge. Soon the ship began to roll and a few minutes later was pulled free by the tugs.
(Editor’s Note: Teniente de Fragata Zartmann has donated his check for this comment to the Navy- Marine Corps Memorial Stadium Fund.)
Comments on “The Sea War in Korea”
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, usn (ret.). — The Sea War in Korea is semi-official history, written by regular officers of the Navy. The work is notable in this fact alone for it marks the return to the practice of professional officers writing their own history, something which has not been done since Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, usn, wrote the definitive history of the War with Spain. A naval history of World War f has yet to be written and for World War II the job was turned over to outsiders. The Navy at last seems to have gotten over its inferiority complex and has put its historiography back in the hands of professional officers, where it belongs.
The most important chapters in this book are those on mine warfare, for they record a defeat and some salutary lessons for the U. S. Navy. In October, 1950, off Wonsan on the east coast of Korea, a naval amphibious force with two divisions embarked, and supported by four carriers, had to ignominiously wait for a week while a pitiful handful of minesweepers struggled with 3,000 mines laid mostly from sampans by North Korean fishermen. Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith shocked the Pentagon with his message, “The U. S. Navy has lost control of the sea in Korean waters.”
Our navy has always had a fetish for big ships and for operations in the open sea. Jobs >n amphibious warfare, in hydrographic surveying, and in mining have been second class billets compared with carrier, cruiser, and destroyer commands. The Marines did force an interest in amphibious operations on the Navy but there was no comparable incentive to keep up training in mining and surveying after World War II. The result was that in Korea the U. S. Navy was defeated in mine warfare and had to depend on the British for its hydrographic surveying. The Korean War demonstrated that our naval forces did not know how to work inshore and had not equipped itself with the small craft necessary for such work. It is to be doubted if the lessons have been well learned.
The Korean War did prove the superiority of the Navy-Marine system of ground-controlled air support of troops over the air controller system used by the U. S. Air Force. The acid test of the two systems came in the retreat from North Korea in December, 1950. Naval and Marine aviation supported the Xth Corps in northeastern Korea. Its retreat became an operation of such magnificence that it has earned a place in American military tradition. The retreat of the Eighth Army from northwestern Korea was a rout. The difference, in a large measure, lay in the air support.
The U. S. Navy received very valuable experience in the withdrawal of the Xth Corps from Wonsan and Hungnam. This was something our Navy had not been called upon to do in World War II. One could wish however that the authors had not succumbed to the American habit of semantic falsehood by continually referring to this withdrawal as a “redeployment.” In fact this withdrawal was not necessary; Wonsan could have been held, but either GHQ in Japan had less of an appreciation of martime strategy than it boasted or else another Pusan perimeter was feared. Korea reverted to the Italian type of peninsula war. Our Marine divisions became bogged down in Korean mountains and our Navy spent its substance in shore bombardments and air strikes. For these reasons the second half of the book containing the naval operations from 1951 to 1953 is hardly worth reading. It could be all summed up in one sentence. The communist enemies were tough.
The most important maritime contribution in the Korean War, logistic support, is barely mentioned. Fighting a war at the end of a 5,000-mile supply line is “sea power” in its fullest manifestation, but the authors give this aspect of the war only a few lines at the end of the work.
The large number of long quotations in the book, many of them poorly edited, makes for difficult reading. On the other hand, this format has merit. Readers learn what the men who fought the war thought of it and future historians and political scientists will be grateful for this humble attitude of the authors. Their work will probably be used for source material and reference long after the smoother written histories of World War II. It does seem to this reviewer that the authors were captivated by the MacArthur charm, for there are some bad gaps in their analysis of the overall conduct of the combined operations.
Keep the “Arizona” in Commission
(See page 109, April, 1958 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral S. H. Ingersoll, usn.—I desire to take exception to Dr. Fruin’s comment on this subject. I cannot agree with his opinion that “There are literally hundreds of sunken hulls for which this practice would be just as appropriate.” I cannot understand why the connotations of this Memorial should be “unpleasant, disquieting, distressing, and somewhat embarrassing” to Captain Fruin. I cannot agree that the construction of this Memorial would be a ridiculous job from an engineering standpoint as the Doctor would seem to infer. I cannot agree with Dr. Fruin that an Arizona Memorial in the form of a library on the mainland would mean anything at all. If there is to be an Arizona Memorial, it must be right at the location of the Arizona with its entombed heroic dead.
World War II is long since over and I have no desire to perpetuate enmity or hatred. However, the fact still remains that December 7, 1941, is a day which Americans had best never forget. What happened on December 7, 1941, is indicative of what could happen at any time when a small fanatic group has control of a nation and its war-making powers. I think Americans had best remember Pearl Harbor, not out of hatred, but because eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.
I think an Arizona Memorial is a good idea, and I believe the Arizona should be kept in commission with the stars and stripes flying over it. Once this Memorial is completed, the American Battle Monuments Commission will be only too happy to maintain it. Americans in large numbers are already visiting the site of the Arizona, and countless Americans would visit the completed Memorial in the years to come. Many of these visitors will undoubtedly appreciate the symbolic significance of this battle monument—- and perhaps do a little reflective thinking.
In Praise of 1958 Prize Essay
(See pages 23-30, March, 1958 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Harley D. Wilbur, usn.— Commander Williams’ essay does much to clarify the position of seapower in the over-all fabric of our national defense forces. It seems to me that he has not discovered basically new principles, but rather has successfully adapted Mahan’s theories to the nuclear missile age.
There is a dangerous tendency in our current national thought to seek a panacea for all our defense problems. With the coming of the hydrogen bomb such thinking naturally turned to airpower for its answers, but with the advent of long-range guided missiles it would seem that the proponents of land- based air as a war deterrent have had their day. The essay effectively demonstrates that the pouring of ever-increasing billions of dollars into large bombers and the tremendous fixed facilities required to support them is leading us to fiscal insolvency without providing the protection we need. Yet we must beware of the pitfall of offering seapower as the new panacea. The essay’s critical point is that while we need an effective deterrent to general war which can fit within a reasonable budget, we also need forces that can handle small wars, and we need loyal allies outside the western hemisphere. The achievement of this threefold objective in national security policy demands a balanced military force. We need airpower, landpower, and most certainly seapower. But by all means, we must avoid the “eggs in one basket” philosophy that searches for the one clear solution to all our problems. There is no single solution to the long term problem of security. Conditions and requirements change continually, and we must keep our thinking flexible enough to meet new situations, or face stagnation and destruction.