Isthmian Canal Policy Rooted in History
The Panama Canal, opened to traffic on August 15, 1914, is an interoceanic public utility for the transit of vessels of commerce and war of all nations on terms of equality as provided by treaty. The history of this undertaking is epic.
The idea of its construction traces back more than four centuries. The development of it includes extensive explorations, grave crises, and weighty decisions. Out of these the Isthmian Canal Policy of the United States gradually evolved. Yet, despite the vast literature on the canal question, nowhere are the principles of this policy comprehensively stated in one place, and they are not adequately understood. For these reasons a knowledge of key episodes of this important historical subject is essential.
The advantageous geographical position of the American Isthmus was recognized by the early Spanish who, within an incredibly short time after their arrival in 1502, explored its regions and reduced their fields of investigation to four main areas: Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, Panama, and Darien-Atrato.
Because of the lower continental divides at Panama and Nicaragua and penetration of the jungles there by river valleys, these two avenues quickly became the great rivals for trans-isthmian commerce. They are still potential rivals.
At Panama, mountainous terrain and torrential rivers, notably the Chagres, at first represented insuperable barriers to the construction of a canal. At Nicaragua, the existence of a large lake, with the then navigable San Juan River flowing from it into the Atlantic, reduced the magnitude of that undertaking simply to cutting across the narrow strip separating the lake from the Pacific. These facts undoubtedly supply the basis for the initial predilection of the United States in the 19th Century for a Nicaraguan canal.
Eventually, the control of the Nicaragua route became a focal point of international conflict, with Great Britain and the United States in a diplomatic deadlock. This difficulty was not removed until 1901, when the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty superseded the earlier Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which had deprived the United States of exclusive control of any Isthmian canal.
Pattern of Isthmian Canal Issues Evolves
Meanwhile, French interests under the dynamic leadership of Ferdinand de Lesseps had decided to construct a canal across the Isthmus. An International Congress for Consideration of an Interoceanic Canal met in Paris in 1879. There, this Congress wrestled with the difficult questions of selecting the best site and deciding on the best type. De Lesseps, the hero of Suez, (a simple sea-level canal), lent the full force of his prestige and his genius toward securing approval for a “sea-level” undertaking at Panama—a wholly different problem.
One engineer, the only one in that Congress who had adequately studied the geography of Isthmian regions and grasped their significance, when he saw the trend toward decision for the “sea-level” type, rose in strong protest.
He understood the topography at Nicaragua and how its elevated lake, 105.5' high, would contribute toward the construction and operation of a canal there. He knew the surface features at Panama—the continental divide about ten miles from the Pacific, the torrential Rio Obispo-Chagres flowing into the Atlantic, and the smaller Rio Grande into the Pacific, both through contiguous valleys suitable for the formation of lakes. Interpreting these elements in the light of maritime as well as engineering needs, he recognized the lake idea as offering the solution of the canal problem.
Then, with the vision and simplicity of true genius, he proposed a “practical” plan for the Panama Canal, here summarized: “Build a dam at Gatun and another at Miraflores, or as close to the seas as the configuration of the land permits. Let the waters rise to form two lakes about 80 feet high, join the lakes thus formed with a channel cut through the continental divide, and connect the lakes with the oceans by locks. This is not only the best plan for engineering but also best for navigation.” Essentially, that was the plan for the Panama Canal eventually adopted in 1906. The man who conceived and presented the plan was Adolphe Godín de Lépinay.
The applicability of this plan—the Only one which at that time could have had any chance for success—was not understood. De Lépinay’s great idea was ignored. His conception of this plan, however, and its dramatic presentation before the Paris Congress of 1879 establish him as an architectural and engineering genius—the originator of the plan from which the Panama Canal was eventually built.
The French, despite De Lépinay’s timely warning, launched upon their ill-fated undertaking. Ten years later, in 1889, their effort collapsed and the Isthmus returned to the jungle. Yet, before the failure, the French, to save time and money, were forced to change their plans from “sea-level” to a modified high-level lake and lock type.
Thus, as the 19th Century closed, the pattern of interoceanic canal’s focal political and engineering issues had evolved: first, a struggle among competing interests in the choice of route; and second, debate as to the type of canal, with final decision for the high-level-lake and lock type at Panama.
Panama Wins the Battle of the Routes
In 1899, after more than half a century of exploration, including a number of naval expeditions, the United States started serious investigations by means of an Isthmian Canal Commission for exploration, 1899-1902 of which Rear Admiral John G. Walker, a distinguished line officer of the U. S. Navy, was president.
After an extraordinary political struggle, known as the “battle of the routes,’’ the Congress authorized the acquisition for the United States of a canal zone in what was then a part of the Republic of Colombia, the purchase of the French holdings, and construction of a canal at Panama, with provision for the Nicaragua Canal as an alternate project, if suitable arrangements could not be made for one at Panama.
To this end, the Chargé d’Affaires of Colombia, Dr. Tomás Herrán, a graduate of Georgetown University and well acquainted with American governmental leaders, succeeded, after many months of arduous labor, in negotiating what was considered a most favorable canal treaty for his country— the Hay-Herrán Treaty of January 22, 1903which was ratified by the United States Senate on March 17, 1903.
Unfortunately, this treaty became involved politically in Bogotá. The Colombian Senate, called into special session on June 20,1903, for its ratification, rejected the treaty on August 12, 1903, against urgent pleadings of Dr. Herrán in Washington and U. S. Minister Arthur M. Beaupré in Bogotá.
Panamanian leaders, fearing that after all Panama still might lose the canal to Nicaragua, set out to prevent that possibility. Under the leadership of Dr. Manuel Amador, the state of Panama seceded from Colombia on November 3, 1903, and declared its independence. This was quickly recognized, first, by the United States, and appropriately, second, by France, the country that started the waterway. Then followed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of November 18, 1903, which was ratified first by Panama and then by the United States.
In this treaty the Republic of Panama granted to the United States “in perpetuity” the “use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection” of the Panama Canal—and as if the United States were the “sovereign” of that territory. The ratification of this treaty sealed the choice of the Panama route.
The technical justification for this fundamental action was supplied by the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1902, which, under the direction of Rear Admiral John G. Walker, explored all canal routes. He also headed the first Isthmian Canal Commission for construction of the Panama Canal (1904-05) under which the Canal Zone was acquired, the Canal Zone Government organized, and preliminary work started. These achievements place him in history as a principal architect of Isthmian Canal Policy.
Battle of the Levels and the Great Decision
Work under the United States control started haltingly, with increasing uncertainty as to the type of canal that should be constructed—the high-level-lake and lock type or a canal at sea-level. Each proposal had strong advocates.
Fortunately, when the time for decision approached, President Theodore Roosevelt selected the great railroad builder, explorer, and business executive, the late John F. Stevens, as Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission.
Mr. Stevens’ qualifications were unique. He had read everything available on the proposed Panama Canal since the time of Philip II, built railroads in the Rocky Mountains, and supervised open mining operations in Minnesota. Thus, in his experience he had witnessed what occurs when the balances of nature are altered, and understood the hazards involved in excavating a navigation channel through mountains.
Arriving on the Isthmus on July 25, 1905, at the height of a crisis, he had matters under control within 24 hours. Experienced as he was in large undertakings, he promptly provided housing for employees, organized commissaries, encouraged sanitation, ordered equipment, planned the transportation system, and formed the basic engineering organization for building the Panama Canal. Indeed, so rapid was his progress that he found himself hampered by having to wait for a decision as to the type of canal, then being considered by an international Board of Consulting Engineers.
In its report of January 10, 1906, this board split—eight members, including five Europeans, voting for “sea-level”; and the five remaining Americans voting for high- level-lake and lock. The naval member on the Isthmian Canal Commission at that time was the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, who, in a minority report, favored the “sea-level” plan as “affording greater immunity from hostile injury.”1
Meanwhile at Panama, Stevens had walked through the entire length of the canal route and studied the topography. Interpreting it in the light of navigational requirements as well as construction, he decided upon the high-level-lake and lock plan, with the Atlantic terminal dam and locks at Gatun. For the Pacific end, he favored placing its locks in one group south of Miraflores at Aguadulce, just as he planned to do at Gatun.
Testifying in Washington before Congressional committees in January, 1906, with a conviction for the high-level plan that no one could shake, he voiced his determined opposition to the “sea-level” idea.
But one appearance was not enough. In June, he was again in Washington, still leading in this memorable struggle, later described by Colonel George W. Goethals as the “battle of the levels.” On this occasion, Stevens even more forcefully and fearlessly urged the high-level-lake plan as the logical solution.
In the end, with the support of President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War William H. Taft, and the Isthmian Canal Commission, the recommendations of Chief Engineer Stevens prevailed. Congress, by the Act approved June 29, 1906, adopted the high-level-lake and lock plan as proposed by the minority of the international Board of Consulting Engineers. That was the great decision in building the Panama Canal, for the second time completing the pattern of interoceanic canal political and engineering debate.
Here it should be noted that when making his recommendation to the Congress for this action, President Roosevelt did so after evaluating all available evidence of relative vulnerability and operational effectiveness of the two types. Although he understood that the “sea-level” type would be “slightly less exposed to damage in event of war,”2 he recommended the high-level plan because of its economic and operational superiority.
The transit from 1914 through August 31, 1954, in both peace and war, of more than 230,517 vessels of various types has completely established the wisdom of that decision. Moreover, it secured Chief Engineer Stevens, who was primarily responsible for bringing it about, his great fame as the basic architect of the Panama Canal.
Civilian Control Replaced by Military
Though the high-level plan, as approved by the minority of the International Board of Consulting Engineers, provided for placing all Atlantic Locks at Gatun, it also specified separation of the Pacific Locks into two groups. Chief Engineer Stevens, who had had railroad operating experience, recognized the operational inconvenience of this arrangement and never favored dividing the Pacific Locks.
Eventually, on August 3, 1906, Stevens tentatively approved a plan developed by William Gerig. The proposal placed all Pacific Locks in three lifts south of Miraflores with the terminal dam and locks between two hills, Cerro Aguadulce on the west side of the sea-level section of the canal and Cerro de Puente on the east side,—on a natural perimeter that would have supplied the same arrangement as at Gatun. This plan, had it been followed, would have enabled lake-level navigation from the Atlantic Locks to the Pacific, with a summit-level anchorage at the Pacific end of the canal to match that at the Atlantic end.
Regrettably, Stevens was under great pressure to start construction. Advocates of the “sea-level” proposal, stung to-the quick by their defeat in Congress, were poised ready to take advantage of a major change in the approved program as evidence of weakness in the high-level plan. Opponents of any canal at all were also seeking some means to delay the enterprise. These two forces together represented a political and economic- strength that could not be disregarded.
Stevens’ foundation explorations, necessarily made in great haste, proved unsatisfactory, and he did not dare to jeopardize the project by further delay. Twenty days later, on August 23, 1906, still confident that this important question would rise again, he voided his plan marking it, “not to be destroyed but kept in this office,” and proceeded with the approved plan for separating the Pacific Locks.
In 1907, after having brought construction to a point where the success of the project was a certainty, Stevens resigned his positions as Chief Engineer and Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, to which combined offices he had been appointed by President Roosevelt in recognition of his contributions. He was succeeded by Colonel George W. Goethals under whose able direction the work was carried forward.
Panama Canal Opened for Traffic
Notwithstanding this shift in administrative control of the canal enterprise from civilian to military in 1907, the Stevens proposal to combine the Pacific Locks did not die. Colonel William L. Sibert seriously studied it and, on January 31, 1908, formally submitted a definite plan that reflected his appreciation of marine needs as the basis for navigational planning.3 But, unfortunately, the Sibert proposal likewise was not approved for reasons then deemed adequate.
In this connection, it is pertinent to comment that after the resignation of Rear Admiral Walker in 1905 there was no experienced navigator on the Isthmian Canal Commission. Thus, one can only ponder what might have been the result had such a person been readily available for consultation with Stevens and Sibert on marine planning. In the light of later operational and engineering knowledge, developed in 1941-44, when there was such consultation between experienced engineers and marine operating officials, it is indeed regrettable that the Stevens- Sibert proposals were not adopted.
Colonel Goethals headed the project to the end, making a number of important but non-basic changes, which included a widening of Culebra (Gaillard) Cut and the locks. He developed the first permanent operating organization under the Panama Canal Act of 1912 and, as the first Governor of the Panama Canal, opened the canal to traffic on August 15, 1914, and overcame the early slide crises. He and his associates won great fame as builders of the Panama Canal.
In this connection, it should be explained that the original concept of the functioning of the canal enterprise as a civil agency under the Panama Canal Act was dual: in peace, as an interoceanic public utility under a Governor; in war, under the supreme control of the Commanding General of U. S. Army on the Isthmus. In either status, the operational mission of the waterway remained as the transit of vessels under the obvious assumption that the Panama Canal, like other transportation facilities in the United States, would serve in war as well as in peace.
Defense Concepts Become Ascendant
After the opening of the canal to traffic, the great builders left the Isthmus; operation and maintenance became matters of routine, and the project was uncritically accepted. The rapid development of the airplane and other modern weapons following World War I, dramatized by periodic fleet exercises off Panama, made considerations of defense matters of increasing concern; those of marine operations became secondary.
In the excitement preceding World War II, the Congress authorized construction of a third set of larger locks, primarily as a defense measure,4 known as the Third Locks Project, at an authorized cost of $277,000,000. The proposed layout placed a new set of larger locks (140'X1200') near each of the existing locks but at some distance away to afford greater protection through dispersal and increased lock capacity for large naval vessels. The new locks were to be joined with the existing channels by means of by-pass channels.5
Significantly, the plan included a number of construction features for future changing of the canal to “sea-level.” Thus, discerning students recognized the Third Locks Project as renewing the old “battle of the levels” in a new form—-that of “conversion.”
The Third Locks Project layout at the Atlantic end of the canal, which duplicates an operationally sound arrangement at Gatun, is likewise sound. At the Pacific end, however, the proposed new channel layout contained three sharp bends—29°, 47°, and 37°—in succession from north to south. The latter, if it had been completed, would have created operational problems and navigational hazards of the gravest character.
Construction started in 1940 and was pushed vigorously until suspended in May, 1942, because of shortage of ships and materials more urgently needed elsewhere for war purposes. No excavation was accomplished at Pedro Miguel; that at Gatun and Miraflores was substantially completed. Some $75,000,000 was expended.6
War Experience Inspires Plan for Canal Improvement
The suspension of the Third Locks Project, however, afforded an opportunity, while there was still time left to make such a study, for its re-examination in the light of operational needs demonstrated by marine experience. This was at a period when the Panama Canal was the scene of many military and naval expeditions on their way to and from combat zones in the Pacific. This, it should be also noted, was before the advent of the atomic bomb.
These studies conclusively established that the principal marine operational problems of the existing Panama Canal are:
1. Dangerous traffic bottleneck at Pedro Miguel and lack of a Pacific summit anchorage.
2. Double handling of vessels at separated Pacific Locks.
3. Effect of fog in Culebra (Gaillard) Cut on capacity and operations.
4. Lockage surges in Cut caused by operating Pedro Miguel Locks (3' max. amplitude).
5. Limited operating range of Gatun Lake water level (87'-82').
6. Navigational hazards in the restricted Cut (300' min. bottom width).
7. Inadequate dimensions of present locks for largest vessels (110’ X 1000’).7
From the nature of these inadequacies, it is obvious that locating the Pedro Miguel Locks at the south end of Culebra (Gaillard) Cut, where it created a traffic bottleneck and other problems, was the fundamental error in operational design of the Panama Canal.
Under the basic assumption that the prime function of the Panama Canal is the safe and convenient transport of vessels, it is self-evident that the wide channels of Gatun Lake afford safer and more convenient navigation than can any necessarily restricted channel at sea-level. Moreover, the advantages of unrestricted lake navigation outweigh the minor hazards and time lost by passage through locks. Thus, the best operational solution is not provided by lowering the Gatun Lake water level to sea- level, or to some intermediate-level, but by raising it to its highest feasible elevation.
The obvious economic operational solution thus is a major improvement of the existing canal according to what is known as the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, which includes the following program:
1. Removal of the bottleneck Pedro Miguel Locks.
2. Construction of all Pacific Locks in continuous steps near Miraflores.
3. & 4. Elevation of the intermediate Miraflores Lake water level (54') to that of Gatun Lake to serve as an anchorage during fog periods and to dampen surges.
5. Raising the summit water level to its optimum height (Approx. 92').
6. Widening Culebra (Gaillard) Cut.
7. Construction of a set of larger locks.
These modifications will remove the traffic choke at Pedro Miguel, correct present operational dissymmetry and simplify canal control, increase channel depths, and improve navigation, mitigate the effect of fog, reduce marine accidents, decrease transit time slightly, conserve water, and increase capacity. Thus, the plan supplies the best operational canal practicable of economic achievement.
This plan was publicly revealed by its author on May 20, 1943, in an address before the Panama Section of the American Society of Civil Engineers, under the title, “The Marine Operating Problems, Panama Canal, and the Solution.”8 Attended by high Army, Navy, and Canal Zone officials, the presentation aroused the interest of the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, Rear Admiral C. E. Van Hook, who was present. He later submitted the plan to the Navy Department. On September 7, 1943, the Secretary of the Navy forwarded it to the President. Subsequently, this proposal was approved in principle by the Governor of the Panama Canal for the major modification of the existing canal. According to the report of a 1949 Congressional investigation, it can be accomplished at “comparatively low cost.”9 Moreover, no doubt exists as to its soundness because a similar arrangement at Gatun has been tested since 1914 and found eminently satisfactory.
Atomic Bomb Resurrects Sea-Level Plan
The spectacular advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 injected a new element into the canal picture. Under the force of its impact, canal officials sought authority to conduct an “overall review” of the entire interoceanic canals question in the light of the then newest developments in the “military and physical sciences.”10 This was before the hydrogen bomb.
Accordingly, the Congress in 1945 enacted legislation11 authorizing the Governor of the Panama Canal to make a comprehensive investigation of the means for increasing its capacity and security to meet the future needs of interoceanic commerce and national defense. The law also provided for a restudy of the Third Locks Project, a study of canals at other locations, and for consideration of any new means for transporting ships across land. Thus was launched the second major canal crisis in the 20th Century. It served to resurrect the corpses of the 1902 “battle of the routes” and the 1906 “battle of the levels” with a rehashing of all the main arguments of the earlier struggles on the basis of the newer term, “security,” rather than the older one, “vulnerability.”
Under a far more extreme interpretation of the “security” factor of the statute than was intended by the Congress that enacted it, the investigation was directed toward obtaining authorization for a Sea-Level Project at Panama, with the “security” and “national defense” factors as paramount, and money costs not a “governing consideration.”12 In line with the 1905-06 precedent, the naval representative on the Board of Consulting Engineers for the greater part of this engineering investigation was the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
In the ensuing public hysteria centered on the dangers of the atomic bomb and other modern weapons, the long-range and fundamental mission of the Panama Canal to provide efficient and economic transit of vessels was generally overlooked.
The report of the 1946-47 Isthmian Canal Studies13 recommended only the Sea-Level Project for major canal construction at Panama, initially estimated to cost $2,483,000,000. With the exception of the two terminals, this project provides for constructing a virtually new Panama Canal of 60' minimum depth in navigation lanes and of 600' width between sloping sides at a depth of 40' on a new alignment somewhat removed from the present channel, which it crosses several times. The project includes a tidal lock (200'X1500') and a navigable pass at the Pacific end, many miles of dams for flood control reservoirs on both sides of the projected canal, diversion channels and other structural features. This program would result in abandonment of the greater part of the existing waterway and the investment that it represents.
Although the 1947 report contained studies of plans for a Terminal Lake-Third Lock Project, which it did not recommend, it offered a relatively minor program for improvement of the present canal installations “to meet the needs of commerce” as a preferred alternative to the major improvement of the existing waterway as recommended to the President in 1943 by the Secretary of the Navy.
Transmitted by the President to the Congress on December 1, 1947, and without presidential approval, comment or recommendation, the report promptly encountered sharp opposition. The Congress took no action on this report. Instead, in 1949, it authorized\n investigation of the organizational and financial aspects of the canal enterprise,14 for which study Representative Clark W. Thompson of Texas, a retired Marine Corps Reserve officer, served as Chairman. This investigation resulted in the first basic change15 in the permanent canal operating organization that was established in 1914.
The new Act requires that transit tolls be established at rates that will place the operation of the canal enterprise on a self- sustaining basis—a new principle in Isthmian Canal Policy with far-reaching implications affecting the future economic management of the Panama Canal and interoceanic commerce. This subject is now under further Congressional study.16
Clarifications Restore Operations as Basis for Planning
Meanwhile, in the Congress, the “security” and “national defense” premises, on which the recommendation for the Sea-Level Project was primarily based, were vigorously challenged.
As to the atomic bomb, Representative Willis W. Bradley, a retired naval officer, summarized his views: “As far as I can ascertain, the greatest authorities on modern weapons of war who have given this subject serious attention hold uniformly that any canal would be critically vulnerable to the atomic bomb, regardless of type; that a sea- level canal would be in the same security class as a lake canal; that a sea-level canal could be closed for prolonged periods of time beyond any hope of speedy restoration; and that a sea-level canal cannot be considered secure in an atomic war. These same authorities also agree that the atomic bomb is irrelevant as a controlling factor in the planning of operational improvements for the Panama Canal.”17
Representative, now Senator, Thomas E. Martin of Iowa, a retired Army officer, developed the national defense clarification, repeatedly stressing that protection of any type of canal, wherever located, is “an over-all governmental responsibility, and that its defense, like that of the seaports, airports, railroads, highways, and productive centers of the United States depends upon the combined industrial, military, naval, and air power of this Nation as obtained in both world wars, and not upon passive defense measures, such as may be embodied in inherent characteristics of canal design.”18
Here it should be stated that leading atomic warfare authorities, who studied the problem of Canal Zone defense in 1947, considered that arguments as to relative vulnerability of types of construction are entirely without point and that the Sea-Level Project would, in effect, constitute a “Maginot Line.” This view has been greatly strengthened by the later development of the hydrogen bomb, which is measured in mega-tons of T.N.T. equivalent as compared to kilo-tons for the atomic bomb.
In the course of extensive discussions of the Sea-Level Project recommendation,19 Congressional and administrative leaders often stressed the point that this project, if justified primarily for “national defense,” would divert both funds and resources from projects and programs in the United States that are far more essential to national security. The combined effects of the defense clarifications have been toward eliminating the concept of inherent resistance to attack as the governing consideration in planning at Panama. Thus, it appears that the only justifiable security design feature is adequate protection against sabotage, which is chiefly an administrative function.
Eventually, a group of engineers and others associated in building the Panama Canal submitted their views in a memorandum to the Congress. This memorial challenged the official cost estimates in the 1947 report, charging that the Sea-Level Project would cost several times its initial estimate— $2,483,000,000—and that the Third Locks Project adapted to the principles of the terminal lake proposal (widening Culebra Cut excepted) can be accomplished at relatively low cost as compared to that of the Sea-Level Project—estimated as under $600,000,000.
The statement also criticized the 1953 program for repair and alteration of present lock structures as makeshift in character and without sufficient merit, pointing out that it will delay the fundamental and long-overdue solution of the problems involved. It stated that the Governor’s recommendation of none but the Sea-Level Project for major increase of Canal facilities served to exclude what may be the best solution when evaluated from all angles.
Included in an address to the House by Representative Eugene J. Keogh of New York20 this memorandum was promptly recognized by the engineering profession.21
Strong appeals for the creation of a wholly American, independent, broadly based, predominantly civilian, strictly nonpartisan and objective Interoceanic Canals Commission, composed of able men who may not be dominated or unduly influenced by Federal executive agencies, have been made by responsible Congressional leaders as the best means for developing a wisely-reasoned Isthmian Canal Policy.22
The consequences of prolonged arguments, in and out of the Congress, have been towards restoration of economic thinking and an increased appreciation of fundamental planning concepts so well expressed during the 1905-06 “battle of the levels” by General Henry L. Abbot, the great student of the Chagres, member of the Comite Technique of the French Panama Canal Company and the international Board of Consulting Engineers, and an advocate of the high-level type. His words were: “The true criterion is ease and safety of transit, and . . . this test leaves no doubt as to which type of canal should be preferred at Panama.”23 This standard, both obvious and simple, is as true today as it was when written in 1905. Moreover, it is applicable in evaluating not only canal proposals at Panama but also those at other locations.
Diplomatic Implications
The juridical basis for the Canal Zone rests with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which authorized a zone ten miles wide extending five miles on each side of the center line of the canal. After extended diplomatic discussions, the boundaries of the Canal Zone were later fixed in the Price-Lefevre Boundary Convention of September 2, 1914.
An examination of the general plan of the proposed Sea-Level Project discloses a number of features not covered by current international agreements. Among these are: a new main channel alignment substantially removed from the existing channel from which Canal Zone boundaries are measured; flooding of additional territory in the Republic of Panama in the Chagres River valley downstream from Madden Dam (Alhajuela); diverting the Chagres River from its present path west of Limon Bay to a new path east of the bay that crosses a Panamanian highway; and draining the central portion of Gatun Lake. The last feature would disrupt present navigation channels to Panamanian settlements on the lake and uncover large and forbidding swamp areas with resulting health and sanitation consequences.
These aspects of the “sea-level” undertaking would undoubtedly bring a demand from the Republic of Panama for a new treaty covering the specific conditions for its construction. What concessions such a treaty would cost cannot be predicted. But, based upon previous experience in such diplomatic negotiations, these costs would be far greater than earlier ones, inevitably adding to the total estimate and increasing tolls.
Furthermore, such negotiations would be fraught with considerable uncertainty in the relations of the United States with Panama and other nations of Latin America, not to mention threats to the security of the enterprise through the process of its internationalization, for which there have been persistent demands.
In contrast, the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, being merely an “enlargement of the existing facilities”24 that does not call for additional “land or waters” or authority, will not require a new canal treaty. This, it must be obvious, is a truly paramount consideration.
The construction of a canal at another location would introduce an entirely new diplomatic situation, which would be just as complicated as that at Panama.
The salient elements of this situation, however, are: that the 1947 report does not present these significant diplomatic involvements; that the need for negotiating a new treaty with Panama to cover the Sea-Level Project was not submitted to the Congress; and that the Congress has not authorized such negotiation as was done in the Spooner Act of 1902 for the original construction of the Panama Canal.
Isthmian Canal Policy Must Be Re-Determined
The evolution of Isthmian Canal Policy has been slow. Its principal objectives have long been the best type of canal at the best site for the transit of vessels of commerce and war of all nations on terms of equality as provided by treaty—and at low cost of construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection.
Often beset by bewildering confusions of ideas, the progress of fundamental concepts has, at times, deviated from their logical courses. Yet events have thus far conspired to avert irretrievable error. Now, with the main arguments clarified, the interoceanic canal problem in its national relationships is coming to be better understood and attention is focusing on the true objectives of securing requisite capacity and operational efficiency. Nevertheless, the evolving situation is of such grave concern that it must be protected by ceaseless vigilance and fully matured objective judgment.
The Panama Canal is now entering its fifth decade of operations. Its navigational inadequacies have been established. The canal as completed contains fundamental errors in operational design centered on the location of the Pedro Miguel Locks. These can be corrected only by the major reconstruction of the Pacific end of the canal as contemplated in the Terminal Lake-Third Locks proposal.
Commercial traffic through the canal has reached the highest volume in history. The Navy has vessels that cannot transit. Issues raised by questions of “security” and “national defense” have been formally submitted but never accepted. The principle of economic operation of the canal has been embodied in law.25 Yet, in a physical sense, the shipway is still essentially what it was in 1914. Thus, the time has come to provide, without further delay, the additional interoceanic transit capacity and operational improvements to meet present and future needs.
The solution of this problem is not the simple proposition that it may appear. Instead, it is a highly complicated one of the greatest national importance, rising above purely personal and group considerations. It involves questions of fundamental operational and engineering planning, the decisions on which will affect the welfare of the United States and other maritime nations through the indefinite future.
These facts call for a further re-assessment of the entire interoceanic canals problem26 based on realities, with a comprehensive restatement of Isthmian Canal Policy as derived from a reasoned line of action. This is the task that sooner or later the Congress and the Nation must meet.
(“Digging the ‘Big Ditch',” a pictorial record of the construction of the Panama Canal, will he found on pages 316-331 of this issue of the Proceedings.)
1. Report of Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal (Washington, 1906), p. xix.
2. Ibid., p. iv.
3. William L. Sibert and John F. Stevens, The Construction of the Panama Canal (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1915), pp. 139-46 contains a summary of the Sibert proposal and its disposition.
4. Public Law 391, 76th Congress, approved August 11, 1939 (535 Stat. 1409).
5. H. Doc. 210, 76th Congress, 1st Sess. (1939).
6. House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Executive Hearings on H.R. 4480, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., Nov. 15, 1945, p. 4.
7. Hon. Willis W. Bradley, ‘What of the Panama Canal?,” Congressional Record, Vol. 94, Pt. 10 (Apr. 21, 1948), p. A2449 and “The Whys of the Panama Canal,” Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Pt. 12 (Mar. 4, 1949), p. A1303 contain extended discussions of marine problems.
8. A.S.C.E. Transactions, Vol. 114 (1949), p. 558.
9. H. Rept. 1304, 81st Congress, 1st Sess. (1949), p. 2.
10. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, op. cit., p. 5.
11. Public Law’ 280, 79th Congress, approved December 28, 1945 (59 Stat. 663).
12. See statement of Board of Consulting Engineers, quoted in Panama American, Aug. 5, 1946, p. 3, cols. 4-6.
13. Summarized with discussions in A.S.C.E. Transactions, Vol. 114 (1949), pp. 607-906.
14. H. Res. 44, 81st Congress quoted in Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Pt. 2 (Feb. 28, 1949), p. 1617.
15. H.Doc. 460, 81st Congress, 2d Sess. (1950) and Public Law 841, 81st Congress, approved September 26, 1950 (64 Stat. 1038).
16. Hon. John J. Allen, “Panama Canal—Interim Report,” Congressional Record, Vol. 100, No. 149 (Aug. 4, 1954), p. A5766.
17. Bradley, “What of the Panama Canal?,” op. cit., p. A2451. '
18. Hon. Thomas E. Martin, “An Interoceanic Canals Commission, the Best Solution of Panama Canal Problem,” Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Pt. 14 (July 18, 1951), p. A4481
19. Hon. Clark W. Thompson, “Isthmian Canal Policy of the United States—Bibliographical List,” Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Pt. 16 (Aug. 25, 1949), p. A5580 and subsequent statements of distinguished members of Congress
20. “Panama Canal Construction Engineers Favor Interoceanic Canals Commission,” Congressional Record Vol. 100, No. 79 (Apr. 29, 1954), p. 5491.
21. “Panama Canal Problem,” Civil Engineering, Vol. 24 (July 1954), p. 460.
22. H.R. 8457 and H.R. 8458, 82nd Congress, H.R. 1048, 83rd Congress, and S. 766 and H.R. 3335, 84th Congress.
23. Henry L. Abbot, Problems of the Panama Canal. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1905), p. 224
24. Hull-Alfaro Treaty of March 2, 1936. Art. II.
25. Public Law 841, 81st Congress, approved September 26, 1950 (64 Stat. 1038).
26. Thompson, “Interoceanic Canals Problem,” Congressional Record, Vol. 98, Pt. 8 (Jan. 15, 1952), p. A163.