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THE MAGNIFICENT MITSCHER. By
Theodore Taylor. W. W. Norton, New
York, 1954. 365 pages, illustrated. $5.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Arleigii Burke, U. S. Navy
(Currently serving as Commander Destroyer Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Burke was Admiral Milscher’s Chief of Staff throughout several months of the Pacific War.)
This is a story all sailors should read. All sailors from Fleet Admirals to the newest recruits.
It is the story of a man—a real man. It is the story of a sailor. It is a record of achievement. It is the history of a man who accomplished phenomenal things, of a man who won many battles and whose fighting spirit, sound decisions, and extraordinary leadership in war proved him to be one of the great naval heroes.
This book contains much history, but the history is incidental, since the story is the story of the development of a man. Admiral Mitscher had adversities throughout his life, from the beginning of his career to its final glorious end. He overcame them all, and in overcoming them, he created in himself the spirit, the doggedness, and the ability to analyze problems which enabled him to lead his great fleet to spectacular victories using ships and planes boldly in the evolution of tactics for modern naval power.
Lieutenant Taylor has done an excellent job in recording the life of the Magnificent Mitscher. It must have been a difficult job, for he did not know Admiral Mitscher personally, and Admiral Mitscher was a most complex personality.
Admiral Mitscher did not claim to be brilliant. He was not even a deep student. He did know, though, in utmost detail, tactics, aviation, but, above all, people. He was a sound judge of people—his friends, his associates, and his enemies. He knew, better even than most great military leaders, that success of a military operation depends upon the actions of men. Although Admiral Mitscher kept careful watch on the material condition of ships and aircraft, he devoted most of his attention to his people. This was the reason for his unusual success as a naval commander and as a leader—which are not always synonymous.
Admiral Mitscher liked people, but he realized, too, that military operations will not permit incompetence or lack of ability regardless of the personalities involved. Admiral Mitscher correctly was intolerant of officers who did not have the will to fight to a very high degree, or who did not have the ability to hold positions of responsibility. He exacted a high performance of duty and he was ruthless with those who did not measure up to the high standards which he set.
He would do anything for subordinates who demonstrated by their actions that they had the will, skill, and the ability to perform, but just as quickly, he eliminated from his organization those who failed to perform.
Admiral Mitscher was not easily known for he did not make close friends easily. Once he made a friend he kept him. He had, to a greater degree than any man I have ever known, those ideal characteristics which John Paul Jones first proclaimed. Admiral Mitscher was selfless; he devoted his entire life to his duty. It is not possible to list all those characteristics in detail which caused his subordinates, not only to respect and admire him, but literally to idolize him. The author has done well in bringing out these characteristics.
Lieutenant Taylor describes how many decisions were reached in battle. His descriptions are over-simplified because of the nature of his book, but it is well to point out, that in any military operation, decisions, even those which are naturally made quickly, are made after consideration of many factors. If there is time, many people comment on possible courses of action and their probable effects. These comments come from subordinate commanders and the staff, and all are weighed carefully before decisions are reached. In this respect, Lieutenant Taylor’s book could be improved.
This is a book which all men who go to sea will want to read.
JAPAN’S DECISION TO SURRENDER. By Robert J. C. Butow. Stanford University Press, 1954. (Published as part of the Hoover Library Series on War, Revolution, and Peace). $4.00.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, Former Japanese Imperial Navy
(A Captain and senior staff officer of the Japanese Combined Fleet in 1933, Admiral Fukudome held a succession of important assignments. In 1939, as a Rear Admiral, he was Chief of Staff for the Combined Fleet under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Attaining the rank of Vice Admiral in 1942, he was once more Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, then Commander-in-Chief, Second Air Fleet, and finally Commander-in-Chief Tenth Area Fleet, Thirteenth Air Fleet, and First South Sea Fleet, concurrently.)
This book contains the excellent results of Dr. Butow’s precise study of the Surrender, a study to which he devoted some three and a half years. His sharp observations and the valuable research he had done on the guiding principles of the war will excite keen interest and deep emotion among Japanese readers. His Prologue, for example, with its description of the attitude and psychology of the Japanese people as they listened to the imperial broadcast announcing Japan’s capitulation, will arouse poignant memories.
The national isolation policy of the Tokugawa regime retarded Japan’s development for two and a half centuries. The adoption of a military policy after the Meiji Restoration, however, resulted in an improvement in Japan’s position. Japan became stronger after every war: the Sino- Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I. In order to maintain our new position and prosperity, we were forced to follow a military policy. The militarists became all-powerful and attempted to rush Japan’s military development. This produced conflict in Manchuria, in China, and finally in the Pacific as well.
With our defeat, Japanese militarism collapsed instantly, and the business of politics reverted to the politicians. During the last days of the war, however, Premier Zuzuki was greatly embarrassed by the conflict which developed between the military and the politicians. As a result, he was finally forced to request the Emperor’s decision, first at an imperial conference held at midnight on August 9 and then at a second imperial conference which met on the morning of August 14. His Majesty’s decision brought about the downfall of the military clique, and this, in turn, meant the end of the war. Had it not been for this, the military authorities might have pushed the country into “a decisive battle in the homeland.” This could only have brought about our complete destruction.
Miscalculation with regard to marine transportation was one of the important reasons for Japan’s defeat. When the decision was made to go to war, the Japanese government and Imperial General Headquarters estimated that our loss of shipping would amount to less than one million tons per year. They expected to make good that loss by constructing new ships. But the fact is that our shipping losses amounted to much more than they had expected, and this inevitably affected our ability to wage war. Another reason for our defeat was the miscalculation with regard to Midway and Guadalcanal. On both occasions Imperial General Headquarters was confident of success. The miserable failure of both operations produced a strategic turning point.
As a Japanese, especially as a naval officer, I would like to point out another shameful reason for our defeat. As Dr. Butow suggests, excessive emphasis upon spirit made us close our eyes to many realities. The majority of Japanese military men overestimated themselves morally and spiritually while, at the same time, underestimating the spirit of Americans. Being almost entirely ignorant of the United States, the Japanese military believed the American people were lacking in spirit. The USSR, on the other hand, was regarded as possessing a strong military spirit.
As already noted, the role of the Emperor was one of the remarkable features of Japan’s defeat. His Majesty’s decision to accept the Potsdam Proclamation saved the nation from catastrophe. Loyalty to the Emperor and anxiety over the maintenance of the imperial institution were important factors. As a Japanese, I cannot help but be surprised at Dr. Butow’s complete description of the circumstances leading to and surrounding the Surrender.
In conclusion, I would like to add one final thought. In his Preface Dr. Butow declared, “The writing of ‘recent history’ is difficult at best; at worst, it degenerates into a form of disguised fiction with little or no claim upon the historical.” This is entirely correct in the case of Japan.
Since the capitulation, Japan has been flooded with publications concerning the Pacific War. Most of these, however, are nothing but fictional accounts. There have been very few books of historical significance. In view of these circumstances, it has been a great pleasure for me to come upon Dr. Putow’s valuable historical account. I would therefore like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the author. I should also add, however, that I could not help feeling that the book was written in accordance with the viewpoint of the American people. It is of course natural. If a Japanese were to write on this same subject, he would be certain to write the Japanese point of view. It is desirable that Americans, Japanese, and others should write recent history freely, frankly, and from their own points of view. If such accounts are then integrated by the historian of the future, the complete story of world history will eventually emerge.
A great many official Japanese documents on the history of World War II are now in the custody of the United States government in Washington. So that we Japanese can also play a role in writing the history of the Second World War, I sincerely hope that the American government will give favorable consideration to the question of returning these documents to Japan. This is my fervent desire after having read Dr. Butow’s excellent work.
THE SUPREME COMMAND. By Forrest C. Pogue. (“United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations.”) Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, 1954. 608 pp. §6.50.
Reviewed by Colonel C. P. Stacey
(Colonel Stacey is Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff, Canadian Army Headquarters, Ottawa, and author of The Canadian Army, 1939-1945. Before the Second World War he was a Professor of History at Princeton.)
The United States has been very fortunate in its official and semi-official histories of the Second World War. Admiral Morison’s History of United Slates Naval Operations in World War II, one of the most triumphant historical undertakings of this generation, is well known to readers of the Proceedings. The Marines have produced an excellent series of small monographs, the U.S.A.F. a valuable succession of ponderous tomes. Largest of all is the U. S. Army’s project, which is, however, impressive in much more than size. Sober, thorough, and objective, its published volumes have done much to light up the dark corners of the war. The latest, Dr. Forrest Pogue’s The Supreme Command, a study of SHAEF, is one of the best, and that is saying a great deal.
The North-West Europe campaign of 1944-45, as the culminating episode of the war against Germany, has been a centre of public interest and controversy. It is a correspondingly difficult field for an official writer; but Dr. Pogue handles his tough subject with sureness and confidence. He has done an enormous amount of work in the documents, and in interviewing and corresponding with the principal actors to the number of nearly a hundred. (The only individual really important for his purpose who isn’t on the list is Lord Montgomery, who presumably was not available for interview.) The author has had the important advantage of free access to General Eisenhower’s personal files. And he has contrived to be both frank and objective in dealing with the famous controversies of the campaign, in most of which Montgomery was a leading figure. He is never backward about stating facts. He is more backward about stating his own opinions. It is fairly evident, however, that he thinks that Eisenhower’s contemporary impatience with Montgomery’s “slowness” in Normandy was unjustified: that Monty knew what he was doing, and that the Supreme Commander did not fully appreciate his plan. As for the great argument later, over the relative merits of Montgomery’s plan for a concentrated thrust, and Eisenhower’s for an advance to the Rhine on a broad front, the author’s views here are less clear, and indeed there is room for endless discussion on the question. What Dr. Pogue does is to illuminate it with well-chosen quotations from the vital documents, including many not heretofore available. It is particularly interesting to have the letters in which the Supreme Commander pressed Montgomery to get on with the job of opening Antwerp. We shall probably hear more from the Field Marshal on these matters yet; until he has said his full say it would be premature to attempt a final commentary upon them; and Dr. Pogue does not do so.
In some respects this book reads like ancient history. In 1955 it seems strange to find that when in 1945 the British Prime
Minister and Chiefs of Staff, full of apprehension of post-war Russian policy, wished to order the Supreme Commander to try to get into Berlin and Prague ahead of the Russians, the U. S. President and Chiefs of Staff would not listen to them. (One U. S. Army Commander, General W. H. Simpson, also got turned down when he wanted to go for Berlin.) Most Americans today would probably take the view that here their national leaders failed in political prescience. Perhaps they did; but at least it enables us to point out that Allied policy, under U. S. influence, leaned over backwards in the direction of playing ball with the Russians at the end of the war. We gave them every chance; it certainly wasn’t our side that started the Cold War.
This excellent book throws light on every aspect—military, political and personal—of the remarkable campaign with which it deals. For everyone who wishes to understand that campaign it is essential reading.
RUSSIA: A HISTORY AND AN INTERPRETATION. By Michael J. Florinsky. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1953. 2 vols., 1511 pp., glossary, indices, bibliography & maps. $15.00.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, U. S. Navy (Ret.)
(President of the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, Admiral Stevens was U. S. Naval Attache in Moscow, 1947-1949.)
Michael Florinsky is a Professor of Economics at Columbia University, where he has taught in the Graduate School (Faculty of Political Science) since 1931. He was born in Kiev and served in the Russian Army throughout World War I, following which he has engaged in a series of interpretative and research publications in both England and the United States. In 1934 Dr. Florinsky accepted an offer of the Macmillan Company to write a history of Russia, expecting that he would be able to complete it within two or three years. The fact that it has taken twenty years is reflected in its workmanship and scope.
The publisher’s claim that this is the most comprehensive history of Russia in English is well founded. One continually encounters information, most of it interesting and all of it valuable, that is not to be found in other general histories. Even so, it is highly condensed, and the reader often experiences a feeling of regret that it must be handled in so summary a fashion. It is a pity that such a stimulating and brilliant history ends with the Brest-Litovsk peace conference. The author’s reasons for not extending it to include the Soviet phase constitute an extraordinarily able and concentrated indictment of the Soviet regime from the viewpoint of a scholar.
Dr. Florinsky reached the conclusion that the personalities of the tsars and rulers had a , greater part in determining the course of Russian history than he was at first ready to believe. His general plan of presentation is consequently to begin with a character analysis of a ruler, together with an outline of the way in which this character may have been modified by events. Then, depending upon the importance of the reign and the richness of our information, follow chapters dealing with foreign relations, wars and diplomacy, internal administration, trade, finance, industry, social conditions, cultural developments, and political movements. Since there is no continuous narrative, such an approach presupposes a general familiarity with Russian history.
The book is in other ways suitable only for those with considerable background, as in its evaluations of other historians, or its frequently controversial interpretations. When scholars disagree or are puzzled, as is so often the case with Russia, Florinsky sets forth their varying theories, usually taking a very definite view himself, and one which is often unorthodox or even contrary. This quality of contrariness, which the author usually succeeds admirably in justifying, is shown in other ways, as in the good words he has for such widely condemned rulers as Peter III and Paul, in his stand that Russia never constituted a real threat to India, or in his final sentence: “It seems reasonably clear in retrospect that what in 1917 was treason to the allies and condonation of peasant lawlessness would have served, in the long run, the cause of democracy in Russia and throughout the world.” One of the difficulties, and perhaps charms, of Russian history is that the last word has seldom been said on any viewpoint.
This book is consistently at its best in its detailed descriptions of diplomacy and dynastic complications, internal administrative, educational and fiscal affairs, and the development of Russian industry. Its scope and size are such as to permit scores of brilliant, concentrated summaries that give a peculiar vividness to the contemporary atmosphere. Among these are the best and most sensible account of Slavic origins I have ever seen; an outstanding discussion of Alexander I’s liberalism and mysticism; an extraordinary portrayal of Kerensky; and detailed accounts of Russia’s part in wars that the West knows little of or has forgotten, such as the Asiatic conquests and the Balkan wars of the ’70s and ’80s.
This is no book to consult for cultural developments, perhaps because they do not lend themselves to condensation. Its accounts of literature, the theatre, art, architecture, and the ballet, unlike the rest of the book, are inadequate, hackneyed, conventional, and frequently misleading. Coming from such an iconoclast, this is surprising.
Dr. Florinsky generally takes a dim view of Russian or Slavic accomplishment. He is often harsh and acid to the point of sourness, and sometimes cynical. Nevertheless, he is hard-headed and generally fair, and his book is salutary in that it continually reminds the reader that there are at least two sides to every judgment.
This important book, which cannot help but be controversial today, will be increasingly valued with the passage of time, when the western world has made many of the reappraisals which Dr. Florinsky argues so persuasively should be made.
★