In late October, 1953, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a major reorganization of the senior courses in military strategy and tactics offered at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. It was stated that the reorganization may be one of the most significant changes in the College’s seventy years of history. The major revision involves the institution of a two-year course effective beginning with the academic year 1954-55. Meanwhile, an amalgamation of the senior courses has gone forward during the 1953-54 session. The announcement also confirmed the fact that courses at the Naval War College will continue to be open to senior officers of all U. S. military services, as well as the Coast Guard, Foreign Service officers of the State Department, and certain civilians attached to other U. S. Government departments, who may be designated for the courses.
The change combines the previous courses —Strategy and Tactics, and Strategy and Logistics—into one two-year course in Naval Warfare, to be taken in whole or in part. Although the first year is designed to prepare for and lead into the second year, each year is complete in itself and represents the Navy’s highest level course within its respective field. With the full realization of the limited availability of officers, the plan is designed to give the entire course to certain senior officers who are available for two years of study. Others will be enrolled for the first or second year depending upon their rank, experience, and the needs of the service.
The new course takes into account the complexity and advancement in modern warfare, and the increased responsibility of military personnel in joint and allied commands. Then too, the revised curriculum is designed to provide military officers and particularly naval officers with a better understanding of the international and political aspects of warfare. These changes were considered only after a study of the evolution of the curriculum and its relation to present day needs in a changing world.
In reviewing the evolution of the curriculum of the Naval War College, it is easy to recognize the influence of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. The historical impact of Mahan is notable in at least two respects. He brought I he study of sea power into world-wide prominence, and also impressed upon the War College the necessity for a high level of study of warfare. In his “Reminiscences” covering his period of service at the Naval War College, he stated, “I knew that there was a disposition, even among the friendly, to enhance the importance of the College by dwelling upon electricity, steam, ordnance, and other studies dependent upon the mechanical and physical sciences, as being part of the service it might do the Navy. It appeared to me that once impress upon the College that characteristic, it would inevitably predominate over the study of warfare, because the disposition, alike of the Navy and of the age, is to insist upon material perfections as the chief end of military effort.”
Commodore Luce, the first President of the Naval War College, with the aid of Mahan, who was then a captain, pioneered the study of strategy and naval history. Earliest instruction took the form of lectures, reading, and discussion. As early as 1885, International Law was a topic of discussion under Professor James A. Soley, USN. In 1901 this professorship was taken over by John Bassett Moore and in 1906 by George Grafton Wilson. From 1885 to 1887 Lieutenant Tasker H, Bliss, USA, was a member of the staff, thus inaugurating a joint aspect of the military instruction.
In the early years, there was much opposition to the College, and there were times when it was questionable whether the course could be continued. There was hostility from within the Service and from some of the secretaries of the Navy. Some factions questioned the necessity of the College. Then too, lack of adequate appropriations led to friction between the Naval War College on the one hand, and the Torpedo Station and Newport Training Station on the other. However, by the year 1889 the College was sufficiently in favor to obtain an appropriation for $100,000 for a new building which was completed in 1892.
By the time of Captain Henry C. Taylor, USN, who was President from 1893 to 1896 an annual war problem and a series of war games had been developed as part of the curriculum. The war problem was known as the “problem of the year” and was solved by committees. War games were of three types: (1) the two ship duel (2) the tactical game, resulting usually in fleet actions, and (3) the strategic game played in a theater of war.
The year 1910 brought dramatic change insofar as studies were concerned. Rear Admiral R. P. Rodgers introduced into the war problems a system of problem solution which had been borrowed from the German Army Staff and War Schools. It involved a method of individual thought process and solution having to do with a derivation of the mission, the estimate of the situation, and the resultant decision. Emanating from the decision, various types of orders, plans and directives could then be written in accordance with prescribed order forms. This “case” or “applicatory” system in which general principles are developed through the study of individual situations has been carried forward to the present day and has had a marked influence in the evolution of the College’s educational philosophy. Summer sessions only were held during the early years. Then during the winter of 1911-12, the Long Course was inaugurated. This provided much needed time for additional war problems and other studies.
During 1912-1913 under the presidencies of Captain W. L. Rodgers and Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, the College expanded its coverage of the study of warfare by requiring the students to write theses on various subjects pertaining to their studies. This practice, requiring individual research and expression of the student’s own conclusions, has also carried forward to the present. Five thesis subjects in 1913 were: (1) Strategy— Its Principles and Practices (2) Policy—Its Relation to War and Preparation for War (3) Logistics (4) Tactics (5) The Strategy of the Pacific.
By order of the Secretary of the Navy in 1914 the War College was directed to institute correspondence courses for the benefit of officers desiring to do War College work but not available for attendance. This directive was signed by Josephus Daniels who had taken a personal interest in the College. Correspondence Courses have in general conformed to the regular resident courses and have evolved during the years stressing strategy, tactics, logistics and international law.
At the close of World War I the College was to experience a major expansion under the dynamic leadership of Rear Admiral W. S. Sims. Increased interest in the War College was brought about by the policy expressed by the Navy Department that higher commands were to go to those who had attended the Naval War College, insofar as practicable. This policy was to insure that leaders of marked ability attended the College.
About 1923 a Senior and a Junior Course were established. The Junior Class was the forerunner of the present Command and Staff Course. Then during the administration of Rear Admiral W. V. Pratt in 1926, extensive staff reorganization was undertaken to insure proper emphasis on operations, foreign and international relations, and the joint aspects of warfare.
With the advent of World War II the courses at the War College were patterned to fit the situation. Rather than close the College it was decided to continue small classes of regular officers and to train reserve officers in staff duties. Therefore a Command Class and a Preparatory Staff Class were organized. Many reserve officers were graduated in the Preparatory Staff Classes.
The post World War II period was, as are most such periods, a time of change and adjustment for the Naval War College. From experience gained in the war, it was apparent that Logistics should receive more consideration in the study of warfare. Although not a new subject at the War College, it had not become a major part of any of the courses. All this was changed in 1947 when a separate course in Logistics was established. By 1950 the Logistics Course had become more closely identified with the Senior Course and at that time the names of the two senior courses were changed to “Strategy and Tactics” and “Strategy and Logistics.”
In 1950 the Command and Staff Course was inaugurated. It was designed to provide lieutenant commanders, junior commanders and equivalent ranks of other services essentially with a better understanding of the operational functions of command and the organizational functions and procedures of staffs. This course may be compared to the Army’s Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth, Kansas, and to the Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, provides a five months’ course in the joint aspects of command and staff work.
The Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power was added at about this time (1951). The purpose of the course is to provide a small number of senior officers with an opportunity for study of the nature of war, sea power, and the employment of naval and other armed forces in coordination with nonmilitary elements of the nation. Not to be confused with the Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power is the Flag Officers Refresher Course, which is designed to fit the individual needs of flag officers who may be ordered to the College from time to time.
Through the years, by a process of evolution, the College has developed its curriculum on the study of warfare, with emphasis on future naval warfare. In 1953 coverage for the senior resident courses and for the Command and Staff Course, at appropriate levels, consisted essentially of Strategy, Tactics, Logistics, and International Relations.
Methods of education have varied, but the operations problem, in general, has been one of the principle vehicles of instruction. These operations problems, based upon the case method of instruction, have developed from the war problems of earlier years. Intimately related to the operations problems are various studies and research programs, a lecture series, and the preparation of term papers.
The philosophy of the College is based upon a sense of academic freedom where the student is:
(1) Expected to express his own ideas regardless of his rank.
(2) Offered only such guidance as is necessary to prevent undue loss of time.
(3) Not expected to produce fixed solutions, but is expected to make his own decisions, and
(4) Provided with an academic atmosphere free from administrative duties.
As Admiral Conolly expressed it:
“A school where no work is arbitrarily required of students, yet where everybody works hard; a school where no grades are assigned, yet where students have always maintained a high scholastic level; a school which propounds no ‘official solution,’ yet where a student may provide an accepted solution even when it runs directly counter to staff thinking; a school that was the first to have instructors from the other services— that in brief portrays the spirit of the Naval War College.”1
In spite of the long evolution and improvement of the Courses, the aftermath of World War II created for the War College a crisis and also a challenge. Throughout its history, the Naval War College has existed for the study of warfare. In older, less complicated times, various aspects of this professional study could be dealt with during a one-year course. This, however, no longer appears to be true. Both the basic professional and the strategic fields in the study of warfare have become vastly more complicated and extensive, and must be viewed in a new light.
The tactics of fleet action, and of components of the fleet deployed for action, have given place to the employment of a large and diverse number of air, surface, and subsurface elements operating on a theater scale, each a complex problem in itself and doubly so in its necessary interaction with others. Naval “operations” have replaced tactics in the original sense of combat with the enemy. National and military strategy, in the broad sense, and also naval strategy, must now encompass all the elements of a highly complex and integrated world order.
A closely related factor to be considered is the Navy’s postgraduate educational policy. Under the present educational and personnel system, relatively few officers can be made available for schools and courses ashore. The first consideration has always been to man the fleet, and properly so. The fleet provides a means of training which is peculiar to the Navy alone, but higher education must be accomplished ashore. The system worked very well prior to World War II when officers could spend part of their shore duty in postgraduate and higher level schools. With the great expansion of the Navy during World War II and the subsequent build-up for the Korean War, no corresponding build-up of high level naval schools was undertaken. The trend was toward joint schools. Of the limited number of officers which can be made available for schools ashore, a certain proportion are assigned to the joint schools which came into being after World War I and World War II.2
The lack of definite means for the progressive post-graduate education of naval officers has resulted in an influx of students at the Naval War College with widely varying backgrounds of education and experience. While the intermingling of such officers has been mutually beneficial, it has been difficult to pattern high level courses with a denominator common to all. In seeking a remedy it was considered inappropriate to add many layers of technical subject matter, and inadvisable to dip into levels of studies which properly belonged to other institutions of learning. Mahan had warned against this tendency.
Another fact is that many high ranking officers are not having the opportunity for high level education, and are reaching flag rank without War College work. The percentage of Naval War College graduates reaching flag rank has dropped perceptibly. This is in striking contrast to the record of the recent past. As “proof of the pudding,” the following distinguished World War II leaders were all Naval War College graduates: King, Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance, Kinkaid, Hewitt, Edwards, Conolly, Sherman, Kirk. It would seem reasonable then that if the Naval War College’s stature as the highest level educational institution in the Navy and the only one of the highest level military colleges which is oriented directly toward and deals primarily with naval matters is maintained, the quality of its leadership and the quality of its graduate product must also be maintained.
In attacking the problem, it seemed that some modification in. the courses would be necessary. Consequently, the two senior resident courses were considered for modification, as no changes in the other Naval War College courses were believed appropriate at this time. All concerned, however, were completely aware that further consideration of the basic difficulties would be necessary on a long term basis. It had become apparent that the Naval War College was faced with the problem of helping the Navy meet its responsibilities attendant upon U. S. world leadership in an atomic age. Therefore, some of the more important reasons for course changes could be summarized as follows:
(1) There is an increasing requirement and importance of education in higher military matters and their inter-relationships with other than military factors of national strategy.
(2) There is an increasing requirement for participation by naval officers on the policy, command, and planning levels of joint and allied commands and national agencies. Such officers must, in addition to being competent professional officers, have an understanding of the Navy’s strategic roles and its position in the national defense structure.
(3) The present and growing complexity of the art and science of naval warfare is such that some modification to the existing educational system for officers seems appropriate.
The Senior Courses (Strategy and Tactics and Strategy and Logistics) have during recent years become more closely related. So it was considered feasible to amalgamate them. However, in considering the requirements, it became evident that the Naval War College would not be able to continue a single year course which would be adequate at both the “basic professional” and the “strategic” levels. A single year course could do either reasonably well, but not both. The Senior Courses of recent years have been compromises which resulted in a level lower than that on which the War College was intended to operate. A two year course would make it possible for the second year to carry through to the highest level, and further, would enable at least a portion of the senior students to have two years of higher naval education. It therefore appeared that in light of many aspects of a changing world, it would be highly desirable to extend this new course to two years, at least on an interim basis.
With the assumption that the educational objective of both years would be preparation for higher command, further planning was developed along the following lines. The emphasis in the first year would be placed upon fundamentals of naval warfare and, in particular, the integration of elements of naval power in accomplishment of the Navy’s mission. Restated as an educational objective this would:
(1) Develop powers of logical military thought.
(2) Increase knowledge essential to proper exercise of command responsibilities at fleet and theater component force levels.
(3) Increase knowledge of capabilities and limitations of all elements of the fleet, concepts of their integrated employment and knowledge of fleet and theater naval logistics, and
(4) Promote the study of Strategy, Logistics, and Organizations at higher levels.
The Second Year would emphasize elements of national strategy, the strategic employment of naval power in the furtherance of national objectives, and the higher aspects of the art of naval warfare. In other words the second year will rest almost entirely on the strategic level with little time on basic professional aspects.
The educational objective of the second year might be stated as follows:
(1) To provide the broad education and working knowledge essential to the discharge of command responsibilities at the Naval Operations, theater, and allied command levels.
(2) To provide breadth of vision, seasoned judgment, and highly developed reasoning powers in the entire field of naval warfare.
In the broad considerations of the program, it was necessary to plan for the immediate future with no increase in numbers of students. Under that assumption, the following procedure was formulated:
(1) Senior captains who by reason of their seniority are not likely to return to the Naval War College for duty under instruction would be ordered to the Course in Naval Warfare (Second Year) and would be in attendance for one year only.
(2) The input into the Course in Naval Warfare (First Year) would consist of junior captains and senior commanders. A number of officers assigned to the latter course would be selected to remain in attendance for a second consecutive year for the Course in Naval Warfare (Second Year). The remainder of the student officers in the Course in Naval Warfare (First Year) would attend only one year, but would be considered suitable and especially well qualified for the Course in Naval Warfare (Second Year) at a future time.
The exact nature of the above scheme for the flow of Officers will of course depend upon the availability of officers in the various ranks. The Chief of Naval Operations exercises general supervision over the determination of qualifications for attendance.
As mentioned before, this plan is considered to be an interim measure to be used for possibly ten years. In carrying out the procedure it was found that the amalgamation of Strategy and Tactics and Strategy and Logistics could be undertaken during the academic year 1953-54. The new two- year course is being inaugurated during the 1954-55 session.
In conclusion, it is pertinent to note that for the Naval War College program to be successful, it must receive the full support of all concerned. Eventually it may be possible that an integrated scheme of higher naval education recommended by various boards may be fully implemented. This would be based essentially upon three years of higher education during an officers’ career as follows:
(1) Post Graduate School (School of the Line). (After approximately six years of commissioned service.)
(2) The Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College—or its equivalent in other services. (During the tenth to fifteenth year of commissioned service.)
(3) A new Naval War College Course in Naval Warfare of 1 year—or its equivalent. (During approximately the fifteenth to twenty-fourth year of commissioned service.)
Meanwhile, in light of the dynamic world situation, the Naval War College must carry out its mission with consideration of the transitional as well as the traditional aspects of the study of warfare, in order to be of service to the Navy and to the Nation.
1. Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, “Naval War College Command Training,” Army Information Digest, April 1952.
2. These schools are: (1) The National War College, (2) The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and (3) The Armed Forces Staff College.