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THE VANISHING AMERICAN
(Editor’s Note: The September, 1954, Proceedings carried the above-named Jarrell, U. S. Navy. Admiral Jarrell’s article stimulated so many comments that we are devoting usual to this section so that we may print those we consider will be most interesting
Rear Admiral Walter Ansel, U. S. Navy (Ret.)—-The Navy is going to hell again! Of course, the situation is neither as bad as Admiral Jarrell thinks, or as bad as I have thought in the past and think now, with the past to review. We were talking at the Naval Academy Officers Club, a friend and
I. The subject was the Naval Academy and Midshipmen. “Well it must be a pretty good place,” said my friend, “it has been going to hell ever since 1845 and is still in operation.”
1 he thumbnail sketch accompanying Admiral Jarrell’s article, “The Vanishing American Naval Officer,” notes, “It (the article) is written for young officers and young men who want to be officers. . . .” I’ll wager his excellent inventory will raise nostalgic twinges with oldsters too. Let us reinventory the points briefly.
1. The Good Ole Days: There’s no getting around it, they lived and are still real. Some of their virtues were: responsibility and pride in a job well done; knowing where you stood and where others stood, and going about the business of making this work instead of “handling” each situation and each individual (including your superiors); going to sea, not only because we liked it and were glad to be shed of the beach but more because that was why we were in the Navy. We were an “outfit!” It was good.
But The Great Outside speaks, and with feeling, of the good ole days too. Rich man,
NAVAL OFFICER
article by Rear Admiral A. E.
more space than to Proceedings readers.)
poor man, beggar man, thief, doctor, lawyer, Indian chief—they all, except the lawyer, recall better days. Life is apparently no longer simple.
Perhaps we in the Navy have been a club. We produced; I can’t imagine anyone accusing us of irresponsibility and zest for special privilege. Yet, I now find by civilian standards my daily life had been comparatively serene and untroubled. I have been sheltered. Are we just coming up against the facts of life with which the Army, who has lived with the Outside, has been coping all along? Is that life the way the other half has lived forever?
The truth of the matter probably is some of each less shelter and more complications in life generally. The New Deal and a deal for everything came on the Navy late. We are just beginning to appreciate the reduction in standards that took place. This is not to say that such reduction had to be accepted.
2. Bad Captains—not bad ships: A businessman friend of mine who likes to fish puts it another way. He says, “A fish stinks from the head. My friend and Admiral Jarrell are both right. Why, in the ultimate, do we have so many specialists in line officer’s uniform? Why are we overburdened with legalism and legal staffs and the Uniform Code? Why do we have 29 Flag Officers and huge staffs on duty in the Norfolk area alone (with liberty every night)? Who has lowered our standards and in consequence has lowered the prestige of the Navy? It takes no public relations specialist or nuclear physicist to frame the answer. It is simple: We have! We are guilty on every count.
True, the officer corps suffered great dilution in the war. It is curious, the spirit and efficiency in the operating forces at sea suffered no perceptible diminution. On the beach it was different. We compromised with the established Navy standards. It was not giving in to civilian influences (with the advent of dilution) that was as important as compromising among ourselves over our own standards. We adopted civilian yardsticks and practices. It was hard to tell where one stood. The esprit of the Navy that was, is gone. Many civilians gained a low opinion of the Navy from war-time beach association; they still retain it.
3. The Lack of Career Officer Material: There have always been inequities in emoluments and living for the naval officer as against the civilian. The disparity may be growing. A reduction of prestige may have come out of the war. But, I do not believe we are going to be able to buy naval officers with increases of pay and perquisites. We certainly shall not be able to buy prestige or argue people into believing that the naval officer deserves it.
No! Rather, Admiral Jarrell has it when he speaks with pride of the U.S.S. Pruitt. “Morale was high, and naturally so were reenlistments. We put in long hours, but there was very little work. The Navy was a vocation. . . . Our services were available only to the Navy, for as long as the Navy would have
them.” m
Dedicated men! In simpler words it meant simply they were Navy. This is what we have lost. The Navy grew and grew fast; there were too many things that needed doing. It broke into cliques, better not to identify them but their existence—the divergence of aims, the quest for special privilege, the loss of aim—is incontestable. One cause was left out, the overall binding one, the Navy and our heritage, the sea.
Let someone stand up and form a Salt Horse clique!
* * *
Commander G. W. Harper (SC), U. S. Navy.—I have recently read several articles including “The Vanishing American Naval Officer” which lament the passing of the old Navy, the unsatisfactory status of the line officer, and the deplorable existing state wherein specialists are permitted to “masquerade” as naval officers. These papers imply that “authority,” “prestige,” “fame,’" and “recognition” are lost to the line officer.
As a supply officer, and possibly a specialist, I consider myself primarily a naval officer rather than a specialist, and I conclude after examining the facts, that neither the position of the line officer nor our modern Navy has “Gone to Hell” as those of little faith and less discernment imagine.
Let’s take stock and see how we stand, not avoiding any of the hard or controversial issues. First, is the naval officer’s profession essentially different from what it was in bygone days? Radio long ago lessened the independence of the naval commander operating on foreign stations. No longer is he permitted to resolve on the spot questions pertaining to American interests which involve really important policy matters. This change is not recent, and I don’t think this can be attributed to the recent war or post-war aftermath. Since most of the laments for the good old days seem to be for the Navy as some knew it in the late twenties and the thirties, it is reasonable to assume that it is not a major cause for the disturbed view, although this is certainly a prime area wherein the naval commander no longer draws the water he once did.
But the responsibilities and demands of the naval profession have increased and seem to be increasing further. The line officer today needs to know everything that was required in the good old days of the 1930’s—and considerably more. He must retain the old skills as seaman and mariner and learn many new ones. He requires even more skill, discernment, and experience in commanding and administering his men since society in general, including the make-up of the Navy, has become far more complex. If the moving tide of events has made life in general more difficult, it is but an added difficulty which the naval officer must effectively surmount. These conditions may leave less time for
cutter-racing and football, and no one regrets this more than myself, but I don’t think anyone can say that the new times have decreased the area of responsibility for the line officer. Indeed, if those who complain are merely looking backwards to the days of more leisure time, fifteen and twenty- year petty officers and a Navy of hand-picked high school graduates, no one can reply effectively.
The line officer today must first of all realize that yesterday is no more and, if his station and field of endeavor is changed, it does not mean that there is not another type of game to be played under difficult conditions in a changed arena, and a game which is crying aloud for all the devotion and skill he possesses. Incidentally, the stakes—control of the seas—remain the same. It is the duty of line officers, from five star admirals to new ensigns, to take the material available and to work with might and main to forge, maintain, and, as our national interest requires, use effective naval strength. Let us be reminded that in the past superlative fighting ships have been fashioned in corrupt and inefficiently administered shore establishments and manned by the dregs of civilized society, recruited by the press gang. History is replete with such examples, and if line officers of today will reflect on the problems of Robert Blake, Samuel Pepys, Admirals Suffren, Duncan, Jervis, and Nelson, to name only a few, they may more readily comprehend that the good old days never were. Responsibility indeed! The opportunity is here now and cries aloud for as much command and executive talent as can be mustered.
Responsibility exists only where it is accompanied by authority. If the line officer of today does not possess the necessary authority to do his job, he must get it quickly. By necessary authority” I do not mean exactly ]he same authority and power which existed m 1936, 1908, 1812, or any other tim e—we are not concerned with other times, we are concerned with right now. The line commander must have the authority necessary to carry out his mission and to operate his ship under modern conditions. At one time a captain could punish small offenders by having a man’s bare back literally cut to ribbons with a cat-o’-ninetails. It may be that this was a very proper and necessary authority many years ago. Captains today have been divested of this authority, yet we have successfully engaged in' some right considerable naval warfare in recent years, and our captains have gotten along well enough. I his authority, once traditionally theirs, is simply not needed, and its passing has not destroyed discipline or organization. It is really of little importance whether or not a captain can use his brig and the bread and water punishment in exactly the same way as he could in the glorious 30’s. The question is whether or not he has been divested of authority to the detriment of an organized fighting service.
Authority has not been withdrawn from the commanding officer to the extent that he can’t impose discipline. Our fleet has not become an undisciplined rabble, nor is it becoming one. The job is becoming tougher as it has gotten larger, and the simple fact is, the profession is more exacting. There is less place for the arrogant martinet who takes improper advantage of historic prerogative. Yes, his berth is a little narrower—maybe for the good of the service. On the other hand, there is a more exacting requirement for real leadership.
The line officer’s job has not been swept away; it has grown to proportions which many of us possibly may not even recognize, and those line officers who don’t rise to meet these increased responsibilities will be engulfed, and they will be passed in the general advance just as all who stand still are passed. The Navy is going ahead, and the great bulk of our officers are going to forge ahead, using the tools and authority available to them.
In discussing sea duty in general, and watch keeping and ship handling in particular, it seems that some “unrestricted line officers” consider this to be the holy of holies and, if we believe much of the current writing on this subject, it would automatically follow that proficiency in these lines means that the individual is necessarily more courageous and devoted than others.
I submit that this is simply not so. Everyone recognizes that the naval officer must be a capable mariner and that naval vessels must
be operated and kept in a seamanlike man- officers” hold them. “Unrestricted line ner. However, this part of the profession by officers” hold these prestige billets for a sim- no means encompasses everything which pie and very excellent reason they are goes to make a real professional. While the those best qualified to (ill them by virtue
sea is an ancient and honorable calling, it is a of their training and experience. The reason
simple fact that uneducated men acquire for this is that line officers are the great body this skill and proficiency and successfully and backbone of the officer corps today and operate large ships all over the world at a not that they have also happened to be just substantial profit to shipowners. There is this since the first Navy put to sea. far more than this to being a line officer in The “line officer’s” prestige is recognized the U S Navy, and those who think differ- by assignment to these command tasks, and ently are selling themselves and their pro- it is a fact that they remain eminent in the fession short Skill in this line of endeavor area. As prestige exists in our Navy, the alone is quite unlikely to set a line officer “unrestricted line officer” has most of it. apart as an individual to be revered and Further, it may be well to examine an addi- looked upon with awe by all who approach. tional area of recognition and reward which The scope of a line officer’s duty embraces contributes to prestige in our service. Decora- far more than watch keeping or familiarity tions and medals are still awarded primarily with the complex and intricate workings of for success in combat and command, and the greatest modern warship, and I respect- “unrestricted line officers” have more oppor- fully submit that the planning, developing, tunity to distinguish themselves in combat, and organizing of naval forces with the stra- planning, and naval command, and it is tegic and tactical leadership involved is the only fair to point out that line officers are higher calling and, as such, represents the the principal recipients of distinguishing prime area for achievement by the line awards. Decorations bestowed by the United officer. It is here that line officers can be States are of considerable importance, and recognized and, if prestige and fame are the receipt of these high awards enhances gained, it will be in this area. prestige to a great degree. The fact is that
It has been said that the “pride” of naval prestige in this area simply does not come officers is now materially reduced. Once as a general rule to the specialist except in a more I must disagree and discount. Pride few outstanding cases; and line preeminence is something we either have or do not have, in this area of distinction may be recognized Almost 100,% of us have it in the Navy, and merely by looking at the uniforms of officers it cannot be undermined by unsound attacks, who have held the command jobs, no matter how untrue. I pity those who don’t We encounter the term “fame,” not used have it and I earnestly hope that any officer quite so often as others, but even this is lacking’it will leave the career service. allegedly being undermined. Statements
Let’s take up the term “prestige,” which such as this are utter nonsense! If an officer is some say the “line officer” seems to be in to be a famous naval officer, his fame will danger of losing. Again we must examine the come as a result of his achievement and good record and see just what conditions are. fortune. An officer may prepare himself for Within the Navy the “line officer” has re- fame, but nothing will guarantee it, and fame tained his position in all important respects is simply not the normal reward for an officer, —CNO and his deputies are “line officers”; no matter how ably and diligently he has fleet and type commands are all filled by pursued his career. One may expect to be “line officers”; district commandants are rewarded with authority and prestige, the “line officers”; commanding officers and same is not so with regard to fame. One may executive officers of fleet units are “line hope for it, but one cannot expect it. It is officers.” The officer of the deck is still un- not within the capacity of an individual to hampered in his authority to manage the confer it. If it comes, it may arrive early or ship while on watch. These are the prestige late in a career, and an officer can only prebillets in our Navy and “unrestricted line pare himself in order that he may justly
earn it. The opportunity for fame is, however, more likely to present itself to a “line officer” than to a specialist.
Thus “line officers” are not so badly off as some imagine. They have a tremendous task and opportunity; they have responsibility and authority to go with their task, and they are recognized and rewarded by any fair standard.
The Navy today and in the post-war years has been commanded in every echelon almost entirely by officers who were in the Navy prior to 1941, and subordinate grades have contained literally thousands of exenlisted men with prewar service. If indeed things are as bad as some would have us think, it does not speak well for the example and leadership of so many who enjoy the benefit of being forged in this “alleged” crucible of excellence. As far as I can see these groups contain their share of the general average, and I have not encountered professional excellence or special social tone in the group which sets it apart. While we had a good Navy in the 1930’s, it was not as good as it is today, and although it may have been smaller, simpler, and neater, it certainly had its shortcomings. Those who complain should recognize that the Navy of the 1930’s was not up-to-date in some respects and was downwright backward in others. We had torpedoes that ran poorly and failed to detonate, and we were extremely backward in concepts of AA defense and splinter protection for personnel. Our tactics and training for night surface action certainly couldn’t be considered adequate, much less excellent. Logistics did not receive its merited attention, and whole areas of research and development were ignored. It is possible that the program of much time in port, winter bases, and plenty of time for organized athletics may have been improved upon.
Our NROTC program is failing today simply because it has the cart before the horse. Instead of holding out a college education as bait for a little service we should be offering a service career and the college training necessary to pursue one. Many young men want to serve if they are approached correctly, but we must emphasize first motivation and desire to serve, and this must be
part of the selection process as much as high school marks. The present program attracts the type who will settle for a new car, a wife, a suburban residence, and a steady pay check. It is incorrect to work in this area of limited initiative and ambition; and yet we seem bent on paying their way through college simply because they can make good grades in school. ,
It has been falsely alleged that the presence of specialists is a cause for trouble. It is necessary to examine this in view of the facts. Why does the Navy have commissioned specialists? We have had some, such as paymasters and surgeons, for many years, and it seems reasonable to assume that they are needed to accomplish special tasks which require different training and talent. The Navy has and needs more specialists because our modern Navy has become so complex and technical that more tasks which require special training and qualifications have to be performed. Traditionally, our Navy has made every effort to obtain the best in manpower, training, and material. The specialist has not been introduced into a private club by means of a sinister plot of some sort, nor have most of them been introduced by theorists, unrealistic planners or empire-builders. Specialization has been resorted to after actual experience has dictated a change, and, the impetus of these changes has originated with “unrestricted line” commanders who have taken steps to fill the need.
The need for specialization is real. Let’s take shipbuilding as an example. Is there any real serious school of thought which holds that “steam and juice,” as taught at the Naval Academy, plus operating experience at sea, qualifies an officer to oversee the design and construction of a modern man-o’- war? I believe most thinking people will recognize that this is merely a thorough introduction to this field.
At one time, the line officer was his own weather expert and, perhaps there exists a group of “unrestricted line officers” who consider themselves meteorologists. Here again, weather is more than reading a barometer, glancing at the sky, looking at the sea, and holding a finger in the wind. No naval commander responsible for launching an air strike or an amphibious operation wants merely good advice on this subject—he absolutely requires expert advice collected from every available source, interpreted by an expert. If some specialists have arrived at sea late in life by the standards of some “unrestricted line officers,” it is probably due to the fact that they were badly needed in their speciality and have been so assigned. Similar reasons justify the presence of all specialists who have been brought into the Navy to develop and maintain our equipment, assist in administering the establishment, and to furnish the line commander with the best advice available. When these tasks no longer need to be performed, the specialists will no longer be retained; for we can expect the Navy to change constantly as time passes.
Specialists are educated men with special training, usually post-graduate training at university level, and they simply will not accept a second-class position. They expect to be paid and promoted within a fair and reasonable personnel policy. They make the same sacrifices, or put up with the same inconveniences, as other officers and, naturally, they expect to be considered with their contemporaries for pay and promotion purposes. They do not expect to direct naval warfare as Chief of Naval Operations, and they recognize that their chances for reaching flag rank are not equal to those of the “unrestricted line officer”; but they do expect a full career to be offered them in all respects, if they are to remain in the Navy. As always, only second-class types will remain long in a second-class position.
Commander John V. Noel, Jr., USN— s
Admiral Jarrell’s eloquent analysis of the s
Navy’s major personnel problems should in- 2
spire the enthusiastic concurrence of all pro- f
fessional naval officers. At long last a senior 1
officer has laid it on the line with heartwarm- 1
ing candor and logic. Certainly our world has i
changed radically in fifteen years, but it is ;
much more than nostalgia that leads us to ;
strive for a return to the morale and to the <
professional competence of the old Navy. i
None of us really expect to be as relatively well-off financially as we were in the thirties, nor can we expect the Fleet to be based only ;
at Norfolk, Long Beach, and San Diego. But we can hope to restore our Service to the place it once held in the esteem of the American people as an elite Corps of public servants whose men were a credit to their uniform and whose officers were gentlemen of superior professional ethics.
To the major aspects of the postwar Navy described so colorfully by Admiral Jarrell, I would add two: the shocking decline in dependent medical care and the equally severe decline in the relative status, within the Navy, of the line officers qualified for command at sea. Medical care for dependents has, for the Navy, long had legislative sanction. There persists the delusion, in Washington at least, that this medical care, while reduced, is still an actuality. With the exception of relatively remote naval shore establishments (and in Washington, D. C.) medical care for dependents is largely a myth. As an example, in the Long Beach Area, a major Fleet base, for tens of thousands of active and retired personnel there were, in June, 1954, five doctors available at the Naval Station, Long Beach, for dependent care. Additional facilities are available at Corona, but the Naval hospital there is about sixty miles away.
The decline of the broadly qualified general duty line officer relative to his companions who are specialists is one of the most disturbing trends in our Service today. The officers who endure the most hardship and danger in terms of sea duty and responsibility—the seagoing officers qualified for command at sea—seldom enjoy the pleasant quarters ashore that legal and engineering
Specialists are not stealing any thunder from good “line officers,” nor does their presence interfere with the authority, recognition, or prestige of the line officer. If problem areas exist for the “unrestricted line career,” they cannot be resolved by attacks upon the position of others. Any successful approach must be positive rather than negative. Grumbling about specialists will gain no advantage, nor will looking back to the one- shot operations of the 1930’s and pining for their return. It is much like the little French restaurants which aren’t as good as they used to be. Wake up!—they never were! As for 1 he specialist, he pleads NOT GUILTY.
specialists, for example, fall heir to at naval stations and shipyards. It is somewhat bizarre to equate the responsibilities and professional knowledge of a lieutenant commanding an LST off the coast of Asia and a lieutenant Wave officer in the United States; yet they both wear the same two stripes and a star and draw the same pay. Even more absurd is the sense of values that permits a commander dentist to draw $100 more a month than his running mate in the line who commands a destroyer.
The Commanding Officer of a fleet unit has become enmeshed in a fine web of bureaucratic directives that seriously impair not only his prestige, but his ability to administer his command. Each of these directives is well intentioned and motivated by a concern for the interests of the government, but their accumulative effect has been to reduce most seriously the authority of the Commanding Officer. As an example, when the U.S.S. Rochester recently visited Saigon, the crew expressed interest in the French perfume on sale there at bargain prices. With the men’s ready cash a bit low, it seemed wise to buy several hundred dollars worth of perfume for the Ship’s Store; thus taking advantage of wholesale prices and making the perfume available for purchase later after future paydays. It was then learned, from effective BUSANDA directives, that the Commanding Officer lacked the authority to purchase a single dollar’s worth of foreign merchandise without specific permission from a BUSANDA purchasing office in New York. Since time did not permit the necessary exchange of radio messages, the project was dropped. A small matter, of course, but symptomatic of the creeping bureaucracy that hampers a responsible Commanding Officer.
Admiral Jarrell’s comments on the Uniform Code of Military Justice deserves the widest publicity. If the members of the Congress who approved the Code had any idea of the cost, in man- and officer-hours, to administer the smallest punishment, they would reconsider the whole issue from a viewpoint of economy alone. It cannot be worthwhile, on any basis, to expend the endless hours of typing and checking that it takes
to complete a simple cut and dried “guilty’ Summary Court Martial of a man who has been five hours late in returning to his ship. The Commanding Officer may, of course, award non-judicial punishment at mast, but this is considered such a trivial matter under the Code that it does not qualify as a previous conviction if the man offends again.
If the man has missed the sailing of his ship, a Special Court is required to award any sort of punishment commensurate with the offense. But how many Fleet Units can afford the officer hours involved in awarding a Special Court Martial? The answer is very few—only the largest ones. An operating destroyer, for example, can hardly assign four or five of its most capable officers and its only competent yeoman to a procedure that may take days or even weeks. The result is that many of the offenders under the Code get away with a slap on the wrist, and they, the small percentage of habitual offenders, soon get the word. The Navy is making a sincere effort to make the Code work, but the technical difficulties should receive greater recognition from the cognizant Navy Department Bureaus who could provide or assign legal office space in Fleet Units and additional clerical and legal assistance.
While we must depend on a gradual change in public attitudes, as well as upon Congressional action, to cure many of the ills of our profession, there are some things that we as naval officers can do to pull ourselves up, as it were, by our own bootstraps. There are two courses of action that every officer could take in his relations with his subordinates that would assist this process of raising the professional competence and esprit of our officers to pre-war levels.
Officers should, individually and officially, be more exacting in the performance of duty expected of their subordinates. Too many young officers get by with sloppy appearance, lubberly manners, and shoddy performance because no senior officer has squared them away. “Live and let live” seems to characterize too many of our activities. Sometimes it takes a lot of energy and moral courage to be tough and exacting. A reminder from the very highest levels in the Navy might help: to the effect that officers are, in a sense,
always on duty and no unofficer-like appearance or conduct should ever go unacted upon. In this large, complex, and sprawling naval shore establishment of ours too many officers and men live and work on the fringes, only technically under someone’s command and direct supervision.
The second course of action that is recommended might appear to be in contradiction to the first. It is to emphasize the human relations aspect of the management of our naval units. Too often, in the hustle and bustle of work, we tend to lose sight of the ' fact that our men and officers are the most important tools we work with. There need be no conflict with a policy of maximum tautness, smart appearance, cleanliness, preservation, economy, and efficient performance of duty and, at the same time, a policy of genuine consideration for the comfort, welfare, and the feelings of our men and officers. It is no altruistic concept but one proved in terms of higher profits in industry that happy, secure, and well-motivated men produce more efficiently.
As officers we can raise professional standards by demanding them; we*can raise morale at the same time by the enlightened, humane, mature management of our most valuable asset, the officers and men of the Navy.
* * *
Commander Louis P. Gray III, U. S. Navy.—-In the Navy today there may well be very few officers of experience who would differ with Rear Admiral Jarrell’s statement that “the quality of our officer corps has steadily deteriorated,” and that the quality of our enlisted personnel has followed a similar decline.
Justice. If we fail to do so, and if we fail to acquire a firm understanding of the principles of the Code and acquire operating experience thereunder so that we may later testify rationally and intelligently before Congressional Committees considering highly desirable revisions to the Code, we can expect to be saddled with a far more restrictive piece of legislation.
Representatives of various Bar Associations, AMVETS, the American Legion, the National Guard Bureau, the Reserve Officers’ Associations of each of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as well as legislators and lawyers, and others testified before the Congressional Committees enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The services were represented, of course, by professional career officers who were grossly outnumbered and can best be described as a minority raising their voices in the face of a rising gale bent upon generating reforms. To ascertain the degree of fact contained in the foregoing language, one need only peruse the volume entitled, Index and Legislative History, Uniform Code of Military Justice (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).
This document reveals clearly the intentions of those who will oppose any revision which would tend to increase the disciplinary powers of command in order to render them commensurate with the responsibilities thrust upon the commander by the nation. Let us face the naval facts of life with regard to the position of the commander in the field of discipline.
The proponents of the original Uniform Code did not, and apparently do not now, understand the mission of the military. They evidenced, and still do evidence, an inclination to emphasize the justice element of the Uniform Code to the detriment of the military element. Such emphasis is all too clear in the contents of the aforementioned Legislative History wherein approximately sixty pages are devoted to the concept that command influence must be eradicated and that the natural twin functions in any military organization, command and discipline, must be separated once and for all if we are to have an effective military force. Our pro-
The many factors contributing to and enhancing the degree of deterioration and decline are presented rather forcibly by the Admiral in his able article, “The Vanishing American Naval Officer.” However, although I agree wholeheartedly with the basic premise advanced in the article, it is my desire to advance the premise that we naval officers must take considerable action to develop, maintain, and enforce discipline, as well as generate efficiency, notwithstanding the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military
fessional military men realize all too well that such a concept represents the zenith of sheer nonsense.
Knowing that this concept is deeply embedded in the hearts and minds of those who testified most vehemently before the Committees of Congress during the crystallization of the Uniform Code, our course of action is clearly charted. The line officers, or staff officers, exercising command at the highest and lowest levels, must dedicate themselves to the task of learning the provisions of the Code, applying them intelligently, and thereby placing themselves in a sound position to testify or report as to the detrimental after-effects of the application based upon operating experience.
Not all officers can be expected to testify in support of the military argument to be advanced in favor of revision, but our senior operating commanders can be expected to offer the Congress the benefit of their experiences flowing from practical applications. Such was not the case during the enactment of the UCMJ where a relatively new field was being carved insofar as the U. S. Navy was concerned. At that time our leaders could testify only as to the effectiveness of the Articles for the Government of the Navy which had already been unjustly and unfairly indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to be removed from the statutes of our land by those who were determined to overthrow all prior laws in the field of military discipline.
We must not confuse our planning by indulging in the whimsy that the Articles can be restored to the statute books even though we must all agree that they were effective as stated by Rear Admiral Jarrell. Sufficient injustices did crop up in all branches of the services to arouse the reformers. Our course of action is to meet this degree of rationalism headlong, but in a calm, rational manner based upon case histories—facts—stemming from our intelligent application of the present Code. If we fail, our vast weapons systems, costly armament and machinery of war will be of little avail to us in the face of an onrushing aggressor because we will have lost our capability to control the human element. Undisciplined mobs merely fight wars!
Properly-indoctrinated, well-disciplined, and capably-led forces WIN WARS!
Hoist Ashes or Something
(See page 747, July, 1954, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Donlad Royce, U. S. Navy (Ret.).—The picture of the old Indiana and the “Hoist Ashes” article in the July issue revived memories of our (Class of T4) first practice cruise in the summer of 1911. The Indiana, Iowa and Massachusetts comprised the squadron and carried the three classes of T2, T3, T4. The picture of the Indiana didn’t seem exactly familiar, so I resurrected some old snaps of the “Massey” to find the reasons—readily apparent they were, the gray paint and the cage mast later installed as a mainmast. A detail missing was the crow’s nest on the foremast where I had the pleasure (?) of standing my first watch as we went out the Virginia Capes one late afternoon in early June—it was rough and many became seasick—I was doing all right although these ships pitched heavily, and I was getting an extra special ride up there in the crow’s nest. I felt that I would get by if my relief showed on time—it was the second dog watch, and at 2015 my patience was exhausted, and I called down to the bridge for my relief. I didn’t appreciate the laughter that followed nor the advice that the masthead lookout should lay below at sunset—almost an hour before. The routine about Hoist Ashes seemed to go on through the night, and we would wake in the middle of the night to hear the bosuns pipe and the cry of “Man the Ash Whips— numbers two, four, six, and eight,” and the subsequent rattle and bang of the ash cans themselves. Those ships may now seem primitive and a hard life—certainly the ashhoisting, coaling, scrub clothes and hammocks on deck with salt water, the Dense- Air ice machines which did not seem up to their job a great part of the time, thus resultant warm water at the scuttlebutt, and the spud lockers around the top side which were soused with salt water, the spuds showing their lack of appreciation by decomposing.
The introduction to coaling ship at Queens-
town was hard—we coaled in baskets, and after that day of passing baskets along the deck, it seemed as if the old back would never be the same as before. But the weather improved as we went along, and we got used to things, could curl up on the bridge deck under the apron on the stack when “Watch on Deck” and keep warm and dry even on a squally night. Of course, these conditions would probably seem luxurious to our predecessors of the wooden ships and sailing days —and so on back to the beginning of things. Xext cruise we stepped up to ships of the Connecticut and Rhode Island classes which had ash ejectors in the fire rooms but still we coaled, although it never seemed as bad as that first occasion with the baskets at Queenstown.
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Captain K. C. McIntosh (S.C.), U. S. Navy (Ret.).—The author doesn’t know the half of it. True, the year he mentions, 1902, saw the dawn of the new day. It was in that year the General Mess was established after a tryout on the old Texas, under Paymaster J. S. Carpenter’s guidance. Before that the ONE (yes, just one!) Ship’s Cook made a comfortable nestegg baking and selling pies; and gave casual instruction to the Mess Cooks, as what we now call Messmen were then termed. In the phrase of the time, a Mess Cook was a man who “was too small to be a shellman and too dumb to be anything else.” And he cooked for twenty men not just served them. One fourth of the allowed ration was held back and “commuted” at the rate of thirty cents per man per day; and this money could be spent on such luxuries as catsup or mustard or jam which were no part of the ration. Neither was fresh fruit. However, unless his mess sent a watchman along with the mess cook when he went shopping for luxuries, he was apt at times to get a beer or so too many on the beach and come back with neither catsup nor ration money. It was not government money in those days. The mess had to get it out of his hide if they could during the lean days that followed.
I thoroughly enjoyed the article; but one main proof of how far the comparatively recent past is in the past, is that the author
had to do so much guessing, and so inevitably got a few things hazy. To wit: Of course spit-kits were never covered, but that was no worry to the sweeper. A careless sitter who missed the kit was never out of sight of some sort of petty officer. So, hardly would his “crachat” land on the deck before there was a roar. He, not the sweeper, scrubbed that spot; and to make is more memorable, he took off his undershirt and used it for a swab. Then he scrubbed the undershirt under Jimmy-Legs watchful eye.
Recreational facilities? Acey-Deucy, of couse. And Spanish Pool—does that exciting brand of checkers still exist? But mostly^ making skrimshaw to sell on the beach, maybe. Woven string belts, ornamental thrum- mats, carved shark-bone sticks, etc.
Quarters? For muster at 0930, then, Monday a drill more or less up to the division officers. Stand by to repel boarders,” or maybe cutlass drill, or perhaps just a joyous session of cockfighting.” Tuesday, Fire Drill. Wednesday, Collision. Thursday, General Quarters. Friday, Field Day. Saturday, Captain’s inspection of compartments. Sunday, just Muster and Church, except the first Sunday in the month, General Muster, in Special Full Dress, when the Paymaster called the roll beginning with the Skipper’s name and ending with the junior Apprentice. Each man, from the Captain down, answered by shouting his rank or rating; and as soon as he had shouted, all but the Captain marched up to the Skipper, saluted, spun on his heel and went below. Third Sunday was Full Dress, not Special Full, and it was “Rocks and Shoals,” sometimes called “Death or Worse Punishment.” Which of course meant nothing but the reading of the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
The author made two very natural errors regarding Conduct Class Four. No, he was no trouble to the Paymaster. He saved trouble; for when the Mast Report was brought into the Pay Office by the Ship’s Writer, the Special 4th names at once got a date set over them in the payroll—a date three months from now. Up to then, it was easy. The man got $5,00 per month, unless a Summary Court had taken even that away. That about kept him, with care, in tobacco and necessary clothing and soap for the month,
with maybe a pie or two from the Cook. There was no use trying to borrow money from him. He didn’t have any.
Coal passers did indeed pass coal; but not into the glowing furnace doors. That was the job of Firemen, First Class. CP’s were in the hot bunkers, shovelling it out where the h 2c’s could pass it on to the F lc’s. AND Coal Passers hoisted ashes. No, it was not an all-hands evolution. The Ash-Hoist was usually located right alongside the galley, to have all the necessary “chutes” in one small area. When the fireroom deck was getting crowded and all the ash buckets were full, the Engineer sent the Orderly into the cabin. “Permission to hoist ashes, Sir?” If drill was over, if it wasn’t “air-bedding time, if there was no fresh paint, “Permission granted.” Coal passers assembled at the top of the hoist on deck and at its foot in the fireroom. One by one, the big buckets came clanking and clattering up. The ash-chute was guyed out well clear of the side, and bucket after bucket was emptied into it and splashed into the sea, or sometimes Oh, JOY!—into a bumboat coming alongside. 1902? Yes, hoist ashes was carefree, then and for the next five years. It was, I think, 1907 before Robley D. Evans noticed that a ship could be tracked and theoretically sunk just by the floating clinkers she had hoisted, and the sport became more circumspect.
One last note: Of course “men took this opportunity to bathe.” For once there was plenty of water. You try bathing—and drinking—a maximum of two quarts of water a day for a month or so and see if you won’t take any opportunity offered to get under a washdeck hose!
But it was a mighty good article!
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Lieutenant Commander Frederick C. Dyer, U. S. Naval Reserve.—I certainly enjoyed Yeoman Robinson’s article on life in the old Navy as portrayed in the 1902 Bluejacket's Manual—particularly where he italicized the fact that reveille at sea was at 0400 every day\
I remember my own cold horror at Midshipmen’s School in 1943 when I read in the then current BJM that reveille was at 0500. The ship I went to held an 0600 reveille
(just after dawn GQ); but in the back of my mind always lurked the fear that the full terror of an 0500 rising might be unleashed upon us. I swore that if ever 1 came to power I would strike a blow for later reveilles.
Thus years later when I had the job of preparing a new edition of the BJM, I found that the editions as late as 1946 were still stating:
0500. Reveille; call all hands, pipe “up hammocks,” serve out coffee; light the smoking lam]).
I was sure that such a schedule was an archaism reprinted from indolence or oversight. I searched until I ran across a 1948 battleship organization book which gave 0600 reveille for weekdays and 0630 for Sundays and Holidays. This I printed in the 1950 edition of the BJM; and then felt much better.
I am still keeping my eyes open for a formula by which we can bring an even later reveille to all the ships at sea. I have found a large carrier which spells out an 0700 and even an 0730 hour for mid-watchers and night workers, but as yet 0600 seems the standard. Of course I must first continue my campaign to correct the diabolical practice aboard certain ships whereby the OOD with the midwatch has to get up for GQ, then reveille, work the morning, and go back on watch at 1145—wholly missing the 1200 to 1300 “quiet period and sack time” enjoyed by the rest of the ship. He stands the most onerous watch and yet gets the least and the most interrupted sleep . . . and misses the noon nap.
After I am sure that all ships have made proper arrangements for the midwatchers, I shall return to my campaign for an 0700 reveille for all hands. Or maybe even an 0730 reveille. Certainly for reservists on two weeks training duty there should be an 0900 to 1200 reveille-with-brunch!
Incidentally I am looking for early editions of the BJM to complete my collection, and take this opportunity to request same of your readers. The only 1902 copy I have seen so far is the original copyright one in the Library of Congress. Perhaps Yeoman Robinson and his misty-eyed chiefs can dig me up some World War I and prior editions?
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