Ever since the Korean armistice was signed, occasional newspaper stories have reported the decline of Armed Forces re-enlistments. The infrequency of these stories has been natural because there have been few day-to-day developments which would warrant repetition to civilian readers. To the Department of Defense, however, the rate of re-enlistments is of daily importance and will continue to be so for many months.
All the military services are affected. The re-enlistment blues plague top officials in every service. Examples of this growing concern have been manifested in the Womble report and the recent Kaplan report. Both were official committee investigations on the state of morale and both reports concluded that not enough men want a career in view of the present internal conditions of the services.
The reports covered both officer and enlisted personnel and nearly every aspect of navy life and, according to the information received, most phases were found wanting in popularity. Though there is an admitted career problem in both officer and enlisted ranks, only the enlisted attitude will be discussed here.
Each of the reports detailed areas where legislation and policy could alleviate the present unpopularity of certain facets of navy life; however, this discussion will not cover pay, commissaries, dependents medical care, or any of the so-called “fringe benefits.” Legislation and policy changes take time. Each day of delay results in another draft of men reporting to separation centers; men the Navy can ill afford to lose.
Improvement in re-enlistment conditions must and can come first from those individuals immediately concerned with maintaining their assigned segment of the U. S. Navy as an effective fighting instrument. The officers of the Navy control the greater portion of an enlisted man’s destiny and thus it is the officers who must initiate relief action.
Obviously any program to increase career- mindedness will not satisfy everyone and, unfortunately, a “program” carries the seeds of its own destruction within itself when unsupported by individuals. Individual thought and awareness of the problem must precede any action or energy applied by the officer corps. Personal attention and initiative in dealing with career conditions is a preliminary requirement in any solution.
But how does a poor re-enlistment percentage affect you as a division officer or head of department, or even as commanding officer? Does it merely involve another shuffle of the watch bill, as one of your men carries his seabag to the separation center? Or does the exodus make you doubt your judgment in choosing a naval career? As man after man shakes his head when the shipping articles are mentioned, do you wonder if the Navy is worthwhile as a life? Assuming you are one who believes, as does the author, that the Navy can be a satisfying and worthwhile life’s work, how does the individual go about “sticking his finger in the dike”?
There can be no doubt that there is general discontent in the enlisted Navy and that this discontent tends to retard re-enlistments. Re-enlistments mean career men and the lack of new career men is the basic problem. In attempting to raise the re-enlistment percentages there is an enlisted group which should receive maximum attention now.
Chief and first class petty officers cannot exercise proper immediate supervision over large groups of inexperienced non-rated men, and this void can be effectively bridged only by third and second class petty officers. Three enlisted groups, then, should be considered in any analysis: senior petty officers, junior petty officers, and the non-rated group.
The Navy will never actually lack raw manpower, or non-rated men; UMT, the draft, and our growing population will continue to fill recruit training centers. An acute shortage of senior petty officers is not evident at present, as the majority of chief and first class petty officers can be considered career men. Therefore, the “keystone” of the career problem is the retention by re-enlistment of third and second class petty officers. An increase in re-enlistments by these men will have an immediate and beneficial effect throughout the Navy. But, their continued group failure to desire a navy career may well result in a future “desert of enlisted leadership.” The senior petty officers of 1960 must come from the third and second class petty officers of 1955.
In this vein, one item in the Kaplan report is ominous. The report states that of the 788,106 men on active duty in mid-1953, only about 100,000 will still be on active duty in 1964. There is good reason to believe that the greater part of this group will be the men who matured in the campaigns across the Pacific and Atlantic in World War II. The truly ominous note is in the speculation that less than 20,000 men out of the 788,106 in 1953 will be on active duty 20 years hence. Contrast these figures against the foreword of a publication issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel which said in part, “The ideal personnel situation would be one in which every man who enlisted would remain on active duty for thirty years. That, of course, is not attainable.”
Before considering what can be done to increase re-enlistments, the characteristics of the keystone group of third and second class petty officers should be understood, and their importance to the Navy, other than just a link in the enlisted chain of command, should be appraised. In general, a typical biography of an individual in this group would reveal that he is young, a high school graduate, and probably serving on a ship or in an aviation unit. In marital status he would have a split personality, a large number of the group being married. His basic reason for joining the Navy is significant: He entered the Navy after June, 1950, to avoid military service in the other branches of the Armed Forces. The majority of the men in the keystone group did not enter the Navy with the thought of a naval career.
As to the group’s importance to the Navy, the simple fact that these men have sufficient service and knowledge to qualify for rating badges makes them a trained and experienced group. In effect they are the “working” petty officers; the men who both direct and do the multitude of tasks which keep our Fleet units running smoothly and efficiently. Without them, senior petty officers must devote more attention to immediate supervision, weakening the function of overall supervision. Greater responsibility is forced upon non-rated men, often with a loss in operating efficiency.
If an insufficient number of men are shipping over in 1954, let us examine the ingredients which produced an adequate force of career men in the late 1930’s.
Militarily the years before 1939 were years of gradual awakening to a growing international tension, but a peacetime mood predominated. In brief, a typical third or second class petty officer in the 30’s was single and received relatively good pay, lived a spartan life under a high degree of discipline. An annual “fleet battle problem” was the highlight of the year’s operations, and though aboard ship, he received adequate liberty in ports where many enjoyable, if perhaps lusty, pursuits were available. Is there any significant contrast between a typical individual of the keystone group of 1954 and his counterpart of the ’30’s?
A study of the factors involved indicate that the primary contrast is in international relations. The “peacetime” personnel of 1954 are not simply station-keepers or a cadre for future expansion but are, in effect, a mobilized force operating on a quasi-war footing. The “long pull” up to the heights of military security is widely stressed by the Nation’s leaders. Readiness for war is emphasized in operation orders throughout the various U. S. Fleets.
Another major contrast, and perhaps one that has the greatest effect on the individual, is the marital status of the keystone group. Where few were married before Pearl Harbor, a substantial percentage are husbands and fathers today. This trend began during and subsequent to World War II when increased base pay and family allowances were necessary for the volunteers who were already married. The improved financial prospects of a service marriage accelerated the marriage rate. Also the Navy became aware of its obligation to provide higher moral surroundings for the men then entering the service, and a vigorous program to instill appreciation of family life began with the approval and backing of the Fleet commanders. Various liberty ports instituted gradually increasing restrictions on certain recreational activities, conceded to be entertaining, but leading to disrupted moral fiber. The total result of this effort is a Navy which must now account satisfactory home life a place in operational planning.
The incompatibility of home life and a mobilized Navy is recognized by top naval officers, and most have expressed regret that our nation’s survival requires such hardships to be endured by personnel and their families. Yet, a great many of the present careermen experienced this hardship in World War II and, in spite of it, chose to re-enlist or transfer to the regular Navy. This has not been true of the keystone group in 1954. Individual motive and action is widely separated in the two groups and is a factor in the change of attitude.
Like Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by North Korean forces burst upon the peace time Navy without preamble. Rapid mobilization of reserve strength accompanied an influx of personnel who had no previous military service. In both World War II and Korea, the new personnel impressed their personality into the Navy’s collective mood. In World War II the prime mover was, “The sooner we get it over with, the sooner we get back home,” but a recruit in the 1950’s usually said, “I’m in here because I didn’t want to get caught in a draft.”
World War II, as the name implies, was a global military struggle, with battle grounds and final objectives clearly visible to the individual. Whether in an isolated rear area or within rifle range of the enemy, an individual sensed he was an active participant, and his personal sacrifices or hardships lent him progressive pride and identity with the accomplishments of the global group.
Conversely, Korea was a theater action with limited objectives—an unfamiliar type of political-military strategy to the United States—and as the limited scope became evident, mental relaxation replaced the earlier willingness to endure sacrifice. Distance decreased identity with the group effort and the general feeling became one of, “What good am I doing in here?” The triumphant memories of Sagami Wan and Omaha Beach were replaced by the dulling influence of Korea’s East Coast “Bomb Line” and the tiresome pull to a dollar-hungry Mediterranean basin. Individuals among the keystone group feel their naval service was futile and sense no future satisfaction from a Navy career.
Surprisingly, the individuals in the keystone group do not always agree on the reasons why a naval career is unattractive to them. Even individuals with similar service and civil backgrounds have varied explanations for not re-enlisting. Many of the incidents which culminate in, or directly influence, a refusal to ship over can be reduced to the old saying, “You can sit on a mountain top, but you can’t sit on a tack.” They are minor items but the individual considers them important to himself. Is there a reason for this weak attitude towards the inconveniences and annoyances which are ever present in the Navy?
The individual’s loyalty to a group is in inverse proportion to the size of that group; the smaller the group the greater the loyalty. If that loyalty is absent in a ship, squadron, or shore station, then it is certain to be absent for the abstract and gargantuan concept of the Navy in its entirety. Lacking the global memories of the Navy in World War II, the keystone group of 1954 failed to discover adequate “unit spirit” which would promote career-mindedness and enable individuals to sustain or surmount the real or imagined hardships inherent in a career.
As difficult as the present personnel problem is, there is one factor which can encourage those officers and enlisted men concerned with application of remedial action. From numerous conversations and discussions, the author, an enlisted man himself, strongly believes that an increased percentage of the keystone group can be influenced to ship over. Many first cruise men with an eagle on their arm leave their ships and squadrons with regret. This regret at leaving the “team” is the first evidence of cohesion which welds an individual into the group and is the “fulcrum” with which to move the keystone group. But regret at the separation center or at the foot of the gangway does not result in re-enlistment. A “lever” of corrective action is required to intensify this vague feeling into a wide-eyed, planned decision to ship over. But how is the Navy to nurture the individual’s mere regret at leaving his organization into an active “unit spirit” which tends to reduce personal resentments against a career?
In setting forth examples which tend to reduce re-enlistments, and measures to increase career-mindedness, the author will limit himself to personal experience and observations and first hand conversations with others. It is realized that any suggested measures must be gauged in the light of military or political factors which may be unfamiliar to him and that these factors may modify or prevent the initiation of such action.
The starting point in increasing career- mindedness among the keystone group is at the individual unit level. As the Nation’s basic social group is the family, so is the Navy’s basic social group the ship or air squadron. Because loyalty to this type of “team” is more easily grasped by the individual, these organizations have the greatest cohesion. Development of an essence which might be described as “unit personality” or “unit character” is the first step in building individual career-mindedness. Men respond emotionally to the comradeship evolved from working with each other, and the individual degree of emotion is tied to the individual’s importance to the group. Whether it be a stores working party or a CIC exercise, group action fosters a group spirit and a loyalty to that group. Such action must result in a sense of achievement, and the result most useful to the unit is the individual’s inward feeling of pride that, “He belongs to the best division in the best crew aboard the best ship in the Navy.” A healthy unit spirit gives an individual a desire to lift his organization above any other, because the organization will lift him in turn.
Competition invokes a natural human desire in the individual to defend those mental and material qualities which are threatened and results in a “will to win.” War between nations could be defined in one sense as competition which brings out this will to win. In peacetime, competition is reduced to rivalry between individual units or groups in the same military service. In the final analysis it is the unit commander who controls the degree of unit spirit, but the desire to instill a healthy unit spirit must range unbroken from the command level down through the successive officer and enlisted ranks.
We may well ask what specific measures can be taken to build a ship or squadron personality. Bona fide desires for unit or group insignia should be encouraged and both insignia and campaign ribbons should be an established part of the ship’s in-port appearance, even at the risk of engendering official or semi-official status for the insignia.
Cap ribbons for the blue flat hat, instead of simply denoting that the individual is in the U. S. Navy, should again tell what ship he is serving aboard. If that is not adequate, due to the limited ports where flat hats are prescribed winter uniform, a shoulder patch with the unit name or insignia may be as valuable in developing an individual’s sense of “belonging.” Change, if it threatens unit personality or affects the individual’s pride in his naval service, should be vigorously resisted on the command level. Groups of ships or aircraft squadrons which represent war-time fame or lengthy tradition should retain the numerical or other type designations under which they won that fame or established their tradition. Indiscriminate shifting of units and scrambling of designators destroys the individual’s sense of continuity with the achievements of the past. For example, the numerical designator of the “Seahorse Squadron,” which had existed through part of World War II and Korea, seemed almost arbitrarily changed when the squadron returned to the Atlantic Fleet from a tour off Korea.
The pre-Korea change in position of deck group rating badges from the right arm to the left arm disappointed many of the individuals in that group. A right arm rating badge had come to mean a military and seamanship group and they felt a loss of prestige and identity with the change.
The “Dixie Division” was censured because of the display of a flag which was the emblem of a group of Southern states in past history. However inappropriate the display might seem, on the occasion of a foreign visit, it nevertheless gave a sense of personality to an otherwise inanimate group of four ships. The Army considers regimental colors an important item in establishing a group identity. What obstacles are present to prevent adoption of this method by the Navy?
Command must have increased opportunity to reward individual responsibility and achievement. Commendatory masts are excellent but they fail to provide a more permanent recognition. Commanding Officers cannot fill enlisted vacancies in rates from qualified men aboard their own units. Recommendations for advancement in rating by the Commanding Officer merely fills one more blank in the applicant’s form. A strong personal recommendation receives no more consideration than a non-committal rubber-stamp type recommendation. A flexible temporary advancement system for seagoing units would be beneficial, even if the individual advanced under this system reverted to his lower grade upon transfer from the unit which rated him.
Simple rewards for maintaining high standards of readiness or fast and efficient accomplishment of a difficult task will promote a healthy unit spirit, “Because the ‘old man’ is looking out for us.” Blind obedience to an employment schedule which provides more training to a trained crew will breed resentment and listlessness. The command level should be in a position to offer compensations commensurate with efficient operations. An extra day in port or extra hours of liberty, if deserved, will establish a group feeling of inward superiority which will be reflected in outward actions. This superiority should not be suppressed if it is equal to the group accomplishments.
Increased awareness by officers of the enlisted man’s pride in his job would enhance an enlisted feeling that it is, “an enlisted Navy too.'” Consider the second class quartermaster now attached to a staff who does not intend to ship over because of the belittlement of himself and his shipmates. The officer-in-charge of the operations plot orders a field day and clears the area of enlisted men when the admiral intends to visit the space. Work stops, the men, figuratively speaking, “crouch in a corner,” while the officer briefs the admiral in majestic solitude. These enlisted men are all attached to a highly classified section and have been cleared for the work. Most are well above average in loyalty and intelligence. The reenlistment rate in this division is nil.
An officer of carrier XYZ stated that he couldn’t trust his men to handle the billeting job, and that he took care of it in five minutes on Friday. But on Sunday flag personnel embarked and four hours later were lucky enough to find enough bunks and bunk bottoms scattered throughout the ship. Another four hours were required to obtain mattresses on an emergency requisition from the nearest shore supply center. On a later cruise the enlisted men responsible for the billeting function handled the task smoothly and quickly. Fortunately these two examples have counterbalances in those officers who recognize the fact that enlisted men are more than just “hired hands” and that they have “stock in the company.”
The action of one carrier skipper is an example of positive development of unit spirit. This ship was in port in mid-week and Captain’s Personnel Inspection was scheduled for Saturday. On Thursday the Captain spoke over the general announcing system and said that the crew’s appearance and actions on liberty were highly satisfactory and that, “Captain’s inspection is cancelled.” The general feeling was a determination to make the next inspection better than ever, to show their appreciation for simple recognition of their appearance and conduct.
Personal leadership must replace edictal leadership. The routine of the skipper of carrier ABC was, from the accounts of his crew, from the bridge to his cabin, and to the quarterdeck when in port. Though he was conceded to be a good skipper, the men beneath the bridge seldom knew what was going on, nor did they seem to care. Rule from the wardroom or stateroom is beneficial only when the individual officer is attempting to build a bridge of trust and responsibility between himself and his petty officers.
How many commanding officers make it a point to meet petty officers when they are newly advanced or report aboard for duty? How many commanding officers have ever called meetings of the various grades of petty officers? The subjects of these meetings would be immaterial. The fact that their positions of responsibility warranted a meeting with the “old man” would make each grade of petty officer more conscious of his importance to the group.
Personality, once established in a unit, is a chain-reaction which struggles to grow outside the borders of individual units, both horizontally to other units, and vertically to higher command. But in this chain binding ship to ship and level to level, the unit remains the governing strength.
In addition to the improvement of unit spirit four other broad categories are problems in increasing career-mindedness in the enlisted Navy. These are: operations, leadership, “needs of the service,” and “creature comfort.” Actually the first three are interlocking but one factor is usually predominant in any given situation. The last category is partially covered in the excellent Operational Development Force report on habitability aboard ships of the U. S. Navy.
The phrase “needs of the service” tends to be a dangerous catch-phrase which seems to justify nearly any decision requiring sacrifice or hardship on the part of officer and enlisted personnel. It must be admitted that the majority of these decisions are forced upon officers who have no other alternative but to require sacrifice or hardship. The danger lies in the education, or lack of it, given to the individual concerning the actual needs of the service.
Carrier ZYX had completed six weeks of winter training in the Caribbean and was returning to the continental U. S. for a yard period. Her assigned home port and home yard was Norfolk, Virginia. Instead of reasonably going to Norfolk, the ship was assigned to New York for the work. Certainly this was a boon to the single men because liberty in New York is to be preferred over that of their home port. But the liberty most appreciated by married men is liberty in the port where their families reside. Home ports and home yards should be as geographically close as is possible, and they should be used as such.
Successful graduates of Class “A” radiomen school report to duty stations with a high degree of skill in copying code. It is disheartening to these men to feel their skill sloughing away as they carry message boards, mess cook, or clean compartments. Graduates of Class “A” schools should be assigned to units which have an actual need for their talents, and the practice of ordering “bodies to billets” minimized.
Yeoman ABC was married and had purchased a home in Norfolk, and when his shore duty expired he requested assignment to a ship which operated from Norfolk. When his orders arrived, however, they sent him to a ship based in Newport, R. I. This hash- marked petty officer now wonders if there really are any advantages in a Navy career. Ships have home ports, couldn’t personnel be assigned home ports too? How difficult would it be to establish a policy whereby an enlisted man could choose a home port upon completion of four or six years of naval service? A map of the east and west coasts shows that naval installations are not confined to one region. Ships and planes operate from every geographical area along both coasts.
Certainly here is a psychological lure to increase re-enlistments. An individual might not know what unit he will be serving aboard ten years from the time he ships over, but, he will know at what port to establish his family. His dependents would no longer be looked upon as transients, and therefore unworthy of sharing civic activities, the complaint of many service wives.
In the field of leadership national security dictates the maintenance of a strong and adequate Naval Officer Corps, strengthened annually by young officer groups. Progress is accompanied by change and our naval leadership must progress in technology and tactics. Stagnation is fatal in this field. Qualified officers must not be denied the opportunities of advancement in rank and responsibility.
A majority of the factors involved in naval operations are usually at cross-purposes, and any decision is the result of a compromise. An example is our overseas commitments. In theory a force operating on distant duty should be strong enough to overcome any local concentration of enemy power, but long range economy dictates a reduction of forces whenever possible. The compromise is a middle ground which results in strength without excessive financial burden on the nation’s resources.
As the factors within operations oppose one another, so are operations and personnel in opposition. Married men are not enthusiastic about repeated and lengthy overseas cruises, even individuals who had decided upon a navy career prior to Korea are affected in their outlook. Perfectly willing to forego family life during wartime, “because it is necessary,” they are unwilling to accept without rancor the heavy schedules that lie ahead in “peacetime.” Single men who now look forward to interesting foreign liberty have turned thumbs down on a navy career because they themselves expect to marry and do not want a long distance home life. A look at the 1952 employment schedule for one of the Atlantic Fleet’s biggest carriers reveals that in one year she spent little more than 100 days in her home port. The longest period was thirty days and the next longest listed was eighteen. One year home out of every three and a half years, if 1952 is any criterion. Comments from various career personnel indicate that this ship was lucky to have even this amount of time at home.
Even the overseas liberty situation sometimes hits a snag. Task group ABC conducted extensive training for close to three weeks from the U. S. to Northern Europe. The first liberty port was considered outstanding by various men of the entire task force. However, regulations prescribed one out of three section liberty, and unfortunately the ships could only spare two days in port. Of course, the section which did not get liberty went ashore first at the next port, but again unfortunately, this next port happened to be a rather small crowded Royal Navy town, and considered not much better than the poorest East Coast liberty port.
Though this situation of leaving only “thin slices” of the operational loaf for recreation and liberty may be isolated, the career- mindedness of the individuals who are affected is decreased. Foreign liberty is one of the Navy’s prime attractions for young men, and it is a product that is easily obtained. In view of the benefits to be derived from adequate overseas liberty, the operations schedule of a unit should automatically provide time in each port for at least one liberty for all hands, or should provide for a return visit to that port.
“Creature comforts” can be loosely defined as the day-to-day living conditions actually encountered aboard navy ships. As stated previously this is covered in an extensive report by the Operational Development Force. Some progress has been made in improved housekeeping aboard ships and more can be expected in the future. Habitability nevertheless remains one of the sore spots affecting the re-enlistment rate. Crowded ships are cited as one reason for poor living conditions. Why are the ships crowded? Is the ship assigned too many jobs, or are too many men assigned to do the various tasks required for the ship’s operation? If either of these reasons apply, a reduction in that area is in order.
To be complete the term “creature comforts” must apply to conditions encountered off the ship as well as aboard. It is perhaps unfortunate that the major East Coast naval base must be considered poor in this respect. Each week end busses, trains, airlines, and private cars are jammed with sailors moving out of Norfolk, seeking recreation elsewhere. But even with this mass evacuation the liberty facilities remain crowded. City officials and civic clubs have expended vast amounts of effort and money in attempts to provide better and more adequate facilities but the situation has improved little, nor is it likely to improve under existing laws. Personnel, though discouraged at the prospects of spending liberty hours in Norfolk, admit that the city cannot be held wholly to blame. Naval installations cover the entire area in a patchwork and the “Navy” has become a livelihood for the section. There are just too many sailors in Norfolk.
And yet, the Norfolk area continues to wield an almost hypnotic influence upon naval officials when a ship must be assigned a home port or when a new installation must be located. “Put it in Norfolk,” seems to be the accepted formula for resolving discussion or doubt. Accepted reasons why other coastal areas cannot support new or increased naval activities should be re-investigated. Channels, merchant shipping, shore facilities, etc., may have changed since the first negative answers became the basis for today’s negative answers.
Some, or perhaps all, of the suggestions discussed here will be counter to the preconceived or established opinions of many individual officers. Pampering or “bribing” of personnel is not suggested, in fact a higher level of discipline and military standards is advocated by the author. The time for hair-splitting and deliberate ponderings over the conference tables is rapidly passing. Action, or lack of it, taken in the early months of 1955 may set the pattern for the crucial years immediately ahead.
Basically, individuals in the enlisted Navy want to be proud of their ship, their skipper and officers, and their part, however small, in creating that pride. It is the task of today’s officer corps to re-establish those conditions which permit an individual lo build pride in his military service.