Many factors influence the global strategy of a nation, not the least important of which are certain narrow water passages throughout the world. While the United Kingdom strategy is linked solidly to the Suez, to Gibraltar, the United States has its Panama Canal. The Skagerrak and Kattegat markedly influenced German strategic planning in two world wars. Similarly, the Turkish Straits have been and will continue to be an important factor in Russian strategy.
An examination of the part which the Turkish Straits have played and are playing in modern history reveals that their importance transcends the geographical limits of the twenty-mile-long Bosphorus, the tiny Sea of Marmora, and the forty-mile-long Dardanelles. It transcends the geographical limits of Turkey which, unhappily, perhaps, is the sovereign of the contiguous shores. In fact, it transcends the geographical limits of all the riparian states along the Black Sea and the Aegean. Today, when Turkey and Greece are gaining membership in NATO, when the Middle East is in a turmoil, when Soviet control of the Turkish Straits would endanger NATO control of the Mediterranean, the importance of this small water passageway can never be underestimated by London, Paris, Washington, or Moscow. Indeed, control of this water link between the Black and Aegean Seas is an issue which affects the world.
To realize this, one must look into the background of the “Straits Question,” its role in history, and its connection with the current “Cold War.”
Turkey is the only modern state which faced the question of the Straits prior to the 18th century. Four hundred years before that time the armies of the Ottoman Empire, moving westward from Anatolia, crossed the Dardanelles and established themselves on European soil. The Ottomans established Adrianople as their capital in 1367 and, after almost a century of struggling, they were able to occupy Constantinople, the capital of the crumbling Byzantine Empire. Thus, in 1453, the Turks controlled both the Straits and the Black Sea area and were extending their influence to both the west and north.
Meanwhile, up north the peoples of the steppes had defeated their Mongol invaders and were organizing and consolidating the Russian State. Progress was such that, late in the 17th century, the aggressive Peter the Great could commence the struggle for expansion to the west and especially to the south.
Under Catherine II Russia emerged victorious from a war in which the Ottoman Empire had joined Poland against her. By the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, the Turkish rule of the Black Sea, from which all foreign ships had long been excluded, was broken. Russia was established on the northern shores of the Black Sea which were opened to trade, and Catherine obtained the right of free passage through the Straits for her merchant ships. Thus, in 1774, the Straits became a matter of international concern.
But Catherine’s designs were not limited to freedom for her trade. There was a perennial hostility toward the Ottoman Empire, the hostility arising from the jealousy of one state for a powerful neighbor. There was the desire to possess the Sublime Porte, not only because of the political prestige which would come with possession, but also because Constantinople had long been the center of Orthodox religion and culture. Despite the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, Catherine continued her designs to crush the Ottoman Empire. To this end she entered into a secret alliance with Austria in 1787. War broke out in the same year when the Sultan, learning of the secret treaty and counting on aid from Sweden and Prussia, attacked Russia. Austria withdrew in 1791, leaving Russia alone in fighting the Turks. Russia might have overcome the Turks and realized her dream of possession of Constantinople and the Straits but for the intervention of England, Prussia, and Austria. By the Treaty of Jassy in 1792, Turkey was saved from possible dismemberment and the Straits remained under Turkish sovereignty. This Treaty is significant since it marked the entry of England into the affairs of the Straits and the Straits were opened to non- Black Sea powers for the first time.
The question of passage of warships first arose in 1798, when Napoleon attacked Egypt and Turkey appealed to Russia and England for assistance. British and Russian fleets were granted unrestricted use of the Straits and, without regard to treaty stipulations, continued to pass through the Straits after the threat of Napoleon had passed. After the Franco-Russian rapprochement signified by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, the Anglo-Russian alliance was broken and England entered into negotiations with Turkey. The ensuing Treaty of the Dardanelles, signed in 1809, recorded significantly “… this ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire ...” to prohibit the entry of the warships of other powers into the Straits.
Thus, in the course of three decades, several significant factors had emerged: the opening of the Black Sea and the Straits to merchant shipping of Russia (1774), the opening of the Straits to merchant shipping of other powers (1792), and the closing of the Straits to warships in accordance with the “ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire” (1809). And thus, the fundamentals, freedom of passage for merchant vessels and restriction of passage for war vessels through the Straits, were established.
In 1833 the Sultan, having accepted Russian aid to fight Mohamed Ali who had revolted in Egypt and threatened the Ottoman Empire, found Russian troops on his soil near Constantinople. They were withdrawn only after the Treaty of Unkiar- Eskelessi was signed. This treaty was ostensibly a mutual assistance pact, but a secret article of the treaty provided that the nature and extent of Turkish aid to Russia, when called for, would be not to allow foreign warships to enter the Straits under any pretext whatsoever.
Once the secret clause of the Unkiar- Eskelessi pact became known, the reaction, especially in France and England, was prompt and strong. As a result, the treaty was abrogated in 1841 at the London Convention between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey. At the same time the “ancient rule” of the Ottoman Empire was reaffirmed with regard to prohibition of warships of foreign powers from entering the Straits, except for light vessels employed in the service of missions. Thus, the principle of the “ancient rule” became a recognized international principle.
But Russia was not to be easily satisfied. In 1853 she attacked the Turks again. France and Great Britain came to the assistance of Turkey. Russia was again defeated. In the treaty signed at Paris in 1856, terminating the Crimean War, a new element was injected into the Straits question, neutralization of the Black Sea, “ . . . its waters [being] formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power. ... In order to insure the execution of the regulations which shall be established by common agreement . . . each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right to station, at all times, two light vessels at the mouth of the Danube ...” The ancient rule prohibiting warships from entering the Straits, as agreed to in 1841 was reaffirmed.
Russia took the opportunity of the Franco- Prussian War to issue a note denouncing the provisions of the 1856 treaty, to which she had been forced to subscribe after her defeat in the Crimean War. It was to be expected that she would not long submit to the neutralization of the Black Sea. The questions were considered at the London Conference in 1871, and the provisions of the Treaty of 1856 which pertained to the neutralization of the Black Sea were abrogated. It was agreed at this time that the Straits might be opened by Turkey in time of peace to warships of friendly powers. The principles thus established were to remain in effect until the first World War.
It is of interest to note that Russia, after Turkey’s entry into the first World War on the side of the Central Powers, demanded annexation of the Straits and certain contiguous areas, including Constantinople. The Allies acceded to the Russian claim, although with reluctance, in early 1915. When Russia withdrew unilaterally from the war in 1917, the Russian claim was considered by the Allies as having lapsed. Bolshevik Russia not only did not press the claim but renounced all claims to the Straits and Constantinople.
In the general peace settlement, the Treaty of Sevres set up a regime whereby the Straits would be open to all ships, merchant and naval, at all times, in peace and in war, but neither Turkey nor Soviet Russia would ratify it. The failure of the two countries to accept the Treaty, along with the Turkish appeal, brought forth the conference at Lausanne where agreement was reached in 1923. By this agreement merchant shipping continued to have the right of free passage; war vessels had freedom of passage within certain limits in peace and during war, Turkey being neutral. The “ancient rule” of prohibiting passage of warships was thus denounced, except in time of war, Turkey being belligerent.
Another significant result of the Lausanne Treaty was the demilitarization of the Straits, together with an area extending for fifteen miles on either side of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (the Black Sea was neutralized from 1856 to 1871), and the establishment of an International Straits Commission to supervise the Straits according to the provisions of the Lausanne Convention. At the conference Soviet Russia had insisted that the Straits be closed to warships and, accordingly, refused to ratify the treaty. Turkey, on the other hand, accepted the treaty, presumably relying on the League of Nations to protect her interests.
By the mid-1930’s it was apparent that the League was not going to be able to maintain international law and order. Turkey appealed for remilitarization of the Straits. The signatories to the Lausanne Convention agreed to a convention which would re-examine the regime of the area. At Montreux in 1936, the demilitarization clause of the Lausanne treaty was abrogated and the functions of the Straits Commission reverted to Turkey. At the same time, freedom for merchant shipping was continued and a limitation was placed on the aggregate tonnage of war vessels which other-than-Black Sea powers might have in the Black Sea in time of peace. Limitations on the number of warships in transit through the Straits also were established along with certain regulations conducting the passage. The provisions of the Montreux Convention obtain today.
Thus, Turkey gained control of the Straits in 1453, Russia entered the picture formally in 1774, and England in 1792, and their interests have been present since these dates. Except for trade agreements with Turkey dating from about 1830, the United States has not been, and today is not, a signatory to any treaty or convention affecting the administration of the Straits. However, since the end of World War II, the United States has demonstrated-interest in the Straits question and willingness, if invited, to participate in a conference which would have as its objective the revision of the Montreux Convention.
It was agreed by the “Big Three” at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 that the Montreux Convention should be revised and, according to the British version of the agreement, the question “should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government.” Following up this agreement, the United States sent a note to Turkey, with copies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, in November 1945, suggesting an international conference to discuss revision of the Montreux Convention. The points suggested as a basis for discussion at the conference were that the Straits should be open at all times to merchant shipping of all nations and to warships of the Black Sea powers, but closed at all times to warships of non- Black Sea powers, except for a limited tonnage in time of peace and except when acting under United Nations authority or with the consent of the Black Sea powers.
Great Britain accepted the American proposal as a basis for discussion, as did Turkey.
Nothing was forthcoming from the Soviet Government until August, 1946, when the Soviet Government presented a note to the Turkish Government declaring that the control of the Straits established by the Montreux Convention did not insure against actions inimical to Black Sea Powers. A series of incidents was related in the note allegedly to show how the Axis Powers during World War II had been permitted to use the Straits in pursuit of military action against the Soviet Union and in violation of the provisions of the Montreux Convention. The note also proposed negotiations to establish a regime on the principles that the Straits should be open at all times to merchant shipping of all nations and to warships of the Black Sea powers, but closed at all times to warships of non-Black Sea powers, except as especially provided for; that the Straits should come under a regime which should be established under Turkey and the Black Sea powers; and that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the most interested and capable powers to guarantee the Straits, should organize joint means for defense against use of the Straits by other countries for acts hostile to Black Sea powers.
The Soviet note, copies of which were furnished to the British and American governments, invoked prompt replies from Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States. The United States and Great Britain both asserted that the Straits were a matter of international concern, not solely a matter for Black Sea powers. Turkey, in her note, went to great length to refute one by one the allegations of her mismanagement of the Straits during World War II. As for a Russo- Turkish defense of the Straits, Turkey considered it incompatible with her own sovereignty and pointed to the United Nations as the guarantor of security rather than a bilateral agreement on the Straits.
The exchange of notes continued. The Soviet Union reiterated the incidents in World War II wherein Turkey allegedly mismanaged the control of the Straits in violation of the terms of the Montreux Convention. Each government maintained the position taken initially. Although the exchange of notes gave rise to considerable tension for a time, the real significance, however, was to make clear the positions of the interested governments.
Great Britain and the United States, on the one hand, sought an arrangement whereby within the framework of the United Nations, there should be freedom of passage for merchant vessels of all nations at all times, freedom for war vessels of Black Sea powers at all times, and denial of passage to war vessels of non-Black Sea powers, except for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace.
Turkey’s position was fundamentally that of Great Britain and the United States. Turkey considered, too, that any bilateral arrangements or any arrangement limited to Black Sea powers were most objectionable, since security came not from privileged strategic positions but from sincere amity among nations and through the United Nations. Further, any joint arrangement for defense of the Straits was incompatible with the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Turkey.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, while in agreement basically with the other three powers on the movements of ships through the Straits, differed sharply in the concept of the control of the Straits. The Soviet Union held that control of the Straits should be not international but regional, i.e., within the Black Sea powers; and within the Black Sea powers, the control should be in the hands of the powers capable of control, i.e., Turkey and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the lines at the Straits are drawn. One party to the issue seeks international control of a defile that leads from the open seas to a closed sea and is willing to submit to restrictions on its access to the closed sea. The other party seeks local control of a defile that leads from a closed sea to the rest of the world. But the problem of control of the Straits has been set aside while problems of greater import receive attention.
The Straits, important as they are politically and economically, regionally and internationally, are today but a smaller part of a larger problem. Control of the Straits, whether demilitarized or fortified, no longer can be exercised from within an area which extends for fifteen miles from either shore of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In the day of the long-range bomber, the jet-propelled fighter, and the atomic bomb, the question of the Straits is the question of adjacent states. In this respect the question of the Straits is the question of the Middle East and the Balkans. There are several indications that the Soviet Union holds this view.
First, the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between the Soviet Union and Turkey was denounced by the Soviet Union in March, 1945. Shortly thereafter, Soviet Russia made claims in publications and over the radio to the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and suggested the establishment of a naval base in the Straits.
Second, Soviet aims to the south, via the Balkans, were revealed as early as November, 1940, by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov when he was discussing with the German Führer the partitioning of the British Empire and spheres of influence in general. Hitler indicated that his interest lay principally in the west, and, therefore, he offered the areas to the east and to the south toward the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union. This was the offer of . . an exceedingly generous portion of the world to the Soviets who had not lost a life nor spent a dollar in the war.” Such a long-term program was interesting to Molotov but there were, he indicated, certain more immediate problems, viz., German troops should be withdrawn from Finland, the German guarantee of the Rumanian frontier was objectionable, Soviet Russia desired a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria in consonance with Soviet needs in the Straits, and there was need for a new regime for the Straits which would establish “realistic guarantees rather than paper assurances.”
In the course of the succeeding six years these immediate problems, but for the Straits, have been solved. German troops are no longer in Finland, and in Rumania and Bulgaria regimes acceptable to the Soviet Union are in power.
Third, late in 1945 in the province of Azerbaijan in northern Iran, a separatist movement set out to establish an autonomous state. Efforts on the part of the Iranian Government to move in forces to put down the revolt and to maintain order were prevented by Soviet military forces. The puppet state of Azerbaijan was established. Efforts on the part of the United States Secretary of State in an interview with Stalin to intercede on behalf of Iran were not successful. Iran finally placed the issue before the Security Council of the United Nations. It was only then that Soviet forces were withdrawn. The puppet government in Azerbaijan eventually collapsed.
Fourth, at Potsdam, Generalissimo Stalin indicated that the Soviet Union “would like some territory of the defeated states.” Accordingly a proposal was made by the Soviet delegation that the Soviet Union be named trustee of one of the Italian colonies. In the later deliberations of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation reiterated this proposal. It was consistently opposed. Later the delegation offered a proposal for a two-power (Italy and the Soviet Union) trusteeship of Tripolitania. This proposal was also opposed by the other Foreign Minsters.
Fifth, at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, 1945, it was proposed that the strategically located Dodecanese Islands be transferred from Italy to Greece and demilitarized. Molotov indicated that, although he might finally agree to the transfer of the islands to Greece, he could not agree to their demilitarization. It would appear that he was unwilling for the then existent Greek Government to acquire the islands because it might fortify them. On the other hand, he did not want the islands demilitarized under any conditions lest a subsequent government friendly to the Soviet Government be embarrassed in its actions to fortify the Dodecanese.
Sixth, with regard to Greece proper, at the first meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in London in January, 1946, the Soviet delegation filed a complaint against the presence of British troops in Greece. Later it proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Greece. Since that time the Greek Government and general conditions in Greece have been the subject of incessant attack by Soviet officials and by the Soviet press. According to the report of the United Nations Balkans Commission to the Security Council, the dissident elements in Greece, and especially the guerrilla forces which operated near the northern frontiers, received aid and asylum from areas beyond the Greek frontiers in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. These forces had as their objective the overthrow of the present Greek Government.
Great Britain and the United States also consider the question as an integral portion of the question of the Middle .East and the Balkans. Russian offensives in the area have been resisted. Iran was supported in her opposition to Soviet activities in Azerbaijan. Proposals for Russian trusteeship over Italian colonies have been refused. Objections were raised to the regimes created in the Balkan states under the aegis of the Red Army. Pressure on Greece and Turkey has been met by the Truman Doctrine. The over-all objective of the United States and Great Britain is to permit states freely to choose their form of government, to prevent oppression, to oppose aggression.
What is the objective of the Soviet Union? What is the significance of the attitudes and the actions which have been taken by Soviet Russia? There would appear to be two motivations.
First, and defensively, the Soviet Union seeks a group of friendly neighbors along her borders, a series of buffer states, a cordon sanitaire. To the south, the objectives are Greece, Turkey, and, at the least, northern Iran. The buffer state system to the west and south would then be complete. At the same time the Straits question, at least for the Soviet Union, would vanish, should the areas adjacent to the Straits come under the effective influence of the Kremlin.
Second, and offensively, if Soviet Russia should attain the implied objectives, she would dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and, with it, the sea lanes to and through the Suez Canal. As a result, she could deny to the western nations access to the Middle East area in general, except for the long sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and the air route across Central Africa. The offensive value of such a position is very great indeed, since the oil resources of the Middle East could then be denied to the western nations and, with limited military operations, actual seizure of the oil fields could be effected.
It would appear that these Soviet moves are not the result of purely defensive intentions. Restriction of the Straits to warships of non-Black Sea powers would almost certainly be included in a revision of the Montreux Convention, while freedom of passage for warships of Black Sea powers would be certain. It is inconceivable that the United States or Great Britain, under their system of government, would undertake a surprise attack, either in the Middle East or against the Soviet Union through the Middle East. Further, security from attack by naval forces would seem to be adequately assured. If, however, the revised convention should be violated, air power from bases in the southern Ukraine should be able to cope with the problem adequately and with dispatch. Further, there are no powers in the Middle East area capable of providing a material threat to the security of the Soviet Union. And still further, Soviet Russia in case of being attacked would have recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations. Thus, there appears to be no defensible basis for the Soviet attitude toward the Straits, or the Middle East, in terms of search for security.
It might be well at this point to consider another source of possible concern from the Soviet point of view, namely, Soviet naval weakness. Suffice it to say that Russia has never been a great naval power, and such efforts as she has made to create a strong navy have been hampered by three wars and a revolution in the 20th century alone, as well as by her entire history of industrial and technological backwardness and by a lack of development of the arts of naval warfare. It might appear reasonable then for the Soviet, Union today to seek real guarantees that the Straits be not used against her. But she has such guarantees for the reasons already indicated and, further, she has the willingness on the part of the two great naval powers, the United States and Great Britain, to enter into an agreement which would close the Straits to their own fleets while leaving them open to those of Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia’s problem in this respect is not in having a weak navy incapable of defense, but in not having a strong navy capable of offense.
The only reasonable interpretation of Soviet intentions comes, then, not from consideration of the Straits question alone, but from consideration of the pattern of Soviet actions from Iran to the Albanian border—or to Italy and Tripolitania. That pattern indicates that the immediate objective is not defensive, but offensive, viz., the domination of the entire Middle East area, the completion of the buffer state system. The method is the well-known process of imposition upon an area and upon its inhabitants of a government attentive to Moscow. And, needless to say, this objective is but a part of the broader objective, the announced goal of destroying any government which opposes the spread of communism.