As history indicates, Japan’s desire to acquire a far-flung empire, including the Philippines, went back to at least the sixteenth century. One of the most interesting chapters of the story of Japanese imperialism during the modern era involved events connected with the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the resurgence of the Filipino insurrection against the United States in the following year. A careful examination of these events should throw much light upon the manner in which Japan strove to achieve her overseas ambitions.1
When the United States declared war upon Spain in April, 1898, relations between the Toyko and Washington Governments were on a very cordial basis. This condition was reflected by the active American support of Japan’s successful efforts to revise existing treaties with the Western powers during the closing years of the nineteenth century. In so far as the Spanish-American War was concerned, the position of Japan was technically that of a neutral. Throughout the conflict, however, the Tokyo Government pursued a diplomatic policy indicating an endorsement of American objectives which, in turn, seemed to be supported by the Japanese public.
Hostilities between Spain and the United States ceased on August 12, and a peace conference was to be held shortly thereafter at Paris. The Foreign Office at Tokyo decided that the United States should be informed of Japan’s official views concerning the disposition of the Philippines. Conversations followed between the diplomatic representatives of the two countries. The Japanese emphasized that the Filipinos were not capable of governing themselves. At the same time, they maintained that Spain had been eliminated as a factor in determining the future of the Philippines. In view of these considerations, Japan was convinced that the United States, rather than some European power, should retain the long archipelago in its entirety. If necessary, the Japanese were willing to share with the Americans the responsibility of governing the Filipino people.
This diplomatic activity on the part of Japan was a factor in the determination of policy by the United States. Being interested in the issues of the Spanish-American War, the Far Eastern nation served as a listening post fqr information pertaining to the attitudes of the major powers concerning the Philippines. Without question the Japanese were opposed to any step whereby an unfriendly European power would have acquired a foothold in the Islands. This reaction, although not decisive, tended to substantiate and to strengthen certain points of view which already had developed at Washington. One of these, of course, was that if the United States abandoned the Philippines, the rivalries of the other powers would result in a serious situation, possibly to the extent of creating an international war of far-reaching proportions.
Despite the fact that the official policy of the Toyko Government, supported by a large segment of Japanese public opinion, endorsed the decision of the United States to retain the Philippines, it was by no means the only reaction voiced in Japan regarding the disposition of the former Spanish colony. Prior to 1898, there was much evidence to indicate that the Japanese themselves had desired to supplant Spain in the Philippines. Whatever hopes had been entertained for an early achievement of this goal gave way, however, to the realities of Japan’s international position at the time of the Spanish- American War. Hard-pressed for assistance on other fronts, the former hermit kingdom had little choice but to sanction American retention of the Philippines. Even so, there was a strong undercurrent in Japan, particularly among the expansionist-minded groups, to the effect that the United States should not be permitted to fall heir to the Far Eastern colony. This minority point of view carried with it an ominous warning regarding the future.
While Spain and the United States were still at war, the press of continental Europe occasionally suggested that Japanese and American interests conflicted over the solution of the Philippine problem. It was also rumored that Czarist Russia was utilizing the rich archipelago as bait to draw the ambitious Asiatics away from their endeavors in China. This prompted the British Minister to Japan, Sir Ernest Satow, to make inquiries at the Tokyo Foreign Office. He was informed that the Japanese were not interested in acquiring the Spanish possession because they had their hands full with Formosa, which was causing much trouble.
The Japanese press itself, though generally favorable to the United States, contained scattered protests against American occupation of the Philippines. According to one leading journal, which had manifested opposition to American policy on more than one occasion, “It is assured that America will take the Philippines, and with Hawaii and the Philippines, she will hold the key to the Pacific, and the balance of power will be completely upset. Japan bears no ill-will towards America, but she should prevent the Philippines from falling into the hands of this great nation.”
On February 4, 1899, less than two months after the Treaty of Paris was concluded, fighting broke out in the Philippines between Aguinaldo’s followers and the American expeditionary force. As before, the official policy of the Japanese Government and the dominant public sentiment in Japan appeared to stand squarely behind the United States with respect to this additional phase of the Philippine problem. The majority of the Japanese newspapers expressed the opinion that the broader aspects of their country’s relations with the United States compelled this attitude.
The Filipino insurrectionists, however, were not without their public champions in Japan. Through the medium of the press, some statements were made in open support of Aguinaldo’s cause. Unknown to most observers, this criticism of American policy, which was embraced by a minority, assumed a greater significance in view of the negotiations which were transpiring secretly between the Filipino dissidents and influential Japanese. Repeating the precedent established during the earlier revolt against Spain, the embattled natives had turned to Japan for aid. In conformity with a general plan to gain international recognition for his movement, Aguinaldo had sent a trusted lieutenant, Mariano Ponce, to Tokyo in June, 1898.
One of Ponce’s major objectives in his negotiations with the Japanese was the acquisition of arms and ammunition which were badly needed by his rebellious compatriots. For this purpose the Filipino Revolutionary Government had nearly half a million dollars at its disposal. A large part of this sum had been given Aguinaldo by the Spaniards under the terms of the peace agreement which terminated the revolt of 1896- 1897. The rest came from a number of sources available to the leaders of the insurrection. Ponce tried continuously to make arrangements with the Japanese Government for the purchase of the desired military supplies, but success in this connection persisted in eluding him.
Meanwhile, the activities of Ponce and his associates had not gone unnoticed by United States authorities. Major-General Otis, Commander-in-Chief of the American forces in the Philippines, reported to Washington on September 12, 1898, that it was understood the “insurgents had contracted with the Japanese Government for a considerable supply of arms and ammunition.” On November 13 of the same year, he spoke of information received which “asserted that the Japanese Government has promised protection (to the Filipinos), favored by some, as Japanese kindred race.”
As one result of the reports forwarded from Manila to the War Department at Washington, key officials in the United States Army and Navy, as well as the Foreign Service, were alerted to guard against the possibility that the Filipino insurgents would get large-scale military ‘aid from Japanese sources. The naval attaché of the United States Legation at Tokyo was particularly active in observing the activities of Ponce and his co-plotters. His findings resulted in a number of highly confidential dispatches to Washington. Admiral George Dewey was similarly active in taking precautionary measures, and all vessels under his command were instructed to make certain that incoming commercial ships were not smuggling arms from Japan to the insurgents.
Ponce, in the meantime, had met another individual who rendered him valuable assistance. This individual was none other than Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese Revolution. At this particular juncture in Far Eastern history, Japan had become the refuge of revolutionaries from not only the Philippines but other countries of Asia as well, including China, Korea and India. These men often conferred with one another regarding their aspirations for the future, and Sun Yat-sen was unquestionably the outstanding member of the entire group. Already plotting the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, Sun had gone to Japan where he was afforded political asylum. The Chinese underground leader became very interested in Aguinaldo’s campaign for Filipino independence because he regarded it as a development, similar to his own program for a republican China, which would contribute to the progress of East Asiatic peoples. With this thought in mind, he spared no effort to espouse Aguinaldo’s cause in Japan and he became the warm friend of Ponce.
It was undoubtedly Sun Yat-sen who opened the door to Ponce in another direction—the Japanese secret societies which were paving the way for their country’s unfolding program of imperialism. The most prominent of these clandestine organizations were the Black Ocean and Black Dragon Societies. Their influence became so great that their policies were eventually adopted by the Japanese Government. Once Ponce became persona grata to the Black Dragon and Black Ocean Societies, no door in the political and military life of Japan was closed to him. The imperialistic groups had contacts everywhere and many outstanding Japanese officials were in constant touch with them. By means of his reports to his revolutionary associates in Hongkong and the Philippines, Ponce indicated that he was in frequent association with the clandestine organizations.
Despite the continued friendliness of the Japanese Government, there were some signs that the United States had grown wary of Japan’s intentions towards the Philippines. The First Philippine Commission, appointed by President William McKinley for the purpose of establishing civil government in America’s new colony, sailed for the Far East in January, 1899, and stopped in Japan en route to Manila. Marquis Hirobumi Ito, formerly the Japanese Prime Minister, offered to aid the Commission in restoring peace in the Philippines. He contended that existing conditions of open warfare between Filipinos and Americans resulted from misunderstandings. He pointed out that the Americans did not understand Asiatics, and since he was an Asiatic himself, that he was capable of straightening out the difficulties. His offer, potentially important as it was, met a polite but firm refusal by the State Department at Washington.
So carefully hidden were the undercover activities of the Japanese helping Ponce, however, that the United States Government was able to secure but a partial picture of events which were taking place. On the basis of intelligence reports received from Tokyo and Manila, Secretary of State John Hay had instructed the American Minister to Japan to investigate the possibility that Aguinaldo’s representatives had succeeded in purchasing munitions from the Japanese. The American diplomat went to the highest official levels and was told that the Japanese Government would not sanction such a violation of her neutrality.
The Filipino efforts to obtain arms and ammunition in Japan and elsewhere comprise one of the most interesting as well as one of the most secret chapters of modern Far Eastern history. Of foremost significance in the entire sequence of events was the fact that Ponce finally succeeded in purchasing a large quantity of military supplies which were shipped from Japan to the Philippines. After encountering failure in his previous attempts, the Filipino emissary managed to procure ten thousand Murata rifles and other articles of war. The Muratas were considered by Ponce to be ideal weapons for Aguinaldo’s forces. They had been manufactured to conform with the size of the Japanese soldiers who were similar in stature to the Filipinos. In the recent Sino-Japanese War, they had proved their excellence. Besides, it would instill optimism and confidence in the ranks of the revolutionists to know that they were using guns from Japan, who had thrown off the shackles of Western domination.
Following a long search, Ponce was able to purchase a vessel, the 1,441-ton Nonubiki Maru, for transporting the shipment. Registered in the names of a Japanese and a Chinese, it proceeded from Kobe, its home port, to Nagasaki where the arms were loaded. The vessel’s cargo included the ten thousand Murata rifles, six million rounds of ammunition, eleven field guns and cannon, one pressing machine for gun powder, materials for the manufacture of cartridges, and miscellaneous items such as field glasses. Successful in leaving Japan by way of the port of Moji, the Nonubiki Maru encountered a severe typhoon when about one hundred miles from Shanghai and sank on July 19, 1899.
Disclosures by the Japanese press prompted the American Legation at Tokyo to undertake a thorough investigation of the Nonubiki Maru’s activities. The American naval attaché confirmed that the vessel had been engaged in a filibustering expedition and, as a consequence, the United States Government addressed a formal note to Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked for an explanation of the affair. The Tokyo Government replied, after a lapse of time during which it apparently conducted an investigation of its own, that the Nonubiki Maru was able to elude Japanese port authorities because its destination had been declared to be Formosa. Communications from Ponce to Aguinaldo indicated, however, that key Japanese officials had participated in the undertaking. Throughout his correspondence, the Filipino representative spoke often of the “Japanese Government” and of “Japanese officials” having a major role in preparing the expedition. For example, he asserted that the “Japanese Government” had originally furnished him the name of the “military officer who was to make the necessary arrangements with him.”
Another interesting aspect of the Nonubiki Maru case pertained to a plan whereby Japanese volunteers were to join Aguinaldo’s militia in the Philippines. With the enthusiastic support of the Black Dragon Society, Ponce proposed that the volunteers be split into two groups, the first of which left Japan and entered the Philippines by way of Hongkong. This contingent included eight or ten men and was headed by a former captain of artillery in the Imperial Bodyguard Division. Slipping through Dewey’s blockading vessels, they landed at the port of Orani in Bataan and reported to various headquarters of Aguinaldo’s forces. The captain and a second Japanese officer went to Zambales where they joined General Tomas Mascardo, who commanded the revolutionary forces in that sector. It was here that the two Japanese became the warm friends of Manuel L. Quezon, destined to be the first President of the Philippines and a key figure in World War II. Quezon, then a major in Aguinaldo’s army, was Mascardo’s chief of staff. His association with the Japanese volunteers was the initial link in a long chain of events which involves a little known but highly important aspect of Japanese-American-Filipino relations prior to and during World War II.
Coupled with the Nonubiki Maru disaster, the Filipino revolutionary cause had suffered serious reverses at Hongkong in additional attempts to secure arms and ammunition. It was at the British crown colony that Aguinaldo’s representatives tried unsuccessfully to obtain a large quantity of German Mauser rifles and other munitions from several groups of international adventurers. Meanwhile, Ponce managed to make a second shipment of rifles and ammunition to the Philippines via Formosa. After arriving at the Japanese colony, they remained there for a considerable period of time because of difficulties encountered in securing transportation to Filipino-held territory, which was becoming increasingly small.
Sun Yat-sen, still present as a factor in these filibustering activities, made arrangements to use the munitions to arm his followers in China. Filipino sources claimed that the Chinese leader failed to make payment for them, a development which placed a severe strain upon his friendship with Ponce. Viewed from the standpoint of Japanese policy, this second attempt by Ponce was perhaps the most significant of all for it was reasonable to assume that the interest of the Governments of both Japan and the United States in the Nonubiki Maru case would have made it impossible for the Filipino and his Japanese associates to continue their activities. Moreover, it is not without importance that Ponce was able to carry on his intrigues until the very end of Aguinaldo’s resistance free of any interference from the Japanese Government.
Largely concealed, but not entirely so, from American eyes, the joint intrigues of Aguinaldo’s followers and the Japanese secret societies had helped to sow the seeds of suspicion among high-ranking American military authorities as to Japanese policy. This development, initiating an opposite trend from the cordial Japanese-American relations which had existed for nearly half a century, was indicated by a dispatch sent to Washington on December 28, 1900, by Major-General Arthur MacArthur, who had become commanding officer of the United States Army in the Philippines:
Many papers belonging to Trias, secured recent capture, one of which contains Filipino account conferences between Japanese consul and Trias in remote part of Cavite province October 11, this year. Paper carefully prepared, authenticated by Filipino secretary, measurably confirmed by other captured papers, most probably true. I accept it as such without hesitation. Consul advised that Trias visit Japan to negotiate voluntary contribution of arms, and, concerning future of archipelago. Filipinos represented that concessions which they might be forced to make to Washington would be more agreeable if made to Japan. . . . Consul said Japan desired coaling stations, freedom to trade and to build railways. That individual Japanese have aided insurgents has been more than suspected, but if official intervention and encouragement has transpired, a new and strong light is thrown on the situation— sufficient, perhaps, to account for defiant attitude of many leaders, especially the wavering policy of Trias, who on several occasions has apparently been on verge of surrender, and also explain unyielding characterof resistance in southern Luzon. In view of delicate international questions involved, shall act only under advice of Department Papers by mail.
This dispatch by General MacArthur, written in a direct style not unlike that to be used some forty-odd years afterward by his more famous son Douglas in communiques which were to describe Japan’s conquest of the Philippines and its liberation by the United States, caused a mild sensation in Washington and Secretary Hay immediately requested rigid investigation and proper discipline by the Japanese Government to prevent its agents from covert intercourse with insurgents. The Foreign Office at Tokyo reviewed the incident and reported that the Japanese consul at Manila had actually held a chance interview with the Filipino insurgent leader Trias. Although minimizing its importance, the Japanese authorities transferred the consular official to another post and the United States Government declared the matter to be closed.
In the final analysis, the Japanese imperialists had been unable to lend effective aid to Aguinaldo’s cause. The sinking of the Nonubiki Maru and the second but abortive filibustering expedition from Japan via Formosa, coupled with the equally unsuccessful endeavors at Hongkong, consumed most of the money which the Filipino insurgents had available for the acquisition of arms and ammunition. This series of reverses far removed from the battlefields in the Philippines, constituted one of the underlying reasons for the complete defeat of Aguinaldo and his followers by the American forces. On the other hand, last-minute hope of assistance from Japan contributed to prolong the conflict and thereby produced the loss of more American lives before peace was finally restored in the Philippines. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Manuel L. Quezon, who had associated with the two Japanese Army officers sent by the Black Dragon Society to the Philippines, was among the Filipino die-hards whose surrender to the American authorities came long after the main strength of Aguinaldo’s guerrillas had been crushed.
It is now apparent that when the United States acquired the Philippines fifty years ago, American responsibilities were bound to come in direct conflict with Japanese imperialistic ambitions. Despite the surface indications of Japan’s friendly attitude towards the American Government, the Japanese were determinedly following the path of empire and there can be little doubt that they regretted their inability to obtain the Philippines for themselves in 1898. At that time, the Tokyo Government’s hands were tied and a policy of expediency was adopted. Needing American as well as British cooperation to check the inroads made by France, Germany, and Russia in China, Japan considered it inadvisable to take any official steps which would oppose the United States in the Philippines. The Japanese, glancing at a map of the world, realized that the Americans would find it difficult to defend the Islands in any subsequent war between Japan and the United States. The erstwhile hermit kingdom had formulated sound strategy in dealing with the Western powers, counterbalancing them against one another, the combinations varying according to the circumstances. In this fashion the Japanese continued to strengthen their position at the expense of the others, and without much regard to the ethics.
Shortly after the termination of the Spanish-American War, an incident occurred which indicated the exact manner in which Japan regarded American sovereignty in the Philippines. Having acquired territory in the Far East, the United States redoubled its interest in that area. The famous Open Door notes soon followed. Secretary Hay felt that it might be desirable to acquire a naval station on the Chinese coast. Formally sponsoring this project, he sent a cipher telegram to the American Minister at Tokyo on December 7, 1900:
The Navy greatly desires a coaling station at Samsah Inlet north of Fuchow. Ascertain informally and discreetly whether Japanese Government would see any objection to our negotiating for this with China.
Despite the American enthusiasm for this project, the Japanese Government subsequently reported that it could not accede to the proposal. Content to tolerate the presence of the American flag in the Philippines, Japan was determined that the United States should not secure additional bases on the Asiatic mainland. On another December seventh, forty years later, the Japanese launched their treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor and began the war against the American people which resulted in the loss of an empire which had taken nearly a century to build.
1. The material for this article and the previous one, “Early Japanese Imperialism and the Philippines,” resulted from a world-wide search for information which covered a period of years. Correspondence with individuals in Germany, Japan, England and the Philippines was conducted. Extensive use was made of Department of State files and U. S. Navy records in the National Archives, as well as several volumes of documents published by the Philippine Government.