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"Where Do We Go From Here?"
(See page 47, January 1949 Proceedings)
Captain J. M. Kennaday, U.S.N. - In his article in the January issue Commander McCain proposes a program of "operational training and experience ... (which) ... will give a certain number of officers this necessary extensive background ... (for the) ultimate command of combined operations."
I think his idea of such specialized training for higher command or for a sort of general staff in the Navy is excellent in its general concept. It is quite true that we apparently have assumed, up to now, that our leaders and their able staff assistants would just naturally develop if they followed the generally prescribed rotation of duty. We have been pretty lucky in having them do so, thus far, but it is a haphazard system.
I cannot see, however, that Commander McCain's program will, as he sums tip, "give equal opportunity to all line officers irrespective of former training" because he states earlier that "At this point (after eighteen years' service) those officers best qualified for broad command shall enter an indoctrinational and training period of sufficient duration to thoroughly familiarize them with the capabilities and uses of all the tools of modern naval warfare . . . . These officers become the Navy's specialists in strategy and tactics." (What about logistics? But more of that later.) It seems to me that this selection after eighteen years most decidedly puts an end to "equal opportunity." Equality of opportunity, by this plan, exists up to eighteen years' service but not after. In effect, Commander McCain is selecting his admirals on the basis of the first eighteen years of service.
I don't deny the desirability of such a plan, even so. But I am sure I am right in saying that the thinking of the officers' corps is not geared to such a concept at present. We all naturally want to be admirals, not merely for the prestige and pay but because to become so signifies success and prowess in our profession. If we did not want to be admirals, we should not be sufficiently ambitious. All line officers want to command destroyer squadrons or large combatant ships not merely because such commands are (or may have been) prescribed stepping-stones to flag rank - "something on your record" but because we consider them (as Commander McCain does, too) necessary experiences for future higher commanders. If after eighteen years only, these experiences are cut off, these ambitions dashed, what will be the effect upon the attitude of those not selected to be the "leaders of tomorrow"?
Well, I think there is a solution, although it may be slow in coming. We all realize that modern war requires more "men behind the man behind the gun" than ever before. Logistics and services were tremendously important in the late war and they will be even more so in any future conflict. Commander McCain has treated them rather lightly in his article, I feel, although the Proceedings, with one of the illustrations for it, pointed them up for him! We must come to the realization that only a few of us need to be-can be, in fact in the combatant billets.
But there's a catch to that, too. The noncombatant billets are just as important as the combatant ones. An officer who knows has written, "There is no duty in the Navy that makes greater demands upon the ability, character and physique of an officer" than command of an advanced base in wartime. Such a commander, he adds, should have the same attributes as those required for the commander of a large combatant unit. There is high command in the services and in logistics as well as in strategy and tactics.
The fact that there is should broaden the field somewhat, at least. Because of the great numbers required in the support organization, it should broaden it a good deal and spread out considerably the opportunity for a useful and progressive future after eighteen years.
Even if that is so, however, a change in thinking is required. We still have the tendency to feel that the logistics man won't thoroughly understand and appreciate the problems of the combatant- or any-ship unless he too has been in the ship end of the game, and as high up in that end as command. I admit to an instinctive feeling in that direction myself, but I believe, on sober consideration of the record, that our EDO's, supply officers, and civil engineers have proved the fallacy of such a feeling. The Army's experience with its services also supports this. I know, however, that many officers do not agree with me on this point.
I believe, though, that the Navy will have to specialize more and more, and that we must get out of the old prejudice that specialists will not work whole-heartedly for the support of the Fleet. There are two good reasons for this specialization. One is that large ship commands are just too scarce and that the present short tours of command are good neither for the captains nor the crews. The other is that we are simply not developing in sufficient numbers the specialists in: logistics that we need.
I used to wonder how graduates of the Naval Academy who had also served in the Fleet could ever put themselves in the position (by becoming constructors-now EDO's) of never being able to command a ship. I understand their feeling now, and I respect them for it. But it will take time and education and tangible inducements to bring the Navy around to a system of specialist services anywhere near approaching that of the Army.