The use of naval gunfire support in the amphibious operations of World War II, particularly in the Pacific in the last stages of the war, reached unpredicted proportions. The gradual improvement in the technique of its employment as the war wore itself out resulted in a lowering in the number of our Army and Marine casualties together with a reduction in the amount of time normally required to complete an operation successfully.
In contrast to the efficiency and effectiveness of naval gunfire support at the end of the war, the beginning of the amphibious war, Guadalcanal, was characterized not only by a poor appreciation of the potential of naval gunfire support but also by a complete absence of any technique for employment of this formidable weapon in conjunction with troops.
Up to the Guadalcanal campaign, naval officers in general had not concerned themselves with amphibious operations. Most of them felt that our battleships, cruisers, and destroyers were provided primarily to fight enemy ships of similar types. Few considered the use of these same ships as carriers of weapons that could be employed in support of landings on hostile shores. True, some peacetime practice landings had been made in the Atlantic and in the Pacific.
The “Fleet Landing Exercises” held between 1936 and 1941, while in many respects elementary, represented the best efforts of the minds that became involved in the development of amphibious warfare. Many worthwhile ideas were created during the exercises and some of these manifested themselves during World War II. Nevertheless, except for those who participated in this training, relatively few naval officers followed the exercises with more than passing interest. Few believed that any future war would find our combatant ships assigned in the role of one of the three dominant supporting arms of an amphibious operation.
During the period between World War I and World War II the Marine Corps had been active in developing a technique in amphibious operations. With little interest from the afloat Navy, the results of their efforts were rather feeble. By the time that Guadalcanal was scheduled, however, the Navy at large had become sufficiently interested in landing craft to follow through a program in this important detail. As far as gunfire support (and air support) was concerned, the active interest of the Navy as a whole had not been awakened by August 7, 1942.
When the Guadalcanal campaign was launched in August, 1942, the entire Navy was electrified with the promise and importance of this method of warfare. Many officers in the Navy began studying the intricacies of this method of advancing our holdings in the direction of the enemy homeland. As their interest was stimulated, so was the quality of the amphibious technique. Not until the entire Navy was awakened to the possibilities of amphibious warfare did the necessary support accrue from the forces afloat. The feeble efforts of the Marine Corps then became, at first, lusty and finally, mighty. In addition the U. S. Army became amphibious conscious on a grandiose scale, especially in North Africa and at Normandy.
The research and development facilities and the complete support of the high command of the Navy were responsible for the swift advances made in amphibious warfare between Guadalcanal and Okinawa. The effectiveness of gunfire support of these amphibious operations increased in proportion to the advance in all other phases.
During World War II, gunfire support was put to every conceivable use and against all imaginable types of targets and objectives. Small island (Tulagi), large island (Guam), Atoll (Roi-Namur), mountainous terrain (Okinawa), continental land mass (Normandy), undefended beaches (Lingayen Gulf), fiercely defended beach areas (Tarawa) precipitous slopes (Mt. Suribachi at Iwo Jima), and fog enshrouded areas (Attu), are listed as only a few of the varied types of objectives against which naval gunfire support was employed.
World War II gave us many lessons for future consideration. The necessary but bloody trial and error method, reflected in the many casualties of the cream of our American youth, gives us food for thought. We should heed the lessons and make sure that, in the event of another war, the mistakes made to date are not repeated with resulting needless casualties.
The lessons learned from World War II, with regard to gunfire support of amphibious operations, will now be discussed under several main headings. Each apparent lesson will be cited in one form or another and in all cases an attempt will be made to point to the application of the lesson to our needs. In other words, what can we do to insure that the lessons do not go unnoticed and that mistakes made in the formative stage of the science of gunfire support will not be repeated?
Personnel and Training
In considering the lessons learned from World War II, we find probably the most important fact made apparent is that well trained personnel are a must if maximum benefit is to be derived from naval gunfire support.
It was demonstrated conclusively that it is mandatory for all echelons of command, both naval and troop, to have well qualified naval gunfire support specialists assigned to advise the commanders concerned. These specialists include the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO), a junior rank naval officer, as the head of the Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP) on the battalion level; the NGLO and his Naval Gunfire Team at the regimental level, and special troop staff officers, assisted by naval officers qualified in N GLO duties, in the higher troop levels. On the naval side of the picture it was found that each attack force or similar commander needed a staff officer particularly well informed regarding the requirements of a well prepared and executed gunfire support plan.
The NGLO, serving with assault troops, is the actual link between the troops being supported and the fire support ships. As a result of our experience we know that during peacetime we should build up a sizeable pool of trained officers for eventual use in war, if required, as NGLO’S and spotters in the battalions, as NGLO’S in the regiments, and as special staff officers in the higher echelons of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. At Salerno, poorly trained SFCP’S were unable to communicate with their assigned ships. They contributed little to that venture. At Normandy one poorly trained spotter called for 14-inch gunfire on a machine gun nest. Poorly trained SFCP’S result in waste of ammunition, neglect of more important targets, and most of all reduce effectiveness of the support that rightfully belongs to the troops. Poorly trained naval gunfire staff officers can do little to advise their commanders regarding provision of the kind of gunfire support needed by the troops.
We learned that, upon many occasions, the SFCP’S were not able to direct fire upon certain targets out of their sight. It was necessary to use air-borne spotters. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to maintain a trained pool of aviators qualified to control the guns of fire support ships. This, of course, includes pilots of the Navy, Marine Corps, and U. S. Air Force, land based as well as carrier based. These naval gunfire air spotters (pilots) must be trained to appreciate the ground forces’ problem and to recognize front lines and profitable targets. They must also be trained to appreciate the problem of the fire support ships, to be familiar with their ordnance and ammunition, and to understand and use the proper spotting procedure and method of conduct of fires.
The lack of a standard spotting procedure for all arms and services was keenly felt between 1942 and 1945. Now that unification is a fact, the need becomes more acute for all cognizant personnel of all services and arms to be able to use one system. Any artilleryman must be qualified to spot naval gunfire in emergency just as naval pilots must understand the spotting phraseology for adjusting artillery fire if the air-borne spotter is unavailable.
It was announced late in World War II that the old battleships were delivering the bulk of the gunfire support in a most outstanding manner. Why? The old battleships performed almost solely in gunfire support roles (one notable exception being Surigao Strait). They were too slow for the fast carrier task forces and too outmoded in other respects. They found themselves in one amphibious operation after the other. The Pennsylvania was a veteran of all landings from Attu to Okinawa and received a Navy Unit Commendation based largely upon her gunfire support work. The other old battleships served in similar capacities. The point to be stressed is that they were used over and over again to such an extent that they became extremely proficient in the slow rate, deliberate and accurate type of fire that is needed by the troops. Many times the fast carrier task force battleships were loaned to amphibious commanders to further augment the softening up process of particularly tough target areas. They roared in, turned smartly to the firing course, and let go rapidly from twenty thousand yards range or better. At Roi- Namur such doubtful support netted but several Japanese killed and a few houses knocked down after several hundred major caliber projectiles had been thus fired. The old battleships, however, learned to get in close, even under 2,000 yards range, and calmly destroy, chunk by chunk, the ponderous blockhouses that stood in the way. We should have learned from these experiences that: (a) certain ships should be continuously earmarked for gunfire support duty in order that they may gradually absorb all the knowledge that is needed to support troops, properly, and (b) hit and run bombardments, generally speaking, except for enemy demoralization purposes, are largely a waste of time and ammunition.
“Practice makes perfect” is as true in gunfire support as in any other undertaking. We learned that full scale rehearsals are necessary. The same relative areas, targets, charts, lines of fire, troops to be supported, and communications used must be exercised in practice before the actual operation is executed. The amphibious commanders who conducted realistic rehearsals, with live bombing and gunfire, were the most successful such commanders of World War II.
It became apparent during the war that some troops we/e afraid of ships’ gunfire when fired in close proximity to their own lines. Some reports were broadcast that ships had fired into our own troops. These reports caused certain troop commanders to refuse to use naval gunfire when it was handy and the logical weapon to employ. Even ships’ captains, hearing the rumors, came to mistrust their own judgment. Most such reports were false, but the law of averages makes this unfortunate possibility a reality now and then. For one case like the above there were hundreds where naval gunfire was delivered very close to our own troops and to their complete satisfaction. At Attu, for instance, the troops stood in their foxholes and cheered when the ships opened fire on the elusive Japs hidden in the overhanging fog clouds. In o der to instill confidence it is necessary to insure that the ships are well trained and that the troops are fully acquainted with the capabilities and limitations of the firing ships. Education on both sides to weld them into one team is necessary. The troops will then have confidence in the effectiveness of the ships’ gunfire, and the ships will be ready to assist them when needed. Most important, with confidence, and with intelligent advice from his NGLO, the troop commander will not overlook any possible use of the potential of naval gunfire support.
Gunfire support plans are complicated. The outstanding amphibious commanders always ascertained that no misunderstandings existed. To make sure that all subordinates understood the details of the plans, briefings were conducted for the benefit of the subordinate admirals, captains, and troop commanders. All departed for the operation in complete accord, with no questions left unanswered. The legendary admiral who kept his plans locked up in a strong box, safe from the eyes of even his staff officers, would be a complete failure as an amphibious commander.
The detailed training of individual ships to qualify them to deliver gunfire support became normal procedure during World War II. The complexities of the amphibious operation, involving boat lanes, lines of departure, and movements of troops ashore, and other features, introduced hitherto unconsidered phases of the gunnery problem that had to be solved. The ability of the fire support ships at Iwo Jima to deliver continuous support to the troops, while underway in the vicinity of hundreds of other ships, is an example of how units can be trained to fit into the amphibious picture.
Those who have studied the course of the amphibious war in the Atlantic as compared with that in the Pacific will be interested in a comparison between the use of gunfire support in the two widely separated theatres. There is some evidence that the complete potential of naval gunfire support was not called upon at Normandy. However, the character of the objective there had much to do with the quantity of naval gunfire actually delivered. The prolonged softening-up bombardment that became so popular in the Pacific was not practicable at Normandy. It was not possible to encircle the defenders completely as we were able to do at Roi-Namur and Kwajalein. A prolonged preliminary bombardment at Normandy would have permitted the enemy to rush many divisions of reinforcements to the assaulted area. As it turned out, the Germans manned the beach defenses with old men and boys and kept their main body well to the rear, outside the range of naval gunfire. (The Japanese had fully acquainted Berlin with their unhappy experiences with the supporting ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet.)
During the Omaha Beach landings at Normandy about four times as many troops were landed as at Kwajalein in the Marshalls. The defensive strength at Omaha was about three times that encountered in the Marshalls. Now the startling fact! Only one third as much naval gunfire support was used at Omaha Beach as at Kwajalein. These facts should indicate that our planners must be particularly well trained in order to evaluate properly the actual requirements for gunfire support, regardless of the type of objective. This is a skill that cannot be acquired overnight.
The only justification for gunfire support is the need of the troops that are to make the assault. This want must remain uppermost in the minds of those concerned with the planning and execution of amphibious assaults. During World War II it happened that a few outstanding commanders stayed with amphibious operations for the duration of the war. They grew up in the game and, by many heartbreaking experiences, came to know all the tricks of the trade. Toward the end of the war the size of the amphibious forces expanded to such huge proportions that the well seasoned talent was scattered. In order to “break-in” new commanders, it became necessary to send them out with forces of varying sizes to perform softening- up missions or other missions connected with the ultimate landings scheduled. Some of these were conducted by commanders who had had no previous experience in amphibious operations and who were thus unable to estimate the requirements of the troops. On one occasion an objective, actually reported by despatch to be “softened” for the landing, was not ready at all and many unjustified casualties resulted. On another operation, the officer in command did not fully appreciate what naval gunfire could accomplish. The most important enemy guns thereby received only negligible damage and our troops had to land against a withering fire. Again, uncalled for casualties.
Airplanes and submarines are complicated mechanisms and require special talent to employ them to best advantage. If anything, amphibious warfare, particularly the gunfire and air support connected therewith, is infinitely more complicated and requires a greater degree of personal qualification in commanders and their staffs. The necessity for a well trained, professionally qualified commander in an amphibious task force is even more acute than in air and submarine activities. This commander has the lives of thousands of troops within his grasp. They depend upon him. If he is not fully qualified by temperament, special study, and background regarding his manifold obligations to the troops, his resulting shortcomings will be reflected in a considerable increase in casualties. With the lessons of World War II fresh in our minds, perhaps now is the time to set up the amphibious forces on a parallel with the specialized status of the air and submarine forces.
Before reporting on board a submarine or to an aviation organization for duty, officers must complete a course at New London or Pensacola respectively (or others established). With amphibious warfare on a par with air and submarine warfare, the officers ordered to gunfire support duty, whether troop or naval and whatever the echelon concerned, would, as a prerequisite, complete a course of instruction at one of the Gunfire Support Schools. Similarly, officers ordered to certain other duties connected with amphibious operations, particularly staff and command, would doubtless be required to demonstrate their qualifications for the type of duty to be performed. When such procedure is adopted, the contribution of the amphibious forces toward victory in a future war will be measureably increased. Adoption of such a program will insure that our amphibious commanders of the future are, in fact, specialists in the technique of amphibious warfare.
Weapons and Ammunition
During the war our battleships conclusively demonstrated that the old principle, “ships cannot fight forts,” is out of date. Using their 16-inch and 14-inch guns, our old battleships were able to destroy any type of fortification encountered.
Certain types of high fragmentation projectiles with super-quick fuzes permitted the complete neutralization of enemy areas and produced many casualties. Low velocity powder charges, at some risk of danger to own troops when fired over their heads, permitted us to curve the trajectory of our projectiles sufficiently to approach that of the howitzer shell. We were thus able to deliver fire upon defiladed targets. Starshells became so popular with the troops that the stocks of illuminating projectiles became critical at times. The troops liked to have them burst at night to disclose enemy counter-attacks and infiltration attempts, and to keep the enemy awake at night when he needed rest and relaxation. We discovered what we should have known before, that white phosphorous cannot be relied upon to set cane fields and grass on fire. It made good smoke, however, and also served as a marker for salvos.
The quantities of ammunition used became huge as the war progressed. We know now that either sufficient ammunition must be carried by the firing ships or an extensive replenishment program must be set up that can be depended upon in the open sea, in a protected roadstead or harbor, or whatever the conditions at the objective.
The use of rockets became popular and the rocket carrying craft appeared to spectacular advantage in the newsreels of the country. It became customary to lead in the assault waves with these craft and to saturate the landing beach with rockets. The tremendous volume of fire and its effect were of comfort and aid to the troops in the landing craft. Along with the other support that the troops came to appreciate and expect, these rocket carrying craft fully established themselves for future use.
The Japanese had several fiascos that can be traced back to a faulty appreciation of the proper type of ammunition to use. One night at Guadalcanal, their battleships came in to deliver an intensive bombardment upon our Marines. They were so intent upon their assigned mission that they neglected all precautions regarding targets other than those on shore. They filled their ammunition trains with high explosive ammunition and made no provisions for armor piercing. When they bumped into Admiral Lee’s battleships during the night they realized their error when their salvos were seen to be completely ineffective. Also, in the jeep carriers’ part of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, the Japs used armor piercing shells against the fragile carriers, thinking that they were heavier ships. Again they were unable to use the proper type ammunition. The lesson contained here for our future consideration is obvious. Fire support ships must, at all times, have appropriate types of ammunition available, whatever the target that may appear. At this point it may be well to state that a fire support ship’s primary concern, if attacked, is to defend herself. A temporary discontinuance in support is better than getting sunk and being thus eliminated from delivering any support at all.
Communications and Equipment
It has been estimated that, after the troops land, communications form about 75% of the gunfire support problem. Without good communications there exists no actual link between the troops and the fire support ships, since the Shore Fire Control Party is impotent under this condition. This necessitates not only adequate training of personnel but also provision of proper equipment. The radio equipment supplied the shore fire control parties was known to be inadequate as late in the war as 1944. The Army had the proper type radios at this time, but they were never obtained, except in minute quantities, for the SFCP’S. With the services all rolled into one, the mutual exchange of equipment advantageous to each service should be possible.
As a matter of interest, some of the particular radios desired, the SCR 694’s, were obtained for one particular operation, Guam. The writer was the Attack Force Gunnery Officer for this affair and had an Army Lieutenant Colonel for his assistant. This officer was sent back to Washington by air and flew back with a load of the radios sufficient to equip the regimental and higher headquarters of the III Marine Amphibious Corps. They were used to good advantage.
In gunfire support communications it is normal for heavy loads and peaks of traffic to occur. It is necessary for strict circuit discipline to be maintained in order to handle such heavy loads and traffic peaks.
Up until the time that the shore fire control parties begin to function, the communications required for gunfire support, if the plan is well conceived and prepared, are perfunctory and administrative only. This is in contrast to the high volume of traffic required to control the support aircraft. In some cases where well executed plans were a fact, the gunfire operations proceeded so smoothly that some participants became alarmed that the support had failed. Once the troops get ashore, communications become a big problem.
The lack of adequate charts and maps at Guadalcanal demanded early corrective measures. It is necessary to have complete charts of the objective area to the proper scale.
The absence of a common point referencing or grid system, completely familiar to all services, was noteworthy when the last war began. The grid system finally developed was very simple and was superimposed upon the charts of the objective area being attacked.
Proper radio equipment, in addition to that provided the SFCP’S, must be arranged for all fire support ships to meet the needs for special missions. The next war may not allow the time necessary to arrange for changing sets, crystals, and the like.
Tenets
The principles developed during World War II, apparently new in many respects, were basically a simple rearrangement of facts already known.
The duration of the softening-up (preliminary) bombardment became an extremely controversial subject during the war, especially after the unsatisfactory nature of this phase before landings at Iwo Jima. The amount of gunfire to deliver and the time required to deliver it deserves careful attention. We learned at Tarawa and at Iwo Jima that the time devoted at those places was not enough. It was ample at Roi-Namur and Guam. The number of casualties will be greatly influenced by the success of this important phase. In this principle we may look at examples like Roi-Namur and Guam for the proper approach to the answer. These two operations are considered by most Marines to represent the ultimate, as well as the models, for adequate consideration and handling of the enemy defenders of an objective. The small numbers of casualties in these operations give real evidence to the value of the methods employed at those objectives.
We learned at Tarawa that the ships did not get in close enough and that their effort was not properly directed. We took advantage of this lesson and took remedial steps at Roi-Namur. We discovered that the best range to use depends upon the character of the target engaged. A massive blockhouse is engaged at close range with major caliber fire. A target on a reverse slope is reached by a ship firing from long range or with reduced charges. A steep angle of fall is necessary to penetrate the roof of a certain structure. Each target must be judged on its own merits and the procedure adopted must suffice to eliminate that target from further concern.
Whether to anchor, lie to, or keep the fire support ships moving was tested during the war. If anchored, the ships had to take chances against being hit by enemy counterfire. If lying to or underway, the ships could evade the enemy fire by using their engines. If underway, errors were introduced into the fire control solutions. Our lesson learned here was to be ready to move instantly if liable to attack from any source. If enemy batteries are known to be destroyed, the ships may anchor and thus improve the solution of the fire control problem.
We were made aware, in the Philippines and at Okinawa, that fire support ships could stand off attacks from large fleets of land based aircraft and that they could deliver almost continuous support to the troops while doing so. At Leyte we found that the threat of an attack by Japan’s surface navy caused a complete discontinuance of the naval gunfire support for a considerable period of time. In the Aleutians, we were able to deliver continuous support without regard for the foul weather. We may say, with some confidence therefore, that, except when threatened by a powerful enemy surface force, ships are able to deliver gunfire support continuously in a well organized amphibious effort. Normal air and antisubmarine protection must, of course, be provided.
The theory was accepted at Roi-Namur that fire support ships must ready themselves to fight duels with enemy shore batteries. The thought on this subject was logical when the position of the foot soldier was considered. Many of these individuals landed under shell fire with no personal protection whatever. Could the ships, some heavily armored, do less? We must become accustomed to fighting it out with shore installations. We must disregard, once and for all, the idea that ships fight only ships (and aircraft) .
Tarawa taught us that during their assault landing the troops must be protected by a continuing curtain of fire protection. We also learned there that there can be no cessation of supporting fire when the troops hit the beach. The fire curtain must envelop the enemy completely and allow our men to get ashore in sufficient quantity to overwhelm him. The rockets and mortars, together with all calibers of the supporting ships, provide the protective wall of fire. The intensified bombardment must continue until the gunfire becomes dangerous to our own forces. The enemy cannot be allowed to recover from his fear or shock and concussion sufficiently to fight back at the beaches.
The reaction of Japanese defenders at certain objectives made it necessary that all structures in the immediate objective landing area be completely razed by bombardment prior to the landing of troops, else the structures shelter machine guns, mortars, or other defensive installations. At Guam this was done in the towns of Agana, Piti, Tepungan, Asan, and Agat.
In order to prevent the enemy from rushing reinforcements to the assaulted beaches we found during the war that it was profitable to direct fire upon those road junctions, highways, bridges, and cross roads that lead to the area. This served to deny the strategic zone to the enemy. The European amphibious war saw this type of fire used on many occasions, and it should be remembered as worthy of inclusion in the future.
The Japanese were religious in their habits about jotting down their thoughts in little books. These captured diaries give us some idea of the effect of naval gunfire support. Most of them mentioned the devastation caused, the demoralization of entire units, and their uniform inability to get away from the fire. The ability of the ships to speed up and move to the most advantageous firing position was noted with dismay by the Japs. Many of them confessed that when the gunfire of the big guns started, all hands got into their holes and stayed there. For our own side of the record we recall the effect of the Japanese bombardment of our Marines at Guadalcanal. The writer has talked with some of those who endured those shellings. Whether friend or foe, therefore, the demoralizing effect upon troops is an important fact to remember. This is particularly the case when sixteen-inch guns are fired (with full charges). Just let the reader imagine himself on the receiving end of such fire, with himself as a point of aim, regardless of the type of shelter at hand. How would you feel?
As the war increased in fury we found it necessary to coordinate completely the employment of the supporting weapons. Before the troops were landed this was applied to the combination of the efforts of naval gunfire and air. After the landing, the troop artillery became a third weapon to consider. At Attu we saw the first attempt to coordinate fully air with naval gunfire in support of troops. Much later in the war it became possible for gunfire and air to work simultaneously in the same target area. Without proper coordination, air and gunfire will interfere with each other and targets outside the range of naval guns may escape attention by aircraft. Most important of all, the troops may lose some valuable assistance when it is most needed. As a result of our experience we have come to appreciate the necessity for complete coordination. It is indeed regretted that certain uninformed and inexperienced personnel are already ignoring the lessons learned in this connection. It is well for troop commanders to remember that it takes more time to re-arm, re-fuel, take station, be briefed by radio and orient fire support ships and craft than it does to have their field artillery perform like functions. Requests for gunfire support from subordinate troop echelons must be handled most expeditiously and not delayed in such illogical and unauthorized places as, for instance, artillery fire direction centers.
The American public is familiar with the role of the underwater demolition teams. Their swim-finned feet have appeared in many films as they disappeared over the gun- whale of a tending boat. We found, during the war, that these teams had to be given adequate protection while clearing beaches, blowing up obstacles, and making reconnaissances of defended beaches. At Guam, the Attack Force Commander used battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to prevent enemy interference with their operations. As a result of these experiences and many others, we know that the operations of the UDT’s, minesweepers, and similar units can be accomplished only with powerful support from support ships. These ships must slug it out with the enemy as they did prior to D-Day at Iwo Jima. Mutual cooperation and support are the keynotes for success in an amphibious assault, and ultimately all effort is focused upon the basis for all amphibious effort—landing foot soldiers in quantity.
Toward the end of the war we finally learned to assign individual ship fire support jobs by numbers like BB/1, CL#18, DD#6, etc. This was brought about after many orders had to be changed as ships were replaced by others for whatever reason. It was found not good practice to assign, say U.S.S. Pennsylvania, to a certain task. Better to assign the job to BB# so and so. Then any battleship that became actually available at the objective was told off and proceeded with the job assigned. This meant that schedules could be printed with no fear of names of ships being changed that would require corrections to the plan already sent out.
Those of us who participated in amphibious operations know that the operation plan for a single operation became a huge volume. For instance, the expeditionary force commander’s operations plan for Okinawa weighed about ten pounds and was styled the “Black Beauty.” (This name came from the heavy black cover upon which was emblazoned the dragon insignia of the amphibious forces.) Because of the size of this volume and since the gunfire support plan was usually the last ready for issue it became appropriate to take all gunfire support information, including communications, and issue it as a “gunfire support supplement.” This handy volume obviated the necessity of lugging around the voluminous text of the entire plan. Toward the humorous side, the writer heard many officers jestingly remark that it would be a good idea to drop a few bales of “Black Beauties” on the heads of the enemy. By the time they unsnarled the intricate details disclosed therein, they would be so confused that we could land with ease.
Intelligence
There was little or no photointelligence at Guadalcanal. Fortunately for us, the Japs there had poor defenses. Later on we learned to rely upon photographic coverage of enemy held objectives to disclose likely targets for gunfire. At Normandy, although the photoreconnaissance was thorough and correct, many German installations remained undetected and continued to fire upon our forces. We learned from experience that all sources of intelligence must be consulted to ferret out the best targets for our ships.
Although we were ready at Leyte and Lingayen Gulf to deliver intensive gunfire support, the need for it never materialized. The enemy had learned to stay away from the beaches and out of the range of naval gunfire. At Kiska, of course, the enemy pulled out altogether. At Okinawa, many of us present suspected for awhile that the Japs had pulled another Kiska withdrawal since they couldn’t be found for a considerable period of time. We must be prepared for such an eventuality. Adequate reconnaissance should disclose such and permit a reduction or cancellation in planned gunfire support if required. No reconnaissance was held at Kiska and the ammunition was expended as scheduled. At Okinawa when the reconnaissance disclosed no Japs near the beaches, the gunfire was stopped and the ammunition was saved for future use.
The technique of employment of gunfire support, its detailed planning, coordination, and execution is outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that all of the above should be based upon intelligent use of the gunfire support available in order to give the maximum assistance to the troops in landing and completely defeating the enemy. Luckily, most of the techniques that we have developed have been preserved in concrete form, in doctrinal publications. Intelligent study and application of these publications together with continuous common sense considerations regarding new weapons should permit us to use these lessons and the developed techniques to best advantage. It is incumbent upon all officers to make themselves familiar with the provisions of the books provided and the procedure for future amphibious war contained therein.
Application of Lessons for the Future
We may rest assured that the lessons that we learned in World War II about gunfire support will have application in the future. The responsibility for their proper evaluation will rest with the planners and executors of future amphibious operations.
Although we now control most of the strategic islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines and Japan, there is no certainty that we will not again have to recapture them after seizure by a determined enemy, more powerful, temporarily at least, than ourselves. In this event, the lessons learned in “island hopping” warfare will come into play all over again, although different weapons and techniques may be invented.
If we retain control of all our islands and are able to use them effectively as bases from which to launch multi-pronged attacks upon Eurasia, we shall have Normandy repeated, except that, in comparison, the latter will possibly be classed a minor operation. The rapid landing of troops, in sufficient quantities to command the sought objective, will be supported by naval gunfire. The effectiveness of that support will depend upon the skill and ingenuity of those responsible for its planning and execution.
We should never forget the lessons contained in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, described by some authorities as the most decisive battle in all history. If the Japanese Fleet had penetrated the Gulf, it is probable that our assault thereon would have become the greatest naval disaster in all history. In our amphibious operations of the future we must insure non-interference by an enemy surface fleet. And conversely, in the event of an amphibious attack upon the United States, we must be ready with our surface fleet to destroy not only the gunfire support vessels assisting the troops ashore but every other amphibious ship or craft that ventures into our domain.
The statement was made earlier that continuous gunfire support could be rendered if the normal antiaircraft and antisubmarine protection were assigned the gunfire support ships. The future will bring new aircraft, guided missiles and atomic applications, together with extremely fast submerged submarines. We shall probably not be able to lie to or steam slowly along while pulverizing enemy defenses with the same relative security that was enjoyed during World War II. However, for every weapon, it is a well known scientific fact that there exists, to be searched out, a counter-weapon. The enterprise of Americans and the latent power of the American way of life should produce the counter-weapons as fast as our enemies can develop the weapons themselves.