On Sunday, December 7, 1941, war fell upon the United States. Neither the fact that it had threatened this country for a long period of months nor the sudden startling events at Pearl Harbor indicate adequately the seriousness and magnitude of this war. Unexpected developments have characterized this war from its inception. No one yet knows what kind of a war it will become before peace is won.
Only a defeated, humiliated nation can afford to analyze her unsuccessful military effort to discover her mistakes. After the War of 1914-18 the Germans made a searching study of their official archives and published a meticulous report on that war in the semiofficial Krieg Zur See and Welt Krieg 1914-1918. From these and other studies as to the causes of defeat the Germans derived new ways and means of using force.
The Germans have coupled to the noteworthy scientific and mechanical advances of the past twenty years an officer corps, freshly selected for the most part and largely freed of all restrictions which might bind its thinking to the past. These officers have considered new weapons and means of communication from novel points of view and have developed schemes of using them in war. The result has been apparent. The present war in Europe is the most complex, most skillfully calculated and co-ordinated operation the world has seen. Economic measures, espionage, intelligence, propaganda, psychology, aircraft, mines, motorized equipment, deception, fifth column, communications, and specially trained troops have been blended under singleness of command and direction to accomplish national ends with remarkable precision and dispatch. Only recently has the long record of distinct successes been broken by setbacks in the Russian campaign.
To defeat the enemy is our Allied mission. To do so requires not only that his equipment, technique, personnel, and leadership be matched but that it must be definitely surpassed.
This superiority can be established. The United States possesses the singular ability of producing machinery, arms, and supplies in enormous quantities by its factory systems. The New England mechanics, who manufactured clocks and guns with interchangeable parts, laid the foundation for the motorcar industry which now makes possible the production of vast quantities of munitions in a fashion no other country can match. An ever increasing production by willing, determined hearts in industry will cheer the spirit of the fighting forces as well as furnish more plentiful equipment.
Factory production is aided by an important outgrowth of American curiosity and ingenuity: industrial research. The recognition of the value of research or the discovery of truth has resulted in the establishment of numerous research laboratories under commercial, governmental, and educational auspices. In consequence this nation possesses outstanding facilities for applying the findings of science to the winning of the war. Fortunate as the country may be in the number of its laboratories, they alone would be of little value without the large body of proficient research men now organized and assembled for action. Since June 15, 1940, the National Defense Research Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Vannevar Bush has been bending every effort to solve scientific problems produced by war conditions.
But no amount of cleverly designed and beautifully produced machines, in however great quantity a nation may desire, will win a war. Wars are won by fighting, and fighting is done by men.
Personnel is therefore the basic instrument in war. Good personnel will recognize the need for equipment; may even design or assist civilian specialists to perfect and produce the desired apparatus. Good personnel will be forehanded and articulate enough to present the military needs of the future to the Congress, though favorable action by that body is not invariably assured.
Adequate ships, bases, fuel, aircraft, guns, radio sets, and ammunition do not guarantee that the war is to be won, for men must maintain mechanisms against the corrosion of nature and the damage of ignorance. Moreover, men must operate the mechanism with intelligence and understanding of the capability of the design. Unless the capacity of the machine is fully extended in action, the armed forces are guilty of not exerting their utmost effort. Such a shortcoming may cost them their lives and equipment and prolong or lose the war.
Since the efficiency of guns, machinery, and aircraft is so greatly dependent upon the operators, the Navy should give more attention than ever to the improvement of its personnel. It has been able to enlist young men of higher intellectual capacity than ever before. These men very likely surpass their contemporaries in other navies. Whether or not they have greater pugnacity than less highly endowed men is a question outside this paper. No body of enlisted men, however, will be any better than its officers. The Navy can be no better than its officers. This absolute fact is a sober challenge to the officer corps of the service.
What does this challenge mean to officers? What can officers do about it? What is the situation now confronting those who are commissioned to direct and lead the Navy?
First of all, the expansion of the Navy must be recognized together with its attendant problems. In 1939 there were about 6,000 regular line officers and 110,- 000 men. Now there are 25,000 line officers and 250,000 men. In a year or two these numbers probably will be doubled. Since the newcomers have almost no training or sea experience, it falls upon the relatively fixed number of regular line officers to shoulder the job of perfecting the Navy for action. Luckily, the expansion commenced well before the declarations of war were exchanged, so that definite progress has been recorded.
The problem of training is a more critical one than ever. A fortunate development in the recent past is the greatly increased use of schools ashore, where fundamental instruction in specialties can be given with the advantages of aids, skilled instructors, uninterrupted time, and fixed plant apparatus. As has always been true, the art of living at sea must be gained by going to sea. Certainly sailors still are made at sea.
But officers must be trained. In one sense, each regular line officer, wherever located, bears a responsibility for helping train four officers who are newly come into the Navy. It does not mean that school is to be held but it does mean that experienced officers, particularly those of say two or three grades higher, are in a position to greatly assist new officers. Probably the chief assistance can be given by conversation. A natural disinclination to talk shop may grow up in war time, but the new reserve officer needs and welcomes such talk. He almost invariably enters the Navy with a “desire to do well” or a “want to” which is fresh and genuine. That spark of extra interest can be recognized and cultivated to be of lasting merit, or it can be cooled within a month if the reserve officer feels he is not received as a working partner of the concern, to share the load of work and information and to learn the technique of the business.
A deliberate attempt to encourage the enthusiasm of new officers was made recently in a light cruiser. The rapid, satisfactory development of the six new officers was so apparent that the captain and heads of departments all spoke favorably about it. In that ship direct precept gave way to the device of relating stories of one’s own experience to illustrate points of value to the listener.
Every officer must recognize the heightened value which this war has placed upon the element of time. The critical importance of timing a stroke of force was illustrated at Pearl Harbor, when the quiet of Sunday morning was capitalized. The period of unguarded week-ends, the hour of relieving the watch, or of fueling, are similarly valuable. The Russians, at Rostov, cleverly used the night to push out the invader, since the Germans could not use their powerful advantage in mechanized vehicles except in daylight. Naturally enough, the use of radio, aircraft, and mechanized equipment, such as automobiles, mosquito boats, or power-loaded guns, begets operations which move at high rates of speed. The management of such forces in co-ordination each with the other, at a tempo in excess of that which the enemy can achieve, contributes largely to success.
The speed of communications and the speed of operations, particularly in tactical situations, are closely related. Secrecy of signals and dispatches requires the encryption of call signs and texts. Security has to be purchased at the cost of speed. All officers must understand that the problem of communications is basically one of determining the proper balance between security and speed in a given military situation. Speed can usually be sacrificed to security in strategic circumstances where several hours can be spared for encryption. In extreme cases, tactical engagements may move so quickly that no secret message can be sent and previous instructions must then be depended upon.
A procedure which may effect the saving of time and also may bring greater concentration of forces to bear upon a task is the decentralization of authority. A number of tasks may be prosecuted simultaneously under several supervisors or commanders. Such organization increases the interest and the feeling of importance among the supervising individuals. Be they commanding officers or boatswain’s mates, they in general respond especially well when assigned a task to do without interference. And the superior, too, benefits by being relieved of his concern over the details which rob him of time. Willingness to delegate authority to subordinates and, in like manner, to accept responsibility is generally the mark of a successful officer. His trust in his assistants, and his encouragement and recognition of work well done by man or officer, arouse further enthusiasm and lead to a strong organization.
Discipline is the preparation of individuals by training to perform their duties in the absence of orders or supervision. It is important that the association of discipline with punishment, so common in civil life, be replaced in the minds of new officers and men with the concept just stated. Subordinates in a military unit should be “disciples” or followers of their commander and his desires. Well-disciplined men initiate and carry on the intention of their commander despite his absence or the distractions of action. Without orders they act properly.
Every officer must continue the pursuit of knowledge to develop skill in his profession. This unremitting study is particularly required in the present crisis because German leadership has devoted so much untrammeled thought and energy to getting the right answers to military problems. Truth must be sought by accurate observation of events and by measured judgment of reports. While lessons of the first World War must enter the estimate, the lapse of twenty years must ever be kept in mind when those lessons are considered today. Though the principles of the art of war do not change, weapons and schools of thought do change so greatly that constant pondering is necessary.
Naval officers in peace habitually keep busy and usually have the happy faculty of taking their jobs seriously but themselves not too seriously. Now that war is come, it will be difficult to find time for the reflective thinking which officers in positions of command will be required to do if we are to be guided in the shortest direction to victory. Younger officers, also, can well cultivate the trilogy of observation, recollection, and decision, to be followed by action. Recollection and decision comprise reflective thinking. Such thinking caused the long-standing doctrine of concentrating battle-line fire upon the hard units of the opposite line to be superseded by the principle of concentration upon the soft units. Reflective thinking caused the employment of submarines awash at night rather than submerged in daylight. Reflective thinking caused a young officer to recommend a slight addition to a gun platform, so that the use of two loaders instead of one would greatly increase the rate of anti-aircraft fire. And more reflective thought by those who stand on bridges in action will be needed to check and defeat enemy practices used against us.
The search for knowledge should normally lead officers to inter ship visiting and to the exchange of experiences. Inconvenient as visiting may sometimes be, it does offer significant benefits to both participants. Particularly should officers learn about aviation and army activities by acquaintance with officers who are in those services. This war has demonstrated amply the possibilities of co-ordinated action of Army, Navy, and air forces, and may, in the future, require that same co-ordination of United States forces along with forces from allied nations. The smooth co-operation in such a complex tactical situation will demand the highest degree of consideration and understanding between officers. Co-ordination will be better when officers are not only conversant with each other’s problems and capacities but when they are personally acquainted.
Though army-navy relationships are the most cordial that they ever have been, could they not be even better if more majors and lieutenant commanders, and colonels and captains knew each other by their first names from associations started as midshipmen and cadets on cruise or in summer camp? Even now the exchange of more army and naval officers in planning or operational offices, each actually to perform duties of the other, might be profitable.
The relations between officers and men in the Navy will decidedly increase in importance as the war wears on. Their relationship must be founded upon mutual esteem and consideration. Since the Navy enjoys the advantages of being manned by men who enlist voluntarily and who are above average in intelligence and understanding, commissioned officers must have more professional qualification and knowledge than in the last war. Men are as quick to sense lack of knowledge as they are to perceive lack of character. Qualities of leadership are ever in order, regardless of time. Men who are able to reason and think are, of course, valuable to the Navy, but they must be guided by leaders who are more able. Officers will need to give stability to their men when they suffer much hardship, and are subject to the doubt and fear which the enemy may attempt to implant through propaganda of one sort or another.
Arduous stretches of duty, quite removed from the peace-time luxuries of soda fountains, launderies, abundant water, and varied food, may better be endured when officers remind their men of the hardy American tradition which commences at Plymouth Rock and continues through the signal of rebellion from the old North Church steeple in Boston, the river bridge at Concord, the Alamo in Texas, the pioneering to tame the West, and the heroic stories of navy men in service and sacrifice. Under certain conditions the views of officers as to the causes and goals of the war should be imparted to their men. This expression of opinion will result in a solid understanding particularly valuable in the later stages of a long war when interest may be diverted from the objectives which were at the outset quite clear to all. The proper explanation of the importance of the operations in progress stimulates interest in the small jobs of each day. These informative measures, comparatively little used in the last war, are necessary now to combat the extensive and effective use of propaganda by the enemy.
Finally, there rests upon officers the task of showing the enlisted man and the public at large that the naval service is based not on “getting without so much giving,” but on “giving without so much getting.”
There is no question but that this conflict is being waged to preserve the American way of life. The circumstances and geography of the war have placed responsibility for victory in an unprecedented degree upon the Navy. The strength of the Navy rests chiefly in the hands and minds of its officers.