FROM FEBRUARY 3 TO MARCH 3
FAR EAST
Tokyo Assassinations. —A climax of the long series of political assassinations in Japan came on the morning of February 27 when a body of rebellious troops, estimated at not more than 1,000, took possession of government buildings, and their leaders directed murderous attacks on Cabinet officers and other high officials. The four who met their death were the veteran Finance Minister, Viscount Takahashi; General Watanabe, Inspector of Military Training; Viscount Makato Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; and Colonel Danzo Matsuo. The latter was the brother-in-law and secretary of Premier Okada and was killed by mistake instead of the Premier. While there was apparently no general disaffection within the Army, it was only after a critical period of several days that government forces were able to restore control.
In the Cabinet reorganization which followed, some assurance was given that the radical army faction would not gain an increased measure of influence in the government. Army leaders were consulted, and in view of the Army’s responsibility for the outbreak, they were expected to share in the reconstruction of a strong civil administration. But it would be a paradoxical outcome, only possible in Japan, if a wild attack on every organ of government from the Emperor down, should give the military radicals a still greater domination over Japanese foreign and domestic policies. The Japanese Navy was apparently not implicated in the uprising. Possibly its leaders remembered the last advice of Admiral Togo, that “all the officers of the Imperial Navy be prudent in speech and action,” given after the assassination of Premier Inyukai in 1932.
The assassinations were interpreted as a violent protest of the militarists against the “rottenness of politics” in general and in particular against the liberal trend evident in the parliamentary elections of February 20. In these elections the Labor and other small proletarian parties gained a bloc of about 23 votes, and the Minseito or quasi-Liberal party, on which the Okada Cabinet was chiefly dependent for support, secured 205 votes to 174 for the Seiyukai. Both major parties, however, have acquiesced in the military demand for a “positive” policy in foreign affairs.
Senator Pittman’s Speech. —A more stiff-necked attitude regarding American interests in the Orient was reflected in the remarks on that subject made in the Senate on February 10 by Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. As reported in the press, Senator Pittman interpreted a speech made by Admiral Takahashi in Japan as a threat that the Tokyo government would increase its naval power sufficiently to cut off this country’s commerce with China and the Philippines. The Senator recognized the present limitations on American naval strength in the Western Pacific, but added:
By every obligation imposed upon a government it is our duty in honor and in good conscience to defend and protect our citizens and those dependent upon us for protection, not only in the Far Pacific, but wherever they may be. Apparently this cannot be accomplished through treaties, and if that be so then there is only one answer, and that is dominating naval and air forces.
America in the Orient. —At the present time, when most American students would find it difficult to define our policy in the Orient, it is interesting to find a book on this subject written by a Russian, and published at Moscow last year. The book is entitled America in the Struggle for China, and, according to a review in the March number of Pacific Affairs, it has already sold widely in the Soviet Republic, nearly exhausting a first edition of 7,000 copies. As interpreted in the review, the author believes the United States cannot renounce her Far Eastern interests “so long as American economy, on a capitalistic basis, goes on producing more goods and capital than it can distribute or consume.” For the time being we may pursue limited objectives, while building up our Navy. This “is a policy forced on those imperialist countries whose domestic contradictions are too deep and naked to make possible the open aggrandizement, for example, of Japan. But it is no less imperialism, and no less certain to lead to war.”
The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations is making plans for the American translation and publication of this book, in time presumably for the next meeting of the Institute at Yosemite National Park during the coming summer.
Japan’s Continental Aims. —In addition to the review cited above, and much other material on oriental problems, the March Pacific A fairs carries as its leading article a study of Japanese policy in China by Sir Frederick Whyte, former President of the Indian Legislative Assembly and later political adviser to the National Government at Nanking. Of Japanese aims on the Continent Sir Frederick writes in part as follows:
Looking at Japanese expansion in a long perspective, we can see that a steady, though sometimes interrupted, course of policy has carried Japan forward with such success that in three decades it has either annexed or drawn within its orbit an Asiatic dominion as large as Western Europe from Denmark to the Straits of Gibraltar. The propellants and intoxicants that have given it the momentum for this progress are well known. It is equally well known that Japan’s is still unfulfilled; and whether its military leaders have fixed the final goal in their own minds is a question which may be left in doubt. Strategic, dynastic and economic motives still drive Japan onward to the creation of a new Eastern Asia, of which it is already the virtual master. It is now too deeply committed to the threefold task to draw back until it has achieved, or attempted, the joint solution of the closely related problems of Manchuria and the Manchu Restoration, of Mongolia and the future of Russia in the Far East, of China as a field of political influence and a great market.
The ultimate event may prove that Japan can achieve two of its three purposes. It may succeed in re-establishing government by traditional authority, using the “kingly way” to drive democracy, republicanism, and even communism out of the Far East. Japan may also win strategic security for itself and its continental territories by pushing Russia back from the Pacific coast and closing the gates through which Russia might advance to the attack in a war of the future; but in this matter, of course, the relative power which Russia and Japan can mobilize for the solution of the Mongolian question will be decided, not by anything in the Far East, but by the relative security which Russia may enjoy in Europe. Japan’s strategic success is therefore an open question, and must be left so. Its third and final purpose, to assure its own economic future, cannot be achieved on an Eastern Asiatic basis alone, and Japan has only been driven to attempt it on that basis because of the obstacles it has encountered elsewhere.
The author’s view is that only by a study of this economic aspect of the problem can a peaceful solution be found. This solution must take the form of “a long range policy,” considering in some measure the economic needs of Japan for raw materials, markets, and capital, considering also the many-sided problems of China, and yet in the end not unfavorable to the economic interests of the Western nations.
INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENTS
Franco-Soviet Pact. —At the close of February the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement, signed last May, was ratified by the French Chamber, with every prospect that similar action would soon be taken by the Senate. As with most such agreements, the significance of this one lies in its indication of Franco-Soviet solidarity rather than in its actual terms, which provide simply for reciprocal assistance if either signatory is the victim of aggression by another European power or powers. Premier Flandin insisted that the new agreement merely supplemented the Locarno Treaty and was in no way contrary to its letter or spirit, or to the principles of the League Covenant.
In France and elsewhere, however, there was a very general fear that the pact would not be so regarded by either Germany or Italy. Italy in particular has throughout the sanctions crisis held over France the threat of withdrawing from her Locarno pledges and reviving her old pre-war time league with Germany and other states of Central Europe. Germany on her part might seize upon the Soviet pact as an excuse for re-garrisoning the demilitarized Rhineland. This is practically the last of the military restrictions imposed at Versailles which Germany has not already violated, and it is also the most galling to the new Nazi nationalism. In fact, if French Army reports are to be accepted, the Rhineland restrictions are already a dead letter, and Germany under the guise of police, constabulary, or other quasi-military organizations has 40,000 troops at present in the demilitarized zone.
Italy’s Bid to Hitler. —As a further damper on French enthusiasm for the League sanctions policy, Premier Mussolini was reported late in February to have definitely suggested to Germany the formation of a Central European bloc to include Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria, and Hungary. Whether or not the complete sincerity of this offer was questioned, Herr Hitler’s reply was politely negative. Germany was still economically and militarily weak, needed a breathing spell, and could not risk at present the hostility of France and England, though she would maintain toward Italy an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Thus the scheme appeared shelved at least for the present, but the mere specter of Italo-German rapprochement was quite sufficient to emphasize the dangers of a stiffer sanctions policy in the African war.
Oil Sanctions Threatened. —Somewhat unexpectedly, at the session of the League Sanctions Committee in the first week of March, the League powers took the stand that oil and oil transport embargoes would be imposed on Italy unless within short space she entered into peace negotiations “within the framework of the League Covenant.” One explanation given for this positive action was that encouragement had been found in President Roosevelt’s renewed appeal against war profits, in his statement of March 1, and that other assurances had been given of co-operation from within and outside the League.
In the period preceding, a slightly absurd stress had been laid on American responsibility for delay in the oil sanctions, especially after the fashion in which the American administration last autumn boarded the sanctions steamer, so to speak, and then found its prospective fellow-passengers still on shore. Normally only about 10 per cent of Italy’s oil imports come from the United States, and only 6 per cent are reported to have come from this country last year. Nevertheless, the report of the League committee of experts, made public February 12, stressed the weakening of the oil sanctions that would result from the non-cooperation of states outside the League. With such cooperation, according to the report, an oil embargo might be effective within four months; without it, an embargo could hardly be effective at all. Similarly, a tanker embargo confined to League States would be of limited effect, since Italy could transport 50 per cent of her supply in her own tankers and get the rest through non-members of the League.
Naval Pact Takes Form. —At the beginning of March the naval agreement reached at London still awaited final approval by the states represented at the conference. As for the agreement itself, its terms were necessarily limited in character and its details belong primarily in the technical field. Its chief provisions include: (1) annual exchange of building programs among the four signatory powers, (2) a building holiday in 10,000-ton cruisers, (3) changed restrictions in the size and gun-calibers of certain types of vessels.
The delay in approving the treaty, however, was primarily a matter of politics, arising from Italy’s efforts to gain, in exchange for her signature, a relaxation of Franco-British naval pressure in the Mediterranean. In fact, without some favorable shift in the sanctions policy, it was presumably a matter of indifference to Italy whether or not the treaty were approved at all.
From the French delegates the only delay over approval arose from fear that German delegates might be invited to London to attach their signatures to the treaty. To thus join French and German signatures on the same document would, as the French saw it, commit them to acceptance of the Anglo-German naval agreement and all the violations of the Versailles Treaty therein involved. This difficulty was avoided by a proposal that the German adherence to the treaty take the form of a separate agreement between England and Germany, to be annexed to their pact of last year.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Swing Left in Spain. —Chiefly significant in the Spanish parliamentary elections of February 16 was the “United front” of the Left parties—Republicans, Socialists, and Communists—which gained for their coalition a fairly definite preponderance in the new Cortes. Though the balance might still be thrown either way by the shift of a few members, the returns indicated that of the 473 seats in the Cortes the Left parties had won 253 to 220 for the Right. A new Left Republican cabinet was formed by the veteran ex- Premier Manuel Azana, and a postelection decree released some 30,000 “political and social” prisoners, most of whom had been confined since the unsuccessful Socialist uprising of October, 1934. As the elections results indicate, the future of the Spanish Republic is still highly hazardous, with two almost equally matched factions in a bitter struggle for control.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Neutrality Act Extended. —Chiefly because of the wide divergence of opinion on the question, Congress in mid-February abandoned further neutrality legislation and extended the operation of the Neutrality Act of last August for another 14 months, until May 1, 1937. Only two minor provisions were added, one prohibiting loans or credits to belligerents, and another exempting from the application of the neutrality measures any American republic at war with a non-American power. In their present form the new neutrality measures thus stand as follows:
Absolute mandatory embargo on arms, ammunition and implements of war must be proclaimed by the President whenever the existence of a conflict abroad is called to his attention.
American vessels cannot transport arms, ammunition, or implements of war to belligerents.
The President may remove protection of this government to American citizens traveling on vessels flying the flags of warring nations, thus imposing on Americans the condition that they travel at their own risk.
Loans or credit extensions to belligerents are prohibited, except that licenses may be issued for ordinary commercial transactions and the exchange of short-time obligations.
In general the feeling of those opposed to stronger legislation at this time was that the conditions of future international conflict could not be foreseen, and that such conditions could best be provided for when the need arose. In proclaiming the extension of the Neutrality Act, President Roosevelt repeated his appeal of last October to the American people that
They so conduct their trade with belligerents that it cannot be said that they are seizing new opportunities for profit or that by changing their peace-time trade they give aid to the continuation of the war.
Pan-American Peace Project. —In February, President Roosevelt sent letters to all the American republics suggesting another conference of American nations, the chief purpose of which should be to consolidate, simplify, or supplement the various peace agreements already existing among these nations and if possible bring about a closer Pan-American solidarity. More specifically, the idea behind the Washington proposal was interpreted as that of substituting for the unpopular unilateral protection of the Monroe Doctrine a new policy of joint action, both to present inter-American warfare and to prevent a united front against aggression from overseas. Favorable replies were received from all the Latin American states except Paraguay, whose reply was held up owing to American delay in recognizing the new Franco government. The meeting place of the conference was to be at Buenos Aires.
Paraguay Resolution. —Further delay or disruption of the Chaco peace settlement was threatened by the February revolution of army leaders in Paraguay, as a result of which President Ayala was forced out of office and Colonel Rafael Franco, most popular of the Paraguayan war heroes, was made provisional head of the state. Shortly before, Colonel Franco had been deported as a “communist.” Chief motive behind the governmental upset was said to be the dissatisfaction of Paraguayan army chiefs over the Buenos Aires peace terms and their fixed intention to retain the whole Chaco area. Against them, however, was ranged the weight of the six neutral mediators—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay—who threatened non-recognition of the new government unless it agreed to abide by the peace protocols already signed.