A Landsman’s Model of the U.S.S. Texas
(See page 1819, December, 1933, Proceedings, and also pages 974 and 977, this issue.)
Ensign W. A. Marchant, U. S. Naval Reserve.—It is customary among seafaring men to treat with disdain the landsman’s ideas of ships and all things pertaining to them. But the writer has recently witnessed the building of a model of the U.S.S. Texas by two men who literally do Hot know port from starboard which has somewhat changed his ideas on the subject.
The only sea service of one of the builders, John F. Collins, F.R.P.S. (Fellow of the Royal Photographic Society), consists of a trip to France with the Army, during the late war. The other builder, Lieutenant George Derleth, of the New York City Police Force, has never been nearer to the ocean than the Battery, and neither of these gentlemen has ever been aboard a battleship. Yet I believe that most people will agree that the model which they have constructed will compare very favorably with some of the professional ones to be found at the Naval Academy or in the Navy Building in Washington
This miniature Texas is to the scale of 1 inch to 6.25 feet and measures 36 inches over all. The construction of the hull follows what may be called a modified form of the longitudinal system. Each of five 0.75-inch white pine boards was shaped roughly to form and an oblong piece cut out of the center. They were then secured together with marine glue. It was decided by the builders that the original plans, which came from Popular Science, could be improved upon. In pursuance of this idea the hull was shaped largely by eye, and the finished model embodies many refinements not contained in the blue prints. The only tools used in this part of the building were a saw, spoke shave, file, and sandpaper. If the resulting lines of the run, bilges, forefoot, and other parts are not perfect, the imperfection could be found only with micrometer calipers. The oblong cuts mentioned above resulted in the formation of a “hold” into which was inserted 3.5 pounds of sheet lead for ballast. As it was thought that bilge keels, docking keels, armor belt, and other appendages to the hull would spoil its appearance, they were omitted.
The entire superstructure was built in one assembly and can be removed bodily to give access to the hold. The arrangement of details, such as masts, boats, deck fittings, and other parts, was obtained from several photographs of the original. While a few of these fittings were bought in the manufactured state, a survey of the model as a whole will give ample evidence of the ingenuity and skill of the builders, as well as some unusual ideas in marine construction.
The mooring bits were fashioned from the fasteners of a pair of hose supporters. For niggerheads on the winches, a couple of eyelets were pressed together and soldered, while the shafts are large straight pins, and the motor housings were carved from a block of wood. The anchor windlasses were originally wheels on a toy truck. Spouts of small oil cans furnished the main and secondary batteries. The standing rigging and signal halyards are of ordinary spool cotton, with tiny glass beads purloined from a lady’s necklace for insulators. These were also used for absentee and other lights. Still in keeping with her feminine gender, the tops of lipstick holders set with 10-cent store diamonds serve as searchlights.
Metal from an empty film pack was utilized in construction of the bridge, wheelhouse, and control towers. These have windows of celluloid and are painted the regulation red inside. Two pictures of range clocks were cut out and pasted on the masts. Access hatches were made by hand, while settings from 10-cent rings were used for some of the ventilation hatches. Thumb tacks and eyelets served to manufacture mushroom vents.
Special mention is due the plane. Its fuselage was carved from a clothespin, the “prop” from a flat hairpin, and the catapult from the wood of a cigar box. The plane has a wing spread of 2 inches, the “prop” is well shaped and properly pitched, and the wings and rudders are all in correct form.
Another item of special interest is the boats. Each of the two motor launches is correct to the smallest detail. One has a 4-cylinder engine constructed of wood and wire, and complete with starter, generator, wiring, and exhaust pipe, while the other has her engine housed over. Each has rudder, tiller, propeller, life rings, and a rail around the stern. The whaleboats are suspended from their davits by a twofold tackle which will actually lower and hoist them. The tiny blocks were made by hand and the falls are rove off with a fine linen thread. Sennit gripes of the same thread hold the boats against the strongbacks.
This model was built in the owner’s bedroom. It is finished off with an excellent paint job, in battleship gray with red underbody and black boot topping which add materially to the appearance. Beside the tools already mentioned, the limited supply included a jeweler’s glass, pair of stamp tweezers, screw driver, jackknife, magnifying glass, and a vice. The total cost of materials used was about $60.
At her “dock” trials held in a bathtub, she floated on an even keel both fore and aft and awthartship, at the designers water line, as proved by the use of plumb bobs. Later, on her “shake down cruise” on a near-by lake, she exhibited marked qualities of stability and seaworthiness, recovering with ease from a 60°-70° roll and weathering the “heavy seas” which were created for her trial.
Unfortunately, the builders had to separate before a few of the final details could be completed. Lieutenant Derleth took the model to his home in New York before some extra chain could be procured properly to house the sheet anchor and before flags and other details could be made. It is also unfortunate that none of the photographs gives a good view of the underbody.
Study of a Tropical Hurricane
(See page 183, February, 1934, Proceedings)
Professor H. C. Willett, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.—This article furnishes an excellent example of the utilization of the meteorological observations obtained during the passage of a single ship through the center of a tropical hurricane in order to compute the size, intensity, and direction and rate of movement of the storm. This case is particularly interesting in that it deals with a comparatively “young” hurricane, or one which is very small and intense, before it has entered the stage of increasing size and diminishing intensity which marks the later life of the tropical cyclone.
In view of the unusually steep pressure gradient indicated within the vortex of this hurricane in the author's sketch of the probable pressure distribution, it is of interest to apply the gradient wind formula to the case and compare the actually observed wind velocities to those theoretically necessitated by the indicated pressure distribution. The author finds a decrease of pressure of 1.04 in. in only 3 mi. at the Inner edge of the hurricane vortex. Since this is of quite a different order of magnitude than that usually associated with cyclones, it would appear at first glance that Captain Cadogan's estimated wind velocity in this zone of 125 m.p.h. must fall far short of the gradient wind velocity required by such a pressure gradient. At the same time, we know that at the inner edge of the hurricane vortex there can be almost no movement of the air across the isobars if the intensity of the storm is to continue unabated; in other words, the actual wind velocity must be approximately the gradient velocity.
This value is in surprisingly good agreement with the observed wind velocity. Allowing for the fact that the wind velocity at the level of the bridge should be slightly less than the full gradient value and that Captain Cadogan’s estimate of 125 m.p.h. was admittedly conservative, the agreement is excellent. The really surprising fact is that such a steep pressure gradient should not require a wind velocity greater than 175 m.p.h. The reason for this, of course, lies in the extremely small radius of curvature of the path of the air particles which, in this particular case, for the zone of the vortex under consideration, is seen from the author’s diagram to be only 6 mi. In this case it is almost entirely the centrifugal force that balances the pressure gradient force.
The extreme rate of pressure fall observed in this case, 1.13 in. in half an hour just before the President Hayes passed into the central calm or “eye” of the storm, is of course simply the result of the intensity of the storm and the rate of its advance over the ship. Such extremely rapid pressure falls are to be observed in those rare cases when a young hurricane still in the stage of its maximum intensity moves with fair speed directly over the observer. A similar case is that of the SS. Coamo which was just outside the harbor of Santo Domingo during the frightfully destructive hurricane of September 3, 1930. She reported a pressure fall of 1.23 in. in 30 min. shortly before entering the central calm. In this case also the ship passed through the hurricane in less than 4 hours, was in the central calm for 40 min., and experienced an estimated wind velocity of 160 m.p.h. Such small and very intense hurricanes occur in all the hurricane-breeding zones at low latitude. As already mentioned, that condition is characteristic of the stage of the development of the storm and not of the particular locality in which it formed. Many of the West Indian hurricanes are of such very small size when their presence is first detected, but it is seldom that a ship or station comes really into the center of one at this stage. By the time the West Indian storms have moved northwestward to Cuba or the Gulf of Mexico, they have usually expanded considerably in size. Also in the Far East, especially in lower latitudes, storms of similar small size and intensity are observed. The famous Port Blair storm, one of the most destructive in history, left a path of destruction only 37 mi. wide. It also had a central calm 5 or 6 mi. diameter, so that the zone of hurricane winds was only 16 mi. wide on either side. It seems unjustifiable to assume that the genetic processes controlling the development of the hurricane really differ from one hurricane region to another in such a way that smaller and more intense storms tend to develop in one region rather than in another. On the other hand, in the actual region of genesis, more storms in the early stage of development will be found than in more remote areas. The region off the west coast of Mexico from the Revilla Gigedo Islands some 5 or 6 degrees southward has for some time been recognized as a breeding ground of tropical hurricanes (cf. Hann’s Lehrbuch, p. 604). Consequently, it is not surprising that the hurricanes met with in this region are frequently of the “young” type. This particular area, like that off Cape Verde on the west coast of Africa, is covered in the late summer and early autumn by the doldrums, or the belt of calms at the heat equator between the northeast trade winds of the northern hemisphere and the southeast trade winds of the southern hemisphere. These latter turn to southwest after crossing the equator. These two doldrum belts, especially well marked just off the coasts of the two continents, are particularly favored spots for hurricane genesis. At the same time almost nothing is known quantitatively about these dynamic or thermodynamic genetic processes. Almost diametrically opposed theories of the way in which the hurricane genesis and development takes place are put forward by leading meteorologists representing different schools of thought. And nothing can be definitely proved in this important problem, owing to the lack of necessary observational material. Of surface observations in developing and fully developed hurricanes we have a considerable number. Those which are entirely lacking and are absolutely essential to the solution of this important problem, are observations of wind, temperature, and moisture at upper levels. Aerological soundings in regions of tropical cyclogensis would be of very great value, particularly so at the time of and in the immediate vicinity of the genesis of a hurricane. One of the most useful pieces of work which might be undertaken at naval meteorological stations suitably located would be the acquisition of records of this type, in particular the release of small sounding balloons with meteorographs within a tropical hurricane. This would, of course, require the development of a meteorograph capable of withstanding much more severe buffeting than the standard instrument, but that part of the problem should not offer very great difficulties. Such work must eventually be undertaken by some agency.
Lieutenant P. G. Hale, U.S. Navy.—Lieutenant Anderson's article contains an item of interesting data which he comments upon but is inclined to dismiss as perhaps an erroneous entry in the log. This entry recorded a shift of the wind from northeast to east by south as the President Hayes entered the calm central Portion of a hurricane. Lieutenant Anderson states he was unable to find any reference to this phenomenon other than the entry in the log and that he could find no satisfactory explanation for it. He concludes that the entry may have been erroneous because such an occurrence is contrary to the accepted ideas of wind movements in circular storms and because the same condition was not reported when leaving the vortex.
It is considered quite possible that the lack of such a report was an omission and that the equivalent shifting winds may have occurred during the two minutes required for the wind to increase from calm to maximum velocity of over 125 miles per hour. Under the conditions it would not be surprising for small variations in the wind direction not to have been recorded. This comment is made because the behavior of the wind as the President Hayes entered the hurricane is quite in accord with a general theoretical explanation for the cause of the calm at the center of tropical cyclones.
In the small calm area of tropical cyclones there is usually reported a clearing of the clouds, and the sky is often reported as being visible. A leading explanation for this phenomenon is that the air in the calm center of a hurricane is slowly descending, thus compressing and heating the air, and dissolving the clouds. If this assumption of a descending current is the correct explanation, the escape of the descending air must be accounted for. This is done by assuming an outward flow from the calm central part of the storm. Such an outward flow could cause the sequence of winds that the President Hayes reported as having occurred. Thus the final wind reported, east by south, would have an outflowing component, while the northeast wind blowing a minute or two previously would have an inflowing component. That the latter is the case seems indicated from Lieutenant Anderson's conclusion that the 10-point rule was more accurate in locating the storm center than the 8-point rule, even up to the time of entering the central calm.
Going further into theory, or more properly, conjecture, of the mechanism of the hurricane, the theory has been advanced that the descending air in the central calm of the storm is itself caused by the outward flow around the calm area. And that this outward flow is caused by centrifugal force of the rapidly revolving air immediately surrounding the calm center; i.e., as the air on the outer edges of the storm flows in toward the center, inflowing at an angle of about 22° with the isobars, its speed is increased due to its tendency to maintain constant angular velocity. This results in an increase in linear velocity as the air flows inward toward the center. Finally, the linear velocity increases to the speed where the centrifugal force acting on the air particles overcomes the inward directed force, and at this point the central calm of the hurricane is encountered.
It is quite true, as Lieutenant Anderson states, that little is now known about the factors which influence any given storm because of the lack of adequate observations. Due to an increasingly efficient world-wide system of reporting severe tropical storms by radio, there is less chance than ever for ships to be caught near storm centers and by chance obtain the data required to study the mechanism of the tropical cyclone. A dense network of reporting stations would be required to obtain the data properly to study the structure of these storms. Such networks exist only over land and land quickly changes the features of tropical storms suspected to exist when they are over oceans.
However, theoretical studies, supported by observations that are available and those that may be made on future storms, are expected to increase our knowledge of both the origin and physical characteristics of tropical cyclones. The majority of meteorologists now generally accept the ideas of the Norwegian meteorologists as to the origin and structure of extratropical cyclones. In the explanation of the places of origin of these storms it was an incidental step to point out, with similar explanations, the places of origin of the tropical cyclones and the presence in these regions of “fronts” separating air masses having different characteristics. The idea has been advanced that the tropical storms originate as waves on a “front” as do the extratropical storms. Even if this is true, there is but little doubt that there is a distinct difference in the subsequent structure of these two classes of cyclones.
It will require much future work, both observational and theoretical, to arrive at an acceptable explanation of the origin and structure of tropical cyclones. Mathematics and physics will be called upon to confirm or disprove theories arising from reported observations. In a recent issue of the Proceedings, there was a mathematical explanation by a theoretical physicist to account for the observation that the proper amount of food to prepare for a mess of N men is not a linear function of N. It is hoped that the wind observed by the President Hayes as it entered the vortex of the hurricane might inspire someone to explain mathematically the correctness of the observation; or a mathematical treatment to prove such observed winds impossible would serve a useful purpose. Finally, for observational material, anyone in the future unfortunate enough to find himself passing through a hurricane should make all the observations possible, including wind directions which may seem contrary.
Promotions, Past and Future
(See page 157, February, 1934, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Inglis, U. S. Navy.—To say that the subject of this article is timely is an understatement. It should have been brought to the front, thoroughly investigated, and definitely settled years ago.
Lieutenant Brown has presented his material in a highly readable form. His graphs and tables are excellent, if accurate. The Secretary's Notes indicate that his present and past duty qualify him as a statistician, with all available data in the Bureau of Navigation at his disposal. It is, therefore, with some hesitancy that I venture to question whether his presentation is entirely accurate and representative. .A quick check shows some apparent discrepancies which the author could probably satisfactorily explain but which are not readily reconcilable by the reader.
For example, to quote from page 158: "In this figure (3) the assumption has been made that each successive class begins its naval career with the same number of members." The number is not given. Roughly scaling off the ordinates for admiral, which must equal 55, and applying this scale to the first year ensigns, we find that this graduating class numbers about 140. This figure is apparently the author's estimate of an average or representative class. The strength of each graduating class for the last 25 years far exceeded that figure.
Figures 1 and 2 are based on Naval Academy officers only. The attrition among former temporary officers is practically the same; but among former warrant and former enlisted officers it is very much greater.
Perhaps the most glaring discrepancy is in Table III, page 168, where a comparison is made of the cost to the taxpayer of retirements under various plans. The author attempts to compare retired pay of commanders at $4,313 per year (32 years of commissioned service) under present legislation with $3,553 (28 years of commissioned service) under proposed legislation; of lieutenant commanders at $3,304 per year (26 years of commissioned service) under present legislation with $2,126 (21 Years of commissioned service) under proposed legislation. It is admittedly difficult to compute future retired pay because no one can predict with any degree of certainty what proportion of those retired kay count precommission service for pay purposes. Nevertheless "sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." To make a fair and logical comparison the same basis must be used for each computation. If precommissioned service is not counted for the proposed plans, it should not be counted tor the present plan, barring a change in the pay laws of which no mention is made in the article.
It will immediately be said that my figures are likewise not representative because they do not include provision for the added cost due to increased service of those retained in the future beyond 21 years' service under present legislation. This criticism is correct, but we are comparing present costs, and there is no retention list at present, nor will there be one of any appreciable proportions until 1941. Lieutenant Brown's computations fail to consider the cost of retirements of officers counting precommissioned service in his proposed plans.
If we orient our viewpoint to the year 1942, say, we find that the truth lies somewhere between his figures and mine. Under his plan there would be no retention list but there would be retired officers—a large number of them—counting precommissioned service.
It is not intended to be hypercritical but rather to point out the ramifications of this subject and its many variable factors. It is difficult, if not impossible, to completely cover it in one short article. The author has done a good job but I would be better satisfied with his conclusions if his data and formulas were more specifically stated.
The Navy itself is largely to blame for the impossible situation which will shortly confront it. Too many World War officers were permanently commissioned in 1921. The Naval Academy classes entering since the World War have been too large. We have not been sufficiently strict in eliminating the unfit, physically and professionally. But that is all water over the dam, or under the bridge, if you prefer. We are interested in the future, not the past. Some measures can be taken without legislation. The most painless, effective, and immediate would be the retirement of the physically unfit. Probably any one of us can name, offhand, a dozen or more line officers who should be on the retired list.
From the daily orders being posted, I suspect that something in the nature of a campaign to this end is now afoot. The campaign should be actively prosecuted to completion, and it should include all ranks.
We can also do something in the way of eliminating the professionally unfit. Our discipline can be tightened to weed out those who are definitely incompetent and those whose standard of conduct is below par. The examining board can eliminate some of the mediocre in promotion examinations. None of these administrative measures has been as effective as it could be, and as it should be in the light of the present promotion jam. The reason is obvious. Taking any action, however just, which will injure a brother-officer is the most unpleasant duty with which one can be faced. But in the interests of the Navy and of the able officers who are being held back, deadwood in all ranks must be eliminated—the sooner the better, and the easier on the pocket-book of John Taxpayer.
Another measure which can be taken is the elimination of future humps before they are born—at the Naval Academy. The present limitation on authorized strength is automatically taking care of this so far as the Navy is concerned. We could save some more money for John Taxpayer by not taking in so many plebes in the first place and by more thorough weeding out early in the Naval Academy course.
But elimination of the definitely unfit will not provide a complete solution to the problem with which we will soon be faced. Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on the point of view, the proportion of the unfit to the fit is small.
The solution offered by Lieutenant Brown—extending selection to the lower grades—will help; but, as he states, it should have been introduced years ago to be effective. As shown by the author’s Fig. 8, the large classes of 1930-32 are nearly balanced by the small classes of 1928-29. Classes subsequent to 1932 are limited by the authorized strength of the line. Hence, the big problem lies between the classes of 1918 and 1928. This is the hump, 10 per cent of which having already been promoted to lieutenant commander, Lieutenant Brown’s remedy would not apply; 60 per cent having already been promoted to lieutenant, his remedy would apply in part only; 30 per cent still being lieutenants (junior grade), his remedy would apply in full to this rather small proportion only.
Lieutenant Brown’s proposal also overlooks several considerations important to the individual. Figure 12 is a graphic presentation of his solution. It shows the retirement of roughly 25 per cent of each class completing 7 years' service; 45 per cent of the remainder at 14 years' service, 40 per cent of the remainder completing 21 year's service, 45 per cent of the remainder completing 28 years' service; and about 60 per cent of the remainder of each class completing 35 years' service. In my judgment, these percentages of retirements at 14 and 21 years (45 per cent and 40 per cent) are too high. That is the period in an officer's career when security of employment and income is most important, when retirement would be the greatest blow, and, what is perhaps more important, when the Navy reaps the highest return per salary dollar from the expense of the officer's training.
We can all agree that 5 per cent of 3 class completing 7, 14, and 21 years' service are definitely unfit. We can agree that possibly another 15 per cent are mediocre. But elimination by selection of more than 20 per cent of a class, at the most, at this stage of their career is a waste of good talent and, incidentally, an unnecessary hardship on the individual.
Rapid promotion is undoubtedly much to be desired, but adequate pay and reasonable security of employment are fully as important to the individual. An officer who does his job thoroughly and competently; who carries a little, or a lot, more than his share of the load; who has the personality and the ethical standards of a gentleman, should not be faced with a 4 to 6 chance of being arbitrarily retired in the prime of life, with a family at the most expensive age, with little or no chance for civilian employment, and with totally inadequate retired pay.
Granted that selection is good in principle, our pay and retirement laws should be cut to fit. Otherwise the individual officer might wish he had joined the Army, where they at least have security and pay, though no promotion. If selection is worth what is claimed for it (I believe it is), it is worth paying for. We can't expect to have in the Navy only the cream of the crop, without paying more, both directly and in terms of adequate retired pay, for those arbitrarily selected out.
Our first need is a new pay law based on rank, precommissioned service to count for none or for all, which will give reasonable retired pay, no more no less, to those retired for physical disability and for failure of selection. Having that, in my judgment, selection should be limited to the elimination of not more than 20 per cent of each group at 7, 14, and 21 years of commissioned service. An officer who has not been promoted to flag rank by that time has no place on the active list. There should be no limit on compulsory retirements at 35 years' service. There should also be an age limit for each grade, since the duties of the lower ranks require more in the way of youthful energy, agility, and stamina. I would suggest 60 for captain, 55 for commander, 50 for lieutenant commander, and 45 for lieutenant. Failure of promotion prior to reaching any of the respective age limits should result in enforced retirement under the same pay formula as would apply for failure of selection for promotion. Incidentally, I would make these age limits much less were Naval Academy graduates only to be considered.
With selection out controlled within the proposed limits, promotion should be by seniority, however slow. Security of employment is just as important as rapid promotion.
A Code for Correspondence
(See page 234, February, 1934, Proceedings)
Colonel A. H. Sunderland, Coast Artillery Corps.—I agree with the author of this article in his conclusion that letters are a necessary evil. I further agree that, as far as the Army is concerned, letter writing could be greatly improved, but I cannot agree completely as to the correctness of the remedy he suggests.
It appears to me that the Army field order affords a good form to follow in writing a letter and, in my opinion, that form is logically correct. I suppose the Navy uses the same form in operation orders.
In general, there are to be found in such a field order four essentials. Paragraph 1 sketches in the picture, or sets the stage; it includes statements concerning the enemy’s forces, positions, movements, etc., as well as pertinent statements as to the positions and movements of our own troops. Paragraph 2 is the essence of the order, and states briefly “what it’s all about,” e.g., “this command will march tomorrow.” Paragraph 3 states the hour, formation, and other tactical requirements. The remainder of the order embodies details of administration such as supply, means of communication, etc.
As stated above, I believe that the logic of such presentation is correct. After reading the opening paragraph of a letter so formulated, a person is led into the discussion gradually and is put in a mental position to grasp the meat of the letter, but he is not held in suspense as to the essence until he gets to the end, nor is he required to carry forward details the pertinence of which he cannot evaluate, as appears to be the case in the two corrected letters submitted with the article under discussion. An official letter differs from a novel in the psychological aspect.
Reading official letters is an irksome duty and, in my opinion, it can’t be lightened by causing the reader to go back for the supporting arguments after he learns what is to be supported. In a letter, I want to know early in the game whether the villain or the hero gets the girl, and after that I may need to be told why, how, or when.