Although much time was consumed in discussion during the early weeks of the conference, it was hoped that some real work could be done after the Easter recess when decisions on principles would be in order. When the matter of adherence to the draft treaty was brought up for decision, Germany objected because the draft reaffirmed the restrictions placed upon her by the Versailles Treaty. The conference adopted the draft, with the provision that the matter would be left open. Committee members were rather appalled when they found the large number of points they would have to decide upon in the first clause of the draft alone. It appeared that discussion might go on forever. Mr. Gibson then submitted his proposals which were definite in nature, and asked that the conference consider them as soon as possible. M. Tardieu objected on the ground that they did not provide for the French need for security. The French press attacked the American proposals bitterly.
It appears that part of the bitterness of M. Tardieu and of the French press was due to the suspicion that the American proposals had been made up after consultation with the British and possibly the Germans and Italians and without any consultation with the French. It was felt that an attempt was being made to force the hand of France. M. Tardieu returned to Paris to look out for his election campaign and, for the moment, all chance of accomplishing anything along the lines of the American proposals seemed lost. At about this time Mr. Stimson arrived in Paris and succeeded in convincing the French leader and the public that the American proposals had been made up by our delegation alone and that they were only intended as a basis for discussion.
At the same time the conference was considering some further proposals for “qualitative” disarmament proposed by Sir John Simon. As these were along the same lines as that part of the American proposals which covered abolition of “offensive” weapons of war, the French press continued to see the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance attempting to dictate terms to the rest of the world. Mr. Stimson arrived in Geneva on April 19 and was joined by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Chancellor Bruening. These leaders endeavored to exert a moderating influence.
The Simon resolution provided for the approval of the principle of the abolition of weapons that are “offensive.” It came up for discussion on April 21, and there seemed to be little objection. One delegate after another agreed and it appeared that some definite step would be taken. M. Titulescu of Rumania offered a resolution to the effect that the Simon resolution did not meet the demands of thirteen states for security. This threw matters back to where they were before, although it was noted that France was not one of the nations supporting the resolution. When the conference met the next day an amendment was offered and adopted which provided for “abolition or internationalization” of weapons found to be aggressive in character. The amended resolution was adopted unanimously. This only put off the vital decision whether “offensive” weapons are to be abolished as proposed by the United States or internationalized as demanded by France. The conference also agreed to the appointment of commissions to examine all land, sea, and air weapons and report on those that are considered aggressive in character.
This method of making “ decisions” has been typical of the conference. Each time an issue comes up on which there is a considerable difference of opinion, a way out is found by adopting phraseology sufficiently broad to cover all views, so that the matter is postponed. The question whether the present conference should make a deep cut in arms so as to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or whether the process should be progressive in a series of conferences, was disposed of by providing for progressive cuts after a “decisive” one now.
The truth is that the political situation is very uncertain. Although von Hindenburg was elected in Germany, the Nazis made such gains that their support must be asked by any government. During April, M. Tardieu was busy over elections. His recent defeat means that nothing can be done until the Chamber meets next month and selects M. Herriot. While the latter will gain his support from blocs further to the left than did M. Tardieu, this is no indication of a change on the part of France on the matter of security. In fact, M. Herriot criticized the United States in a recent speech and said that we are a disturbing influence in Europe. He might be inclined to make some compromise with Germany.
Apparently one of Mr. Stimson’s reasons for visiting Europe was to attempt to secure the adhesion of Italy and France to the Treaty of London and simplify the work of the conference by removing the question of naval armament. France and the non-naval powers objected to any attempt to use the figures of the London limitation at Geneva, as they maintained that the question of naval disarmament is only one phase of the whole matter. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said that, in case the powers disregard the limitations of London, England might be forced to invoke the “escalator” clause and build more ships. If this occurs the conference will have done more harm than good.
Mr. Stimson also tried to find a means of compromise between France and Germany and arranged for a conference of representatives of these nations with those of England and Italy—a sort of a “big five” reminiscent of the negotiations at Paris in 1919. M. Tardieu was ill and unable to attend before Mr. Stimson had to leave. The remainder contented themselves with a declaration to the effect that there was yet hope and that further conferences would be held.
The committees appointed to determine which weapons are “offensive” ran into immediate difficulties. All nations except England, Japan, and the United States maintained that battleships are offensive; all except England and the United States took the same position regarding aircraft carriers. In the case of submarines, the position was reversed. Submarines were considered to be purely defensive weapons by all except England, the United States, Russia, and Germany to whom they are forbidden. The German delegate mentioned the fact that England and all the Allies had gone on record as maintaining that airplanes are “offensive” in the Versailles Treaty, and that in the same treaty France had gone on record that submarines are weapons of offense. The important part is not the arguments advanced but the honest differences of opinion that exist. It is easy to see that France considers the submarines to be her defense against possible naval pressure by England. At the same time, who in the United States considers the battleship anything but part of our defense, our first line of defense at that? It seems to appear that the conference, in attempting to draw a distinction between “weapons of defense” and “weapons of aggression” has set a tremendous task for itself.