Ten years ago, on April 6, 1917, the hostile aggressions of the then existing German Imperial government brought the United States into the World War. On the present anniversary, it is fitting that the situation should be described which led to our declaration of war. For the whole truth is now a matter of knowledge, because the German leaders, in their recriminations after the loss of the war, have revealed to an astonishing extent what was going on behind the curtain, and their records can never be expunged. Consequently, the attitude of the United States can no longer be misunderstood—and should no longer be misstated.
In the first place, any reflections upon the “lateness” of our entrance are altogether unjust and are not in accord with the facts. We know now, from the statements of the German leaders themselves, that the popular impression in 1915 of the Lusitania negotiations, as long drawn out and ineffective on the part of the United States, was far from reflecting the real state of the case. On the contrary, the fact was, these protests of the United States had dominated the German Imperial government. As the Kaiser expressed it in his memoirs, “The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over events.” So far from being “ineffective” was our attitude that it even forced the complete abandonment of the U-boat campaign as originally planned.
There can be no doubt about this, after reading the angry revelations of the disappointed Tirpitz. Admiral Tirpitz was so enraged by the effects of the American protests in upsetting the whole German naval strategy, that he tried to resign. He stated: “We continued the campaign in a form in which it could not live and at the same time could not die.” But, upon the additional irritation caused by the sinking of the Arabic, the Imperial Chancellor declared that he “could not stay forever on the top of a volcano,” and the German Imperial government yielded, in what Tirpitz called “practically complete cessation of all employment of submarines.” Consequently, it is established that, in 1915, the thing that kept 11s out of war was the surrender of the German Imperial government, not any weakening on the part of the United States.
It is now also established that it was the same story at the time of the other crisis in 1916. Of the case of the Sussex, Tirpitz wrote: “To our note of April 10, the incorrectness of which in fact was proved by the Americans, there followed the well known American bullying note of April 20, 1916.” This American note was an ultimatum to the German Imperial government, which stated: “Unless the Imperial government should now immediately declare and effect abandonment of this present method of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German empire altogether.”
When actually brought face to face with this ultimatum from the United States, the German Imperial government capitulated.
Admiral Scheer has written: "As a result of this note, presented on April 20, 1916, our government decided to give in and sent orders to the naval staff to the effect that submarine warfare was henceforward to be carried on in accordance with prize law.” Admiral Tirpitz stated: “The Sussex note was a decisive turning point in the war, the beginning of our capitulation.”
Knowing all these facts, it is now evident that the time of our entrance was absolutely fixed by the acts of the German Imperial government. In 1915 and 1916 we had not entered the war because, in each year, the Imperial government had yielded to the United States. In 1917, the German military and naval leaders had influence enough to induce the German Imperial government to persist in illegal submarine warfare. As a result, the United States entered the war. That is the whole truth in the matter—and no American need feel the slightest doubt as to the attitude of the United States.
The fateful die was cast for the German Imperial government when it was decreed that unrestricted U-boat warfare was to begin on February 1, 1917. A paragraph from the memorandum of the German naval chief-of-staff will show the spirit in which this ruthless policy was undertaken: “A further condition is that the declaration and commencement of the unrestricted U-boat warfare should be simultaneous, especially between England and the neutrals. Only on these conditions will the enemy and the neutrals be inspired with ‘holy’ terror.”
It is a matter of record, and it should be stated to the credit of Bethmann-Hollweg, that the Chancellor opposed this measure. Hindenburg has stated: “On January 9, 1917, our All-Highest War Lord decided in favor of the proposals of the naval and general staffs, and against the Imperial Chancellor.” The responsibility is thus fixed— and it was another example of control by the militaristic regime, which was the ruling element in the Imperial German government of the World War. Again, as in 1914, a supposedly infallible plan of war was adopted, in spite of all other considerations.
The German naval staff had made its calculations, which foretold certain victory in the war by means of unrestricted U-boat warfare. As Admiral Scheer afterwards wrote, when chief-of-staff, “We felt that we were responsible for the attainment of such an end to the war as had been promised to the German people, and that we could achieve it by these means alone.” And the general staffs of both army and navy united in adopting this plan of war as undefeatable. But again, as in 1914, the plan had the fatal defect of being made from one side of the board alone, and in not taking into account factors outside the German formulas.
It was an irony of fate for the German Imperial government that this plan of adopting unrestricted U-boat warfare, which had been conceived in an unfavorable military situation, should have been put into operation in a most favorable situation—a situation in which there were other means of future victory within the grasp of the German leaders. But the German Imperial government had not realized the military collapse of Russia. Hindenburg has stated this beyond question: “No intelligence came through to us which revealed any striking indications of the disintegration of the Russian Army.” So, in utter unconsciousness that one of their strongest enemies was already overcome, the German Imperial government began the provocative warfare on the seas, which was destined to bring into the World War the one nation on earth which could take the place of vanquished Russia and provide a reenforcement to prevent German victory. But the leaders of the Imperial government had decided that they would be able to win by this means— and the result was upon their own heads.
When it was found that the German Imperial government intended to persist in this unlawful undertaking, the United States broke off relations with the Imperial government. The cynical conduct of that government was a direct challenge, and there was no course other than to hand the German Ambassador his passports—to have no more dealings with a government that had broken its pledges when it felt strong enough to win by so doing.
On February 3, 1917, the President of the United States addressed both houses of Congress, and announced that diplomacy had failed, and that relations with Germany had been severed. In his address, President Wilson made the sharp distinction between the people of Germany and its autocratic government, which was destined to influence the whole remaining course of the war: “We are sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the government which speaks for them. God grant we may not be challenged by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the government of Germany.”
These acts of injustice were not long delayed. The German Ambassador, after receiving his papers, had asked his government to delay action until he had made a plea for peace to the Emperor, but the Imperial government refused to change its policy and persisted in carrying forward its campaign of unrestricted u-boat warfare. On March 12 orders were given to arm American merchantmen against the submarines.
On March 1 the United States government had revealed the contents of an intercepted letter written by Zimmermann, the German Foreign Secretary, to the German Minister in Mexico.
It was dated at Berlin, January 19, 1917:
On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to keep neutral the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: that we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona.
You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in great confidence as soon as it is certain there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.
Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months. Zimmermann.
Aside from all other matters, this outrageous letter was in itself a cause for war. It is hard to see how anything could have been written that would show more clearly the utter hostility of the German Imperial government toward the United States. Another point of view, as to this letter, should be emphasized. Even after the short decade which has elapsed, it is difficult to realize that such an abnormal structure as the German Imperial government of 1917 could have existed. It was against this German Imperial government that the United States went to war—not against the German
people. And here, in this Zimmermann letter, the German Imperial government of 1917 has written a description of itself which could not have been more damning if the whole lexicon had been exhausted.
In all sections of our country there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the character of the rulers of the German Imperial government and their intentions as to the United States. Additional provocation soon followed from the conduct of the German submarine campaign, as no attention had been paid to Bernstorff’s representations, and the Imperial government adhered to the over-confident program of unrestricted U-boat warfare. Upon this continuance of the hostile policy of the German Imperial government, Congress passed the resolution for war with the German Imperial government, and the President signed the Declaration of War on the same day (April 6, 1917).
There can be no question of the fact that the United States was driven into the war by the hostile acts of the German Imperial government. That government has written its own record too plainly to leave any doubt in the matter. If ever a nation was justified in entering a war, the United States was justified and in the right—and we should believe that this right prevailed.
Our nation was made strong by the fact that there was no trace of selfish aims in our participation in the war. In all other respects our position was above question. The conditions which had brought on the war were not in any way made by us. We had not committed any hostile acts. On the contrary, in our relations with the German Imperial government, we had exhausted all the resources of peaceful diplomacy. Our President had stated our objects so plainly that they could not be mistaken, and, in spite of all accusations, even our enemies were forced to believe that the United States fought for a principle and not for gain. A striking testimony of this was rendered by Ludendorff himself, all unconsciously in a tirade: “For American soldiers the war became as it were a crusade against us.”
So evident was this that the United States became a moral force in the war, and this had a disturbing influence upon the nations allied with the German empire. Especially in Austria-Hungary it was noticeable that the entrance of the United States against the Central Powers had a widespread effect against the German Imperial government. Even in Germany, where every attempt was made to brand the United States with hypocrisy, the German people could not help seeing that our nation was fighting for a cause, and that our nation believed this cause to be just.
The most wise distinction made by our President between the German government and the German people became an issue in Germany itself, and the cause of a rift in the hitherto united nation. This was slight at first, but unquestionably it had come into existence. It was no mere coincidence that the German emperor, in the month of our declaration of war, made tentative proposals of popular legislative government for the Germans. The German leaders had read the signs of the times. The vague dissatisfaction of the German people had been given a tangible basis, and in spite of all attempts to divert attention, the beginning of a cleavage was there. From the time of the entrance of the United States, the German Imperial government was being scrutinized and held accountable by the German people.
This was a strong moral force exerted upon the war by the United States, apart from all our physical force, and this was a disturbing and disintegrating influence that was always working within the Central Powers throughout the rest of the World War. This moral force must be counted as a very real and potent factor, in conjunction with the unexpected physical strength of the United States, for bringing about the defeat and disintegration of the carefully built structure of German Imperialism. Again one of Ludendorff’s bitter reproaches has painted the true picture: “By working on our democratic sentiments the enemy propaganda succeeded in bringing our government into discredit in Germany.” It is true that this moral force would not have prevailed, if it had not been backed up by physical force. If the German Imperial government had won its war, the German people would have stood by it. But the situation had been created which meant that, if the German Imperial government met defeat, the German people would repudiate it and destroy it. This was the test of war for the United States.