Training naval personnel is a problem of unfailing interest, and one upon which much time and effort is constantly expended. Because of the complexity of the subject and the amount of talent regularly devoted to it, I have no little trepidation in advancing suggestions regarding this subject. I have devoted an appreciable amount of time to consideration of the problem, and to discussion of it with other officers, and have accumulated some ideas which may be of interest. The following remarks are set forth with the idea of stimulating discussion of the problem.
The Navy has recently made marked and gratifying progress in methods of training enlisted men. I believe that the problem of training officers is similar to the problem of training enlisted men, and that it differs in degree only.
The necessity for training officers is constantly increasing. Our system of line officer personnel requires individual knowledge and proficiency in an increasing variety of highly technical subjects and does not permit of specialization beyond a certain point. The scope of examinations for promotion of officers is being constantly increased, notably by the recent addition of detailed questions in communications and aviation. The operations of our fleet are becoming more advanced, so that an individual officer has less opportunity to become proficient in branches other than the one in which he is actually performing duty. There is an increasing tendency to secure efficiency of operation and administration by increasing the length of details to particular assignments. This further reduces the opportunity for the individual officer to acquire a widely diversified experience.
These tendencies may be deplored by the old timers, particularly because they tend to the development of fewer capable all around seamen among our officers. Notwithstanding this perhaps regrettable fact, the present tendencies are dictated by the necessities of modern naval warfare, and I believe they represent a trend which will be permanent. If this is correct it behooves us to examine our methods of training officers in order to assure ourselves that they produce the necessary results.
The present system for training officers includes many elaborate and beneficial courses on shore. Besides the Naval Academy, there are the Naval War College courses, the postgraduate courses, the law courses, the submarine and aviation courses, and several shorter ones, such as torpedo, gyro compass, and optical courses. All these are producing results. They will doubtless be improved and perhaps extended as time passes.
The number of senior officers who have taken the War College course is increasing, and service appreciation of the War College is undergoing a healthy growth. The addition of a correspondence course to the War College curriculum, and the recent formation of a junior class were excellent additions.
The postgraduate system was originally intended to provide a small number of carefully selected officers with special advanced training to enable them to cope with material design problems on a par at least with civilian specialists. The original conception I believe contemplated the employment of such officers in their specialty only while on shore duty where contact with civilian experts and the handling of design problems rendered their- special knowledge necessary. In recent years means have been devised for increasing the number of officers to undergo postgraduate instruction, for enlarging the scope of the instruction, and for employing the postgraduates in operating capacities in their specialties afloat, especially during their first tour of sea duty subsequent to completion of the course.
These are commendable advances and development along these lines should continue. Because of the technical complexity of modern men-of-war, and owing to the original conception of the postgraduate system, it has been confined largely to material subjects. There is a well-defined feeling in the service that throughout our whole trend of naval thought the operational side of professional subjects has been too greatly subordinated to the mathematical and mechanical aspects. We have thought more of things” themselves than we have of how to use “things” to win naval battles. We have lived in an era of “material mindedness.”
This feeling has been expressed in various ways. Not least among these has been the repeated recommendation for the establishment of a school of the line, or a “staff” school, as a part of the postgraduate system. In spite of the fact that the naval service has not yet progressed far enough in the art of war to evolve an accepted standard staff organization, not to mention an accepted standard idea of the function and duties of a staff afloat, the recommendation has not been adopted. In view of the ever pressing need for officer technicists and the limited number of officers who can be spared for instruction on shore there does not appear much likelihood that this particular recommendation will be adopted.
Concessions have been made to this school of thought. The establishment of the junior class at the War College is in a sense a partial answer to the “anti-materialists.” The amount of time devoted to operational features in the regular technical courses of the postgraduate system has been increased. These things are helpful. Their effect on the whole question of the training of officers is a mere “drop in the bucket.”
Advocates of solving the problem of training officers by a radical extension of the postgraduate or an equivalent system into an all embracing service school system point out the successful application of that idea in the Army. They ignore a fundamental and essential difference between conditions in the Navy and those in the Army. The number of officers in each service in time of peace is approximately constant. Neither can look for any appreciable increase. The. Navy is, however, even in peace, in constant active operation. A large portion of the material which the Navy will use in war is kept in active commission in peace. It is operated at various distances from the centers of naval education on shore. Notwithstanding the necessary expansion of the operating Navy in the event of war, there is, in peace, an extensive, active “first line of defense” which must be kept at the highest point of efficiency by constant actual operation. Therefore, unless this active navy is to be crippled by being under-officered, there is a definite limit to the number of naval officers who can be spared for instruction on shore. On this basis many naval officers are destined never to receive special instruction in schools on shore, and certainly it will not be practicable to give every officer a course in every subject in which he is required to be proficient.
The Army is far differently situated. In spite of the fact that in the event of war the Army will undergo an expansion relatively greater than that of the Navy, there is in peace a relatively smaller nucleus of army material in active operation. There being less material to maintain in a high state of efficiency by constant operation, officers of the Army can devote more time to perfecting plans for war operations, including detailed instruction of officers. In general army officers alternate tours of duty in administrative positions, or with troops and at service schools. In this way they receive special instruction in practically all of the subjects in which they are required to be proficient. The situation in the Army is relatively simpler, also, because conditions of land warfare are such that a very considerable degree of specialization is possible. The Army not being faced with the necessity for complete interchangeability of line officers, as is the Navy, carries the corps idea much further than can the Navy.
Whether one agrees or not that we are approaching the practical limit to the number of naval officers who can be spared for instruction in schools on shore, it is obvious that there is a practical limit. It is also obvious that when that practical limit is reached there will still be need for additional training of officers to keep them abreast their profession. It would appear that this need exists now and that it would be profitable to examine the present possibilities of additional professional training. No system of training can supplant that afforded by actual experience in the' actual performance of duty, but I believe we have passed the day when the curriculum of the “school of hard knocks” is sufficient to produce naval officers of the kind we need.
The need for methods of training to supplement existing methods is emphasized by the tendency, slight but none the less insidious, toward loss of confidence in the professional ability of, and loss of self confidence in professional matters by, officers who have not had one of the special courses on shore. This damaging spirit is comparable to the equally insidious feeling so hard to eradicate among naval personnel, that enlisted personnel trained on board ship is not equal to and does not have the same chance of advancement in rating as the graduates of the various trade schools on shore.
A. majority of officers of the Navy must continue to be employed in operating ships, or in supplementary administrative positions on shore. Therefore any additional training of officers must occur on board ship or at the regular shore stations of the Navy, and must take place concurrently with the performance of regularly assigned duty. This fact has been a stumbling block to schemes for training officers. Officers engaged in the performance of regular duty are prone to consider that their “job” takes all their time, and that in performing properly the tasks regularly assigned them they have discharged their full duty toward the service.
The word “school” and the ideas commonly associated therewith have ever been unpopular on board ship. Curiously enough the word “training” does not seem to arouse the same instinctive antagonism, and the necessity for training and instruction is generally recognized. Any system of additional training for officers should therefore avoid known pitfalls and should savor of professional training rather than of “school” in any form.
Navy regulations make the commanding officer afloat responsible for the training of officers under his command. Training is actually accomplished under this provision, and training of junior officers of the line is conducted more or less systematically in most ships. There is not, however, much uniformity in this training, and it is too often entirely secondary to the performance of other duty masquerading under the time worn banner of the “exigencies of service.”
The commanding officer of an active ship has scant time to devote personally to devising courses or methods of instruction for officers under his command. Consequently, except for such training as they get through performing their regular duty in his presence or in the presence of other officers, more experienced than they are, officers are left largely to their own devices for professional training.
This does not result in a satisfactory amount of training nor in the proper kind of training. Naval officers have the idiosyncrasies of any similar group of average persons. Some of them are undeniably lazy and will not study unless thoroughly convinced of some great necessity therefor. Others would study if there were a systematic provision for it and they had but slight encouragement. Still others will and do study constantly in spite of all odds. Even the last mentioned suffer from the lack of systematic, uniform method of professional training. They study such documents as they can procure, according to the best system they can procure or devise. They thereby increase their knowledge and ability, but they have not an authentic and official guide to their studies, nor have they any authentic, official expression of the service experience and opinion in the subject they are learning.
Untrammeled, individual research doubtless stimulates independent thinking and so has certain advantages. It is apt, however, to place undue emphasis on relatively unimportant features, to concentrate too heavily on parts for which the individual has an inherent taste, and is an expensive process in point of time. The requirements of modern naval warfare necessitate that all officers be developed to at least a given degree in all branches of their profession. In spite of the advantages of unguided, individual research it gives no assurance of eventually leading to the uniform development required. In fact it usually retards general intellectual progress through concentration on a given matter to the practical exclusion of all else. Proper training methods should make available to all officers the exact current official status of all professional matters and should insure a working knowledge of them on the part of all officers, whether or not that knowledge is amplified by more advanced study.
I am not unmindful of the constant improvement being made in indoctrination on professional subjects through the preparation of official publications on professional subjects, such as the Bureau Manuals and other publications of the Department. Nor have I overlooked the commendable efforts of many bureaus, offices, and service schools to disseminate up-to-date professional information through the medium of periodic circulars, bulletins, news-letters, etc. Excellent and helpful though these are, they are capable at most of serving as textbooks only, and are not in themselves suitable and systematic courses of instruction. Too often they are written from the standpoint of the expert already well versed m the subject with which they deal, to serve as works of reference for the competent, rather than as instructional matter for the inexperienced seeker of information.
Efforts have been made from time to time to accomplish systematic training of officers in the fleet. During the late war all officers, regular and reserve, in one of the battleship forces were required to do a stipulated amount of professional studying weekly. The larger units of the fleet have been required at various times to conduct classes of instruction for officers in operational and tactical matters, the signal books, etc. These and similar attempts at training have been evidence of the realization of the need for training and have been attempts at establishing it on a methodical basis.
All such efforts have fallen far short of accomplishing their mission, for various and sundry reasons. They have depended for their very existence on the personal views and wishes of individual commanders-in-chief or unit commanders, and have lacked any semblance of permanency. They have not existed simultaneously in all units of the fleet and have been in general mere “flashes in the pan.” In some cases they have been resented because they were required in one unit and were not required in a similar unit operating under identical conditions. In other cases they have been carried out in a perfunctory manner in order to comply with what was regarded purely and simply as a “whim of the old man.” Even in the few cases where these plans have received enthusiastic and loyal support they have fallen far short of the possibilities because of the lack of uniformity in the courses and the methods of instruction.
The textbooks used in these classes were in many cases standard, official publications. The methods of instruction, the degree of scientific training accomplished, and the impression on the students varied widely in the different units, and even from ship to ship in the same unit. In some vessels useful instruction was accomplished by competent instructors in spite of all difficulties. In others the classes degenerated into little more than wardroom debates, the blind leading the blind, and getting exactly nowhere.
It appears to me that in order to be adequate, a system for training officers must be both scientific and uniform. It is deemed necessary to send all postgraduate officers to a preliminary course at the postgraduate school before sending them to the several colleges and universities where they acquire detailed technical training. Presumably this is in order to afford them a uniform grounding necessary for naval education, and which they would not receive at several independent civilian schools. A uniform foundation and a uniform method of presentation is believed to be an essential feature of all professional training. There must be a best method of professional instruction. The uniform one adopted may not be at first the best, although it should be the best available one. Even if it is not the best, by virtue of the fact that it is uniform, it will lend itself to conversion to the best method, when that best method is discovered, more readily than would any unsystematic and uncoordinated method. Furthermore, if there is a uniform method, the responsible officials can determine its deficiencies and will know the shortcomings to be expected in officers trained thereunder, which would not be the case without uniformity of subject matter and method.
I believe that the present navy education courses for enlisted men, and the instructor’s manual prepared to accompany them, might well serve as models for courses of instruction for officers. In cases where existing official publications are deemed to be adequate to serve as textbooks for study by officers generally, the course might consist merely of an instructor’s manual and guide and a suitable outline of assignments showing the order and manner in which parts of the book are to be taken up. Parts of some of the bureau manuals might be found to be suitable as textbooks if used in the manner suggested.
The preparation of such courses for officers would involve a large expenditure of time, effort, and funds. If it aided in the vitally important professional training of officers, the expenditure would seem to be well worth while. As with the courses for enlisted men, courses for officers would have to be revised to date constantly. The section of the Navy Department charged with preparation of material for training of officers might well be charged with publishing a periodic journal for officers. This journal could contain the latest authentic professional information and should be as useful and beneficial to naval officers as are reputable medical journals, for example, to wide-awake doctors.
Many officers are of the opinion that the “Professional Notes” in the Proceedings are the most valuable part of that publication. I share this opinion, and I have the highest regard for those notes. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that in an official journal, time could be taken to sift the wheat from the chaff, a proper balance could be struck between various professional matters, the authentic official version of all controversial or confused subjects could be presented by responsible writers, and the material could be edited and presented with a view to instruction, rather than as mere narratives of events.
If such courses and journals were available, officers on board ship, at isolated stations, or at any post where they felt they could find time for it, could keep abreast of professional development in a systematic manner, and could be certain that they were concentrating on authentic, useful information, and not wasting time and effort on what might prove to be misleading or useless information. Officers who could anticipate a detail to duty in which their experience was out of date, or entirely lacking, could use such courses to advantage in preparing themselves to cope with the problems of the coming assignment.
A very few years ago there existed no official navy courses of instruction for enlisted men on board ship. Men who were desirous of self-advancement had to depend upon such knowledge as they could acquire from more experienced associates among officers and men on board, at least until they could be sent to a trade school on shore. This was unsatisfactory for really ambitious men and was a hit or miss method from an official standpoint. As a result of this condition, many far sighted men subscribed at their own expense to technical courses offered by the civilian correspondence schools. Such courses were excellent as far as they went. They did not approach their subject from a naval viewpoint, nor did they embody naval experience and naval practice. The Navy has seized a wonderful opportunity in providing such courses from within the service itself, and by providing official, authentic courses in form suitable to the purpose, at no expense to the individual men.
The ambitious officer is to-day in much the same position as was the enlisted man of a few years ago, with one important difference. The knowledge required of an officer is naturally more advanced and more detailed than that required of an enlisted man. Very few civilian correspondence courses are in any way suited to the needs of naval officers, and few if any, approach their subject from the operational viewpoint which should be the naval officer’s chief concern. Needless to say none of them embodies service experience or service doctrine and standards, hence their utility to the officer is limited. Why should not the Navy profit by its experience in the case of enlisted men, and apply the same successful principles to the instruction of officers, profiting from an opportunity which surely exists.
I believe that any system of instruction for officers should be conducted under the formal auspices of the commanding officer. This would extend a degree of supervision of the right kind over the training and should at the same time promote the interest of the commanding officer in individuals under his command. It should tend to promote close personal relations between commanding officers and officers under their command, particularly in the larger ships and on the larger stations, where these are sometimes neglected or even wholly lacking. If the courses were properly systematized, and if scientific methods of procedure were developed and promulgated in instructor’s manuals, or otherwise, this should not throw more than a nominal burden on the commanding officer. The use of uniform, official courses under such circumstances would also tend to promote the essential, uniform indoctrination required throughout the service. I venture to suggest that in applying the courses of instruction to enlisted men, many officer instructors have benefited no less than have the enlisted students.
I believe the present War College correspondence course would be greatly improved in usefulness to the service were arrangements made to work through the commanding officer, rather than directly between the college and the officers as at present. This belief implies no criticism of the work of those who conceived and brought into being the present methods. It is fully realized that the present method is probably the only one by means of which the splendid pioneer work could have been accomplished. It is merely suggested that the next step in the development of this to its maximum usefulness is to bring it regularly into the routine channels of our daily official life.
Until the service learns to appreciate courses for officers, and to make a place for them in its daily routine, taking them should be entirely voluntary on the part of the students. Taking such courses would undoubtedly tend to improve the individual officer, and so would re-act to the benefit of the service. The service could therefore well afford to offer inducements for the taking of its courses. It might be argued that an officer’s desire for self-improvement and his pride in keeping abreast of his profession should be incentive enough. Granting the theoretical logic of this argument, the fact remains that practically additional incentives would be necessary to arouse adequate interest in a new departure of this kind.
Increased training of officers is the object sought by additional instruction. Some form of reward for the extra work involved would be a better incentive than would be any form of compulsion or direct penalty for not undergoing the additional instruction. Any system of instruction adopted should include the provision of advantages to accrue to those who have voluntarily received the instruction. No penalty should apply to those who do not choose to take the additional instruction save the unavoidable fact of their being outdistanced in knowledge and ability by those who do.
The form of reward would require careful planning and probably could be determined only by trial and error. I have been informed by an officer of long experience with whom I have considered this subject that “money talks.” He believes that the only form of reward which would make any appeal to our officer personnel would be a monetary return, analogous perhaps to the allowances to officers of the British Navy for special qualifications such as foreign languages, or to the allowances for qualified gun pointers in our own service. I hesitate to challenge the opinion of an officer of such experience. I venture to suggest, however, that a monetary reward for officers in matters of this sort is quite contrary to the traditions of our service, and that it would be certain to encounter almost insurmountable opposition in the Congress. 1 believe the view of my adviser is unnecessarily pessimistic, not to say mercenary, and that forms of reward other than increased emolument can be found to appeal to naval officers.
It is observed that the Naval Examining Board has been directed to omit certain questions from the examination for promotion to certain grades of officers who have successfully completed the War College correspondence course. This appears to be a direct incentive to the officers affected to take that course, which is the only one of its kind. A reasonable observation of the operation of this incentive should soon determine its efficacy.
It appears that the principle involved in this small exemption might readily be extended. If there were available official, authentic courses prepared by the Department and taken under the supervision of commanding officers, it would appear that successful completion of one of them, plus possibly a fixed amount of practical experience in the subject, might well be the basis for exemption from examination in that subject on the next examination for promotion. Should that not prove entirely feasible, it might be practicable to modify the application of the principle, by extending a certain credit in that subject rather than total exemption.
Other incentives which should possess attraction for conscientious and normally ambitious officers can be suggested. For example, the successful completion of an official course in any given subject might well be entered in an officer’s record, and might appear as a note abreast his name in the Navy Register. The successful completion of an official course of instruction should be evidence of an officer’s interest in a subject and proof of some ability therein which might readily be taken into account in making assignments to duty.
It is beyond the scope of my present ability and the space which I can reasonably ask to develop all the details of the plan suggested for the increased training of officers. The idea has been in the process of evolution for a number of years, and I believe that it possesses merit. If, in this brief presentation, I can succeed in planting the germ of the idea in the minds of some who can bring it to successful fruition, I shall feel better about “rushing into print’’ on so vast a subject with so little to offer.