Post Treaty Naval Design
(See page 2125, November, 1925, and page 917, May, 1926 Proceedings.)
Lieutenant (jg) F. G. Percival, U. S. Navy, Ret.—If opinions from “the armchair brigade of ex-sailors” are still being tolerated,
I should like to offer a few remarks on the subject of the much talked of Indomptable cruiser.
Mr. Bywater and Mr. Prendergast have set forth an argument for the proposed type of cruiser that, at first, seems unanswerable. However, on closer inspection, the following premises appear somewhat shaky:
- That the convoy system, with adequate escorts, would not be adopted until several months after the beginning of hostilities.
- That cruisers of ten thousand tons and less would be sent out singly and without support to patrol trade routes when it was known that they would have to face larger and more powerful cruisers.
- That the only way to combat the Indomptable would be by a faster vessel of superior gun power. In other words, that the gun would be the only weapon that could be used against such a vessel.
- That this raider could safely demolish naval bases which could not be demolished by a treaty cruiser.
- That a leading naval power would dissipate his capital ship strength by sending such vessels in pursuit of corsairs.
- That the treaty is producing badly balanced navies.
- That the Indomptable could safely rush in where battleships fear to tread.
To follow the lead of the original article, suppose we consider the probable course of events in case of a war between an Indomptable power and one of the two leading naval powers.
The effectiveness of the convoy system was conclusively demonstrated in the last war. With those dearly bought lessons fresh in everyone’s mind, it is inconceivable that there would be any delay in adopting the convoy system. Plans would be on hand for putting it immediately into effect as soon as a threatening situation developed.
Since France and Italy are the only powers which reserved the right to build Indomptables and neither of these powers has more than a third of the capital ship tonnage allotted to either of the two leading naval powers, it is obvious that at least half of the battleships of either of the leading powers would be available for escort duties.
Obviously an Indomptable is not equipped to fight a battleship. Battleships would be used on the more exposed trade routes, and cruiser escorts of double strength used for the more remote routes. These cruiser escorts would be also strengthened by an anti-submarine screen of four or more destroyers.
In case of an engagement between an Indomptable and the cruiser and destroyer escort of a convoy, the former would not have an easy time. Even if the visibility permitted her to stay out of range of the eight-inch batteries of the cruisers, smoke shells or a smoke screen laid by the destroyers would compel her to come within range if she wished to fight. While approaching and coming through the smoke screen the Indomptable would be very susceptible to torpedo attacks by the destroyers. As pointed out in the original article, she is unusually vulnerable to any under-water attack. If she escapes the torpedo attack and engages the cruisers, she would have two small targets to fire at, while each of the cruisers would have one large target. The heavier guns of the Indomptable would be largely offset by the greater volume of fire from the two cruisers. Even though she carried sufficient armor to keep eight-inch shells out of her magazines and machinery spaces, there would be no armor left for the ends of the ship. Her buoyancy would not be protected and if she lost either her buoyancy or stability it would make very little difference whether or not her vitals were still intact. Her armor would simply insure her against destruction by a single lucky hit.
During the gunnery engagement, she would constantly be harassed by the destroyers. Her unusual gun arrangement allows very little space for the mounting of secondary and anti-aircraft guns. She would consequently be without adequate defense against destroyers. Even though she succeeded in defeating the escort the convoy would probably have had time to scatter and escape. No doubt the Indomptable would be damaged enough so that her only course would be to return to her base. In her damaged condition, she could probably be overtaken and destroyed by battleships.
Within a few weeks, or at least months, of the outbreak of hostilities, it should be possible to convert enough merchant vessels into air-craft carriers to supply each convoy with a carrier. By care in the selection and alteration of these improvised carriers we might reasonably expect to insure that each convoy would possess a marked aerial superiority over the Indomptable. This would probably turn the scale so definitely against the raider that it would be obliged to allow all convoys to proceed unmolested. Accordingly vessels without escort would be the only available prey. These could be dealt with more effectively by smaller and more numerous raiders.
Another menace which would constantly confront the Indomptable would be the submarine. Due to her inadequate under-water protection, and the fact that she would be obliged to steam, most of the time, at low speed and without a destroyer screen, she would be particularly vulnerable to attacks by submarines.
The foregoing pre-supposes that the United States builds an adequate supply of treaty cruisers. Without these, we would be in an awkward position if confronted by commerce destroyers of any size. It would not be necessary to go above 10,000 tons in order to produce vessels which would sadly disorganize our trade. However, with an adequate supply of treaty cruisers and the other measures herein outlined, it seems probable that sufficient resistance could be offered to the Indomptable to make the building of such vessels not worthwhile as commerce destroyers.
Another mission claimed for the Indomptable is that of hunting down and destroying cruisers of 10,000 tons or less along the trade routes. It is very unlikely that any naval power would waste cruisers patrolling trade routes, and further, that they would be sent out without support when it was known that they might be obliged to face larger and more powerful cruisers. The Indomptable would probably fail in her mission of killing off the ten thousand tonner tribe for the simple reason that ten thousand tonners would not be sent out alone to be killed off.
Still another field of usefulness claimed for the Indomptable is that of demolishing ill-defended naval bases, fueling stations, etc. Due to the extreme vulnerability of ships as compared to fortifications ashore, it is extremely unlikely that a raider would attempt to destroy any base or station which was defended at all. Aircraft and submarines have greatly simplified the problem of defending outlying bases. Undefended bases could be destroyed just as effectively by a 10,000-ton cruiser.
It is further claimed that the Indomptable menace would compel an opponent to dissipate his capital ship strength by forcing him to send dreadnaughts in pursuit of these corsairs. No great power would be so foolish as not to hold in reserve enough dreadnaughts to deal with any possible opposing concentration. Since both Great Britain and the United States are allowed to build three times the capital ship tonnage of either of the Indomptable powers, they can maintain this reserve and, at the same time, have enough dreadnaughts to protect their more exposed trade routes.
The writers of the original article assume that it would be necessary to overtake the Indomptable and destroy her by gun fire in order to put an end to her activities. This, however, is not the case, since by grouping our merchant vessels in convoys, and protecting each convoy, we compel the raiders either to fight the escort or to leave our commerce alone, except for occasional unescorted vessels. Even if it were practical and desirable to build vessels which could run down and destroy Indomptables, that would be a very ineffective way of coping with them. One has only to recall the large number of allied cruisers employed in running down and destroying German raiders of inferior speed and fighting power to realize that these vessels can be most effectively dealt with by the prompt adoption of the convoy system.
On page 921 of the Discussion in the May Proceedings, the authors state:
A post-Jutland type of battle cruiser cannot be built below 40,000 tons, so the treaty has virtually prohibited that class of ships in the beginning.
Admittedly, battle cruisers inferior in armament and protection to the Hood would not be worth building. However, by adopting a speed of 28 or 29 knots it would be possible to construct a vessel the equal, if not the superior, of the Hood in fighting power. The lower speed would be sufficient for operations with a battle fleet having a speed of 23 knots.
Again, on page 922 they refer to the treaty as producing badly balanced fleets and elaborate this statement by calling attention to the fact that the three leading naval powers are prohibited from building cruisers between 10,000 and 35,000 tons. While it is true that American naval officers have lamented the lack of a properly balanced fleet, they referred to the lack of ships capable of carrying on the various cruiser functions and not to the limit on displacement of cruisers.
One cannot see why a 10,000-ton cruiser cannot perform all cruiser functions as satisfactorily as a 20,000-ton cruiser, provided that it is not obliged to combat cruisers of greater tonnage. The only case in which the 10,000-ton cruiser would be obliged to combat a cruiser of greater tonnage is in a war with a power of much less strength. This situation has already been dealt with.
The writers state in the original article on page 2136:
Submarines, mines, and aircraft have made enclosed seas too dangerous for goliath ships of the line.
Speed has never been considered any defense against mines. The World War proved that speed alone could not be depended upon as a defense against submarines. Vessels must rely upon a destroyer screen for protection against this menace. Since the destroyer screen cannot be counted upon for speeds above 25 knots in a moderate sea, it would seem that speed above 21 knots is largely thrown away so far as danger from submarines is concerned. Further, high speed is of very little defense against aircraft. The more numerous antiaircraft battery of a battleship would more than make up for its lower speed. Apparently the only advantage the Indomptable would have over the battleship when operating in enclosed seas, is that it would be a slightly less valuable unit. However, this is more than offset by its extreme vulnerability. So far as sheer fighting power is concerned, the battleship would be an incomparably superior investment.
In short, while either England or the United States would find two Indomptables more difficult to deal with than a single battleship, their greater strength would enable them to control the situation.
No doubt, a corsair of 35,000 tons could be built which could engage successfully almost any number of treaty cruisers so far as gun fire alone is concerned. The larger vessel would, however, offer a larger target to torpedo fire or bombers. The destroyer escort of convoys could be strengthened and larger vessels could be converted to aircraft carriers. Further, the submarine menace would be even greater for the larger corsair. It is doubtful if such a large and costly vessel would be risked as a commerce destroyer. There is no magic prescription by which an overwhelming superiority in tonnage can be overcome. There is no royal road to sea power. Occasionally, by the rapid development of some new weapon, a weaker power has gained a temporary superiority, but, as pointed out by the authors, the Indomptable is not a new weapon. It has been tried and found wanting. It would seem sounder policy for the Indomptable powers to aim at the control of the sea in a war with a power of equal or less strength than to waste their tonnage in attempting the impossible.
Another point to be considered is that capital ships must be designed to meet possible conditions fifteen or twenty years from now. There may be many changes in the international line-up in such an interval. Naval powers, now relatively weak, could be built up to the point where they seriously rivaled the Indomptable powers. Probably battleships would be better investments to meet such a situation.
Is it not significant that France has made no move to lay down an Indomptable, although continuing to lay down treaty cruisers, destroyers, and submarines? Does not this indicate that the French naval staff have some doubt as to the glorious future which has been predicted for this type? Would not the fact that the Furious and her sisters were generally regarded as failures, weaken the case for more vessels of the same type?
While one hesitates to offer conclusions differing so radically from those of a recognized authority, I believe that the facts will bear me out in the following summary of the case against the Indomptable;
(1) She would not be worth building as a commerce destroyer against England or the United States (provided the latter power built enough cruisers to maintain the treaty ratio) because:
a) She could not attack convoys escorted by battleships.
b) She would have great difficulty in defeating an escort of two cruisers and four destroyers. Even if successful in this, she would probably be so badly damaged that she must return to her base. Meanwhile the convoy would have scattered and escaped and superior forces would be on her trail.
c) Within a short time of the beginning of hostilities, improvised aircraft carriers would be available for each escort. These would turn the tide so definitely against the raider that she could not attack any convoy and could only wait for unescorted vessels.
d) Unescorted vessels would be more effectively dealt with by smaller and more numerous corsairs.
(2) The Indomptable would fail to “kill off the ten thousand tonner tribe" because these vessels would not be sent out alone and without support to face a larger and more powerful cruiser.
(3) She would probably not be able to demolish any outlying bases that could not be demolished by a treaty cruiser.
(4) She would not compel a greater power to dissipate its capital ship strength in useless pursuits, for the simple reason that it would refuse to be led into so obvious a trap.
(5) The following incidental claims do not appear to be substantiated:
a) That battle cruisers of less than 40,000 tons would not be worth building.
b) That the Treaty is producing badly balanced navies.
(6) Instead of being better suited to operations in enclosed seas than is the battleship, the Indomptable seems to be less suited for the following reasons:
a) Speed is no defense against mines and of very little defense against aircraft. Speeds above 21 knots are of very little increased defense against submarines.
b) The battleship is not only better fitted to defend itself against surface vessels and aircraft but is capable of standing far more punishment.
(7) If the foregoing conclusions are true, the case for the Indomptable collapses since:
a) She would not be an effective weapon against either of the leading powers.
b) Imdomptables would not be worth as much as battleships in a war with a power of equal or inferior strength.
Light Cruisers
(See page 1733, September, 1926, Proceedings.)
Captain Ralph Earle, U. S. Navy, Ret.—I believe it is pretty generally agreed that our Navy is to be strong enough to carry out the policies of the Nation. The cornerstone of our traditional foreign policy is “equality with the strongest on land, on sea and in the air. From this, the Navy has taken as its fundamental policy "To create, maintain and operate a Navy second to none”; and as one of its qualifying policies, in reference to light cruisers it announces its intention as being “To replace all old cruisers by building sixteen modern cruisers of 10,000 ton displacement carrying 8-inch guns.”
Not possessing- or being in a position to build battle cruisers, our Navy neither has nor can have, while the Treaty on Limitation of Armaments is in force, a weapon with which to combat on anywhere near equal terms the fast and heavily-gunned battle cruisers of other navies. This being so, it behooves us to make these sixteen cruisers the best light cruisers practicable.
One phrase in Commander Howard’s article however merits attention before discussing the proper design of these light cruisers. That for ten years we should divert our minds from capital ships and concentrate them wholly upon light cruiser and submarine design is, it seems to me, very poor policy. Instead, by working intensively upon the design of our next capital ships, while not neglecting the other two types, we will be able, because of improvements in hull construction, in engineering, in guns and armor, to produce on the displacement allowed a capital ship, so far ahead of the present type as to greatly exceed what now appears the most optimistic forecasts.
The need for light cruisers is overwhelming, and it is not believed that aircraft have as yet by any means displaced them as scouts. Aircraft may so do in the future. Be that as it may, we must build to meet conditions confronting us now as well as those that can be foreseen in the future.
All vessels are compromises, and the importance of the characteristics of our next light cruisers should be listed in the following order:—1. Speed. 2. Gun power. 3. Cruising radius. 4. Protection.
The writer in the early part of his paper has made this statement, to which no exception is taken:—
She must have such gun power and protection that she can fight and overcome any ship less than a battleship or battlecruiser, and, in addition, such speed that no battleship or battlecruiser can catch her.
However I do not find it possible to agree with his conclusion in which this factor of speed to exceed that of a battle cruiser is subordinated to fighting power.
To my mind that fighting power should be sufficient to defeat destroyers and enemy light cruisers and that requirement is the minimum on which to build.
To discuss in a word or two the characteristics considered as being essential in our new cruisers.
Speed will be fixed by certain definite conditions. It must be great enough to escape an enemy battle cruiser, and sufficient to support our destroyers in all weathers; some acting perhaps as leaders and squadron commander’s flagship, if leaders are not built.
What is this speed? The British battle cruiser Hood is the fastest capital ship existing. It made on the measured mile 32.07 knots. This was in near fighting condition. A sustained and expected battle speed is stated to be 31 knots. The Renown also a British battle cruiser, made 32.68 as her best speed on trials. British light cruisers of E class have 32 knots in fighting trim, 33 knots maximum. Her destroyer leaders are supposed to he 35-knot vessels, though information accessible credits them with 31 knots only. A very few British destroyers are credited with 36 knots, this speed is exceptional however. Japan’s battle cruisers are 27-knot vessels; the highest speed accomplished on trial being that of 27.77 knots made by the Haruna. Japan’s light cruisers are rated as 33-knot vessels, though some credence is given to the Kuma’s having made 37 knots. The only available source—June 1922—gives a maximum speed of 34 on trial and seems doubtful as to this. From other data of her ships displacement, horse power, etc., compared to our Omaha’s with their 33.7 knots, 33 knots seems logical as their speed. So the Kuma or Tama class then probably does not exceed in speed our Omaha’s. Japanese destroyers are rated as 37 knots in a few instances, a speed which seems to be utterly unconfirmed. This being so, 34 knots seems a high limit of action speed for them. Our destroyers have speed of 34 knots as a maximum. Destroyer speed is of course greatly affected by weather and this to a greater degree than is that of the light cruisers. This fact allows a margin in a determination of final speed to give our light cruisers.
Therefore it seems reasonable that the new cruisers should possess 32 knots speed in order to enable them to avoid battle cruisers; and should have 34 knots speed in order to enable them to keep in action with enemy light cruisers and to act as our own destroyer leaders and as their supports in light force actions, tactical scouting, and so on. Let us give them 34 knots speed.
The gun power will naturally be based on the assumption that possible enemies will employ maximum caliber allowed. That is eight inches. The 6-inch gun is satisfactory for use as against light cruisers and destroyers now existent.
The steaming radius of our cruisers must be large due to our far- flung possessions and lack of fueling bases. A few distances will serve to give a line on the minimum satisfactory radius.
Panama to Manila via Pearl Harbor—9,625
Manila to Pearl Harbor—4,939 (by great circle course).
Panama to Manila via Cape of Good Hope—12,025
Fuel consumed at battle speeds is great in amount as compared with that used in cruising. If the minimum radius at 12-knots exceeds the distance from Manila to Pearl Harbor by at least 2,000 miles in order to allow a margin for action, will this be enough? Generally and approximately speaking, at a battle speed of 33 knots a light cruiser of Omaha type would burn 1.25 tons of oil per mile as against 0.18 tons per mile at 12 knots. This shows that a radius at 12 knots of 8200 is the low limit to permit crossing from Hawaii to Manila at 12 knots with 500 miles to spare, and to provide for using top speed—33 to 34 knots—for twelve hours during the passage, as in battle. Fuel for 8,200 miles then at least should be provided.
As to protection, the first thought should be devoted to safeguarding the vessel’s speed. Armor about boilers, propelling and maneuvering machinery sufficient to ensure immunity from damage thereto from destroyer gunfire is the prime requisite. If greater security than that is practicable after due-weight has been given to efficient hull subdivision to counter under-water attacks, so much the better. In any event, the protection should be the best that can be given upon the limited displacement after a speed of 34 knots, a main battery of 8 and 6-inch guns, and a cruising radius at 12 knots of 8200 miles have all been provided for.
The Navy has a difficult problem ahead of it in the design of these sixteen cruisers and of the replacement battleships. It is a wonderful opportunity to effect great improvement in types and characteristics, and we indeed envy the constructors their great opening and prospects in the study of these new ship designs.
A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet
(See page 1111, June, 1926, Proceedings.)
Captain H. C. Dinger, U. S. Navy.—The recitation of the needs, Possible uses and general features of design of destroyer leaders is interesting and timely. In connection with the details of design, there are some points that may be discussed; particularly as to the economics of the proposed design. One of the chief features of a destroyer leader, I take it, is to provide a suitable vessel to carry the squadron commander in reasonable comfort and with the necessary nag equipment for communication, and general control of the force. A speed equal to that of the destroyer units, a greater steaming radius, if possible, and a larger range battery, are also wanted. Any considerable excess speed above that of our destroyers appears unnecessary.
A design that will secure this on the least expenditure of funds °r construction and operation is the desideratum. The design suggested appears to be somewhat larger and a great deal more costly than would appear necessary. I have outlined in accompanying sketch a somewhat smaller vessel, on a more economical basis, that will, I believe, even better, fulfill the essential requirements of a destroyer leader. Although it has slightly less gun and torpedo power, this design would have greater radius and could carry more ammunition per gun or torpedo tube, would have greater air defense, and requires less personnel for its operation.
In essentials it has the main characteristics as indicated by Captain Taussig. I would, however, have a somewhat finer vessel to secure letter propulsive efficiency. With such lines a sustained speed of 35 knots could be obtained with 40,000 S.H.P. and this could be secured with three boilers. There is no engineering obstacle to going to a boiler of 11,000 or even 14,000 square feet of surface; also boilers if properly designed can be forced to a rate of 1.5 lbs. of oil per square foot of heating surface.
By adopting superheat, stage heating, and the most improved condensing apparatus, the steam consumption of our present destroyers can be bettered by at least 20%, without any increase in weight, but by improved design and arrangement.
I have indicated two boilers forward and one aft of the engine rooms. This arrangement secures a clearer deck, better guards against a total disablement of boilers, isolates steam pipes, and makes for a lighter installation.
Additional cruising radius and lower port fuel consumption also is very desirable. This can be secured by using certain equipment that will add but very little weight. In place of the usual steam driven dynamo engines, it is proposed to install one 250 K.W. oil engine generator and one 100 K.W. steam driven generator. The following cruising device can then be obtained. To the end of the forward H.P. turbine would be attached to a 300 horsepower turbine, through reduction gear with a ratio of about 3 to 1. This turbine would be arranged also to drive one of the main feed pumps. By a suitable self-contained clutch the turbine could be made to drive the feed pump at high powers and would become a cruising turbine at low powers. The only extra weight required would be the gearing. A smaller turbine driven feed pump would in addition be provided in each engine room.
To the end of the after H.P. turbine would be attached a 300 horsepower motor by means of gearing, as in case above, and by means of a similar clutch, this motor could be connected to drive a main feed pump at high powers or at low powers drive the main shaft as in an electric drive equipment. The motor would be energized from the 250 K.W. oil engine generator. While this was thus used the 100 K.W. steam set would give electric power for ships’ service and the auxiliary exhaust could be used in the main turbine.
With such apparatus a very greatly increased steaming radius could he obtained. At a speed of 8 or 10 knots it would be fully double that which would be possible without such cruising devices. The ship could maintain a low speed with the Diesel electric equipment alone, using one screw.
The extra weight required for this cruising equipment would not exceed twenty-five tons. The oil engine generator would permit the boilers to be let down in port or even at sea in order that they might be cleaned and overhauled and thus kept in prime condition for service. The fuel consumption in port would be very much lower by reason of using the oil engine generator.
Battery.—The arrangement of battery gives a broadside of three 6-inch and four anti-aircraft guns; each one by itself, so that one lucky shot would not disable a large part of the battery. The less weight of mountings would permit of carrying a larger ammunition supply and extra torpedoes. It is believed a serious mistake to over gun our small vessels. Personnel and ammunition supply is limited; therefore only such battery should be provided as can be effectively manned by the crew and for which an ample ammunition supply can he provided. Less guns and more ammunition is believed better than too many guns and too little ammunition. A few extra guns look well on paper; but it is the service of these guns and the ammunition supply that counts:
The design proposed by Captain Taussig would cost about four millions each, the design here proposed would cost about two and one-half million dollars. For an expenditure of twenty millions we could have five of the larger vessels or eight of the smaller ones. Which is the better proposition? In these days money and operating expenses will have to be considered and I am inclined to believe that the eight smaller vessels would give greater naval power to our destroyer force than the five larger ones.
It appears quite evident that in the event that money is made available for new destroyers the new vessels should be of the leader type, designed to work with our present destroyer units and not necessarily based on the designs used by foreign powers, whose problems are somewhat different from ours. Our vessel must have- large steaming radius; this can only be obtained by installing economical machinery.
The proposed vessel would be large enough to have comfortable living quarters for the squadron commander and his staff and could be provided with ample communication apparatus in the way of radio and sound apparatus. They would provide for a support to destroyers in the absence of larger cruisers.
The building of a limited number of such vessels would provide a means for trying out the latest ideas in destroyer engineering and thus tend to keep alive the art in this country.
A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet
(See page 1111, June, 1926, Proceedings.)
Commander H. E. Kays, U. S. Navy.—The excellent analysis by Captain Taussig is timely and the subject well covered.
The present is the best chance our Navy has had for creating something to fit the role. We are not spending money on capital ships, and we have the destroyers to lead. We have no converted leaders to influence the design, and happily, perhaps, we have no ships remotely suitable for conversion to destroyer leaders. We can create something new, and they should be a little better than those built or building for foreign navies.
A destroyer, to be most efficient, must be able to move quickly. She must possess great maneuverability. Speed is the essence of her attack. She must start quickly, stop quickly, go fast, and turn quickly. Therefore there are limitations to her size. It is believed that our 315-foot boats are about the limit in size for the purpose intended. The “glorified destroyers” being built by foreign navies are neither destroyers nor leaders.
The destroyer leader must be a compromise. It must combine the maneuverability of the destroyer with the seaworthiness and habitability desired in a leader, as shown in Captain Taussig’s article.
One or two additional characteristics of the leader that seem essential, are submitted herewith.
If possible the 400-foot vessel should have the turning radius of a destroyer. She should have rudder power to turn her in a 750-yard circle, the same as the standard turning circle of a destroyer. She has to maneuver with them and lead them, therefore she should handle like them. “Follow the leader’’ is an essential in a destroyer attack, at least.
The squadron leader should be easily recognizable to our own force. How many times, when a radio comes to assemble a scattered squadron on the leader, do the individual commanding officers have to strain their eyes trying to pick out the squadron flagship from numerous similar vessels? Many valuable minutes are lost trying to see where to go.
Again, on the screening line, it is often prescribed, and always desirable, that the leader should be the guide. She must be easily recognizable at a farther distance than her number can be seen Result—more accurate alignment and increased efficiency. The vessel as sketched, meets these characteristics.
It would seem desirable that, if radio considerations permit, the masts of the leader be no higher than destroyer foremasts. Day destroyer attacks will be made under cover of a smoke screen. High masts will betray the leader to the enemy when under some conditions, the squadron is entirely concealed otherwise. A division of >0% light cruisers has been seen in battle maneuvers behind a smoke screen of its own making, each vessel easily identified by her high masts.
Regarding smoke screen attack, in most cases at least one vessel, the van one, is unavoidably visible to the enemy. If she is “picked off,” it is expected that the next vessel will take the lead. With the valuable leader it may be necessary to place her at another position m the line where she is behind the screen, and attack by doctrine, with a division leader in the van. The plane will be even more valuable here.
Due to our preponderance of destroyers, destroyer leaders will at the present time give the most increase of efficiency to our Navy, for the money expended.
A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet
(See page 1111, June, 1926, Proceedings)
Brockholst Livingston.—Captain Taussig has dealt with the subject of destroyer leaders in an efficient manner. He has left nothing out of the question unless it be the problem of convincing Congress as to the need of these vessels. However this latter must be left to others.
If the destroyer leader is a type so needed for the balancing of the fleet, it appears these vessels should be given equal standing with cruisers in the consideration of future construction. Any vessel so necessary for the proper handling of a force as important as is the destroyer force of a fleet certainly deserves the same consideration as vessels of other types.
Mere numbers, it must be remembered, when untrained and badly commanded, can inflict as much harm on their own forces as they do on those of the enemy. So it would be with our destroyers in a fleet action if they remain uncontrolled by larger and more efficient leaders. Consequently, it is believed, at least some of this type should be recommended to be constructed simultaneously with new cruisers. They are of equal value to the effective handling of the fleet and accordingly of equal importance. New leaders would replace some of our older destroyers.
In the matter of the command of vessels of the destroyer type, the American Navy appears to hold different views from other navies. The question is, are our destroyers properly divided for efficient command? Do the numbers allowed each division and squadron permit of proper handling? Taking into consideration the material and personnel involved, our destroyer force could be divided as follows—this, of course, with the understanding that leaders are to be built:
4 ships=l division (commander)
2 divisions + 1 leader=9 ships=l flotilla (captain) (English organization.)
2 flotillas + 1 leader=19 ships=l squadron (rear admiral)
2 or more squadrons=destroyer force under senior rear admiral and in war-time, vice-admiral.
Coming to a consideration of the battery of a destroyer leader, Captain Taussig has concluded “that the best main gun battery .... will be four 6-inch 53-caliber guns mounted in pairs in two turrets on the midship line, one forward of the bridge, and one abaft of the main mast.” This, the present writer believes, is a matter which must receive extended study by the general board and the designers. The flinch gun appears to be the one most suited to vessels of this type but the placing of a battery of four is not a matter to be dismissed lightly. It is considered doubtful whether a vessel with a beam of forty feet could mount a turret capable of housing two 6-inch guns. It is known by the readers of this discussion that the turrets mounted on cruisers of the Omaha type with a beam of fifty-five feet, project over the side when trained for a broadside. It does not seem feasible to reduce the dimensions of a turret for the same number of guns of a like size and therefore the sketch plan submitted by Captain Taussig seems to need revision. The greater flexibility of a single gun seems to offer advantages to a destroyer type. Possibly Captain Taussig has in his possession information which makes this reduction in the turret dimensions advisable.
The destroyer, leader is a type much needed to ensure efficient command of a powerful force in a fleet. Congress must be taught the importance of this class. Captain Taussig has done his part in submitting a basic plan upon which to build.
In conclusion it might be wise to touch on the fact that there are now authorized twelve destroyers for which no funds are provided. It might be easier to have this authorization changed to destroyer leaders than to request completely new authority for the construction of vessels of the latter type.
A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet
(See page 1111, June, 1926, Proceedings)
Maurice Prendergast.—The deficiency of the U. S. Navy in destroyer leaders is so obvious it need hardly be argued, or even discussed. Viewed from the English standpoint, the present situation °f the U. S. destroyer force verges on the ludicrous. It is the largest and strongest organization of its class in the world today, mustering at least 250 boats of the flush-deck type. But means for adequate command, and the efficient employment of this force have been entirely neglected. It is akin to mobilizing an army of half a million men, and forgetting to provide those men with boots to march upon. The Present-deficiency of the U. S. Navy, in destroyer organization, would appear to be the lack of the following vessels:
(a) Three to four, fast, light cruisers, each about 4,000 to 5,000 tons to serve as flagships to rear-admirals. The employment of cruisers of the Omaha class (7,500 tons) appears to be extravagant, and out of proportion to the forces led.
(b) At least ten destroyer leaders, taking 240 flush deck destroyers as fit for the first-line and allowing one leader to every twenty-four boats.
It may also be necessary to make provision for half-leaders and divisional leaders within the destroyer force itself. British experience *u the World War was that destroyer flotillas tended to expand in 'lumbers, and it became necessary in 1917-18 to provide each flotilla with (in addition to its leader), two half-leaders and two divisional leaders. The half-leaders and divisional leaders roughly correspond to the flagships of vice-admirals and rear admirals in the battle squadrons. As a practical example, here is an imaginary organization of a flotilla organized upon a war footing of twenty-four boats. The leader is an imaginary vessel of Captain Taussig’s proposed type.
It need only be added, for the sake of clearness, that the half-leaders also serve as divisional leaders to their own divisions. Boats of normal destroyer design can be used as half-leaders, with, perhaps, some amplification of signaling gear, as, for example, higher foremasts.
Turning to Captain Taussig’s design for a destroyer leader, the following are the points which seem open to objection:
With the overhanging stem, heavily flared bows, and the weight of a twin 6-inch mount set up towards the bows, this leader would probably pitch badly and throw spray over her bridges. It would not be conducive to proper command to have the bridges swamped.
The mounting of 6-inch guns in leaders appears to offer considerable advantage from the attack point of view, but there are also various drawbacks to the use of so large a caliber. During the World War, the British mounted a 6-inch gun, forward, in the destroyer Viking. During night actions with German destroyers in the Dover area, it was found that the flash of this 6-inch gun practically blinded the personnel on the forebridges, (stationed at the most important control positions) for about half a minute, after each round was fired. The paralyzing effect on the sight, produced by rapid fire from a twin 6-inch mount, might be even worse in a night action. Furthermore, the 100-pound 6-inch shell is considered too heavy for use in craft of the destroyer and leader types. The 5-inch and 5.5-inch guns seem to be the largest, useful calibers for these types of warcraft. The inclusion of a leader, armed with 6-inch guns, among a flotilla of destroyers, armed with 4-inch guns, merely complicates the stores problem. The British practice has been, roughly, to give the leader the same marks of gun and torpedo as those mounted in the destroyers led.
Captain Taussig’s design does not appear to make much provision for night actions with hostile destroyers. Scraps of this kind between destroyers took place several times in the Dover Straits, 1914-18, and were fought at such short range, the 21-inch torpedo (heater type) was found useless. This torpedo has a tendency to dive and run deep for some distance, before picking up its depth setting. If fired at close range, at a hostile destroyer, it simply underruns the target. Hence, provision was made, later in the war, for the mounting of 14- and 18-inch short-range “cold torpedoes, with a view to their employment in night fighting with hostile destroyers at short range.
If the searchlights, shown in Captain Taussig’s design, are for visual signaling purposes, they are fairly well located. But if mounted for illumination of targets, they seem to be rather poorly placed. At night, they would advertise to the enemy the exact position of the brain center of the force’s command—the leader’s bridge. The searchlights would have been better placed between the torpedo tubes.
Reviewing the very large boilers (9,000 sq. ft. heating surface) which Captain Taussig proposes to use, I doubt if the uptakes could be gathered into the two small funnels which he shows in his sketch design. It would probably be necessary to trunk four funnels into two, as is done in the new Japanese cruisers.
No means are shown for steadying the mainmast. If shrouds are used, such shrouds would either foul the arc of fire of the after twin- mount turret, or impede the arc of the derrick boom for handling the seaplane. Further these shrouds might interefere with the fire of the two anti-aircraft guns on their most important bearings.
The general look of the design is pleasing, but something distinctive in the way of appearance might be attempted, to ensure instant recognition at night. During the fury and flurry of one night-action during the World War, a French destroyer put a torpedo into a British destroyer leader, thinking that the British vessel was a German! In (be case of Yubari the Japanese have achieved something quite unique, in the way of appearance, for a cruiser leader of flotillas.
As for size in general, it is dubious if there is any real advantage in building leaders of 3,000 tons, even making allowance for the oceanic problems of U. S. naval defence. The writer’s own estimate of a U. S. Navy destroyer leader would be roughly: displacement, 2,200 tons; armament, six 5-inch, and two 3-inch A. A. guns; torpedo tubes, six 21-inch (long range, “heater” torpedoes), two 18-inch tubes ( cold” short-range torpedoes) speed 36 knots; fuel, the oil capacities of recent U. S. naval vessels have never been made public, so it is impossible to give any estimate in exact figures. The endurance should, of course, be equal to that attained by the destroyers led. The construction of six leaders, in place of the twelve destroyers Nos. 348 to (authorized but not yet appropriated for) would certainly raise the efficiency of the U. S. destroyer force. Captain Taussig is quite right, m stressing the point that a leader should be provided with ample signaling gear. Yet this should not he developed to the point of complication. In the World War, one British officer, in command of a flotilla of destroyers, simplified his signalling, with a remarkable degree of success. If he wanted his destroyers to proceed to sea, he simply hoisted the signal, “Follow Pa!” And they all followed.
The Tidal Wave and Earthquake at Arica, Peru, in 1868
(See page 1319, July, 1926, Proceedings)
Commander H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.—I was very much interested by Captain Taussig’s article on the loss of the Wateree, in the July number of the Proceedings. It happens that I had had considerable correspondence on this subject with an Army friend of mine, Colonel A. W. Brown, of the Judge Advocate General’s Department, who was attached to the plebiscitary commission. It seems that the U. S. Consul at Arica, Mr. von Trescow, has taken considerable interest in the history of the Wateree, and was collecting all the data possible on the subject. I was instrumental in sending him, through Colonel Brown, a copy of the official report of the commanding officer of the Wateree. There are the remains of two old boilers apparently near the position where the Wateree was stranded, which the consul was anxious to identify as being those of the Wateree. Unfortunately, I was unable to get in the Department any good description of the boilers the Wateree would have carried, so that positive identification has been impossible.
Two Dozen Books
(See page 866, May, 1926, Proceedings.)
The following is quoted from a letter received from Mr. Philip K. Russell of New York City, for the information of those desiring to obtain copies of the book Heimskringla, listed in the article “Two Dozen Books,” by Frost, as being very difficult to obtain:
... I secured a copy through Baker & Taylor, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, which of course was printed in Norwegian, and I have been rather surprised to find that an English translation of this is printed by the Everyman’s Library, E. P. Dutton & Company, New York.
Sea Words on Shore Duty
(See page 1330, July, 1926, Proceedings.)
Professor Allan Westcott.—In connection with the origin of nautical expressions, Commander J. M. Smeallie, U. S. Navy, has written for information regarding the history of the familiar expression “the Seven Seas.”
This phrase seems to have been given general currency by Kipling, who used it as the title for his collection of poems, The Seven Seas. This title in turn he probably took from a poem called Flowers included in this volume, and containing the following stanza:
Far and far our homes are set round the Seven Seas,
Woe for us if we forget, we that hold by these!
Unto each his mother—beach, bloom and bird, and land—
Masters of the Seven Seas, oh love and understand.
The Oxford Dictionary says that the Seven Seas are the Arctic and the Antarctic, the North and the South Pacific, the North and the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. But is there any very good reason or common precedent for thus counting the Atlantic and the Pacific as two “seas” each? Is this not merely an attempt to give a rational explanation for Kipling’s phrase?
Did Kipling coin the expression, or is it older? If he originated it, he may have selected the number seven partly because it is alliterative and fits the meter, and partly because, as Kipling well knew, seven, like three, is a “mystic number” and a favorite in the old ballads. Cf. the “seven wonders,” the “seven wee men,” the “seven sisters.”
If the phrase is older, it may have some connection with the seas around the British Isles, over which England formerly claimed sovereignty. Commonly, however, these were called the “Four Seas,’ a phrase which in legal documents and the like goes back to the thirteenth century. John Selden in his Mare Clausum (1616) defined the “sea of England” very generously indeed as “that which flows between England and the opposite shores or ports.” This he divided into four parts according to the points of the compass. But becoming more definite, he explained the “four seas” as meaning the so-called Deucaledonian Sea on the west, the sea to the northward indefinitely as far as Spitzbergen and beyond, the German Ocean on the east, and on the south the British Sea proper (Mare Britannicum) including the Channel and the waters southward as far as Spain.
Whether there is any ancient warrant for extending these “Four Seas” to seven I do not know. Possibly some reader can throw further light on the expression “the Seven Seas.”
“The Dardanelles Expedition”
(Book Review, see page 1666, August, 1926 Proceedings)
Captain W. D. Puleston, U. S. Navy.—Major Sherman Miles (CAC) U. S. Army, is extremely well informed on The Dardanelles expedition. He has not only studied this campaign in all its phases, but he has tramped the battlefields on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and personally inspected the terrain of that rugged rampart. More than this his series of excellent articles printed in the Coast Artillery Journal have been commented on by General Hamilton himself, so that the mature reflections of Major Miles on this campaign are entitled to the greatest respect. In view of his manifest qualifications as a critic, I would like to correct certain apparent misconceptions he reached concerning my book on the expedition and to furnish the reasons for my disagreement with the Major on some other features of the campaign.
Major Miles says, “I doubt Captain Puleston’s statement that the real reason of the expedition was England’s dread of losses on the French front.” The statement I made was “This dread of losses was the real reason the government favored the expedition.”
There is no doubt that England (the English people) in the winter of 1914-15 were willing to pay the price of their unpreparedness by a long hard war with bitter losses, but members of the government, notably Lloyd George, were seeking an easy way to overcome the initial advantage gained by Germany, by attacking weaker members of the Central Alliance. When Churchill advocated enlarging the demonstration against the Dardanelles asked by Kitchener into a real attack, he found powerful support in the Cabinet and War Council because appalled by their initial losses on the Western front, the government dreaded the losses which even attempting to eject the Germans from France would entail. In Chapter I of Churchill’s second volume of the World Crisis, he develops fully the idea of winning battles with small losses as one of the main reasons for the expedition. So the statement as made still seems accurate.
I cannot agree that the conception of the campaign was “sound.” It was “brilliant” and if the British Government had possessed sufficient forces to give the expedition a probability of success, it would have been sound. In middle March 1915, Turkey had at least 500,000 troops under arms, and though her roads and railways were poor and her water route to Gallipoli was harassed by submarines, she was able to maintain an army of 90,000 men on and near Gallipoli with replacements in easy forwarding distance. In March 1915, Great Britain could not spare 90,000 men, sufficiently trained to take part in an opposed landing without unduly weakening the Western front. This under estimate of the Turkish Army was primarily Kitchener’s mistake.
In the endeavor to be concise, I did not dilate upon Kitchener’s vacillation which was remarkable in one reputed to be monumentally firm, but I gave what appeared to be the reason for his unexpected conduct; namely, German superiority on land, which forced the Allies to conform to German movements, see pages 44-45. Conciseness also forced the omission of direct mention of the mistakes in loading the transports, but I thought the casualness of the enterprise was sufficiently indicated on page 20, and the delay caused by mistakes in loading is noted on page 25.
The important results which followed the mistake in landing at Anzac justified more space, but the statement “that it saved the Anzacs immediate losses .... but made the capture of Gabe Tepe impossible and upset the whole plan of landing” is a succinct account of the occurrence and its effects. The responsibility for this mistake obviously lay upon the navy and needed no telling to professional readers.
The effect of naval fire on Turkish field troops as noted by Major Miles should have been treated more fully. Its effect during the first landing at X beach is briefly noted on page 74 and its effect on the battle of August 10 is treated briefly on page 136, but its importance deserves more space.
Perhaps naval influence accounted for the diversion of an army corps in a landing at Suvla, but Hamilton stated that he based his Suvla plan on Birdwood’s belief that if the Anzac corps was strengthened by another division, he could seize and hold Sari Bair. The navy did want Savla Bay for a base from which the army could be supplied, but I think it is hardly fair to lay Hamilton’s dispersion of effort on the navy.
Concerning the reported inertia of de Robeck while the army was reorganizing; Corbett states, “By day the troops on the peninsula were continually harassed by fire from the sea, and as the air service improved, the patrolling battleships had some success in hitting concealed gun positions…Still little could be done to stop the night activity of the Turkish working parties that swarmed over the broken ground of the peninsula.” In addition, de Robeck’s fleet made “continual reconnaissance of the shore .... shelled Bulair” and attacked the mine fields with explosive sweeps. De Robeck also endeavored to use his submarines against the sea communications of the Turk.
De Robeck had several vessels repairing injuries received on March 18 and he was endeavoring to refit them for the landing. A submarine went ashore inside the Straits and caused the fleet much work to prevent her being salvaged by the Turks. Preparing the plans for the combined landing also took much of the fleet’s time. In view of these facts, I believe de Robeck should be acquitted of inertia.
Major Miles raises a more difficult problem when he says, “No mention is made of de Robeck’s failure to use his fleet and his greatly improved mine sweeping flotilla when and after the army landed.” When the army landed, every ship available was employed either as covering or attendant ship except those engaged in demonstrations, see illustrations pages 67-87, inclusive. The first two days after landing it took all the ships to support the army in its precarious position and to land a few days’ supplies. Major Miles probably has in mind a simultaneous attack by the army and navy somewhat similar to the naval plan described on pages 146-147 accompanied by an army attack.
This plan sounds enticing and has the theoretical merit of utilizing all the forces simultaneously. Actually the attack of the fleet would have relieved the army of the fire of a number of howitzers and intermediate batteries. While it would have deprived the army attack of the direct support of the naval batteries. In arresting the army attacks, the Turks had a comfortable margin of strength except on August 7 and 8.
In beating off the naval attacks the Dardanelles defenses had a large margin of superiority. Simultaneous army attacks would have relieved the navy of some of the Turks’ artillery, but it is probable that the Turkish batteries still available would have stopped the fleet, and it was not unlikely that a determined attack by the navy would have resulted in losses to the fleet that would have left the army ashore without naval support facing emboldened Turkish infantry. And it should be remembered that the Turks almost invariably resorted to a counterattack after beating off an attack.
Major Miles acquits Winston Churchill of all failings but “overzealousness in pushing the army and navy into a campaign they should have undertaken on their own initiative.” I believe a careful study of Winston Churchill’s own book and books by other leaders such as Wemyss, Fisher, Hamilton, Ellison, Gray, and the official Australian historian will show that Churchill considered himself capable of deciding technical military questions better than any army or navy officer. Acting in this belief, Churchill initiated plans for the fleet and then gained Fisher’s concurrence, thus evading an old naval custom amounting to a law that no ships can be moved or operations undertaken except by the First Sea Lord.
Churchill is perhaps the ablest advocate in England. He is a ready writer and one of the most effective debaters in Parliament, yet his own book, skillfully written to present his side of the case and to make his “contention good,” will convict him of putting pressure on his technical advisors whenever they disagreed with him. He persuaded Lord Kitchener that the Queen Elizabeth alone could conquer the forts at the Dardanelles. He was prepared to order a renewal of the disastrous attempt of March 18 against the advice of de Robeck. He was prepared to order Kitchener to denude the Western front. Earlier in the war he was prepared to take personal command of the British expeditionary forces at Antwerp and was only dissuaded by a tactful message from some of his colleagues that his presence at the Admiralty would be of greater value to his country. Churchill frequently went to France to advise Lord French how to eject the Germans from France, and during his brief service as a regimental officer, he was prepared to advise Lord French on this question again. With such assurance and with a lack of technical military and naval knowledge, it is probable that if Churchill had been left to his own devices, he would have exhausted the British Army and Navy in unsuccessful attacks on Gallipoli. With these easily accessible facts in mind, I cannot agree that Churchill’s only fault was “over-zealousness.” Fortunately, any interested reader can get the evidence for himself from the books previously mentioned, and make his own decision. If the list is too long, either the first report of the Dardanelles Commission or Ellison’s Perils of Amateur Strategy will give a condensed account of Churchill’s methods of overcoming professional objections to his pet projects.
I am also forced to disagree with Major Miles on the question of army and navy cooperation at the Dardanelles. There was no cooperation in London between the army and navy. I tried to make that plain without too much insistence on the obvious. There was cooperation from the very beginning at the Dardanelles. Many of the officers of the army and navy had their first experience in combined exercises in this campaign. At the outset there was some confusion, but the April landing revealed no lack of cooperation between the two services. The August landing was a model of cooperation and reporting it, Hamilton expresses his “gratitude to the Royal Navy for their share in this remarkable achievement, as well as a very natural pride at staff arrangements, which resulted in the infantry of a whole division and three batteries being landed during a single night on a hostile shore, whilst the arrival of the first troops of the supporting division, from another base distant 120 miles, took place at the very psychological moment when support was most needed, namely at break of dawn.”
Wemyss and de Robeck are emphatic in acknowledging the wholehearted cooperation of the army with the navy. The Dardanelles Commission states that, “There was full cooperation between the navy and army and the two services worked well and harmoniously together.” Better evidence of cooperation than words may be found in the smoothness of the Suvla landing and the evacuation. These two operations show conclusively that army and navy officers of ability, granted sufficient experience, can work together and carry out the most difficult parts of amphibious war. We should gain this experience in combined peace-time training and maneuvers and not wait for war. Joint peace-time training of the U. S. Army and Navy will enable us to avoid the desperate expedient of placing a combined expedition under a single commander only trained in one branch of the service with power to order the other branch to destruction through ignorance of its powers and limitations.
Referring to cooperation, the cordial cooperation between the French and British armies and navies on this front should be noted. There was never any disagreement between the Allies at Helles. Each vied with the other in their endeavors against the Turk. A great part of this was due to the tactful management of General Hamilton whose knowledge of the French Army and its plan enabled him to inspire the French corps with the same fine spirit he infused throughout the British Army.
While disagreeing with Major Miles on some very important points, I would like to recommend to all naval officers his articles on the Dardanelles published in the Coast Artillery Journal, and reprinted in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute; and it will be a well-informed reader, indeed, who does not learn something more of the military features of the Dardanelles expedition from Major Miles’ excellent treatise of that campaign.