Editor’s Note: The Naval Institute wishes to acknowledge its appreciation to Mr. Rogers for his permission to publish this article.
My interest in trans-Pacific communication dates from the winter of 1916-1917 when I was in the Far East investigating the possibilities of selling American news to the Chinese and Japanese press. At the time but little American news was reaching the Far East and that little was handled by British, German, and Japanese news organizations. As a consequence foreign news organizations were largely determining the amount and character of news regarding the United States reaching the Orient and, also, to a considerable extent, the amount and volume of news regarding the Orient reaching the United States.
Let me illustrate with a case: When President Wilson's important Lusitania note was made public, a British news agency sent throughout China those portions of the note peculiarly to the liking of the British; A German organization distributed those portions least objectionable to Germany. One Chinese newspaper in bewilderment printed the versions in parallel columns and asked: What did the President really say?
As a matter of fact a British news agency—Reuter’s—has for a great many years largely dominated the world news going in and out of the East. Although there are a number of reasons why direct news services between the United States and the Orient have not been extensively developed, perhaps the principal reason is, and has been, the relatively high rates charged for press messages transmitted across the Pacific.
It is not my intention to get into a discussion of the highly complex questions involved in the world-wide collection and distribution of news— not even into a detailed consideration of problems involved in the handling of news across the Pacific.
I think that we can readily agree that American news, general and commercial, should be widely distributed throughout the Pacific area and that news from our outlying possessions and from the various foreign countries should be available to the American press in generous quantities. Such news, both incoming and outgoing, should in the main be handled by Americans. We should not be at. the mercy of foreign news agencies or of foreign governments.
The existence of such news services, in the absence of government news services or of subsidized services, will largely depend upon there being satisfactory communication services handling press messages at low rates. Satisfactory facilities and services between the United States and other countries are not likely to be provided by foreign companies or foreign governments.
There should be a wide range of facilities, the layout being such that even in war time services can be in large part maintained and be free from an unfriendly censorship. For example, it may be vitally important at some time for American news to be reaching the Chinese press. There can be no certainty of this, if the communication services between the United States and China are controlled by adverse interests.
During the World War I built up and had charge of this government's world-wide telegraph, cable, and radio news services, services that played a large part in getting the American story to the people of the world.
It so happened that my offices in New York were alongside those of the naval censorship. Gradually I was drawn into the consideration of many of the censorship problems. Prior to the World War censorship was looked upon primarily as a device to prevent the transmission of military information. During the course of that war, however, the censorship gradually became a device for exercising economic control. Through control over the means of communication, increasingly effective control was exercised over world markets, over movements of goods, and finance. Messages were scanned for information regarding goods and money, and were suppressed or delayed as seemed desirable.
Obviously the effectiveness of such control or conversely the freedom from such control depends in large part on the degree to which a given belligerent is in position to supervise the main communication channels of the world.
If you will study a cable map, you will see that the English are very advantageously situated with regard to control of cable traffic—infinitely better situated than the United States. The British situation is due in part to the number, the mileage, and location of British-owned cables and in part to the fact that many other cable systems have been developed in such ways as to be dependent in one way or another on the British-owned cables. For example, the Western Union operates a cable from Miami to the Barbadoes Where it connects with a British cable system operating rather generally in South America. In a sense the Western Union cable merely provides an entrance into the United States for the British system.
The British cable systems enabled that country not only to mobilize promptly the material, personnel, and public sentiment of the empire, but to maintain throughout the war unity of action.
As you are well aware, modern naval operations and military operations abroad are largely conditioned by the availability of suitable and dependable communication services—telegraph, cable, and radio. The significance of communications in modern warfare is of course too big a subject to deal with as part of a general discussion. In any event, officers of the signal corps and of naval communications know infinitely more about than I do.
There are, however, two or three relevant points that may well be made. Major communication facilities, such as long-distance submarine cables and high-powered radio stations, cannot be easily provided after hostilities have commenced. The construction problems are serious and often concessions cannot be obtained.
Where possible, communication facilities should be developed so as not to be dependent upon other countries. Many of the British cables touch only British soil, and the British have long been considering plans for an empire- wide radio system.
In addition to the provision of cable and radio systems connecting the scattered parts of an empire, it is also desirable to establish in peace time the widest possible range of communication contacts, cable and radio, with countries likely to be friendly.
There are distinct diplomatic and political aspects to communications. I will mention but two or three. The State Department needs for its purposes the best possible communication contacts with the principal capitals of the world. The contacts should be such that they are not likely to break down at times of crises and should be under such control that they can be trusted—that messages will not be copied and placed in the hands of rivals. Geneva, for example, from a communication point of view, is unfortunately situated for this country. Messages between the State Department and American representatives at Geneva must traverse European countries.
News as a factor in international relations has been referred to. A generous exchange of news between the scattered parts of a country is peculiarly important. There certainly should be adequate news communication services between the United States and its outlying possessions.
For years many leaders in British life have believed that the empire should be linked together by means of cable and radio, transmitting news at low rates. They believe that the continued unity of the empire is dependent upon the steady improvement of such services, that in future the empire must be held together by common ideas and purposes.
It is seemingly impossible to determine the precise part that international communications play in trade and finance. A professor here in Washington, is working on a book in which the subject will be touched upon. Without the professor’s book, it is apparent that a country enjoying good services at relatively low rates possesses an advantage over a commercial rival less well served. Germany as she developed a navy, a mercantile marine, foreign trade, and colonial possessions, found it necessary to provide communication services.
If it is considerably cheaper to communicate between Western Europe and China than it is to communicate between the United States and China, surely European traders have a valuable advantage.
Let me gather up things a bit; all that I have been trying to say is that a wide range of communication contacts, uncontrolled by outsiders, is desirable from many points of view—military, political, diplomatic, social, and economic.
With this in mind let us turn to the trans-Pacific situation. I am not going into details, but intend to touch merely a few of the high spots.
Curiously enough, the history of communications in the Far East begins with the failure of the first trans-Atlantic cable. There was an immense interest in this project, almost as great a popular interest as there now is in radio. When after the transmission of a few hundred messages the first trans-Atlantic cable went dead, many people concluded that no cable of such great length could ever be successfully operated. This belief and general interest in communication between the United States and Western Europe led to a plan for a telegraph system by way of Alaska and Siberia. A company was organized, concessions were obtained and several million dollars spent on the undertaking. It was abandoned, however, when the second and third trans-Atlantic cables proved successful.
The project had aroused great interest in Russia and stimulated the extension of the Russian telegraph system to the Pacific. This extension was followed by the laying of cables in the Far East.
In 1871 a Danish company, in which the Russian imperial family was interested, laid cables connecting Vladivostok, Nagasaki, Shanghai, and Hongkong. In the same year a British company, whose cable system had been gradually extended eastward until Singapore had been reached, laid a cable from that place to Hongkong. Neither company had any very definite permission to operate in China.
The British company is part of the great British cable combine known generally as the “Eastern.” The Danish company, the Great Northern, operates in Europe as well as the Far East and is perhaps the largest commercial enterprise controlled by Danes.
In the early days the two companies were rivals, but in due time they entered into an offensive and defensive alliance: Like all public utility companies they sought to secure a monopoly. Whenever efforts in that direction came to the attention of the American Government—there were several such occasions—the American Government protested on the grounds that a cable monopoly would be detrimental to the interests of China and in violation of American treaty rights. Much can—and has—been said on both sides of these contentions.
As a result of certain agreements secured in 1900, and reaffirmed in 1913, the two cable companies claim a monopoly over Chinese external communications until the beginning of the year 1931.
The agreements were negotiated in secret and, as far as possible were kept secret. The dates are significant. The first agreement is dated August 4, 1900, at which time the foreign legations were being besieged in Peking. The second agreement is dated October 27, two, at which time an Allied military force was in occupation of Peking. China for months had been in chaos. And it is difficult to conceive of any Chinese official or body in position to grant such sweeping rights. Nevertheless they were granted.
It is not to be wondered at that the companies took advantage of the unsettled conditions in China to secure a monopoly. But the British Government was involved. There is good evidence that the British Government, at the very least, knew what was going on, although at the same time the Allied powers were presumably acting together and in good faith. The cable monopoly, and particularly the share the British Government took in securing it, have long been a sore spot in Anglo-American relations. But bluntly the British Government double-crossed the American Government. Diplomatically the British and American governments were cooperating with respect to China; behind the scenes a British company was securing rights detrimental to American interests. Despite the protests of the American Government, the British Government had steadily supported the British company in its assertion of a monopoly.
There were reasons why both the company and the British Government were especially anxious that the monopoly be secured. With the acquisition by the United States first of the Hawaiian Islands and then of the Philippines, it became apparent that a trans-Pacific cable was inevitable. Such a cable had been talked of for many years.
In 1899 President McKinley sent a message to Congress calling attention to the need for such a cable. In two and 1902 committees of Congress gave consideration to the matter.
The cable companies were animated by ordinary commercial self-interest. They did not want competition. In the absence of a trans-Pacific cable, traffic between the United States and the Orient would continue to go by way of Europe and the companies' lines.
The British Government was concerned with the fact the United States was likely to play in future an increasingly important part in the Far East. The acquisition of the Philippines and Guam had given the American Government an additional stake, and the American Government at the moment was actually taking an important part. The American Government was advocating the territorial integrity of China and was urging general acceptance of the Open Door policy.
A trans-Pacific cable would serve to extend America's influence in the Far East. The problem, confronting the British, was either to prevent the laying of a trans-Pacific cable or to have it laid under such conditions that it would be largely ham strung.
When, as a result of President McKinley's message and the attitude of Congress, it seemed that a government-owned or aided cable was likely, an American company announced that it would lay a trans-Pacific cable and Would not ask a subsidy. Upon this announcement Congress dropped the matter. It did not turn out until years later than the alleged American company was really a dummy concern in which one-half of the stock was owned by British cable interests, one-quarter by the Danish, and only one-quarter by Americans. In addition the American company gave to the British and Danish cable companies several millions of dollars in bonds in consideration of their permitting their own creature to land and do business in China.
It is difficult, of course, to characterize the activities of any commercial enterprise. But in my judgment the trans-Pacific cable has on the whole been operated not in American interests, but with a view to protecting the interests of the British and Danish cable companies. One result has been to favor British trade in the Far East as against America. I have at various times made similar statements in public—much to the horror of the officials of the cable company. But I think the facts fully support the statements.
Just as for years there had been discussion of a cable to cross the North Pacific, there had been discussion of a cable to connect Canada with Australia. The British cable company that secured the monopoly in China fought the laying of a Canada-Australasia cable. Although successful in getting a north Pacific cable to their liking, they did not succeed in preventing the laying of an independent cable between Canada and Australasia. Moreover, this cable was provided by Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And has since been operated by a board representing the mother country and the dominions.
The north-Pacific cable and the “All Red’’ cable, as it is sometimes called for it touches only British soil, were laid at about the same time, roughly are of the same length, and roughly represent about the same cost. The “All Red” cable system has been run for the benefit of the British Empire; the trans-Pacific cable has been run—well it is not easy to say for whose benefit. A comparison of the services, rates, and attitudes of the two cables is most enlightening.
The Chinese cable monopoly has prevented the laying of a competing cable across the North Pacific and has prevented the development of direct commercial radio communication between the United States and China.
There are several Chinese radio agreements. The more important are:
In 1918 a contract and certain supplemental agreements were made by the Chinese Ministry of the Navy and the Japanese firm of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha for the construction of a radio station in the neighborhood of Peking capable of direct communication with Japan, America, and Europe. A provision in one of the supplemental agreements confers a monopoly for thirty years over radio communication between China and other countries, and between China and ships at sea.
Reference is made to the cable monopoly, the idea apparently being that either the Mitsui would come to some amicable arrangement with the cable companies or the radio station would not be used to compete with them until the expiration of their monopoly.
Early in 1921 an agreement was entered into between the Chinese Minister of Communications and an American company, the Federal Telegraph Company of California, providing for the construction and operation of a high-power radio station capable of communication with^ the United States and of certain secondary stations. The agreement, which has since been modified, is complicated and not easy to summarize. Reduced to lowest terms it provides both for the construction of stations for the account of the Chinese Government and for their operation for a period of a year by a “China-Federal Radio Administration,” representative of both the government and the company. The agreement, with the consent of the Chinese Government, has been transferred to the Federal Telegraph Company of Delaware, in which the California company and the Radio Corporation of America are interested, with the latter predominating.
The British, Danish, and Japanese governments, acting in behalf of their respective nationals who claim exclusive or preferential rights, have protested vigorously against the Federal Agreement and have used their influence to prevent its being carried into effect. The American Government has given diplomatic support to the Federal, insisting that the monopolistic provisions are violative of American treaty rights and of the principle of the Open Door.
The opposition has, thus far, been sufficiently strong to prevent the erection of the Federal stations. In the American view, China in not carrying out its part of the Federal agreement in not living up to its legal and moral obligations. The station provided by the Mitsui agreement has been erected but does not handle trans-Pacific traffic.
The subject of trans-Pacific communication—what was really meant was the controversy over the Chinese concessions—was on the Agenda of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament, but for a variety of reasons was not taken up for definite consideration. A suggestion was made to the American delegation that certain British, French, American and Japanese radio interests be permitted, working in conjunction, to develop Chinese high-power radio, but the suggestion did not meet with American approval, M. Viviani offered a resolution covering substantially the same idea. It was side-tracked.
Immediately following the Conference, representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, acting informally, undertook to devise a scheme that would iron out the conflicting interests and would be fair to the commercial interests concerned and to the public. While the representatives agreed upon a plan, nothing much has come of it.
One reason why nothing much has come of the plan is that the Federal Company declined to accept it as a basis for an all-around settlement. It so happens that I represented the United States at the informal conference. In my opinion the State Department had nursed the Federal Company to the point where it expected support under almost any circumstances. It believed that, aided by the American Government, it could bull through its program.
When it became apparent that the Federal concession might be considered at the Arms Conference, the president of the Federal Company was sent for and asked point blank whether the company was assured of sufficient financial support to develop its concession. Assurance to that effect was given. Nevertheless, only a short time after the Conference adjourned, his company admitted that it could not raise the necessary funds. Furthermore the president, the representative of the company, the man who had secured the concessions, later on lost control, and was ousted.
Inability of the Federal Company, a California concern, to raise needed funds led to a deal between that company and the Radio Corporation whereby the Federal of California and the Radio Corporation set up a new company, the Federal of Delaware, to which in due time the Chinese concession was transferred. The fact that the Radio Corporation dominated the new company materially changed the situation. The Radio Corporation seeks a monopoly of American radio communication with other countries. One of the grounds for supporting the Federal was the hope that it would develop as an independent competing American radio telegraph organization.
The proposal drafted by the informal conference of British, French, Japanese, and American representatives recognized the principle that radio communication between China and the United States should be owned and conducted by Chinese or Americans or both and that no outside interest, government or commercial, should be allowed to participate or to straddle such communication. In my judgment this is a sound principle. Where would we be were the Chinese end owned by British, French, or Japanese singly, or together, or even in partnership with Americans? Where would we be if radio messages between China and the United States were relayed through Japanese stations?
Perhaps it will be well at this stage to block out roughly the present situation:
1. ) There is one cable across the North Pacific. It is old and of an obsolete type. In my opinion, at least, it has not had any too creditable a career.
2. ) British and Danish cable interests have a monopoly over Chinese external communications running until the beginning of the year 1931.
3. ) There is a government-owned and operated cable connecting Canada and Australasia that touches only British soil and is, therefore, under complete British jurisdiction. It is in the course of being duplicated. It is operated with a view to serve British purposes.
4. ) The Radio Corporation operates a radio circuit connecting' the United States and Japan.
5. ) The Radio Corporation dominates the company now holding the Federal Chinese radio concession. As a result of opposition on the part, principally, of Great Britain and Japan, the Federal concession has thus far pot been developed. Negotiations in regard to it have been going on in Peking for years.
6. ) There are certain other Chinese radio concessions, the really important one being the Mitsui, under which claim is made to a monopoly over Chinese external radio communication. The Mitsui station has been erected.
7. ) The American Navy has an extensive radio system in the Pacific but its employment for general communication purposes is strictly limited by statute.
8. ) The former German cables, Menado-Yap, Yap-Guam, and Yap- Shanghai, were seized as part of the spoils of war. The United States, Japan, and the Dutch governments have agreed to divide the cables, but the agreement has not been ratified by the other countries claiming an interest in the German cables.
I think one will be disposed to agree with me that the present situation with respect to trans-Pacific communication is far from satisfactory if viewed in the light of American political, commercial, press, or military interests. Certainly for strategic reason there should be additional cables, suitably located, and at least there should be radio communication between the Philippines, Guam, the Hawaiian Islands and other American territory and China, with the Chinese stations in control of Americans or at least of interests likely to be friendly.
What can be done to improve the present situation? Let us consider some of the interests involved. Certainly what the Japanese desire is to control as far as possible communication contacts between China and the rest of the world, particularly communication between the Far East and the United States. Japan certainly wants low rates between Japan and China and high rates between China and Western Europe or North America.
Certainly Great Britain can be expected to support her cable and radio companies, and to look after British interests generally. It is reasonable to assume that Great Britain has no desire to have American commerce. American prestige, American military strength develop in the Far East, and this naturally inclines the British to opposition to the development of American communication facilities and services in the Far East.
The French interest is not quite so clear, but in any international activity in respect to communications it will come out that France is alertly concerned with radio communication between France and Indo-Chino, and with holding on to the radio station now in the French concession at Shanghai.
The American cable and radio interests are concerned with making money and only incidentally with American commercial, political, press, and military interests. The American companies are not free agents in regard to trans-Pacific communication for they are involved in relationships with foreign governments and foreign communication companies not only in the Pacific area but in other parts of the world. American cable companies are largely dependent upon the good will of the British Government and of the British cable companies. The Radio Corporation is involved in complicated arrangements with foreign governments and foreign companies.
The American companies seek to avoid as far as possible regulation, either as a result of action by the American Government or as a result of international agreement. Above all, they seek to avoid competition with government-owned facilities.
American business organizations occasionally adopt resolutions that urge better services and rates, but there is no evidence of a general realization on the part of American business of the desirability of constant extension and improvement of international communication contacts—and there certainly is no evidence of a willingness to make a concerted drive to secure them.
The American newspapers and press associations have a cable committee. It does much useful work. But I doubt if the members of the committee are likely to become “het up” over communication needs in the Pacific.
Now, for reasons which I need not elaborate, I do not think that private enterprise, left to its own initiative, is likely to provide for the Pacific area the communication facilities and services needed. Certain additional services that look attractive from a money-making viewpoint will be provided. It was from a feeling that there are some jobs that private enterprises cannot do, or at least is unlikely to do, that led Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to join in providing a Canada-Australasia cable. It was from this same feeling that Congress provided for a government cable to Alaska.
Only recently the head of one of the American cable companies, not of the company now operating in the Pacific, stated to me that the only solution to the Pacific cable situation was the provision of government-owned cables leased for operation to the cable companies on such terms as would stimulate the companies to develop traffic. Incidentally, in 1902, a then vice-president of the Western Union suggested to a committee of Congress a government- owned trans-Pacific cable leased for operation.
In the Pacific, as elsewhere, radio is providing competition with cables. Seemingly on the great trade routes, the history is going to be: first the radio rates will be fixed low enough to attract traffic; then, in due time, the cable and radio interests will get together and agree on rates. Competition so far as rates are concerned will end. I haven’t the slightest doubt that ln due time there will be pretty complete agreement between the great cable and radio interests of the world.
The American Army and Navy have done very remarkable work in developing communication facilities in the Pacific. But I doubt if they can secure money for additional major developments. In any event it is quite unlikely that either the Army or Navy can secure concessions for the location and operation of cables or radio on foreign soil. Moreover, whatever additional facilities the Army and Navy succeed in providing, in view of the power of the commercial communication interests and of the prevailing official attitude in opposition to government participation in business, it is unlikely that permission will be granted for wide use of such facilities for the transmission of press and commercial messages.
The forces at work and the conflicting interest are such that it is difficult to see just how the Pacific area is going to be adequately provided with communication facilities providing services needful to the general interests of all concerned.
There are two things, it seems to me, that would be helpful: first, a broad survey of the whole Pacific area with a view to ascertain precisely what are the communication needs—military, commercial, press, political, social; and secondly the advent of some outstanding person in a position of influence who will advocate and bring about the adoption of progressive action with reference to trans-Pacific communications. The exceptional situation as regards cables held by Great Britain is attributable in no small measure to a little group of men in Parliament who whimsically called themselves the “cable party.” Year in and year out, they nagged the government departments, their fellow members of Parliament, the cable companies, and they got results.
It is fairly certain that, if the United States really had a program, Great Britain, Japan, China, and other countries could be persuaded to do their share in building up a really comprehensive and satisfactory cable and radio situation throughout the whole Pacific area—north and south.