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THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. NAVY, By Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. New York. London. $4.00.
Reviewed by Captain Harris Laning, U. S. Navy Although the foundation and structure that make success in war possible are built in time of peace the architects and builders are soon forgotten and usually only the tenants who occupy the structure when the successes come are remembered in history. We may therefore feel grateful to Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy, (Retired), for giving us, in his Life and Letters of Rear Admiral S. B. Luce, U. S. Navy, an historical record of one who probably did more than any other officer to bring the U. S. Navy, and with it our country, to its present high position of influence in the world’s affairs. Not only does the book record facts of historical importance in our development as an outstanding naval power, with which facts all men in public life should be familiar, but it records them in a way to inspire the reader either to follow the example set by Luce or at least not to stand in the way of those that do.
Admiral Gleaves’ naval career started at the time when Admiral Luce was making his greatest efforts to improve the Navy. He knows the Navy as it was before, during, and after Admiral Luce exerted his influence on it. No one, therefore, could be in a better position than Admiral Gleaves to give an account of Luce’s efforts, analyze their results, or point out the lessons they give us. All men in public life and naval officers in particular will find information, pleasure and profit in a careful reading of his book.
There was little of the spectacular in Admiral Luce's life for he was not one to seek notoriety or publicity. He was a student of the naval profession in each of its many ramifications, and by his work and his example sought to improve the service so it could and would do its part in bringing the United States to its proper place in the world. One would think that a man as little self-seeking as Admiral Luce and whose ideas were so sound would have not only the support of the naval service but also the support of Congress and the other branches of our government. And yet as Admiral Gleaves shows us he had the support of neither. What we might call the “Villains” of the story were always officers of high standing and repute in the service who could not or would not see with Luce’s vision and who, in consequence, belittled and blocked Luce’s every suggestion.
Fortunately Luce was persistent and in the end won recognition for all his suggestions. Reading, as Admiral Gleaves permits us to, of the ideas Luce originated, advocated, and fought for, we can only wonder what could have been wrong with other officers of that day who opposed them. Yet only a little thought will show us that even today we are not entirely different. The opposition to Luce’s ideas and plans is often matched by the opposition such ideas, suggestions and plans have met in recent years. Hence in reading of Admiral Luce as Admiral Gleaves portrays him we can find a double lesson—first, a lesson in how we each may build for the future of our Navy and country, and second, a lesson as to withholding destructive criticism and opposition to really constructive suggestions.
The greater constructive works which made Admiral Luce one of our preeminent naval leaders and all of which were combatted by his brother officers were the following:
1) His attempt to have seamanship taught through the medium of a text book which he himself prepared.
2.) The creation of a system for training the “Men” of the Navy, before sending them out for general service.
3) The establishment of “Nautical School Ships” for training officers for the Merchant Marine.
4) The development of the Naval War College for teaching officers the sound principles of strategy and tactics and training them generally in the art of war.
5) The establishment of post graduate courses in Naval Architecture and Engineering.
6) The reorganization of the Navy Department from the old “Bureau system” of civil administration into the present organization drawn up for war operations.
The story of Luce’s efforts to introduce the above present day necessities is of deep interest. A less persistent or less forceful man would have given up the task. But not so Luce and he lived to see the day when all that he advocated had become an inherent part of our naval system.
What Luce went through before his ideas became adopted is cleverly shown by Admiral Gleaves. The opposition to his plans for the betterment of the Navy was such as to cause him to be opposed in almost everything he did. Although his tact and good judgment in handling the “Canadian Fisheries” question in 1887, when he was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic fleet, probably did more than anything else to prevent trouble with Great Britain at the time, nevertheless, he was made a political catspaw and discredited for his work. Wherever he turned his hand, though his work was well done, he appears to have been rebuffed. Not until he was retired were his services properly appreciated and it was only in the years after his retirement that his sound ideas and opinions were appreciated and he came to his proper place in the hearts of his countrymen. It is possible, however, that he never came into his own with the part of the Navy that opposed him.
In addition to the interesting story of accomplishment in the face of the machinations of those opposed to him the book is replete with letters to and from Admiral Luce touching upon the more important naval and international questions of his time. We can only view with awe the opinions he expressed in connection with those matters, opinions that appear sound even in the light of subsequent happenings. The letters of his later life are no less interesting and profitable to read than the story of his work while on the active list of the Navy.
Taken all in all Admiral Gleaves has filled, in a most interesting way, a very large gap in the history of the United States Navy. Told in the simple language of the sea the book, like its subject, is unostentatious, quiet, effective. It is worth any man’s while to read it and the naval officer who does not read it will certainly be the loser. He will never know his Navy until he has studied and understands the part Rear Admiral S. B. Luce had in its making. Nor will he ever be all he can be to the Navy and his country unless he profits by the lessons the life of Rear Admiral Luce affords.
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE. 3rd
Volume. By Burton Jesse Hendrick. Doubleday, Page & Co., Garden City, N. Y. $5.00.
The first two volumes of this series, published in 1922, took the reading world by storm and are still among the most popular books in the United States. The reasons for their popularity are threefold, (1) The subject matter, the relations of Great Britain and the United States, is of interest to all intelligent citizens of both countries; (2) The charm of Page’s literary style, his obvious sincerity and the eloquent and courageous way he voiced the feeling of many of his fellow citizens on the questions at issue, pleased thousands of readers; (3) Hendrick, his literary executor, wisely permitted Pages’s letters to reveal the man’s character and understanding and unfold those stirring events which sorely tried British-American relations during our neutrality.
Page’s letters to President Wilson form the basis of the 3rd volume, also edited by Hendrick, and cover the same period' of time as the first two volumes. These letters are necessary to complete the picture of events Page laid before the President.
The first of these letters are from Page, the publisher, to Wilson, the writer, and indicate the high value Page placed on Wilson’s writings, their agreement on all questions of government and their liberal ideas. It was during these years that Page first thought of Wilson as a presidential possibility. Page was one of that small group of original Wilson men, who helped secure Wilson’s nomination at Baltimore, and took an active part in the campaign which elected him president. Page was first slated for Secretary of Agriculture, but the slate makers finally omitted' him from the cabinet and early in March he was offered the London embassy, where he arrived in May, 1913.
The questions agitating the British public when Page arrived in London were mainly domestic, including Lloyd Georges’ income taxes, the suffragettes and home rule for Ireland. Asquith headed the government which was maintained in power by a coalition of Liberals and Irish. Sir Edward Grey was at the Foreign Office.
The outstanding question between Great Britain and the United States was the Panama Canal tolls. This was regarded as vital in Britain for if American merchant vessels were not subject to tolls they could underbid British vessels which transited the canal. Convinced of the justice of British claims, Wilson after much opposition, secured the repeal of the law imposing tolls on foreign vessels and was acclaimed in Britain for his high ideals.
Early in 1914 the situation in Mexico went from bad to worse. Wilson, determined to change Mexico’s revolutionary habits, would not intervene; the Monroe Doctrine denied the British that privilege. On account of Wilson’s action in the Panama Canal tolls, the British government refrained from taking direct action to protect her own nationals in Mexico, or insisting on the United States doing so, although public opinion in England demanded that Benton, a British citizen murdered in Mexico, be avenged. Page’s letters give a very interesting account of the growing tension between the two countries on account of Mexico, and his spirited and successful defense of our contention. The World War forced the question of Mexico into the background until the clumsy Zimmerman, grasping at a straw, endeavored to set Carranza on the United States, but before the question was solved, the Cowdray interests had agreed to give up their oil concessions in Central and South America.
Page briefly alludes to House’s trip to Berlin, Paris, and London in the spring of 1914, in the effort to reduce armaments. Berlin was in the hands of the War Lords. Paris, with a new government weekly, was absorbed by Madame Caillaux. London had such a deep-seated mistrust of Berlin that no good came of the attempt except to convince House and Page that Germany was completely dominated by its military chiefs.
After his arrival in London, Page busied himself addressing various British audiences to give them the point of view of the United States on current questions. His knowledge of British history and literature, his acquaintance with the historical background of their ceremonies and customs, and his personal charm made his speeches very popular in England, but for those very reasons subjected him to criticism as pro-British at home. Page, sure of his own Americanism and convinced that his main task was to cultivate a better understanding between the two countries, ignored these attacks, and made no effort to conceal his admiration for the stately homes, the picture galleries and the well-ordered lives of the British aristocracy. He knew and admired the virtues of the British people and their many contributions to civilization, and while aware that many defects existed in the British system of government, he considered them removable, and he became more and more convinced that the future happiness of the world depended upon a sympathetic understanding between the two countries, and to that consummation he dedicated himself. He even persuaded himself that Great Britain was willing to be a junior member of the firm United States and Great Britain, provided she was treated courteously.
Among Page’s earliest friends was Sir Edward Grey, British foreign minister, who convinced of the value of the friendship of the United States to Great Britain, was prepared to go to great lengths to cultivate the good opinion of the United States. These two men soon became close friends and apparently put aside all diplomatic reserve in their personal and official relations.
By August 1914, Page was thoroughly established in England and had unconsciously absorbed the English point of view on many questions, yet his letters at the outbreak of war indicate that he could still view the coming struggle with a certain degree of detachment. The invasion of Belgium, the ruthlessness of Germany and his sympathy for his many British friends soon inclined his sentiments to the Allied cause; the inevitable hostility between Kaiserism and American institutions was as quickly grasped by his keen mind, and by September he was completely committed to the Allied cause.
Page had difficulty in explaining to himself the presence of autocratic Russia on the side of the Allies, and his letters afford evidence that he never satisfactorily solved his problem. Had Page known more of Europe, he would have realized that foreign alliances result from necessity not desire, and he could have learned from Grey the price England had already paid for her muscovite ally.
Page knew much of Chaucer, Shakespeare, Hampden, Cobden, and Bright; he understood the England which faces west, which gave parliaments to the world, which prides itself on Canada, Australia and even the United States, the England represented by the Manchester Guardian. Apparently Page was not so fully acquainted with the England of Disraeli and Curzon, which faces east, with its viceroys and governors general ruling, and ruling well, by edict, which regards India as the Empire’s most precious jewel and whose imperial voice is The Morning Post. Grey knew both Englands, his sympathies perhaps lay with the westerners, but the necessities of foreign policy aligned Great Britain with Russia. He, better than any other person in England, could have removed Page's perplexities on this subject.
Between the United States, the leading neutral, and Great Britain, the dominant sea power, differences of opinion on questions of blockade and contraband of war were inevitable. The theory and practice in the past of neither nation were consistent. As neutrals and ocean carriers, both have always strenuously supported the rights of its citizens and ships on the high seas; when belligerents, they have always applied their belligerent rights with the utmost severity. England has always been in a dilemma on this subject, because as a neutral her prosperity depends on the uninterrupted activity of her merchant marine, as a belligerent her greatest weapon is her navy and its ability to drive her enemies’ commerce off the sea. Her commercial interests have usually been in favor of restricting the rights of belligerents, her Admiralty except when muzzled by the Cabinet has been in favor of extending the rights of belligerents.
In 1908, under the influence of commerce, Grey summoned' to the London Conference to settle the law of the sea, the ten leading maritime nations, Great Britain, Germany, United States, Japan, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, Holland, and Spain. . This law, under the provisions of the Hague Conference of 1907, would be administered by an International Prize Court. This conference, under the lead of Continental powers like France and Russia, and only slightly opposed by naval powers like Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States, restricted the rights of belligerents on the sea and practically nullified the value of sea power. The United States ratified this conference, Germany did with certain reservations, the House of Commons under Grey’s leadership ratified, but the House of Lords refused to ratify and saved Great Britain’s naval power.
For some reason, not yet apparent, the American State Department was determined that Great Britain should adhere to the London Conference. Germany, for obvious reasons, desired that England should abide by the conference, for it would have enabled Germany to trade with the world via neutral countries and through neutral steamers, even British steamers. Grey realized that the Allies were dependent on the United States for supplies, but he also knew that they could not hurt Germany if she adhered to the conference. Page, under orders from the State Department, pressed three times for British adherence to the conference; when directed the fourth time to renew the request, he did so, but refused to say, as also directed, that it was his “personal suggestion and not one for which my government is responsible.” Page commented very frankly on the memorandum accompanying the fourth request, and his comments bore fruit, for the question was never raised again.
The British government, which was so embarrassed by these requests to adhere to the London Conference, had only itself to blame. The instructions of this very government to its delegates to the London Conference contain the following: “The government recognizes to the full the desirability of freeing neutral commerce .... from interference by belligerent powers, and they are ready and willing for their part .... to abandon the principles of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing over-sea trade in neutral vessels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during war without any restrictions, subject only to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy’s port.”
The government would like “to see the right of search restricted in every practicable way.”
“If arrangement can be made for the abolition of contraband, His Majesty’s Government would be willing .... that it should also include “analogues of contraband”; viz, the carriage of belligerent despatches and of persons in the naval and military services of the lielligerents.” The British government had no trouble in getting the weaker naval powers to agree to restrict belligerent rights on the sea, France and Russia had always been in favor of so doing. Lord Loreburn, who defended the government attitude, admitted that “continental powers would be able to trade freely .... even when at war, untouched by the powerful fleets of Great Britain” yet urged the adoption, not on sentimental or humane grounds, but because he thought “the interest of Great Britain will gain much” from the proposed changes. Grey subscribed to these views and secured the approval of the House of Commons.
When Page was urging England’s adherence to the London Conference, he probably did not realize the discomfiture Grey must have felt in having to disavow a conference he had fathered. Grey, in his Twenty Five Years, indicates that after the war began he was not entirely pleased with his creation, but comforted himself with the reflection that if the conference had been ratified, the stress of war would have forced its abandonment.
Lest the United States feel superior in this matter, it must be added that while there were a few minor advantages to Great Britain in the London Conference, there were none to the United States; and while one wise and patriotic Britisher, T. Gibson Bowles, realizing the national peril, succeeded in preventing its adoption, no voice was raised in this country, not even by naval officers, against our adhering to an agreement that would have completely emasculated our naval power during war, and our own War College placed its approval on this indefensible document.
Page was not troubled any more by requests from Washington about the London Conference, but scarcely a day went by without some protest from the United States concerning British interference with American commerce. Page regarded these as minor irritants, and softened them whenever possible. His most significant action was when he advised Grey to let the French Navy seize the Dacia. It is difficult to justify Page’s conduct in this matter. He realized that he was out of sympathy with the President, he believed perhaps correctly that his views more nearly represented his countrymen than the President’s hence his action. On Page’s behalf, it can be urged that the circumstances were extraordinary, that his resignation might have precipitated a crisis between the two countries and that certainly had he insisted on some of our protests, the British government would have no choice but to except our hostility for she could not let us freely trade with Germany and win the war.
With all Page’s wisdom, his ignorance of military affairs led him into many curious errors: as Page has remarked, the inability of naval officers to comprehend large affairs of government, it is perhaps fair to note the limitations of a civilian mind and that mind an unusually keen and informed one. In October, 1915, Page informed the President of a wonderful intelligence stunt of the British which made the Germans withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France to Antwerp. In the same letter he informed Mr. Wilson that the English had destroyed so many German submarines that the Germans agreed not to attack merchant ships without warning to avoid confessing the failure of the submarine campaign. Page accepted without question newspapers stories that England would have a million and a half men in France in the Spring of 1915, and expected Kitchener to capture Berlin with this phantom army. He also made some very curious estimates of the result of the war. He thought England would be more powerful but under definite obligations to Russia and Japan. In other moods, Page saw nothing but a hopeless deadlock and believed that the United States alone could break this deadlock.
At the beginning of the war, Page had a plan to end the war. In a letter to the President on October 6, 1914, Page suggested that the President say to England:
Now you wish to end militarism? Very well, we will recall our neutrality; we will sell you guns and ammunition; we will sell nothing to Germany; if necessary we will let our citizens volunteer in your army; you may have our navy if you need it: Now what abridgement or armament will you make after this war if we thus help you end it?
Page himself was not at all sure of the answer the Allies would have made to this proposal and as the proposal itself was never made, it is only important as one of Page’s reflections and of its similarity with the “House Memorandum” early in 1916 which embodied this same idea only the President was then willing to make the same offer to the Allies and to the Germans. Both these attempts were failures because the European belligerents were unwilling to have a “peace without victory.”
Early in the war there was an unexpressed feeling in England that the Russians might suddenly quit. This feeling was very unfair to an ally who sacrificed the flower of its army to relieve the pressure on France, but it illustrates the great difficulty of all alliances, and the impossibility of expecting real cooperation between great nations when they are allied. Later on in the war, Page remarked that if the Allies did not hang together better, they would hang separately, paraphrasing a remark of a famous American.
After the sinking of the Lusitania, the gulf between Page and the President widened. He still endeavored to convince the President that he should intervene on the side of the Allies. The President scarcely read the letters that Page wrote, and is reported to have remarked that Page was more British than the British themselves. The war shattered the friendship existing between these two men, and although subsequent to our entry into the war, there was a reconciliation, it is doubtful if the old intimacy was ever resumed. Both Page and Wilson sacrificed' their lives for what they considered right, and were equally victims of the war. In his letters, Page gives an illuminating and apt comparison of Jefferson and Wilson, with which many students of history will agree.
After Bernstoff had been dismissed and the United States was on the verge of war but still unwilling to take the final step, the Zimmermann dispatches were intercepted and created such an indignation in the country that it was impossible to prevent our entry into the war. Page tells how these dispatches were intercepted and decoded, and of their careful verification before publication. The pro-German press in the United States, with their usual alacrity, had already proved the falsity of these dispatches before Zimmermann left them in the lurch by acknowledging their authenticity.
The British are a proud, reserved people, but they know and appreciate real friends. The British Government early in the war realized that Page understood and sympathized with their aims. In time, the British people came to realize that Page had sympathetically explained their side of the war to the United States and Britain has shown the world that she is not too proud to publicly acknowledge her indebtedness to a friend. Probably no individual has been so signally honored by a foreign nation as Page has been by Great Britain. A tablet in Westminster Abbey in memory of Walter Hines Page bears this inscription:
“A Friend of Britain In Her Sorest Need.”
W. D. P.
INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE. Edited by Charles Seymour, Professor of History, Yale University. Houghton-Mifflin Company. 2 vols. $10. (See Secretary’s Notes, this issue).
Reviewed last month but price omitted.